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CHAPTER 1
CONVERSATIONS FOR A BETTER WORLD
ECOLOGICAL DIALOGICS IN UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA
The dialogic method is a way to incorporate that decentering recognition
of a permanent in medial's] res of human life and a constantly widening
context for human interaction and interanimation within the biosphere and
beyond.
Patrick D, Murphy, Literature, Nature, and Other: Ecofeminist Critiques
Introduction
In this study, I examine how nineteenth-century evolutionary and ecological
ideology has shaped our current attitudes towards humanity's relationship with the non-
human. Specifically, I focus on how these ideological trends are mobilized in utopian
and dystopian fiction and the implications of this mobilization for our current ecological
praxis. Because in using the genres of utopia and dystopia, authors didactically argue for
the implementation of certain values and practices, these genres represent a particularly
vibrant tradition in the interrogation and dissemination of ideology. Yet despite this
tradition, these genres have received far less critical attention than the more "literary"
genres associated with Modernism and Postmodernism. This relative lack of criticism is
unfortunate precisely because didactic texts have such practical value . unlike many more
avowedly "literary" texts, utopias and dystopias strive to reach a mass audience and
frequently succeed. Indeed, some utopian and dystopian narratives, such as television's
Star Trek, have achieved the status of cultural icons)
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In chapter 2 of this study, I investigate the utopian vision of William Morris's
News from Nowhere (1890); in chapter 3, George Bernard Shaw's Back to Methuselah: 
A Metabiological Pentateuch (1921); and in chapter 4, IL G. Wells's Men Like Gods 
(1923), which I will read against Wells's better known dystopian novella, The Time 
Machine (1895). Having established a set of discursive trends within these texts, I next
trace these trends through two types of more contemporary utopian/dystopian narrative.
One is what I call the "hybrid science fiction novel." Borrowing from Bruno Latour, I
refer to these novels as "hybrids" because they tend to collapse the utopia/dystopia
dichotomy strongly evident in the earlier texts. In chapter 5, I explore as instances of
these novels Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed (1974) and Octavia E. Butler's
Earthseed series (1993, 2000). In chapter 6,1 contrast these hybrid texts with the more
dichotomized utopias and dystopias of television space opera, taking 5. Michael
Straczynski's Babylon 5 (1993-98) and Paul Donovan and Wolfram Tichy's Lexx (1996-
2003) as my principal examples of utopia and dystopia respectively.
All these texts reveal trends that can loosely be classified as either anthropocentric
or ecocentric, terms I examine closely later in this chapter. It will surprise no one that as
an ecocritic, I generally favor the ecocentric trends. Yet I argue that the most useful
paradigm these texts offer for our times resides in hybrid science fiction novels, within an
amalgamation of utopian, dystopian, anthropocentric, and ecocentric tendencies. The
paradigm that emerges in these novels is one that I term "sustainable change." I use
"sustainability" to refer to a praxis that facilitates enough ecological stability that an
ecosystem can adapt and persist without a catastrophic loss of biomass or biodiversity,
such as the loss seen in the desertification of a grassland. A "sustainable" ecological
praxis would militate against the resource depletion, mass extinction, and rapid climate
change pervasive in our contemporary world, thereby supporting resource sufficiency, as
well as limiting human-made disasters. "Change" I use in two senses. The first is an
admission of the impossibility of perfect homeostasis. Evolution itself is evidence that,
over time, ecological relationships change. To reject the inevitability of change is to
reject the processes whereby ecosystems develop and persist. The second sense
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embraces a more proactive model of humanity's ability to effect positive change.
Utopianism presupposes that humans can improve their societies. This hope must be
incorporated into a healthy ecological praxis: the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions
to combat global warming, for example, would be a change we should strive to achieve.
The acceptance of change as inevitable places a positive value on letting things exist
without human interference. Conversely, the pursuit of proactive change posits that
humans should take a hand in altering ecosystems. These passive and active attitudes
toward change exist in an irreducible tension. No precise formula can dictate when we
should act and when we should leave well enough alone. The criterion of sustainability,
however, offers a general guideline. After all, if we cannot sustain a healthy
environment, we will most likely die, and all change will be vain. An ecological praxis
based on sustainable change, then, would tend to reject human interference when it
threatens sustainability and embrace it when it supports sustainability. Such a praxis, for
example, would reject deforestation but embrace population stabilization. I further
contend that this paradigm, with its inherent tensions between stability and fluidity, is
best represented through a dialogic rhetoric that grants value to a variety of voices
without attempting to resolve all their potential conflicts.
The Dialogic in Utopia and Dystopia
To approach an analysis of these texts, it is useful to establish a basic theoretical
framework. To that end, I begin with a broad question: how can fictional narrative aid us
in developing a sound ecological praxis? To answer this, I must define some terms. The
use of the word "fiction" to denote a type of narrative that may seem "realistic" but does
not purport to be based in fact arose in the eighteenth century and gained currency in the
nineteenth, roughly paralleling the rise of the novel, to which the term typically referred
(Williams, Keywords 134). When I speak of "fictional narrative," I am referring to
fabricated narratives as they have existed since the advent of this conception of fiction.
Drama, for instance, is an ancient narrative form that has been affected by the more
recent concept of fictionality. When I discuss Shaw's plays, I am discussing works
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written within a cultural framework that accepts the distinction between "fiction" and
"non-fiction" and would readily categorize those plays as "fiction" insofar as they do not
claim to be literally relating factual events.
"Praxis," sometimes used as a synonym for "practice," suggests a practice or
custom actively supporting a particular conceptual paradigm: a teacher's classroom
"praxis" is based on a certain pedagogy, for instance. It is in this sense that I will employ
the term. For example, one type of "ecological praxis" is "green living," the practice of
choosing products and activities that have relatively little negative environmental impact
based on a belief that such a lifestyle will promote a healthy environment and that this
goal is worthwhile.
The paradigms that support a praxis are ideological. Simply stating this, however,
explains little since "ideology" can be defined in any number of ways. Colloquially, it
often refers to a set of rigid political beliefs (Kavanagh 306). In Marxism, "ideology" is
traditionally defined as "false consciousness," a set of sociopolitical myths designed to
maintain certain power structures. This definition, as David Hawkes observes, becomes
problematic in a postmodern (or post-postmodern) society that widely accepts the
impossibility of any unambiguously "true consciousness" that might be opposed to this
"false consciousness" (4). The erosion of belief in an objective "true consciousness"
necessitates a shift in our conception of ideology. James Kavanagh describes ideology,
in the sense in which I use the word, as "a fundamental framework of assumptions that
defines the parameters of the real and the self [. . .1" (310). Ideology provides us with a
paradigm through which to make sense of our world. This paradigm may include both
comparatively "true" and comparatively "false" assumptions; it may include beliefs that
are rigorously investigated as well as beliefs unreflectively assumed to be self-evident.
Because we have no access to total objective truth, we must interpret our world through
ideology. And because we are social creatures, our personal ideology will, to a large
extent, be shared with other people from the same culture, though a single culture can
comprise numerous conflicting ideological positions. Despite the pejorative connotations
of the word, then, "ideology" is an indispensable aspect of culture. Nonetheless,
ideology always involves adherence to unexamined assumptions. Thus, to minimize the
negative social consequences, such as racism, misogyny, and environmental degradation,
which such unexamined beliefs may enable, ideology must be routinely interrogated.
Works of fiction enact messages that support or subvert a culture's dominant
ideology--or do both. Ideology, in turn, affects practice by a providing a conceptual
framework through which actions can be evaluated. Is it acceptable, for example, to kill
a rabbit in order to develop a vaccine for humans? Humanist ideology, which typically
values human health over rabbits' lives, will say, "yes," and the development of the
vaccine may well follow. Since works of fiction can reflect or challenge an ideology,
they are implicated in the ideological construction of praxis.
How do fictional narratives explore ideology? Works of fiction differ from many
types of non-fictional narrative in that they tend to emphasize showing a sequence of
events in detail, as opposed to--or in addition to--explaining them. A history text will
explain the events in a war; a work of fiction will illustrate them through the experience
of characters. A strength of this illustrative strategy is that it is inherently metaphorical.
Characters and events represent things in the non-narrative world. This is the case even
in texts that deny realist referentiality: any mention of a concrete object in a text invokes
that type of object in the "real world" on some level. This metaphorical representation is
a particular type of communication that has certain advantages over more literal
explanation. For some purposes, saying that the sun is a lamp conveys more than
explaining that it is star.
In a text like Shaw's Back to Methuselah, for example, the depiction of myths of
Creative Evolution in dramatic form conveys a resonance absent from the explication of
Creative Evolution Shaw gives in his preface. Indeed, Shaw describes the project of
constructing a "Metabiological Pentateuch" as a vital step in the development of Creative
Evolution as a religious system. Simply explaining the system is not enough. If people
are to live by it, they must have parables that enact their faith. "The legends, the
parables, the dramas," says Shaw, "are among the choicest treasures of mankind,"
providing that "no one shall believe them literally" (lxxxvii). Understood to be literally
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false, fiction operates as a metaphorical vehicle for illustrating complex positions in a
register that is denied to reasoned explanation, a register that may include ambiguity and
contradiction in ways that enhance, rather than restrict, a text's meaning. Thus, Shaw
may explain in his preface that it would be advantageous for people to live to be three
hundred years old. But when in his fourth play, Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman, he
depicts a world in which part of the population does live this long, the message
immediately becomes more detailed, more complex, and therefore, richer. For while it is
true that his three-hundred-year livers have developed a happier, wiser society, it is also
evident that they look down on those with shorter life spans with a disdain that
sometimes translates into a will to exterminate them. Is this a positive progression?
Even in the work of so didactic a playwright as Shaw, the enactment of shortliver and
longliver relations provides no simple answer. This metaphorical illustration, by its
nature, expresses a set of social complexities that would be difficult to convey in a more
literal explication.
While this metaphoricity is present in all fiction, it takes on a form that is
particularly useful as a means of social argumentation in realist fiction, which typically
depicts plausible, ordinary people involved in the events of daily life in a recognizable
"real world" cultural context. It may appear digressive to discuss realist fiction in a study
focused on utopia, dystopia, and science fiction. Yet realism has a powerful presence in
many texts within these genres. Though a utopian narrative, by definition, does not take
place in the "real world," it is, nonetheless, likely to present ordinary people pursuing
activities that are mundane within the cultural context of the utopia. Such a text can be
"realist" in mode to the extent that it extrapolates what ordinary, "realistic" behavior
would be for a person within the culture depicted. Indeed, this process of realistic
extrapolation is essential to an argument for the plausibility of an alternative society.
Thus, an exploration of realist metaphoricity enables analysis of the metaphorical
structures employed in many speculative texts.
In realist fiction, "ordinary" characters' lives stand for the lives of real people, yet
it is understood that these characters are not real people. Consider quintessential realist
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George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss. Maggie Tulliver's frustrations with women's
education and sexual double standards may echo those of Eliot herself, but Maggie is, of
course, not Eliot. This mutual acknowledgement between the author and reader that the
story is not "real" creates a space for certain types of interpretation denied to non-fiction.
In a text based on factual events, readers, legitimately, tend to be occupied with questions
of historical accuracy. In a work of realist fiction, the accurate representation of a
setting--its climate, customs, technologies, etc.--is at issue; likewise, the plausibility of
the text's characterizations is at issue, but since the characters were never real people, the
historical accuracy of their identities and actions is not. The author, therefore, is allowed
a particular freedom in creating social statements, the reader more freedom in interpreting
them. Maggie's status as a fictional character permits us to ask why Eliot chose to give
her certain characteristics. Why might Eliot have created a Maggie who loves Latin—or
loves her brother? Because a work of realist fiction is made to specification as a detailed
metaphor for everyday aspects of the real world, it is an especially powerful form for
interrogating that world. Even when the world depicted is not our "real world," the
mundane details of the narrative's metaphor can produce a nuanced exploration of the
ramifications of that world as a theoretical alternative to our own.
If realist narratives are apt for producing detailed critiques of specific cultures,
they also have the advantage of producing critiques that are particular engagements with
complex societies. Concerning the lives of just a few individuals within a "realistically"
intricate web of social relations, such narratives depict a society through the experiences
of those individuals. This emphasis on individuality militates against overgeneralization.
It is easy to say that women in the nineteenth century were, by our standards, oppressed.
Yet it would be absurd to claim that each woman shared the views or experiences of that
oppressed fictional woman, Eliot's Maggie. As a particular character, Maggie is a focal
point for a detailed illustration of her society's attitudes toward women's education,
employment, and sexuality. Yet her story is too specific to be construed as reducing an
entire society to a single paradigm. Because realist fiction resists generalizations, the
conclusions it suggests remain provisional. Maggie's plight certainly implies a need for
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certain social reforms: more educational opportunities for women, an interrogation of
sexual double standards. But it is not put forward as a call for one specific program of
reform. This provisionality acts against the reification of ideology by rejecting any
single, definitive answer to a social problem.
I have argued that realism is particularly successful in mounting these critiques. It
is no coincidence that realism is often strongly identified with Balditinian dialogism.
Mikhail Bakhtin held that as a strongly dialogic genre, the novel is particularly well-
suited to the work of interrogating a society's ideological assumptions. As the concept of
"dialogue" suggests, dialogism focuses on an interplay of voices. Thus, dialogism is
often strongly present in realist texts because it enables different individuals to converse
with each other in a polyphony that echoes the multivocality of "real life." These voices
express the relations among different types of language as they struggle to communicate
about common objects. In his 1935 essay, "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin asserts:
[N]o living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the word
and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an
elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same
theme, and this is an environment that it is often difficult to penetrate. It is
precisely in the process of living interaction with this specific environment
that the word may be individualized and given stylistic shape. (276)
Bakhtin emphasizes discourse as a means of understanding an object through words.
And in the distance between the concrete objects and the words we use to express them,
there are always uncertainties: different words brought to bear on the same object, single
words with connotations that shift from moment to moment and speaker to speaker.
Specific, individualized meanings, Bakhtin contends, are generated out of this interplay
between an utterance and all the different utterances explicitly or implicitly in
conversation with it. Within any given language (English, for example), innumerable
"languages" exist: the language of the dentist, the literary critic, the hip-hop artist, the
advertisement, the mother, the Baby-Boomer, the language of Alice, of Curtis, of Alice
when she speaks to Curtis about going to the dentist. Bakhtin denotes this polyphony by
the term, "heteroglossia," the "different languages" that comprise our common language.
This multiplicity of voices is an integral part of culture. Bakhtin states, "At any
given moment in its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the
strict sense of the word [. .] but also—and for us this is the essential point--into
languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, 'professional' and
`generic' languages, languages of generations and so forth" ("Discourse" 271-72). The
"essential" point for Bakhtin is that heteroglossia and social power are inextricably
connected. Languages are "stratified" into categories of greater and lesser prestige; some
ring loudly in public discourse while others whisper. In Bakhtinfan terminology, a
dominant discourse is "centripetal," inserting itself as a centralizing force that absorbs
and converts more marginalized discourses. These marginalized discourses, however,
resist centralization by acting as "centrifugal" forces, pulling at the edges of the dominant
discourse, deconstructing its hegemony. Because human society necessarily embodies
heteroglossia, no centripetal language can exist without centrifugal languages that
challenge it. Nonetheless, dominant languages commonly deny the legitimacy or
existence of marginalized languages. When a discourse frames itself as the only valid or
only possible language, it claims the status of what Bakhtin terms a "unitary" language.
"Unitary language," according to Bakhtin, "constitutes the theoretical expression of the
historical processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the
centripetal forces of language" ("Discourse" 270). But this absolute unification can only
be theoretical, never actual, because linguistic dominance can never be complete.
"Language," Bakhtin contends, "like the living concrete environment in which the
consciousness of the verbal artist lives—is never unitary. It is unitary only as an abstract
grammatical system of nonnative forms [. .1" ("Discourse" 288). The claim of a
language to true unitary standing, thus, is always an oversimplification, an erasure of the
essential complexities of human cultural experience. Texts that extensively enact the
ways in which multiple languages inform, challenge, and sometimes contradict one
another can mobilize these languages against the claims of any "unitary" language to
total and transparent truth.
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For Bakhtin, the novel best exemplifies this dialogic rhetoric. In "Epic and
Novel" (1941), he writes that "[the) ability of the novel to criticize itself is a remarkable
feature of this ever-developing genre" (6). By employing heteroglossia to challenge the
assertions of any particular voice within the text, the novel becomes self-critiquing, and,
thereby, critiques the society it enacts. Bakhtin contends that under a novelistic
influence, other genres "become more free and flexible [. . . ,] they become dialogized,
permeated with laughter, irony, humor, elements of self-parody and finally—this is the
most important thing--the novel inserts into these other genres an indeterminacy, a certain
semantic openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still evolving contemporary
reality (the openended present)" ("Epic" 7). While Bakhtin is not greatly concerned with
speculative fiction, his description of novelistic characteristics demonstrates how
speculative fiction novels serve as effective sources of social critique. The indeterminacy
and openendedness Bakhtin identifies as deriving from the novel enables such texts to
explore the implications of alternative civilizations without enforcing a single conclusion.
Dialogism's stress on the necessity of heteroglossia, thus, distinguishes it from
types of multivocality that employ more than one voice to promote a single, "correct"
ideology or "language." One of the most ancient multivocal rhetorics, for example, is
Socratic dialectic, in which a teacher asks leading questions in order to push a student
toward "correctly" working through a philosophical problem. By extension, a dialectic
rhetoric may be considered one in which various voices within a text question a
proposition in a way that opens textual spaces for defending rather than problematizing
that proposition. Dialectic multivocality, therefore, aims toward the unification of
discourse, while dialogic multivocality aims toward discus	 sive Multiplicity. Yet dialectic
and dialogic processes function similarly insofar as questioning a proposition, whether to
reinforce or challenge it, tends to complicate it by demanding more detailed explication.
Thus, the dialectic and the dialogic are not so much distinct categories as different
positions on a continuum of multivocal rhetorics. The more deeply dialectic questioning
probes, the more nearly the questioning voice approaches to articulating a centrifugal
language. In this study, News from Nowhere, Back to Methuselah, and Men Like Gods
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all illustrate largely dialectic rhetorics that, show signs of incipient dialogism. I contend
that in this movement toward the dialogic these texts exhibit some of their most
compelling challenges to dominant ideologies.
But if strongly dialogic fiction tends to be particularly amenable to critiquing
ideology, dialogism is not the only means to launch such critiques. The genres of utopia
and dystopia, for example, art specifically designed to challenge social attitudes and may
do so with or without the incorporation of a notably dialogic rhetoric, as exemplified in
the texts I mention above. Paul Ricoeur argues that utopian discourse is designed to
complement and correct ideology. While some type of ideology is essential to ordering
human society, the tendency of a society to reproduce its dominant ideology uncritically
renders that ideology libel to distortion (Ricoeur 14). In its negative aspect, ideology
ceases to function as a legitimate tool of social organization and instead becomes
oppressive (Ricoeur 14). When utopianism is functioning properly as social argument
rather than mere fantasy or escapism, it productively critiques ideology by exposing and
opposing these distortions (Ricoeur 16-17). Of course, like all discourse, utopianism
(and dystopianism) is itself ideological and can never completely break free of its own
socially constructed preconceptions. Yet, as Fredric Jameson contends, in the very act of
toproducing such preconceptions, a utopia challenges them. In The Seeds of Time,
Jameson remarks that utopias imagine the unimaginable "by way of the holes in the text
that are our own incapacity to see beyond the epoch and its ideological closures" (75). In
other words, in the unfamiliar context of an alternative society, familiar elements that
reproduce the dominant ideology are more likely to stand out as incongruous or illogical.
These incongruities and fractures of logic create "holes" in the text; which direct the
reader's attention to ideological problems that could otherwise pass unnoticed. This
critiquing and defamiliarizing of the dominant ideology occurs in dystopia as well but as
a product of a somewhat different rhetoric.
While utopias advocate reform by telling us what to strive for, dystopias do so by
telling us what to resist Dystopias are essentially warnings: if we venture down a
certain path, we will regret it. Because they are designed to frighten us, dystopias can
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generally function effectively when they present worst-case scenarios. And though the
most disturbing dystopias are often those—like George Orwell's 1984—that seem to arise
"realistically" out of existing social trends; dystopian scenarios do not have to be
particularly plausible to be rhetorically powerful. Wells's The Time Machine, for
instance, is chilling largely because of the sheer bleakness of its depiction of the
degeneration of the human race and the eventual death of all life on Earth. The specific
scenario is hardly likely. In fact, Wells's supposition that the sun will burn out without
first engulfing the Earth has been shown to be scientifically incorrect. Yet the tale does
not have to be realistic to communicate Wells's point: if we complacently assume that the
future must bring advancement and if we do not take the active steps necessary to bring
about this advancement, we may, instead, find ourselves regressing in ways far more
horrible than we might imagine. If the story bears just enough relation to our social
reality to frighten us into pondering ways to avoid such social and evolutionary
degeneration, it has accomplished its purpose.
Utopias, typically, are not granted the same freedom to play with unlikely
scenarios. If dystopias proscribe, utopias must prescribe, and this is generally a harder
task: it is one thing to say, "Don't set the house on fire," quite another to explain how to
build'a better house. While a dystOpia, therefore, need only unsettle us, a utopia must
convince us that an entire society is organized in . a way we might wish to emulate. As I
discuss in the next chapter, even a text such as Morris's News from Nowhere, which
advertises itself as a romantic "vision," owes much of its, force to the depth of the realist
detail with which it depicts a decentralized communist utopia. Because utopias must
strive for plausibility; they are more likely than dystopias to offer a detailed depiction of
the intricacies of social systems. Yet because utopias are invested in presenting a society
that functions, if not perfectly, at least exceptionally well by our standards, they are also
more likely than dystopias to gloss over, potential problems. Thus, like Ricoeues utopia
and ideology, utopia and dystopia are complementary. Dystopias highlight social
problems; utopias attempt to give solutions. Dystopias, in turn, either implicitly or
explicitly, critique the solutions posited by utopias.
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This mutually constructive process could be, described as a type of intertextual
dialogism. "Intertextuality" describes a variety of ways in which a text invokes other
texts, explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally. in Image-Music-Text,
Roland Barthes contends that "[al text is [. . .1 a multidimensional space in which a
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of
quotations f. . 1" (qtd. in Chandler). Barthes's radical denial of authorial originality has
understandably been questioned, but his description of the blending and clashing of
discursive dimensions within a textis apt. Like all utterances, all texts connect to
semiotic practices used in other contexts. As I discuss in chapter 6, such conversation
between utopias and dystopias sets ideas in motion to yield a more nuanced critique of
society. This, dialogism, however, is, of a different order from the internal heteroglossia
Bakhtin cites as characteristic of the novel. In intertextual "dialogue," voices are
juxtaposed much less explicitly; "conversation" between texts often takes place more in
the reader's mind than on the page. Moreover, except for cases in which an author is
writing a series of related works, intertextual dialogue is not the product of a single writer
orchestrating particular impressions:through the use of many voices. In this. sense,
intertextual dialogism might register the complexity of reality more fully than the
dialogism of the novel does. Where unovel is, in fact, the product of one authorial voice,
intertextuality puts different authorial voices in conversation. Without some sort of
systematic, intratextual interaction of voices, however, numerous potential points of
conflict and complementarity may go: unexpressed. Thus, though utopian and dystopian
intertextual critiques can-be valuable, they often lack the sophistication of intratextual
critiques.
Yet ironically, while utopia and clystopia are genres designed to interrogate
society, they are also genres in which these intensive heteroglossic critiques are
comparatively rare.. If-dialogism is, indeed, a powerful means .of questioning. society, this
relative absence of intratextual dialogism might seem surprising. Yet traditionally,
dialogism has tendedto work against the utopian project (It is -more forgiving to
dystopia) In keeping with their didactic aims, utopias are designed to present an
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alternative society as achnirable, The introduction of voices expressing disaffection with
a utopia, therefore, threatens to undercut the text's vision. Dystopias, in contrast, can
often withstand a great deal of discourse in defense of the dystopia and still maintain a
reader's antipathy for the society. An example is Aldous Huxley's A Brave New World,
a renowned dystopia made only more unsettling by Mustapha Mond's well-argued case
that it is, in fact, utopian. If a utopia appears too flawed, however, readers.are likely to
wonder why they should bother to strive for such a world. A utopia whose potential
problems are intricately delineated through dialogic conversationsmay, therefore, be in
danger of losing its claim to utopian status.
This does not mean that a dialogic utopia will be ineffective. On the contrary,
dialogic utopias may be among the most profound literary agents of ideological
interrogation. They are not, however, conventional utopias. Their aim is not so much to
present a nearly ideal world as to present a world, like ours; filled with flaws; that
nonetheless embodies certain attitudes and practices from which our world might benefit-
-were we to pursue those practices with enough insight to effectively address the
problems they present. An-example, which I thscussat length in chapter 5, is. Le. Guin's
The Dispossessed, subtitled "an ambiguous utopia" Anarres, Le-Guin's anarcho-
syndicalist "utopia," clearly suffers from social stagnation and oppression. Moreover, it
is not certain that all of its more openly venerated "virtues" are salutary. Would we want
to live in a world, for instance, in which decorative arts are considered wasteful
"excrement"? Yet for, at this society's difficulties, it is. equally clear thatAnarres has_
qualities we long for: it has little serious violence, no prisons, sexual equ gity, fair.
distribution of resources, universal human rights, and--within limits--a high degree- of
personal freedom. Using conversations between characters to delineate various views of
Anarres society, Le Guin creates a "utopia" that is ambiguous insofar as its status as a
utopia is questionable. At the same time, this multivocality presents an alternative
society all the more ,compellMg fur.its "realistic" 'depiction of both the potential problems
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and the virtues of such a.system.. Far from requiring us to dismiss the utopia of Anarres,
the text's dialogism serves as a defense against.the accusations- of simplistic wishful
thinking so commonly leveled against utopias.
Yet the fact remains that Anarres is not purely utopian; it is obviously flawed.
The more ambiguous a utopia is, the nearer it approaches dystopia. Similarly, the more
ambiguous a dystopia, the more potentially .utopian it appears. In the gray zone between
the pure utopia and the pure dystopia lies a type -of -text I- describe as the hybrid science
fiction-novel, adapting Latour's concept of "hybridity." In We Have Never Been 
Modern, Latour critiques modernity's penchant for strictly separating—or "purifying"—
the concepts of "nature" and "society," observing, for instance, that it is absurd to regard
the hole in the ozone layer as, a purely "natural" phenomenon or a purely "social" one;
clearly, it is a hybrid of both (6). Moreover, Latour argues, such a hybrid cannot be
productively dealt with so long-as our conceptual framework refuses its hybriclity. If we
treat the hole in the ozone as purely a matter of nature, we will blind ourselves to the
need to change our social. policies. If we treat it , purely as a matter of culture, we are in
-.danger ofdenying its relevance •as a physical force altogether.
By analogy, a fictional alternative society will be severely limited in its ability for
social critique °if it does not acknowledge both the utopian and dystopiaivpossibilities
residing within a given scenario. As I show in chapter 5, these hybrid novels offer more
productive critiques by depicting alternative societies that combine both unsettling social
problems and promising solutions. Simultaneously. presenting an...argument for a future
society and a thought-experiment investigating how a certain- type of society might
function, such texts- explore in- detail the ramifications of a certain course of action. If
embracing anarcho-syndicalism, for example, might eliminate class discrimination but
could also make us vulnerable to social stagnation, should we embrace it? Such a text
will typically favor. one type -of society or course °faction over another:
The Dispossessed embraces Anarres more readily than the capitalistsociety Unas.
But it will offer-no single programmatic answerio all socialills; we are not advised-to
turn Earth into Anarres. Instead, the issue remains suspended amid the contrasting voices
16
of various characters, the, final answer left to the detennination of the reader. Such
speculative dialogic texts are particularly useful tools for ideological critique because
they rigorously explore the vagaries of certain present-day attitudes and actions with the
goal of elucidating their implications for our future. Out of this process of elucidation,
certain precepts are likely to appear as values that, in general, seem wise for us to adopt:
in The Dispossessed, for example, the call to .embrace .a less materialistic life is clear.
A -Case for. &acentric -Values
In this -study; I investigate how utopian and dystopian texts enact ecological
precepts, with the aim of identifying certain precepts that are particularly salutary for our
ecological praxis. Of course, speculative fiction- is: only, one. of many means to. explore..
. ecological principles. Others include personal experience, cultural tradition, historical.
•precedent, and; of course, ecological science: enterinto . my investigation with my own
assumptions about which principles our society should espouse, and "attempt to justify
these assumptions by appealing to science, aware that such an appeal is . problematic. As
a,disc_ourse, science itself is a "hybrid,"-anamalgain. of physical experimentation-and
ideological.intapretation; -it has no .claim .to .transparenttruth. -In "Situated Knowledges,"
Donna Ifflaraway '-articulates- thenecessity and -difficulty of approaching science fromboth
ideologically aware and physically "objective" perspectives: -"So,'I think my problem and
`our' problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency.
•for. all, knowledge.claini g.and. knowing subjects, a critical .practicefor recognizing our.
own 'semiotic technologies' for makingmeanings, and- ano-nonsense commitment to
faithful. account of a 'rear world .1" (187). According.t011araway'sparadigm, when
I discuss a concept such as ecology, I am simultaneously invoking historically entrenched-
cultural constructions,. particular linguistic practices, and information . gleaned--sometimes
.more,.- sometimes less rigorously-:-through The-application of the :scientific -method to the
study of ecosystems. . These facets are inseparable. • The -very -concept =of "ecosystem," a
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word coined. by British botanist.Arthur Tansley in 1935, combines, fieltstudies of
ecological interactions with Tansley's own preoccupations- with Freudian concepts .of.
energetic-homeostasis .- (Anker•29-31).
Although few would seriously claim that we have no meaningful-access to a
physical world outside discourse, there has been a trend in certain strains of
poststucturalism to -emphasize the textuality.olknowledgealmost to. the exclusionof
.non-discursive physical experience. • If language mediates all but the.mo-stsimpk
- -thought-rims the- argument, -and languageisalways ideological and subjective, then no
language can tell us anything "Objective" about'reality." Instead, dominant ideologies
use science as a tool for maintaining . their power. There is no doubt that institutions of
science., have.. often been.. used . to provide.. a falsely "objective mandate..to:. various..
'oppressive social practices. However, numerous scientists and critics, have argued that
although science has certainly' been- put to dubious purposes; this fact does not invalidate
it. In Practical Ecocriticism, Glen Love voices a concern
that those hostile to science have extended their indictment of science's
contextual sins--real enough-to includean attack upon-the scientific
method	 which is the heartand center of science. -This method of
critical thinking through the-gathering afdata and testing of hypothesessis
almost universally defended as the best means humanity has for freeing
itself from. dogma, prejudice, and error. (41),
. Because-the scientific. method -provides, a mechanism . for • science to resist prejudice and
error, Love 'claims 'a speciarstatus for -science 'as a discourse less rooted than athers . in
cultural subjectivity. His reasoning is sound. This is not to say thatany piece of
'information marked as "sCientifie must be accepted; such a practice would amount to
§433plis,tic spip*tis.m.	 aucly,:IMIWPWE, I antIPV.- that if finding. bPs been.
substantiated by. numerous scientists from, various culturesin studies that the- scientific.
community accepts as appropriately rigorous, then that finding can be-provisionally
viewed as correct
A substantial body of scientific evidence points to certain key environmental
_problems ouggatly of worldwide coup=	 wc:suffgrfromovaconsimaption.of
resources; exacerbated -both by -first-world consumer •practices ,and •third-world population
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growth. We, face._ resource depletion and.a, mass extinction of species. Pollution results. in
various hazards; firom global warming and ozone depletion to more localized. ecosystemic
and health'. problems. Despite' positive-. trends; many of these problems. are.- worsening.
Logically, we may conclude that they are likely to continue to worsen as long as our
dominant social and economic ideologies enable them.
There areany mumberof ideological. constructions that contribute to_ these
problems: capitalism, overconsumption, misogyny, -ethnic •onflict, and scientism, to
mainea. few, undoubtedly play their parts. A common themein many of these
constructions is an adherence to a hierarchical ontology, which assigns different degrees
of value to discrete types. One of our most established hierarchical paradigms is, of
course, anthropocentr.ism: the.belief that human interests.should.bethe..focus of our moral.
system. I &not intendto argue that we shoul•elimiriate hierarchical -thinking; the
problems' involved with ascribing equal value to a worm- and . a hunt= are too numerous'
to enter into. There is a difference, however, between an ethical' system that privileges a
human's life over a worm's and a system that is. preoccupied with assigning degrees of
_comparative value-to- different_ species„a. process which_necessitates the location-of value
in -the species -itself as .a . discrete -type. The --first system provides a practical framework
for .determining -which entities to .favorin a given situation; the second .establishes a world
view based on'the categorical separation Of entities. This second view, one deeply
embedded in our dominant Western ideology,. undermines an awareness of
interrelatednessrby privileging difference among types-over similarity. Focusing on_ •
human-privilege, an anthropocentric view would.be likely to.contencl; for_example, that if
humans wish to hunt deeror.protect livestock, they can- legitimately eliminate the
predator species that might thwart those goals. The negative repercussions of this
assumption are clear. Not only is attempting to eradicatepredators expensive, but
withoutculling..by -their natural .predators, prey populations explode, .requiring -rigorous
human management, likewise at great expense.2 Conversely, a view that does not strictly
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hiera.rchize.. but assumes, that_all. organisms, have: significance.. as. partners within, ecological
systems is less likely to-damage species or systems than a view- that tends to consider the
"unimportant" to-be expendable:
Such an ecosystem-oriented view is commonly called "ecocentric." Since the
precise definition of "ecocentrism" is a matter of some contention, I will briefly outline
-how I.:approach-the term. In The Environmental Imagination, Lawrence Buell, quoting
. Timothy 'Riordan, -espouses -the following-definition:
"Ecocentrism peaches the virtues ofreverence,-humility; responsibility,
and care; it argues for low impact technology (but is not
antitechnokvical); it decriesbigness and impersonality in , all forms (but
especiallyin the city); and demands a code of behavior that seeks
-permanence and stability .based-uponecological -principles-of diversity and
-homeostasis."3 1 propose two.amendments: (1) that ecocentrism-may -in
fact be antitechnotogicat, and (2')" that it need not adhere to a dogma of
homeostasis.. Otherwise the definition suffices„ 025.1
°Wotan's definition is .predicated. principally ..on =Se amplaixes.ponsibility toward
the world in general, including-human -and .,non-..hurnan. It-requires a personal, local
-interaction with other life -forms- that will tend to-preserve a wide variety of-organisms
and inorganic phenomena. "Buell amends thatteChnology may or may not be favored.
"it is favorekhowever, it musf be apPlie:d in ways that produce a small and/or slow effect
on. ecosystems. Buell.' s amendment that eoologieal. homeost4cis need, not be_ maintained.
is. in. keeping with the trends in ecological, science away .from adherence to- a. steady-state
paradigm-that perceives ecosystems as naturally inclining- toward the maximum stability
and relative changelessness of the climax community.
Discussing this shift in emphasis in ecological science, Dana PhilliPsgoes still
fiutherthan Buellin problernati7ing an adberence,to homeostasis over. instabiliW and
:change. Indeed,...in The Truth=of Ecology, Phillips contends, "The values to which
ecology 'dedicateditself-early -on–especially balance, harmony, -unity, and economy--are
now seen as more or 'less unscientific, and henceutopian' in the pejorative sense of the
term" (42):4 Phillips is correct that "balance, harmony, unity, and_ economy" are
problematic terms for ecological science.. Their value-laden' imprecision makes them.
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inherently rlifficultto,deplOy inthe. service. of any science that. strives for "objectivity."
However, in stressing. that these concepts are seen.. as "pejoratively- utopian," (i. e. as,
idealized fantasies). because they- are not rigorously scientific; Phillips-implicitly devalues.
concerns for ecological stability. "Balance" may not be a useful' criterion in a scientific
study, but its general conceptual applicability to a healthy ecosystem is evident in events
asmundaneas.theannual resurgence of the same species of wildflowers in .a field. If a
relative "balance"- in the interactions among-of plant ,species,- pollinators, soil-chemistry,
rainfall, °inac^lation, .and .so on .didnotpersist, -a similar distribution of these flowers over
many years would not occur. Buell and Phillips rightly concur that healthy ecosystems
may—indeed,. ultimately will--change. The vital need, : however,. is that they maintain
enough. stability that the changes. they undergo. are not catastrophic but allow time for. a
significant. number of the systems participants to- make adaptive adjustments . so- that a.
diverse functioningsystenr can-persist CeRiordan's. "virtues of reverence; humility,
responsibility, and` care, unscientific though they be, support a praxis in which
ecological changes will be made with sufficient caution to..preempt catastrophic change.
Thus, O'Riordan! s andBue117s principles go along _ way toward expressing _a set of
ecocentric values conducive to the reform-ofour ecological praxis.
Nonetheless, I -wish to step 'back a. little from this definition and-presenta
somewhat -less prescriptive view of ecocentrism. "Ecoceritric" literally means "centered
around ecological systems." As Eric Katz, Andrew Light,. and David Rothenberg state in
their anthology on. deep. ecological philosophy, Beneath. the Surface, "Ecocenuism is, the.
idea that the ecosphere and-ecological systems are the focus of value. It is a holistic view.
of value; for entire systems are thought to be valuable, tatherthan individual- humans or
individual natural entities (such as animals) (xiii). While an anthropocentric view asks
first, "How does an action affect human beings?", an ecocentric view asks first, "How
does itaffect _the system?" This .division-be t=en-anthropocentricand,ecocentric,
.however, -represents something -of-a false -dichotomy. Human beings do ,notexistoutside
of ecosystems; -therefore, 'a phenomenon--that affects an ecosystem in any substantial way
is 'likely to affect `humans. As much as I agree that CrRiordan's virtues of 'reverence,
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humility, responsibility, and care" are, fundamental. to an, ecocentric worldview, these.
values are not immediately necessary to perceiving the basic fact of human-non-human
connectedness. I do . not haveto revere oxygen to- realize that I need it. The irreducible
core of ecocentrism, as I see it, is not that we must revere nature or reject bigness but that
we must place the system foremost in analyzing our practical decisions. This privileging
of the system, if genuine, will almost certainly .be undenvritten-by the values,and
practices 0 'Riordan and Buell cite. I propose, .however, that even though ecocentrism
may ultimately demand-these values, we should-not take theta as our starting point.
Whenl speak of a false dichotomy between human needs and ecosystemic needs,
I do not mean to suggest that the two never come into conflict On the contrary,, it is
common for the preservation of an ecosystem, such as a rain forest, to require the
limitation of certain-human-activities, such-as logging, as a result of which local humans
will experience privation and; at worst, death. Such ethical-problems are real and must be
addressed in all their many facets. Yet, ultimately, the needs of humanity and the needs
of ecosystems are more in accord than opposed: if the rain forest is logged into
extinction,-the loggers will, have, lost their jobs .in any case, and.because such clear,cut
land is ill-suited-to agriculture, -it is likely-that-the former loggers will -still be faced with
privation. hi contrast, a -type of forestry that is based on the harvesting of timber within
the context of preserving the forest ecosystem will, over the long term, provide
sustainable employment for at least a relatively small population of loggers. A value
system, that favors the forest and a- value, system, that favors the loggers will come to very
much the same practical conclusions if each begins with-the premise that since the
loggers cannot be considered in isolation from the fixest ecosystem( in which they live;
the system as a whole must be the primary unit of consideration from the outset.
Put another way, to say that humans should be our. primary concern is a bit like
saying-that vanillaextract is the nlostdelicious part ofa cookie. It may Jar-may not be,
depending-en one's taste,butthe vanilla-extract-only tastes -like vanilla within-the cookie
as a-whole. By-this-metaphor, Imean to illustiate the possibility of-being simultaneously
anthropocentric (favoring the vanilla) and ecocentric (baking the whole cookie). I do not
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pretend to know the extent to which this particular feat of anthropo-eco-hybridization is,
in fact; practicable. I would argue, however, that we should leave a discursive space
open for the possibility. For if our most pressing concern is to- stabilize the biosphere; our
first step must be to develop a practice that will-enable us to achieve that goat This
practice must be predicated on a primary concern for the stability of ecological systems.
If individuals or groups-strongly anthropocentric religions, for example--areableto
-generate such a-practice withctut personally adhering to values such 01Ziordan's, Buell's,
-or -deep ecologists', we would be ill-advised to disallow -their practice because the
attitudes on which they base it are "incorrect" For the purposes of this study, therefore, I
will define "ecocentrism" pragmatically as a view primarily concerned with how
practices may affect ecological systems,
Ecocentrisnr and Anthropacen	 mid in Evolutionary and Ecological Discourse
Though I do not propose to develop a list of moral principlesindispensable to
ecocentrism, my study is necessarily deeply concerned with how value systems put
forward in utopianand.dystopiantexts support eitherananthropocentricoran ecocentric
praxis—or elements -of each. Such awinvestigation- must be -grounded in-the socio-
'scientific discourses out of which these texts arise. I have ehosento orientmy study
toward We-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British texts in part because they
represent a particularly productive moment in the development of the evolutionary and
ecological di.scourses from which our own ecological attitudes.
 nineteenth century saw a revolution in scientific attitudes towar•nature and
humanity. In 1809; Jean Baptiste Lamarck published his oft-decried yet- enormously
influential Zoological Philosophy, one the first texts to describe an environmentally
mediated mechanism for evolution. With Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species
-(1859), .the.-concept of environmentally driven evolution •rose to undisputedprominence.
In-these -theories, relations-between-humanity and-othererganismstooken a new 'level-of
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significance, as adriving force..of evolution. This_ new emphasis on the natural. world .as. a.
network of dynamic relations was reflected in the development of the science of
"oecology;" a term- coined by Ernst Haeckel in-1866,
Ironically, at the same time that the human species''s dependence on and -
inseparability from nature was becoming apparent, humanity was also first achieving the
capability toalter its environment in ways both rapid and expansive. .Over the.course. of
thenineteenthcentiny, the American "wilderness" was. transformed from a vast and
-perilous &inner to a-patchwork of spaces increasingly seen -as -threatened oases -in needi3f
conservation. In Britain, such"wilderness" scarcely existed, yet the British, too, saw an
unprecedented increase in the intensity of human land use, , exemplified by the felling , of
forests.and increase of suburban sprawl, to accommodate an. exploding population. In.
both America and Britain; the Industrial lievolution.gained momentum, making wide-
scale pollution from coal .burning- factories a social• issue for the. first time.
The nineteenth-century view of humanity's relationship to nature was, therefore,
fraught with new fear and new hope. Evolution raised the disturbing idea that humans
might be no more than "animals'," while_at the same time suggesting limitless possibilities
for ascent beyond the -flaws -of thecurrent -human race. Likewise, -humanity's growing
• sway -wirer-nature sparked the first glimmerings of modern environmental concerns over
issues such as pollution, overpopulation, and deforestation, while simultaneously holding
out the promise that nature could be subjugated to human needs and wants. This set of
discursive tensions provoked a . crucial question: is.humanity subject . to nature or destined
to subjugate it? Put another way; should humility accept the limitations imposed by its
membership in a larger ecological context; or shouktit strive to (Amu al (ortranscend).
-that context?
How writers went about answering this question depended to a large extent on
how various . schools ofev_olution.and ecology influenced them. Over the _course .of the
-nineteenth century, numerous—oftencontemporaneous—theories-ofevolution rose and
fell in popularity. The prevailing -mood heldtrat "evolution"-was -synonymous with
advancement (however that might be defined), "devolution" or "degeneration" with the
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frightening phenomenon of regression. The, transmutation of species_ was most often.
considered, naturally progressive: tending toward advancement M . the same time,
countervailing trends explored the concept of devolution through racial- senility; the idea-
. that each species has a natural "life expectancy"' beyond which its evolution will become
increasingly maladaptive until the species becomes extinct By the end of the nineteenth
-century, however, __two chief schools ofevolutionary thought contended for. socio-
scientific-dominance: •Darvvinism-(gradually mutating into Neo-Darwinism) and
-Lainarcldsm.
Since both these schools exist in diverse variations, I will attempt no more than a
brief summary of them here. 'Darwinism" may loosely be thought of as the evolutionary
theory propounded. by Darwin. in. Origin, though it is, worth noting that. Darwin himself
continued' to modify his theory 'up to the last year of his life. 5- Darwin's chief agency for
evolution was natural selection: the process whereby environmentatspressures lead to the
differential repro‘htctive success of well adapted individuals, _As that staunchanti-
. Darwinian .Samuel Butler was fond of observing, however, . Darwin -never denied the
existence of .other agencies in -the -evolutionary process; indeed, -after-Origin, •he
progressively deemphasized -the importance of natural selection, granting greater—though
still relativelylittle—agency to forces. such as. Laraarckian. use-. and disuse. ti Neo-
Darwinism., in contrast, stressed- natural. selection as the sole process needed . to- explain
evolution.
Our cultural mythos teaches that natural selection came to be accepted' as the chief'
mechanism of evolution soon after the publication of Origin. In fact, as Peter Bowler has
.argued-extensively, -natural selection was not widely -accepted until the New-Synthesis-of
evolutionary biology with Mendelian genetics -beginning . in -the 1920s. • In
-The Non-Darwinian Revolution; Bowler contends that while-the nineteenth century did
see a revolution toward the acceptance of evolution over creationism, the view of
evolution most commonly espoused was_ progressive and teleologicaL.not based on the
selective. mediations of the- environment (5). Though Darwin. himself saw evolution by
natural selection as a wondrous process, many resisted the concept. The "war of nature"
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was a prevailing metaphor for, natural selection, the, default assumption that
environmental pressures selected for individuals who were combative, violent, ruthless—
warriors. In Evolution and-Ethics (1893-94), for example, Darwin's great populatizei, T.
H. Huxley, distinguished between the "cosmic process" of evolution driven by a struggle
for survival and the "ethical process" of divinely bestowed spiritual values. Human
society, according to Huxley,exists in a. perpetual tension between The war-like,
-competitive drives developed by evolution and the moral drives-derived-from God. Even
Darwin, who was notable for his emphasis on the adaptive advantages of cooperation and
caring, adopted the war trope. In the final paragraph of Qrgii "II, for example, he states,
"Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we
are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows"
(490). Not surprisingly, many found it difficult to share Darwin's enthusiasm for the
workings of "famine and death."
Against the seeming brutality of the survival of the fittest, Neo-Lamarckism
offered a comforting buttress. British Neo-Lamarckism adhered to the idea that an
individual's will or desire to effect a bodily change was the driving force behind
evolution. Of course, the change might not be apparent within one or several
generations. Nonetheless, just as with natural selection, changes so minute as to appear
initially invisible could over numerous generations produce the full diversity of species
seen on Earth. If Neo-Darwinism suggested that nature was a war in which those who,
utterly by chance, happened to be most fit would survive at the expense of others, Neo-
Lamarckism suggested that everyone who chose to exercise his or her will to its utmost
could actively participate in the evolutionary improvement of humanity. if Neo-
Darwinism stressed divisiveness and the capricious reign of chance, Neo-Lamarckism
stressed harmony and personal choice, thus offering what Bowler calls "a more humane
model of adaptive evolution than natural selection" ("Holding" 333).
Neo-Lamarckians placed a premium on the agency of the mind, and many saw
themselves as doing so in stark contrast to their Neo-Darwinian adversaries. Neo-
Lamarckian Samuel Butler argued that heredity and memory were essentially the same
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process; asserting that memories were passed down to offspring in a latent form,
eventually forming new, instinctive behaviors. It is no coincidence that it was Butler who
remarked in his evolutionary diatribe Luck or Cunning (1887) that "the pitchforking,
fact, of mind out of the universe, or at any rate its exclusion from all share worth talking
about in the process of organic development, this was the pill Mr. Darwin had given us to
swallow" (6). Butler's complaint, in literal terms, is that Darwinism does not
acknowledge the organism's agency in altering its own inborn physical and mental
makeup. His hyperbolic'rhetoric, however, suggests the broader accusation that Darwin's
disciples deny the importance (perhaps even the existence) of mind: Hence Darwinian
"luck" is opposed to Lamarckian "cunning." Echoing Butler, Shaw asserts in his preface
to Back to. Methuselah that "there is no place in. Darwinism for free will, or any other sort
of will [. . I" (lix). In part, Shaw objects to Neo7Darwinism's common materialist
assumption that "mind" or "will" cannot exist outside of a physical body, that
transcendent spirit is illusory. This total rejection of consciousness--disembodied or
embodied--as a feasible possibility within Neo-Darwinian theory, however, erroneously
assumes that the ability to make choices cannot be selected for as an advantageous trait.
Yet, erroneous or not, the charge that evolution by natural selection provided little or no
explanation for the existence of conscious mind was common among Neo-Lamatekians.
Thus, while both these evolutionary theories tended to stress progress and human
ascendancy, they developed markedly different conceptions of what mattered in the
evolutionary process. Neo-Darwinism stressed struggle, Neo-Lamarckism will and
desire. In this simple distinction lie the roots of two very different attitudes toward
ecology. Struggle suggests a direct relationship of organisms with each other. This
relational concept, its negative connotations notwithstanding, is inherently ecological,
part of Darwin's "complex web of relations" whereby "plants and animals; most remote
in the scale of nature, are bound together" (Origin 73). In other words, even the "least-
evolved" of organisms affects and can be affected by the "most highly evolved" Indeed,
natural selection itself describes how individuals relate to organic and inorganic elements
of the environment they inhabit. Though desire also suggests some relationality--one
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presumably desires to do something within an external context--this type of relationality
is far more tenuous. In its consequent deemphasis on the environment, Neo-Lamarckism
diverges from its Lamarckian antecedent. For Lamarck himself, the environment, or
what he referred to as "locality," was vitally important to evolution: the giraffe develops
a long neck in order to reach leaves high on trees. Though the physical evolution is
driven by the giraffe's straining, the straining is driven by location of the leaves. Because
it tended to emphasize human evolution, however, Neo-Lamarckism often invoked
evolutionary "desire" without reference to what we would consider an ecological context.
Shaw, for example, cites riding a bicycle or playing a violin (Back xxiv-xxv) as activities
that might be made instinctive by generations of concerted striving. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Neo-Lamarckian texts are often less engaged with ecological context--are
less ecocentric—than Neo-Darwinian texts.
This analysis, of course, is a generalization. Within both Neo-Lamarckism and
Neo-Darwinism, numerous subsets exist, presenting various types of engagement with
ecology. Creative Evolution, for example, is akin to Neo-Lamarckism in its belief that
evolution is driven by will. According to Creative Evolution, the individual's actions and
desires are ultimately guided by Life Force (Henri Bergson's elan vital), a progressive
drive inherent in all life. While Bergson rejects the agency of individual will in the
evolutionary process, Shaw's version of Creative Evolution embraces both individual
will and Life Force as evolutionary . agencies. Since Life Force is a universal drive,
however, Creative Evolution tends to describe life more collectively than individualist
Neo-Lamarckism. In Creative Evolution (English translation 1911), Bergson relates his
elan vital to the more conventional understanding of energy in physics. A type of energy
flow, though not identical to that described by physics, is the_process by which Life Force
operates (Bergson 253-54); it is also the concept through which Tansley would define an
ecosystem a few decades later (Worster 302). Indeed, .Bergson's description of energetic
flow is profoundly ecosystemic:
Now whence comes the energy [that life-procures and expends]? From the
ingested food, for food is .a kind of explosive, which needs only the spark
to discharge the energy it stores. Who has' made this explosive? The food
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may be the flesh of an animal nourished on animals. and so. on; but, in the
end it is -to -the vegetable we always come back. Vegetables alone gather
_in solar energy, and the animals do but borrowit _fram them [ 	 ] (253)
Thus, without reference to natural selection, Bergson uses Life Force to explain the
functioning of food webs. In contrast, Shaw, also a Creative Evolutionist, seldom.
invokes ecological relations. Even within the relatively narrow context a Creative
Evolution theories, a diversity of ecological attitudes abounds:
Similarly, Neo-Darwinism necessitates no single ecological dogma. For Neo-
Darwinians, complications arise from a tension between ecological relationality and the
perceived -desirability of progress. In the nineteenth century, it was generally assumed
that evolution should be progressive. The eugenics movement is founded on the will to
ensure that this progress will persist. Progress, however, suggests among other things
increasing freedom from environmental restrictions, increasing security in the face of
environmental pressures.. It suggests autonomy from the environment.. Yet
paradoxically, for Neo-Darwinians, evolution is driven by selective- pressures defined by
the environment. Ecological relationships are fundamental to the persistence and
evolution of life. Thus; in Neo-Darwinian texts; it is not uncommon to encounter a
tension between the need to preserve ecosystems and the desire to overcome this need.
This tension speaks to a more fundamental ambivalence about the extent to which
humanity should be considered -a part of "nature."
This question has profound ethical implications; for if humanity and nature are
properly separate categories, it is relatively easy to justify the exploitation of nature for
human wants. Tf humanity and nature are not distinct, however, it is more difficult to
justify a purely utilitarian attitude toward the non-human In nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century Britain, the- utilitarian attitude- prevailed. For instance, Peder Anker
contends that the practice of ecological science in Britain in this period was centrally
motivated by imperial economic interests: the study of nature must be justified by
nature's utility to empire. As one ofmany examples, he cites the Imperial Botanical
Conference of 1924, which  launched a plan for a comprehensive survey of ecological
relations among plant species throughout the British empire: "The focus of this grand
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survey," Anker observes, "was_ the economic aspect of botany; as one lecturer put. [it}, 'it
is our duty as botanists to enlighten the world of commerce' (34). In the dominant
discourse of the Conference, the importance of plants hinged on their economic value to
humans.
Yet, though such anthropocentric views predominated, they did not exclude a
sense of the intrinsic worth and rights of non-human beings. In Man and the Natural 
World, Keith Thomas amply documents the development of the British sense of nature's
intrinsic value, a tradition that extends through the Romantics and post-Romantics, such
as William Morris, to later preservationist movements2 But much of this sense of
nature's worth remained localized within Great Britain itself James Winter argues that
the economic exploitation of British colonies permitted Britain to enjoy the luxury of a
relatively protected landscape without sacrificing short-term economic growth: "The fact
of empire," he contends, "'the empire of free trade,' L 1 allowed Britain to use
steamships and steam locomotives to export at least some environmental damage" by
draining foreign instead of British resources (Winter 3). A common theme in these
attitudes toward ecology and empire is a sense of ontological separateness from the
forces on which one's existence depends: humanity is of a different order from the non-
human, Britain of a different order from the colonies. By granting a special distinction to
one group or entity (Britain, for example) as opposed to everything else (all other lands),
such separation reinforces hierarchies (Britain is superior to other lands). Thus, a
discourse that categorically separates humans from all other life forms tends toward an
anthropocentric privileging of humanity.
Thus, despite countervailing trends, the dominant views of evolution and ecology
in this period generally support a belief in human separateness from and superiority over
other life forms. Such views use this superiority—and the need to maintain it—as a
justification for a utilitarian attitude toward the non-human. At the same time, their
emphasis on human separateness endorses the goal of minimizing human dependence on
the non-human. In this way, the idea that humans are justified in using the non-human
exists alongside a sense that ultimately humans should not need to use the non-human.
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This anthropocentric advocating of human progress is expressed in the dream of "leaving
behind": leaving behind dependence on the whims of nature and, finally, the need to
participate in an ecosystem altogether. Conversely, the development of ecological
science throughout this period led to an increasing awareness within the scientific
community of the intricacy of ecological connections and the difficulties inherent in
controlling or severing them. The more sensitive to these intricacies an ideology
becomes, the more it questions the desirability of attempting to control or surmount
ecology; the ideology, thus, tends toward the ecocentric. Anthropocentisin and
ecocentrism, therefore, exist together in a tension between the desire to "leave ecology
behind" and the fear that attempting to do so will prove detrimental to humanity.
Within this tension, individual texts can be placed on a continuum from strongly
anthropocentric to strongly ecocentric. I contend that, in general, the more
anthropocentric a position the more progressionist it tends to be, the more ecocentric the
more non-progressionist. "Progress" itself is a difficult term, however, and demands
further exploration. In "The Redefinition of Progress," Gilbert LaFreniere examines the
numerous connotations of the word. Drawing from Leo Marx, LaFreniere distinguishes
between "goal-oriented" progress, which describes the pursuit of a particular aim
individually determined to be desirable, and "technocratic progress," which "emphasizes
the most rapid possible rate of technological innovation as the essential criterion of social
progress" (80). "Progress" can variously refer to any positive change or to a more narrow
technological development. For an anti-technologist, therefore, it would be "progress" to
slam the brakes on the steaming locomotive of "progress." Following a similar line of
reasoning, Michael Ruse's study of the concept of progress in evolutionary biology,
Monad to Man, distinguishes between "absolute progress," which describes a change
widely regarded as an advancement under an accepted value system, and "comparative
progress," which describes an advancement in a particular area, an advancement that may
or may not be considered positive within a broader social context: "If one arrives at the
Heavenly City," Ruse explains, "one has made absolute progress. If one makes a biggcl
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and better atom bomb, one has made comparative progress" (20). There is, of course, no
universal, transcultural standard for differentiating absolute and comparative progress.
Even within the comparatively limited context of evolutionary biology, progress
is a troublesome concept. Early evolutionary theory assumed evolution to be progressive
in Ruse's "absolute" sense. This notion, however, began to be complicated as early as
Lamarck's Zoological Philosophy. Lamarck developed a paradoxically dual sense of
evolutionary change: on the one hand, change was progressive, following something
loosely like a scale of nature. On the other hand, change was environmentally mediated
and, therefore, not a predetermined progression. If a species's locality is inundated with
water, for example, the species must evolve to swim, but swimming is not necessarily a
"progressive" stage above walking, certainly not in an absolute sense. The advent of the
theory of evolution by natural selection did nothing to remedy this difficulty.
Evolutionary progress is often identified with an increase in sti	 uctural complexity,
particularly if complexity is a prerequisite for traits, such as intelligence, which humans
value (Ruse 39). Yet it is entirely possible under natural selective pressures for a species
to evolve into a simpler state, a less intelligent state, for example. For all the difficulties
that evolutionary biology has presented to the concept of progress, however, evolutionary
views continue to show a strong progressio-nist bent. Characterizing Darwin's view, Ruse
comments, "In a way, progress is an artifact of the very fact of evolution itself. You have
to start from the bottom up--necessarily go from simple to complex [. . .1" (147). As long
as_ progress can be identified with increasing complexity, the very fact that the earliest
fossils are single-celled organisms evidences a progressive aspect of evolution. In
popular (versus scientific) views of evolution, progress is still unambivalently embraced
to this day. In fact, Ruse contends, "At the popular level, Progress and evolution are
synonyms . .1" (530; emphasis Ruse's). I discuss this contemporary identification of
evolution and progress at length in chapter 6.
Faced with a concept as convoluted as "progress," I must circumscribe it with a
limited definition for the purposes ofthis study. When I speak of "progiessionism," I use
the term in two ways. By evolutionary "progressionism," I mean a belief in the
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inevitability or desirability of the advancement of species as typically defined by an
increase in the complexity of physiological organization and/or the development of
higher cognitive and moral sensibilities. In keeping with this view, I consider a
"progressionist" ideology one that advocates a society in which the process of moral and
mental advancement, typically accompanied by increasing power over matter and energy,
is considered a good in itself the goal is to continue to progress; the virtue lies in the
continued forward movement A "non-progressionist" ideology, then, is one in which
this forward movement is not a primary goal. Instead, some type of balance, stability,
sustainability, or perpetual happiness is typically the aim. By these defmitions, texts that
endorse an anthropocentric ethic of "leaving behind" tend to be progressionist (chiefly
concerned with advancement), while texts that advocate an ecocentric participation
within an existing system tend to be non-progressionist (chiefly concerned with
sustainable living).
Ecological Dialogism
My task, then, is to explore how, as enacted in utopian and klystopian fiction;
these anthropocentric/progressionist and ecocentric/non-progressionist tendencies serve
to develop or undermine an ecological praxis. I argue that ecocentrism is akin to
Bakhtinian dialogism in that both stress the irreducible complexity of relations among
participants within a certain context. Dialogism presumes that an idea gains meaning
through conversation; it is shaped by the networks of words that accrue around it.
Similarly, ecocentrism presumes that a biological entity can only function within a web
of relations among other entities and eneigies. Dialogism, theiefure, provides an apt
rhetorical structure for the expression of ecocentric principles.
Though Bakhtin wrote solely about human society, his method is amenable to a
context that stresses human relations with the non-human. The affinity between
ecological discourse and dialogism stems from their mutual concern with relationality.
Indeed, Michael J. McDowell contends that "Bakhtin's theories may be seen as the
literary equivalent of ecology, the science of relationships" (372). In order to mobilize
33
Bakhtinian dialogism for =critical ends, ecofeminist critic Patrick Murphy has.
integrated a triad of forces—ecology, feminisms, and dialogism—into a heterarchic model
for revising of our dominant anthropocentric and androcentric discourses, a revision that
assumes equal validity to inhere in female and male, human and non-human "voices."
Much of Murphy's work is concerned with the complexities of ascribing voices to the
non-human. Can we grant the non-human the discursive standing of a speaking subject?
Murphy poses the question in concrete terms: "When selenium poisons ground water,
causes animal deformities, and reduces the ability of Califoiuia farmers to continue to
overcultivate through irrigation land with little topsoil, are these signs that we can read?
And in reading such signs and integrating them into our texts,, are we letting that land
speak through us or are we only speaking for it?" (14), Murphy contends that we can
legitimately establish the non-human as a speaking subject, though in doing so, we must
remain aware of the power relations invohred in representing such subjectivity in our own
human words.
Though the voicing of the non-human is a topic of great consequence, in this
study, I focus on how a more traditional Bakhtinian understanding of dialogism as a
literal, verbal conversation among human voices -can elucidate ways in which texts
challenge assumptions of anthropocentric domination. Likewise, I depart somewhat fiuni
Murphy's ecofeminist model by downplaying the role of feminisms per se in my dialogic
investigations. In deemphasizing the issue of the voicing of traditionally silenced groups,
I do not intend to deny the immense value of such work but rather to offer a different
approach to pursuing the same goal of decentering dominant discourses that have been
linked to the exploitation of disenfranchised "others," including women, non-whites, non-
human life forms, and the environment
I focus on human voices rather than the voicing of the non-human because it is
ultimately through human voices, with human words, that our discourses -are enacted. It
goes without saying--or it ought to--that discourse is not merely a matter of words
without reference to a -non--verbal or -non-human world. On the contrary, our relations
with non-human energies and substances physically permit us to survive and, therefore,
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to have discourse in the first place. A discursive artifact, such as Percy Bysshe Shelley's
"Mont Blanc," can be intimately connected to a profound awareness of the mutual effects
of the human and the non-human that is, on some level, nonverbal: the mountain, the
river, the soul. Yet it is almost always through verbal communication that our
experiences of interrelatedness with the non-human are conveyed to other humans. It is
through human discourse that personal experiences accrue, reinforce and _question _each
other, and ultimately form and interrogate ideologies.
Analysis of the literal conversations of characters within a text, as well as the
intertextual dialogues that take place among several texts, can lead to an understanding of
how this process of ideological formation and deconstruction takes place. Such a study
inherently runs the. risk of devaluing the literally non-verbal participants in our ecological
"conversations." Indeed, the same can be said of attempts to "voice" the non-human. As
McDowell observes, "Every attempt to listen to voices in the landscape orto 'read the
book of nature' is necessarily anthropocentric" (372). Our access to nature is mediated
by our human senses and cognitive processes. Nature must be humanly interpreted, and
this interpretation places humanity, to an extent, at the center of the conversation. We
cannot escape this type -of anthrepocentrism. We can only strive to remain aware of our
own bias and eon-time to question our own assumptions. Dialogism provides a powerful
means for doing exactly that.
Just as I do not focus on the voicing. of the non-human in my dialogic analyses, I
do not focus intensively on the. marginalized voices_ of women or ethnic- "others" as-
categories, although I touch on these issues. In the following chapters, I examine primary
texts by only two women: one white, Ursula K. Le Guin, and one black--the only non-
white author I study--Octavia E. Butler. As one of the very few well-known, female,
African American science fiction writers, Butler clearly occupies the position of "most
culturally -marginalized" writer in my study. It is -important to consider _the .marginalized
status of these writers, just as it is important to take into account the cultural
inarginalization of Shaw as an Irishman or Wells as a child ofthe Vie (Riau lower middle
class. Yet for two major reasons, I do not wish to orient my study around the
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ramifications of these marginalizations, First, an engagement with these writers. as
individuals rather than representatives of categories provides some defense against the
temptation to reduce their complex texts to simplified statements about their cultural
statgas. g Second, the lines of similarity and difference which I trace among these texts
cannot-be most productively described in terms of-our conventional categories of
"dominant" versus "marginalized" cultural 'position. For instance, in its -emphasis on the
hybridization of the human organism with other organisms, the work of white
Englishman JohnBrunner is more akin to that ofButler than it is to that of his fellow
white Englishman, Wells. 9 Conversely, in their colonial progressionist overtones,
Butler's Earthseed books resemble the work of Wells more nearly than the work of
Butler's fellow American, female writer, Le Guin. While the ecocentric/anthropocentric
and non-progressionist/progressionist dyads I explore can be correlated, to some extent,
with .a -marginalized/dominant dyad, -a.strong emphasis on this correlation -might well
-obscure other-discursive phenomena that 'trouble these correlations.
As my above examples illustrate, in this study, I explore ecological discourse
through disparate texts, spanning two continents and more than a century. I have chosen
such an expansive time frame in order to track the development of eco-evolutionary
discourses in utopia and dystopia from the. post-Darwin origins of our contemporary
ecological discourses to current, culturally influential texts. Necessarily, over such a time
frame, I must omit numerous highly- relevant texts, selecting only a few	 representatives of
various types of discourse. Yet even careful selectivity woutdyietd more texts than I
could adequately address if I were to engage in a linear progression of utopian and
-dystopian narrative from 1.890 to circa 2000. Thus, I have made -the decision to explore
-no texts at all from the period between the mid-1920s and the mid-1970s. By omitting
this period, I necessarily omit or radically compress discussion of such world-altering
events as the Great Depression, World War II, and the social revolution of the 1960s.
The marginalization of such significant historical moments is unfortunate,
Yet in selecting my focal periods, my aim has been to- maximize. my overall
engagement with the development of utopian and dystopian ecological discourse within
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the space constraints of this. study. The period from the 1890s to. the 1920s marks a
fruitful time for evolutionary and ecological discourse, culminating in the overthrow of
Neo-Lamarckism as a scientifically plausible theory. At the opposite end of lily
chronology, the tate-twentieth and early twenty-f irst centuries are of particular relevance
to us because they describe our own era and the discourses that currently shape
Anglophone civilization. I contend that the earlier texts I have chosen can be usefully
:juxtaposed to these more contemporary texts precisely because they are old enough to
-reveal significant shifts in discourse yet-recent enough -to show clear lines of descent.
Morris's News from Nowhere, impossible as its dream of a pastoral utopia may appear in
the cyberworid of today, marks an early and still influential antecedent to many later
counter-culture texts and movements from Le Gin's The. Dispossessed to Ernest
Callenbach? s Ecotopia (1975) to hippie communes and more recent organic-farming
cooperatives. The 1920s Wells and Shaw texts I have chosen; likewise, operate as
antecedents to more recent discourses. Indeed, the 19208 marks an especially apt point a
comparison for more contemporary texts. These earlier texts often express explicitly and
unashamedly ideological positions that „Anglophone culture has since partially repressed.
In -the 1920s, for example, eugenics could be characterized as an unmitigated "good";
Neo--L-amarckism could be seriously debated as a legitimate scientific theory; the
systematic extermination of nonhuman species could 'be deemed moral and appropriate.
In a (post-}postmodern society, such positions are no longer overtly tenable, yet tacitly
their influence lingers, In- the wake of the. Holocaust, "eugenics!' became. an "evil," yet
"genetic engineering" appears the wave of the future. Following the New Synthesis,
Neo-Lamarckism became universally disparaged within the scientific establishment, yet
versions of (Neo-)Lamarckian evolution (divested of the "Lamarekian" label) continue to
be influential in popular culture; in fact, they are arguably more influential than evolution
by natural selection. The Endangered Species Act (1973) sere-es as benchmark in
American 'discourse for the public acceptance that (mostmacroscopic) species have an
intrinsic -rightto exist, yet global economics continues to endorse a system-that facilitates
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the. current mass. extinction of species. An examination of 1920s-eratextscan_ distill, a
comparatively "pure" form of ideological positions that remain powerful today despite
their overt rejection within dominant discourses'. By exploring the implications of these-
positions in their explicit form, we may better understand the nature of their influence in
their semi-effaced form.
Having explained why I focus on• the historical periods I have _chosen, it remains
for me -to explain why I am grounding my core study in British texts, particularly since
the -more 'contemporary texts I 'examine -are North American. I have -already -mentioned
that late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain was a -hOtbed of evolutionary and
ecological debate. Yet it is also true that equally vigorous debate was occurring . in
America. Nonetheless, I focus. on British texts. because their discourses embody an
indistinctness between wilderness and humanly influenced- land that has particular
relevance for our current world. As a relatively small land continuously inhabited by
settler cultures over many centuries, Britain lacks the type of "wilderness" so prominent
in the American consciousness. It has little in the way of vast, "untrammeled" spaces,
little concept of indigenous natives .as naturalized yet troubling inhabitants of these
-spaces. What Britain-does have -is a distinction between rural and-urban, uncultivated and
cultivated. 'But even-in these 'distinctions, there is -a-non-disjunction that differs from the
civilized/wilderness or inhabited/wilderness dichotomies in America. In 'British parlance,
both the rural and the uncultivated tend to be discursively opposed to urban civilization,.
yet rural- spaces are, by definition, where. most cultivation, most agriculture, takes. place.
Inherently, there is a slippage between- areas largely free of human- intervention and
"country" areas- adapted to human uses. This- slippage- is evident for instance, in the
eighteenth-century picturesque aesthetic, which developed concepts of landscaping based
on maintaining the illusion of "wild" nature ,(see Thomas 258-65). Imperial Britain did,
as 1 have .already mentioned, -make-a-distinction -between -British land and -colonial -land.
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In this sense, the British. had a concept of "frontier" as land in. need of "civilizing," but
these colonial lands were more often viewed as resources than pristine spaces. 1-0- All
land could be seen, to some extent, as humanly methated.
In the _contemporary world, this sensitivity io the pervasive influence nfinunanity
-on-the environment is -essential to -a sound ecological praxis. -In-the -age of global
-warming, ozone depletiomadioactive-contamination, and exploding -human-populations,
cultural myths of an untrammeled wilderness become naive. While American society is
Increasingly aware of the problematic implications of "Wilderness," -Britain,.in this
regard, is a step ahead  as it has little wilderness, myth to. deconstruct I do not mean  to
suggest that wilderness is- not a useful- concept; it has, in- fact, many valid-uses-. When-
investigating the development of alternative- human- societies; however, it is advantageous
to begin with a sense of the human and- natural' worlds as conjoined: The removal of
.pristine, separate natural spaces from the discussion demands a direct engagement with
the human capability to atf etall environments As illustrations of such ellen -ment,ihe
-British -texts -I -examine serve as apt-antecedents -to -more -recent-texts, which,-regardless-of
their-country of-origin, - are -likely -to assume -a -human/nature -non-disjunction -based -on-an
awareness of recent global environmental problems.
Conclusion
This- awareness- requires- an- ability to simultaneously appreciate stability while
embracing the- inevitability—and- sometimes desirability--of change. In- utopian- and-
dystopian narratives, this negotiation is facilitated- by a dialogic rhetoric. By empowering
a multiplicity of voices, dialogism enables discursive hybridity, a prodUctiVe means of
expressingihe .irreflimibly complex interartions_between_the values _of sustainabilityand
change. In hybrid texts, the traditionally anthropocentric value of leaving-behind"
dependence'on material systems may be refigured-as -an-acceptance -of change in-both
progressive and non-progressive forms. For such change to -be enacted without
devastating ecOlogical consegnences, however, it must reflect a deep concern for
sustainable living within ecosystemic relations. While the_ hybrid paradigm offers no set
program for a utopian. future, it does illustrate, the need-for the two core principles of




1 The cultural impact of Star Trek was recently chronicled by TV Guide, which named it the
number one cult television series of all time, remarking humorously, "The series (and its spin-offs) all but
created fan obsession, conventions and an enduring link between science fiction and geekdom that has
given countless outsiders the will to get out of bed every day for 38 years" (Malcolm 30). On a weightier
note, George Takei (Sulu) recounts that the Star Trek cast "was invited to the rollout [of the first space
shuttle]," named Ent_emise after the famous starship; "[w]e had become part of the space program," he
recalls (30). Babylon 5, the series I focus on in this study, was ranked thirteenth cult series of all time
(Malcolm 24).
2 In "The Value of a Varmint," Chapter 13 of  Nature's Economy, Donald Worster offers a
detailed historical overview of movements in the United States to eradicate predators and the ecological
and economic impracticality of these movements. He observes, for instance, that in 1962, "the value of
sheep lost [to predators] on National Forest land in California was $3,500, while the [predator] control
program there cost over $90,000" (265).
3 Buell takes his quotation of O'Riordan from Environmentalism, 2nd. ed. London: Pion,
1981, p. 1.
4 In The Truth of Ecology, Phillips laments ecocriticism's conflation of ecological science with an
ecological "point of view," contending that this conflation damages the credibility of ecological science by
presenting it as overly ideological, while simultaneously damaging the credibility of ecocritism by
presenting it as scientifically ignorant. Phillips's concerns are valid. I would contend, however, that an
"ecological point of view" may usefully be considered "ecocentric" (a term Phillips does not explore) and
that the concerted use of "ecocentrisrn" as distinct from "ecological science" goes a long way toward
combating the conflation of scientific practice and social values that Phillips resists.
5 In Luck of Cunning, Samuel Butler relates an amusing chronicle of Darwin's shifting views on
the heritability of habit. Butler reports that in 1839, Darwin assumes habit to be heredity; in 1859, he calls
this same view "the most serious error"; in 1876, it is still "a serious error," but by 1882, he finds it "not
[. .] at all incredible" that a habit should become instinctive over generations (46).
6 Darwin explains the shift in his perspective on natural selection at length in
The Descent of Man:
I now admit [. .] I perhaps attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the
survival of the fittest [in early editions of Nikki [....j I may be permitted to say, as
some excuse, that I had two distinct objects in view; firstly to show that species had not
been separately created, and secondly, that natural selection had been the chief agent of
change, though largely aided by the inherited effects of habit, and slightly by-the direct
action of the surrounding conditions [. .] [H]ence, if I have erred in giving to natural
selection great power, which I am very far from admitting, or in having exaggerated its
power, which is in itself probable, I have at least, as I hope, done good service in aiding
to overthrow the dogma of separate creations. (50-51)
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7 Thomas's Man and the Natural World chiefly charts changing attitudes toward nature in Britain
from 1500-1800. He tracks a gradual but significant shift away from a view of "wild" nature as an affront
to human civilization to a view, typified by Romantics such as William Wordsworth, that praises the
uncultivated above the cultivated as a space of spiritual renewal. Thomas also describes this time period's
development of the idea that nature and, in particular, animals might have intrinsic rights. By the late-
nineteenth century, such ideas had been powerfully present in Britain for some time. On the whole,
however, they remained culturally subordinate to a more utilitarian attitude.
8 In the afterward to her short story, "Bloodchild," which describes a human's response to being
parasitized by an alien's maggot-like offspring, Octavia Butler comments, "It amazes me that some people
have seen `Bloodchild' as a story of slavery. It isn't. It's a number of other things though" (30). She goes
on to explain that the story is about love, coming of age, male pregnancy, fear of maggot infestation, and
the accommodations humans might have to make when colonizing another planet (30-32). Butler's avowal
that the story is not about slavery suggests a dissatisfaction with criticism that would assume that because
she is an African American, she must inevitably write about "African American" issues. Of course,
Butler's denial of the story's links to slavery-related issues does not necessarily mean that these links do
not exist. At the same time, her denial is a salutary admonition to critics not to assume that the work of
"marginalized" writers will always be primarily concerned with their marginalization.
9 Though space constraints have required me to omit extensive analysis of John Brunner's science
fiction from this study, his work, nonetheless, exemplifies the ecological and utopian issues that I engage
with. In Bedlam Planet (1968), Brunner explores the potential ecological difficulties of adapting to an alien
biosphere. When human colonists become infected by bacteria that prevent them from properly absorbing
vitamin C, they address this problem by relinquishing their physical and emotional ties to Earth and fully
integrating themselves into the alien biosphere, consuming native foods that enable appropriate digestive
processes. Brunner presents the resulting society as a utopia predicated on intensely aware ecological
participation.
lo Wells extrapolates such imperial expansion into space. In The War of the Worlds (1898), his
narrator optimistically ponders the day when humans may colonize space, much as the Martians attempted
to colonize Earth, but ideally with greater success: "Dim and wonderful is the vision I have conjured up in
my mind of life spreading slowly from this little seed-bed of the solar system throughout the inanimate
vastness of sidereal space" (253). in The Food of the Gods (1904), spreading the human race throughout
space, "Mill the earth is no more than a footstool" (190), is figured as a natural and positive progression. In
these scenarios, the colonized spaces are described as resources that humans can use, for example, to guard
against the extinction of the species in the event that the Earth becomes uninhabitable. These locations are




TENSIONS IN THE ECOLOGICAL AESTHETICS OF WILLIAM MORRIS'S
NEWS FROM NOWHERE 
But now, where is the difficulty in accepting the religion of humanity,
when the men and women who go to make up humanity are free, happy,
and energetic at least, and most commonly beautiful of body also, and
surrounded by beautiful things of their own fashioning, and a nature
bettered and not worsened by contact with mankind?
Hammond in William Morris's News from Nowhere
Introduction
In Men Like Gods H .G. Wells calls William Morris's News from Nowhere a
"graceful impossible book," faulting it for painting an unrealistically rosy picture of
human nature (197). Though brief, this evaluation is incisive. News is a graceful book,
consummately crafted and--more than Wells realized--replete with practical social
critiques and suggestions from which our civilization could undoubtedly profit. It is also
an impossible book, depicting an idealized society that is almost certainly not achievable
for the human race as we know it. This gap between the practical suggestion and the
impossible utopia indicates the limitations of Morris's ideology as a model for our praxis.
To develop a workable praxis, we must be able to assess where the practical becomes
impractical: the point at which a basically salutary ideological principle becomes
counterproductive. Focusing on Morris's ecological discourse, 1 will investigate how this
discourse undermines his stated aim of achieving a harmonious relationship with Nature.
Throughout this chapter, I will indicate Morris's quasi-personified concept of "Nature"
by using his capital "N's and will use the lower case "nature" to refer loosely to that
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which is neither human nor invented by humans. 1 I will argue that the ideological
fractures in Morris's concept of Nature are largely the result of an oversimplified view of
humanity, nature, and their relations to each other, a view that is tied to a rhetorical
rejection of dialogism. This oversimplification exacerbates the unresolved tension
between anthropocentric and ecocentric discourses in Morris's Nowhere.
A Marxist Aesthetics for the Defense of Nature
As a dedicated Marxist, neo-medievalist, neo-Romantic, and prime contributor to
the crafts movement, Morris was keenly aware that his species of socialism differed from
many others'. A believer in the necessity of communist revolution, he was
uncomfortable with the Fabian ethic of socialist reform within the existing system. An
anti-industrialist, he was convinced that a faith in the power of technological progress to
solve social woes was misplaced. Morris first published News in 1890 as a response to
his fellow socialist Edward Bellamy's urban-industrial utopia, Looking Backward (1888),
He found Bellamy's argument that laissez faire capitalism would more-or-less naturally
mutate into a utopian state socialism distasteful and disturbing. In a review of Looking
Backward, Morris expresses what would become a major impetus for the writing of
News: the fear that Bellamy's text would be considered a manifesto for socialism:
[This book, having produced a great impression on people who are really enquiring into
Socialism, will be sure to be quoted as an authority for what Socialists believe, and [. . .1
therefore, it is necessary to point out there are some Socialists who do not think that the
problem of the organization of life and necessary labour can be dealt with by a huge
national centralization, working a kind of magic for which no one feels himself
responsible; that on the contrary it will be necessary for the unit of administration to be
small enough for every citizen to feel himself responsible for its details [. . .1 (358)
Thus, to ensure that those inquiring into socialism would have access to an alternative to
Bellamy's project, Morris provided them with a counter-utopia, one founded on aesthetic
principles.
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News depicts a futuristic Britain set somewhere between the early twenty-first
and early twenty-second centuries, in which a workers' revolution, launched in 1952, has
given birth to a decentralized communist utopia. In this Nowhere, healthy and happy
people live in rural communities, enjoying close relationships with their neighbors and
the natural world, while producing beautiful, carefully crafted wares as needed for
legitimate human use. Since they do not produce more than they need and since the
population of Nowhere is relatively stable, the Nowherians are able to pursue this
lifestyle without stressing the natural resources on which they depend. Such a lifestyle
emphasizes sustainability without a drive to "advance."
Thus, Nowhere is non-progressionist: it does not advocate "change" for the sake
of change. While positive changes are embraced, a premium is placed on happiness with
little need for major social or technological transformations. Nowhere, for example, is
not opposed to technological progress. 2 But it values such progress only as it aids in the
Nowherian objective of a sustainable happiness. Thus, Morris's narrator, William Guest,
is impressed to see "barges f. . .1 going on their way without any means of propulsion
visible to me" (News 185). These "force vehicles" are a positive development because
they replace loud, coal-burning steam ships (186) and thereby support the Nowherian
value of a human agency that does not intrude upon Nature but operates in harmony with
her.
Living in harmony with Nature is a governing principle of Nowhere. For Morris,
Nature is always allied with beauty, and society should be oriented around the production
and appreciation of the beautiful. Worthwhile "work," as opposed to "toil," cannot,
therefore, be disruptive to Nature. For example, the Nowherian Hammond tells Guest
that there are no separate manufacturing districts where such disruption would be
permitted to flourish. Instead, coal and minerals are mined "with as little as possible of
dirt, confusion, and the distressing of quiet people's lives" (102). The minimization of
"dirt" and "distressing of quiet people's lives" suggests the avoidance of ugliness and
pollution. Here, "confusion" is implicitly contrasted with "quiet"; "confusion" suggests
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noise and disruption: natural spaces laid waste in industrial mining ventures. In
Nowhere, industry cannot justly exist at the expense of Nature. Nature has an inherent
worth, which must always be taken into account.
Indeed, while the anthropocentric values of Western civilization have traditionally
trained us to evaluate nature's worth in terms of its human utility, Morris collapses the
distinction between utility and intrinsic worth. When Guest asks Hammond if retaining
spaces of wild nature is not wasteful, Hammond replies, "Go and have a look at the
sheep-walks high up the slopes between Ingleborough and Pen-y-gwent, and tell me if
you think we waste the land there by not covering it with factories for making things that
nobody wants [. . .1" (107). The utility of this land is important it is used to raise sheep,
a more productive occupation than the unnecessary manufacture of assembly line
commodities. But Hammond's primary appeal is to the visual impression of the place.
The land's beauty is itself useful.
Beauty is utility, and beauty resides in Nature; therefore, Nature cannot be
sacrificed without sacrificing both beauty and utility. This inseparability of Nature,
utility, and beauty creates a powerful basis for an ecologically sustainable system of life.
Herein lies one of Morris's central challenges to capitalism, which typically assumes that
utility is separable from nature and beauty, that mass production for profit can persist
independent of its effects on the raw materials essential to such production. A
stereotypical capitalist view would hold that a factory pouring smoke into the air or a
quarry leveling a hillside may be visnally unfortunate, but so is going out with
mismatched socks. The thing that matters, finally, is maintaining production, not looking
attractive.
This is, of course, a reductive characterization of the "capitalist mind set." And
indeed, Moms is similarly reductive when he implicitly argues in News that Ellen's
retrogressive grandfather cannot appreciate the bird song because he is a capitalist and,
therefore, has trained himself to dismiss the importance of beauty. But though Morris's
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depiction of "the capitalist" is unfair--a point to which I will return--he is, nonetheless,
incisive in his criticism of capitalist ideology, not least with regard to environmental
concerns,3
The capitalist tendency to separate "profitable production" from its ecological
context has generated negative consequences from Morris's time to our own. The belief,
for example, that one can produce a crop without attending to the biotic and abiotic forces
that have historically maintained the top soil proved detrimental in the Dust Bowl
(Worster 219). Soil erosion, black lung disease, pesticide contamination, global
warming, resource depletion--all are linked to this separation of a product from its
ecological context. Of course, some communist states have shown a similar disregard for
ecological concerns.4 But though other ideological systems have been guilty of
ecological negligence, capitalism particularly lends itself to such disregard. The
fallacious assumption underlying capitalism's separation of product from context is that
infinite growth can occur in a finite space. The aim of capitalism is to increase capital: a
process of continual growth. And though it is conceivable that "growth" purely as a
system of numbers could continue indefinitely, capitalism has traditionally been explicit
in its advocating of material expansion: from automobile sales to population growth.
Such an ideology encourages unsustainable social practices. Enough carbon dioxide
released into the atmosphere will significantly change the properties of that atmosphere; a
continuously growing human population cannot perpetually be supported by a finite
amount of arable land.
Morris, of course, did not live to see things like global warming or the exponential
population growth of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Nonetheless, the ideology
he advocated, even without being specifically on guard against many of these problems,
could have helped to guard against them. When work, nature, humanity, and beauty are
considered inseparable, every aspect of production has value. The trees of Nowhere, for
example, would not be over-harvested not only because such a practice ultimately
impedes production--a reason most capitalists would find compelling—but also because
the elimination of mass production in favor of unalienated craft demands a slower rate of
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production and, finally, because the beauty of a forest should persist Thus, where
capitalist ideology provides one reason for preserving the forest--the need to maintain a
wood supply--Morris's ideology provides at least three. Moreover, where capitalism
inadvertently encourages deforestation by demanding an ever-increasing rate of
production, Morris's ideology avoids such inherent imbalance by operating on the
metaphor of stability rather than growth.
Morris's ideology has much to offer our current civilization. His emphasis on
sustainability, healthy living--particularly the links between a healthy people and healthy
environment--and respect for the non-human keeps his 1890 text germane in a world
beset by unsustainable social and economic practices resulting in global environmental
degradation. Paddy O'Sullivan sums up the contribution of News thus:
What Morris did was to take Marxism, and apply it to the practical
realities of everyday life f. .] What he also achieved, by no means
incidentally, is to provide radical environmentalists with a document
setting out many of their basic ideas, in plain English, which then also
explored in quite considerable detail how these would actually operate in a
future society. (181)
News undoubtedly does set out many of the basic principles of radical--and even
moderate--environmentalism. And Morris did draw these principles out in substantial
detail and with a great deal of sophistication. Yet his depiction of how these values
would operate in human society is not necessarily a viable model for contemporary
Western society or, indeed, for human society in general. Although there can be little
doubt that our civilization would benefit from espousing the Morrisian ethic of
sustainability, we must be wary of embracing Morris's ideology uncritically.
The Human and the Natural as Standards of Beauty
As with any ideology, the value-system upon which Morris's is founded contains
internal contradictions. Notably, there is an unresolved tension between
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism in Morris's discourse of Nature. In his 1877 lecture,
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"The Lesser Arts," Morris describes Nature as if it were a transcendent law. Presenting a
nightmare scenario of the end of art, Morris suggests that while art may be destroyed and
humanity reduced to abjection, Nature will endure unmarred:
[I]n all that has to do with beauty the invention and ingenuity of man will
have come to a dead stop [when art is dead]; and all the while Nature will
go on with her eternal recurrence of lovely changes--spring, summer,
autumn, and winter; sunshine, rain, and snow; storm and fair weather;
dawn, noon, and sunset; day and night--ever bearing witness against man
that he has deliberately chosen ugliness instead of beauty, and to live
where he is strongest amidst squalor or blank emptiness. ("Lesser" 240)
The belief that Nature's fundamental stability cannot be assailed is deep-seated in the
Western tradition, at least as old as the impetus to subjugate Nature. Although Morris's
disaffection with the conquest of Nature places him in opposition to the dominant
discourse of his age, his invocation of Nature's resilience is conventional. hi fact,
Morris's discourse aptly reflects Bruno Latour's conception of the ontology expressed in
modern Western civilization through what Latour terms the "Modem Constitution:"
According to one aspect of this constitution, Society is immanent, Nature transcendent.
Society is within our power to change for good or ill, Nature a power that exists forever
beyond us.
Thus, Morris speaks of Nature as unassailable: not even the worst of human
actions (the killing of art) can stifle "her eternal recurrence of lovely changes." But he
does not consistently abide by this view of Nature. Just a few pages earlier, he expresses
a different view in a philosophy of aesthetics that would later become a central principle
in Nowhere: "[E]verything made by man's hands has a form, which must be either
beautiful or ugly; beautiful if it is in accord with Nature, and helps her; ugly if it is
discordant with Nature, and thwarts her; it cannot be indifferent f. . .1" (234). Nature,
here, still appears to be put forward as the transcendent standard for the beauty that
should govern human society_ Humanity should not shape Nature to its ends; rather,
Nature should guide the ends of humanity. Yet here, Nature is not transcendent, for how
can we "thwart" something that exists beyond our power to affect? For that matter, how
can we "help" it? This helping and thwarting suggests the converse side of the Modem
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Constitution: human society seems a transcendent, preexisting force, Nature something
amenable to human transformation. For if humanity can improve upon Nature, Nature
cannot fully be the transcendent standard by which beauty is judged.
This objection may seem largely semantic. In concrete terms, Morris's meaning
is plain. A traditional illustration--one Morris deploys in News, as I discuss later--is the
trope of the garden. The garden is a space in many ways "natural": it consists most
obviously of plants, which are works of nature. Yet in the garden, humanity manipulates
these natural elements in ways that make them more appealing. For example, plant
species can be chosen such that the garden almost always has flowers in bloom. This
marriage of art and Nature produces something more beautiful than either by itself For
Morris, if "art" opposed to "Nature" must be "ugly," Nature without art is not fulfilling
its potential for beauty either. But there is still a problem here. For if Nature, by itself, is
not the ultimate standard for beauty, then what is? What makes the flower garden
aesthetically superior to the wilderness? Since the aesthetic is a human perception and art
created by humans, the simple answer would seem to be "humanity." But if humanity,
then, is the ultimate judge of beauty, what becomes of the standard of Nature? Who is to
say that a smokestack is not as beautiful as a tree?
Morris, of course, would say so--and often did. And indeed, Morris's writings
tend to assume that every reasonable person will agree with his perceptions of beauty.
On one level, then, Morris's standard of beauty is his own subjectivity. Ironically, this
crusader for mental as well as economic equality among all people failed to take into
account the inevitability that not all people will agree with his aesthetic predispositions.
Morris, for example, was fond of the pastoral English countryside. Percy Bysshe
Shelley, whose poetry Morris was not fond of (Faulkner 6), was more liable to praise the
sublimity of the Alps. Still less might Morris have in common with the aesthetic sense of
many of the urban workers he sought to champion. In "The Lesser Arts," Moms speaks
of the need for "general cultivation of the powers of the mind, general cultivation of the
powers of eye and hand" (249). If his "cultivation" metaphor betrays his preference for
pastoral over "wild" nature, it also suggests the "cultivated" classes. Though Morris
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disdained conventional education and made Nature his putative standard for beauty, he
recognized that men and women will not create beautiful crafts unless they have been
trained to do so. The trainers, presumably, should be those who understand how to apply
beauty in craft. Inevitably, these are socio-economically privileged individuals, like John
Ruskin, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and Morris himself, who have the leisure to study
architecture, medievalism, Norse sagas, and, indeed, the leisure to stroll in the woods. In
his retrospective account, William Morris as I Knew Him, George Bernard Shaw takes up
the problem of class difference, arguing that Morris's attempts to embrace working class
men as his equals in the Socialist League were futile. According to Shaw, the League
"was really Morris and nothing else E. . .1" (14), for "one man of genius of unique culture
and mental power (Morris) with a handful of poor men coming from a different world
seemed very democratic and equalitarian [sic]; but it made skilled criticism and genuine
intellectual co-operation farcically impossible" (15). Despite Morris's sincere efforts to
emancipate the "working man," his own elite upbringing and sensibilities ensured that he
himself would remain a towering authority over his social inferiors.
Yet while the retention of a classist privilege in Morris's aesthetics indicates a
fissure in his ideological commitment to equality, his assumption that most people will
"naturally" share his view of the beautiful carries some weight. Edward 0. Wilson's
biophilia hypothesis, for instance, argues that humans have a genetic predisposition to
appreciate much of the natural world. According to Wilson, if biophobia, the fear of
other life forms, protects us from hazards such as being bitten by a snake, biophilia, too,
might have a positive survival value, drawing us to healthy, fruit-bearing trees, for
example. Though Wilson's hypothesis is not universally accepted within the scientific
community, it nonetheless offers some substantiation for Morris's intuitive sense that
"reasonable" people find "Nature" beautiful. Indeed, people across numerous cultures
show an aesthetic appreciation for flowers, the moon, a blue sky. To an extent, therefore,
humans may have some common standards for what constitutes a beauty in accord with
Nature.
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But even assuming such common standards exist, even if humankind could agree
that the tree is more beautiful than the smokestack, the contradiction in Morris's adducing
both Nature and human judgment as final standards for beauty remains. Morris's
rejection of strict dualism, however, helps resolve this contradiction. One of Latour's
central criticisms of the Modern Constitution is that it pursues "purification"--the
dualistic segregation of categories such as "Nature" and "Society without
acknowledging the existence of hybrids. But for Morris, Nature and humanity are not
ultimately separable. If they were, then the state of the natural world would not affect the
human organism, and clearly, for Morris, it does. In News, for example, a Nowhereian
woman remarks to Guest, "[Tilley say that Southern England [within Nowhere} is a good
place for keeping good looks" (57). Because she specifies "Southern England," she
cannot not simply be referring to Nowherian social practices; Nowhere extends far
beyond that particular region. Not only positive human interactions, but also physical
location, climate, and landscape are integral to human well being. For Morris, both the
land itself and human aesthetic values are vital. The final standard for beauty, then,
might not be so much the green and pleasant "Nature out there" as human nature in tune
with the forces of a vaster Nature.
Despite this non-dualistic strain, however, Morris's position invokes dualism. For
while humanity not only helps but also thwarts Nature, Nature does not thwart itself.
Therefore, humanity must be distinct from Nature. This distinctness enables the
structuring of concepts into hierarchical power relations. Just as Morris's latent classism
retains social inequalities between the undereducated laborer and the "cultivated"
craftsman, so does the separation of Nature and humanity enable a discourse in which
one term or the other must dominate. If humanity in accord with Nature is the final
arbiter of beauty, then humanity retains the specially privileged position of pinnacle of
evolution/creation. Put another way, if the garden is preferable to the wilderness, then
humanity is the optimizer of Nature, human artistry the crowning achievement. Though
this collaboration between humanity and Nature is anthropocentric in its emphasis on
humans as the improvers of Nature, the qualification that humanity must be in accord
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with Nature to fill this function circumscribes the anthropocentism by retaining some
sense of a transcendent Nature. Nevertheless, we have shifted a good way from the
seemingly ecocentric aesthetic that establishes Nature as Morris's standard for beauty in
"The Lesser Arts."
If Morris's ultimate standard of beauty is improved Nature, Nature combined with
art, this standard is potentially ecologically destructive. Morris finally subordinates the
authority of Nature that he adduces in "The Lesser Arts" to a subjective perception of
what the senses find pleasing. Even assuming that enough people agree on certain
general aesthetic principles to define a stable standard of "natural" beauty, this equation
of the aesthetic with the ecological health is dubious. A fetid pool, for example, may be
unattractive but still be an vital participant an ecosystem. Though a Morrisian aesthetics
could, for example, promote the preservation of wetland ecosystems, it could just as
easily promote their drainage for the sake of enhancing pastoral beauty.
Thus, Morris's positioning of humanity as the improver of Nature renders this
ideology subject to an anthropocentric dismissal of the non-human.. Morris himself was
not immune to this dismissive tendency. In his 1884 lecture, "Useful Work versus
Useless Toil," he adopts a rhetoric of "the conquest of nature" that is discordant with both
his "Lesser Arts" lecture of seven years before and his utopian Nowhere of six years
later. Distinguishing his socialism from the more limited aims of other socialists, he
says:
But though the compulsion of man's tyranny [over man] is thus abolished
[by abolishing class-robbery], I yet demand compensation for the
compulsion of Nature's necessity. As long as the work is repulsive it will
still be a burden which must be taken up daily (. . .1 What we want to do
is to add to our wealth without diminishing our pleasure. Nature will not
be finally conquered till our work becomes a. part of the pleasure of our
lives. ("Useful" 295)
The ideology voiced here is near--if not identical to--that of Nowhere. Social equality is
still a goal. The alliance of work with pleasure is still a central principle. What is
radically different is Morris's rhetorical approach to Nature. Here, Nature is not a friend
who holds the secret to a contented life. Instead, she is a force of material necessity
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compelling human labor. The compensation for this compulsion is the pleasure of
working, but the pleasure, in this phrasing, does not derive from helping Nature. Rather
its attainment is an indication that Nature has been conquered, completely subjugated to
human wants.
Indeed, Morris suggests that such a conquest is not only possible but imminent
because the physical means to achieve it are already available. In making this point, he
employs the terminology of violent domination:
Men [. I have laboured many thousands of years at the task of
subjugating the forces of Nature and of making the natural material useful
to them. To our eyes, since we cannot see into the future, that struggle
with Nature seems nearly over, and the victory of the human race over her
nearly complete [. . .] Surely we ought, one and all of us, to be wealthy,
to be well furnished with the good things which our victory over Nature
has won for us. ("Useful" 293; my emphasis)
Morris goes on, of course, to observe that we are not all thus well furnished However,
this is not because the conquest of Nature has not been achieved. Admittedly, his
qualification that the "struggle with Nature seems nearly over" because "we cannot see
into the future," suggests that he questions the imminence of humanity's victory. Yet
elsewhere, Morris's discourse indicates that this qualification critiques capitalism more
than the conquest of Nature. The struggle with Nature cannot be won in each
individual's life as long as economic squalor prevents all individuals from benefiting
from the victory. As Morris goes on to explain, "[T]he fruits of our victory over Nature
[have] been stolen from us [. . 1" by a capitalist power structure, in which pleasurable
work has "been turned into compulsion by man to labour in hope--of living to labour!".
(293). 5 While capitalism has prevented the mass of humans from benefiting from the
conquest of Nature, the conquest itself is imminent and desirable. This rhetoric of
conquest is both hostile and belittling to Nature. Not only is Morris's Nature an enemy
here; she is an enemy who has already been vanquished. One might observe that for a
society such as Morris's, which was still grappling with domestic and agricultural pests,
foul weather, excessive birth rates, disease, and death, this "conquest" of Nature is
extraordinarily limited. Yet the perception that a total conquest has been all but achieved
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was common in Victorian Britain and, indeed, is consistent with our own dominant,
capitalist ideology, which assumes that we can "handle" anything that "nature" throws at
us given a little technological ingenuity.
Given that "the conquest of Nature" is a standard trope of Morris's time, it is
likely that he adopted this trope not so much because it best expressed his own sentiments
but rather to appeal to his audience, the Hampstead Liberal Club, whose politics were
more conventional than his own. In this instance, however, Morris's intentions are beside
the point. The ease with which his discourse of Nature can be adapted to the imperial
language of conquest problematizes his ideology as a model for responsible ecocentrism.
The same perspective that tacitly makes humanity, not Nature, the ultimate standard for
beauty can explicitly reinscribe humanity as Nature's master: a dangerous misconception
for a species that only exists enmeshed in ecological relationships, many of which remain
outside of its control.
Romance, Realism, and the Dialogic in News from Nowhere
In News, Morris's ideological inconsistency is enabled by a rhetoric that
substantially rejects dialogism. As a means of exploring the type of ideological
contradictions that arise within real human communities, the dialogic is associated with
realism. But Morris writes less in the paradigm of realism than romantic vision. He
himself identifies the book as "some chapters from a Utopian Romance" (News 41). By
enacting types of experience beyond the logically explicable, the mode of romance opens
up imaginative possibilities denied to realism. This refusal of the confines of "realistic"
experience makes romance an apt form for the expression of utopian ambition. In
conceptualizing a radically refo,rmed future, a utopia may profit from rejecting limitations
imposed by what Fredric Jameson characterizes as the "anti-Utopian" mindset of the self-
described realist, who dismisses utopia as foolish and impossible. In contrast, as a
romance, News is free to portray a society as felicitous as Morris's imagination could
conceive.
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At first glance, News seems to depict a dream: the central narrative voice, self-
stylized as "William Guest," returns home from a typically contentious evening at the
Socialist League. 6 Preoccupied with imagining a utopian future, he falls asleep, dreams
of one, and at length reawakes to Victorian London. But the narrative structure is more
complex than this. A dream would be consistent with a realist narrative insofar as dreams
are part of our everyday experience. But such a commonplace experience would be easy
to dismiss as the mere fancy of a discouraged socialist. Instead, Morris presents Guest's
experience as more powerful than the ramblings of a sleeping mind. There are hints, for
example, that Guest's transition into the future occurs before he falls asleep. On his
unusually pleasant evening walk home, he wanders down to the bank of the Thames,
enjoys watching the water swirl, and "as for the ugly bridge below, he did not notice it or
think of it, except when for a moment [. .1 it struck him that he missed the row of lights
downstream" (44). Has Guest already passed into the utopia that has replaced the "ugly
bridge" with a bridge that is a work of art (48)? Or are his eyes merely playing tricks on
him?
Similarly ambiguous is Guest's departure from Nowhere. He does not simply
wake from his dream. Rather, after finding that he has become invisible to his futuristic
friends, he is greeted on the road by an aged, grimy man he immediately identifies as a
member of the Victorian working class. Shortly thereafter, "1 saw as it were a black
cloud rolling along to meet me [. .) and for a while, I was conscious of nothing else than
being in the dark, and whether I was walking, or sitting, or lying down, I could not tell"
(228). This darkness, which is, "as it were," a cloud, not necessarily an actual cloud,
suggests that Guest has not been swallowed by a literal blackness but by the metaphorical
dark of being thrust out of utopia. His inability to tell what physical position he is in,
likewise, might represent his confusion at losing the clarity of his vision. On a more
literal level, however, this same image might indicate an interim state between sleeping
and waking or between future and present The text never shows Guest waking. Directly
following his envelopment by the "cloud," the book's final section begins, "I lay in my
bed in my house at dingy Hammersmith" (228). At first, he assumes despondently that
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he has been dreaming, but almost at once, he wonders, "Or was it a dream?" (228). The
more he ruminates, the more he feels that he has been literally transported to the future
and back. He interprets his return to Victorian London as a call to pursue utopian work.
In the closing lines of the book, he takes up this challenge enthusiastically: "Yes, surely!
and if others can see it [a utopian future] as I have seen it, then it may be called a vision
rather than a dream" (228). Guest's characterization of his experience as a vision--almost
a prophecy--lends a weight to his tale that a realist frame would deny. Far from being a
mere "dreamer," Guest is a "visionary." Morris's use of romance encourages his readers
to consider that a future that appears unrealistic as an extrapolation of the Victorian
present is, nonetheless, possible.
Herbert Sussman argues that Morris's refusal of a realist context reinforces his
rejection of social extrapolation as a form. ? According to Sussman, extrapolative science
fiction demonstrates a plausible continuity between the present and the envisioned future
by showing that that future grows directly out of the ideas and inventions of the present
(121). Morris's Nowhere, however, is not an extension of dominant trends in Victorian
Britain but rather a break from them (Sussman 124), a post-revolutionary society in
which industrial capitalism has been dismantled and displaced by decentralized, rural
communism. Because Morris's utopia is discontinuous with the present, it cannot be
readily grasped through a realist narration that would describe it in terms of the known
details of everyday Victorian life. Instead, Sussman observes, Morris uses a
metaphorical descriptive strategy (123). For instance, Guest asserts that Dick's clothes
"would have served very well as a costume for a picture of fourteenth-century life"
(News 47). Morris uses the metaphor of fourteenth-century clothing to suggest things
about Dick's attire that could not readily be conveyed through a direct description. But if
Nowhere is not directly describable, it is not surprising that many readers have difficulty
imagining it with clarity. Sussman conjectures that "perhaps this problem of the
readability of News [. . .] can be said to prove Morris's implicit point about our limitation
of consciousness in expecting that the future will be knowable though the hard language
of the present" (126). News, in part, may be difficult to grasp not because it is
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implausible but because we--perhaps mistakenly--assume that the future will resemble
the present. If this is the case, then Morris's rhetorical departure from realist convention
is successful in challenging us to look beyond the usual limits of our social expectations.
Sussman observes, however, that although Morris's narration is more in the
tradition of "alternative" than "extrapolative" fiction, it does more than comment on his
society by imagining an alternative to it; in fact, it advocates a socialist politics that might
eventually lead to a society similar to Nowhere (127). News was first published in
installments between January and October 1890 in the Commonweal, a socialist paper
published by Morris (Parrinder 29). The primary audience for News, therefore, would
have been socialist activists. Andrew Belsey contends that despite superficial
identifications with Morris himself, Guest is in fact a socialist activist Everyman (349).
Intimations that old Hammond may be Guest's grandson suggest a symbolic relation in
which the utopians of the future are politically--as well as literally--the descendants of
present-day activists (Belsey 349). The frustration of Guest's romance with Ellen arid his
eventual return to his Victorian society represent the activist's need to remain grounded
in the present-day struggle in order to achieve a happier future (Belsey 349). Guest
explicitly expresses this need in the book's final paragraph, imagining Ellen's sad parting
glance to mean, "Go back again [. . . .1 Go on living while you may, striving with
whatever pain and labour needs must be, to build up little by little the day of fellowship,
and rest, and happiness" (News 228). In this light, Guest's vision can be seen as a "pep-
talk" for Morris's fellow socialists, evoking the prize he is calling them to struggle for,
This prize, therefore, must be a future that may be brought forth out of the Victorian
present If Nowhere is not intended to describe the specifics of a communist utopia, it is
intended to enact certain general principles which could be adopted by Victorian socialist
politics and used to bring about a genuine utopian future. In this sense, Morris's
Nowhere is extrapolative as well.
Yet this Nowheria.n society remains more "alternative" than "extrapolative"
precisely because it is not likely to arise out of the continuous progression of Morris's
own capitalist society. 8 Faced with the task of showing how it might arise, Morris
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develops a scenario which is unconvincing. Though he explains in some detail how
communist revolution resulted in the transformation of Victorian society into the
Nowhere he envisions, this transformation seems unlikely. John Crump discusses several
logical difficulties with Morris's revolutionary scenario: Morris's confining of the
revolution to Britain implausibly suggests that a single nation could readily withdraw
from an international capitalist economy (68-69); Morris posits "State Socialism" as a
stage in the development of decentralized communism, when, in fact, the State Socialism
he describes exists within capitalist society and would tend to support rather than
undermine it (69-70); although Moms acknowledges that corrupt union leaders existed,
he assumes too optimistically that they could not flourish in a climate of extreme social
crisis (71). Thus, while Nowhere provides an intriguing model for a different type of
society, Morris's extrapolative attempts to move his own society in that direction appear
wanting.
Much of this narrative implausibility stems directly from Morris's simplified
depiction of humanity, a simplification evident in his discussion of the ousting of corrupt
union leaders. Hammond concedes that
rascality often happened [. .} but at the time of which I am telling, things
looked so threatening, and to the workmen at least their necessity of
dealing with the fast gathering trouble which the labour struggle had
brought about, was so clear, that the conditions of the times had begot a
deep seriousness amongst all reasonable people; a determination which
put aside all non-essentials [. . .1 [Sjuch an element [of determination}
was too dangerous for mere traitors and self-seekers, and one by one they
were thrust out and mostly joined the declared reactionaries. (137)
My aim is not to demonstrate that, as a thumbnail sketch of a historical moment, this
course of events must be implausible. I would contend, however, that Hammond's
explanation is so generalized that it appears implausible. He describes humans almost
entirely as groups rather than individuals. He explains, for instance, that "things looked
[. . threatening." But threatening to whom? The absence of a differentiated agent
indicates that things looked threatening to society in general, in other words, to almost
everyone in Britain. Hammond's next sentence introduces an agent: "the workmen." Yet
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"the workmen" too are generalized: Hammond presents this vast segment of the British
population as being, for all intents and purposes, of a unanimous mind. Next, he tells us
that the crisis "begot a deep seriousness amongst all reasonable people" (my emphasis).
In fact, the only people who emerge as individuals separated from a group identity are the
"mere traitors and self-seekers" who "one by one" are thrust out and "mostly" join the
reactionaries, the suggestion being that some do not.
One of Morris's main points, of course, is that society must pull together to effect
the revolution: communism, after all, requires a commune, a group of people acting
together for the common good. "Self-seekers" are anathema to this process. But what is
elided in Hammond's explanation is legitimate human individuality. Is there not one
workman, who like Ellen's grandfather, believes that capitalism should not be
overthrown? Is there not one more or less "reasonable" individual who might face the
crisis not so much with "deep seriousness" as with jocularity? The obvious response is,
"Of course, such people existed. But they were so few and so out of step with the
Zeitgeist that they had little effect on the final historical movement." Hammond's
generalizations are almost certainly not intended to deny such exceptions. Yet exceptions
remain starkly absent from the text: if the statement that "all" reasonable people agree
does not literally mean "all without one exception," it is left to the reader to infer this.
Morris's lack of engagement with the individual human stories out of which such a
revolution would, in fact, be built suggests a lack of awareness of the diversity of
people's possible perspectives. The end result is a scenario that seems too facile.
Of course, the revolution section, as a historical digression, must be summarized
briefly. The book does not have space to focus on both individuals from 1952 and
individuals from the Nowhere that followed. However, Morris's tendency to simplify
humanity and collapse individual difference in his historical explication is part of a
broader rhetoric of simplification that is evident in his specific Nowherian characters as
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well. These characters, like his physical descriptions, often appear more as symbols for
the people of the future than as examples of them. Patrick Parrinder argues, for instance,
that in their final conversations, Guest and Ellen take on a symbolic function:
In fact, it seems almost anomalous that Guest and Ellen are presented at
this point as realistic characters, engaged in something so mundane as a
riverside flirtation. For if this had been, say, a poem by Shelley, we
should surely have seen Guest as the Ghost of the Past, and the ethereal
Ellen as the Spirit of the Future. When Ellen foresees that "I shall have
children; perhaps before the end a good many" [News 214], she is
speaking of all the future generations of Nowhere. Guest is the
manifestation of historical memory. (35)
Morris's book is not, of course, a poem by Shelley, Guest and Ellen not purely allegorical
figures. Nonetheless, the text does align the two with past and future respectively. At
one point, Guest and Ellen imagine the misery Ellen would have endured had she been
born in Victorian England: "I should have been wrecked and wasted in one way or
another" (223), she observes. This comparison with her happier Nowherian state
implicitly emphasizes her status as the iconic woman of the future. Similarly, what Ellen
calls Guest's "never-ending contrast between the past and this present" (222) highlights
his function as the Victorian outsider who may strive for but will never fully belong to
the utopian future. It is in keeping with Morris's dream-vision technique that his
characters should bear such symbolic functions: Ellen the future; Guest the past and the
role of "guest."
Yet as Parrinder observes of Guest and Ellen, Morris's characters exist in a realist
mode as well. They seldom have obviously symbolic names: Dick, Clara, Hammond,
Ellen, Annie, Walter. While one could search for etymological significance in the words,
they appear foremost to be good, simple, English names for simple, happy English
people. Moreover, the text depicts these characters as clearly differentiated,
psychologically distinct individuals engaged in the activities of their everyday lives. They
have their particular perspectives and problems. Dick, for instance, has had to suffer over
his wife, Clara's, desertion. Philippa, head stone carver among the Obstinate Refusers,
asserts her individuality by continuing her craft when custom expects her to participate in
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the annual haymaking (News 196). Ellen's grandfather laments the passing of capitalism
and the vivacity he believes competition ensures (174). To an extent, Morris's characters
do suggest unique human beings engaged in a type of dialogic communication.
Indeed, Belsey contends, "The reason why a description of the plot fails to reveal
the content of News from Nowhere is that most of the text is dialogue and discussion, and
therefore not the production of a single voice" (342). For Belsey, a type of dialogism is
central to constructing meaning in News. This dialogism functions, in particular, to
generate an ambiguous narrative frame by rejecting any single, completely coherent
account of Nowhere. For instance, while Dick says that the bridge Guest observes upon
his arrival was opened recently, in 2003, Hammond tells Guest that the utopia founded in
1952 has existed for about 150 years, indicating that the date is nearer 2100 than 2000
(Belsey 345). Though it is possible that this inconsistency was an oversight on Morris's
part, the confusion can also be read as part of a coherent rhetorical strategy. The point, in
this case, would be not that either Dick or Hammond is inept with dates but rather that
precise dates don't matter. Such multivocal discontinuities blur the edges of Nowhere's
"reality," reinforcing the subtitle's declaration that the story is a "romance" (News 41)--
or as the final line asserts, "a vision" (228)--an expression of possibility, not a rigid
prescription for the future.
This, however, is a multivocality in the service of romance more than realism.
Refusing to prescribe a precise utopian program, the fluidity of the romance mode leaves
open numerous possibilities for the application of a gingle set of principles. If a realist
dialogism explores numerous ideologies, the romantic multivocality of News explores
only one. Thus, while this multiplicity of voices may superficially resemble
heteroglossia, the resemblance of Morris's "dialogism" to the dialogic strategy described
by Bakhtin is limited. In "Discourse in the Novel," Balchtin states that the multivocal
nature of a national language "represents that co-existence of socio-ideological
contradictions between present and past, between differing epochs of the past, between
different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles,
and so forth [. . .1" (291). Cultural experience is too diverse to be reducible to a single
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discourse. Granting expression to multiple discourses through the dialogic interaction of
different voices highlights the complexity and ambiguity inherent in human culture and,
thus, works against the reification of culture around a single, unquestioned ideology.
Yet News, by and large, depicts a single ideology as so patently correct that it scarcely
needs to be questioned. Guest appears to bring up numerous potential objections to the
utopia: surely it must require formal schooling, a formal government, the incentive of
scarcity to spur labor; surely it cannot exist without prisons unless crime and corruption
run rampant. But we may question whether Guest, in fact, believes his own objections.
He is a nature-loving, aesthetically motivated socialist himself Preaching the values of
Nowhere to Guest is essentially preaching to the converted. The dominant conversational
form is nearer Socratic dialectic than Bakhtinian dialogism. Guest's questions and the
questions he is asked are not, in fact, designed to interrogate Nowhere but to open up
opportunities to defend it. When Hammond, for instance, explains that during one stage
of the revolution, "very great progress had been made amongst the workers, though as
before said but little in the direction of improved livelihood," Guest narrates:
I played the innocent and said: "In what direction could they
improve if not in livelihood?"
Said he: "In the power to bring about a state of things in which
livelihood would be full, and easy to gain." (136)
Guest, in fact, seems quite content with his role as enabler of utopian explication, even
"playing the innocent" in order to give Hammond opportunities to hold forth.
Certainly, Morris does allow a variety of voices to express different perspectives
on Nowhere, but their differences in opinion, though real, tend to be slight. Guest may
sometimes be genuinely dubious about a Nowherian custom, but, on the whole, he is
ready to be converted. The Obstinate Refusers are eccentric but fundamentally believers
in Nowherian ideology. The only significant voice of dissent is Ellen's capitalist
grandfather, and the text is at pains to dismiss him as a foolish, unpleasant old man. I
have already mentioned that as a capitalist, he has no regard for nature. He is discontent
with the charming June weather that everyone else enjoys (172). He disdains the sweet
singing of the birds, and when Clara cries out in appreciation of it, he asks her, "a little
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testily" if she has trodden on a thorn (172). Despite occasional moments of warmer
courtesy, his typical manner is described as "sneering" (174) and "sulky" (176). When
Guest compares Nowhere to heaven, the old man retorts, "I think one may do more with
one's life than sitting on a damp cloud and singing hymns" (176). This flight from their
discussion of the relations among competition, energy, and happiness into a tired
religious cliche is, as Guest rightly observes, an "inconsequence" (176). Inconsequential
is precisely what the old man is, his contribution to the text's dialogue intended to
repudiate capitalism, not to present an intelligent voice to defend it.
Thus, though dialogue is central to Morris's rhetoric, it is not used principally to
depict the type of irreducible multivocality described by Bakhtin. The text's rejection of
multiple valid yet divergent points of view further separates it from realism, which
typically represents such contrasting perspectives. In his concise description of the realist
novel, M. H. Abrams defines it as "the fictional attempt to give the effect of realism, by
representing complex characters with mixed motives who are rooted in social class,
operate in a developed social structure, interact with many other characters, and undergo
plausible, everyday modes of experience" (192; emphasis Abrams's). The "plausibility"
of Nowherian "modes of experience" is debatable; indeed, the extent of their plausibility
is a central issue for the text. But News undeniably diverges from Abrams's realist
characteristics in its substantial refusal to develop "complex characters with mixed
motives." As long as the characters' voices remain squarely in the service of a single
ideological project, the characters themselves cannot readily emerge as multifaceted,
sometimes conflicted, "realistic" people.
Of course, advocating a single ideology is a traditional characteristic of utopias.
Hence the perennial criticisms that utopia does not respect individuality. But the
rhetorical difficulty runs deeper even than this. Even if a utopia does not present a single
ideology as "ideal," even if it strives--more than Morris does--to incorporate dialogic
critiques, it must at least give the illusion of presenting a society as a whole in order to
communicate an overall impression of the place to readers who, manifestly, have never
been there. Yet the very particularity of human individuality thwarts this task. Ellen is a
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case in point. When near the end of their romance on the Thames, she announces to
Guest, "Oh me! How I love the earth, and the seasons, and weather, and all things that
deal with it, and all that grows out of it [. . .J" (220), the sentiment rings false, not
because many people do not, in fact, feel this way but because the pronouncement has the
tone of propaganda. Ellen appears to be a cipher voicing the ideology of her utopia more
than a person stating her own thoughts. She is so slightly developed as a character that
her avowal does not seem to emerge from a particular moment within the life experience
of a complex individual. Although she is given a great deal of dialogue, in which she
discusses numerous social and personal issues, Ellen remains the simplistic model of
Morris's ideal woman of the future: invariably beautiful, healthy, physically strong,
intelligent, friendly, capable, unaffected, loving, kind, and deeply aesthetic in her
sensibilities. She is perfect. Regarding Ellen's apostrophe on Nature, Kingsley Widmer
calls her a "pastoral nymph narcissistically projecting natural piety to resolve human
problems" (87). We may question whether Ellen resembles a "narcissistic nymph," but
she certainly does not resemble a real person. Despite occasional expressions of sadness
at the necessity of Guest's departure, Ellen is not conflicted enough, not flawed enough,
to feel "real"
But conversely, if Morris had developed Ellen as a truly individuated character,
she could not serve as a general representative of the utopian woman. The world seen
through her eyes would be Ellen's world, shaped by her own individual concerns. Just as
the society of the title town of George Eliot's quintessential realist novel, Middlemarch,
appears in a different light to Dorothea than to Lydgate, so would a character-driven
utopia lack any single, stable identity. But the project of utopia has traditionally been to
present a plan for managing a society: one society, managed one way by one set of
principles, which almost everyone can agree on. Move'too much into the realm of
individual difference, and the blissful utopia of Morris becomes the "ambiguous utopia"
of Ursula K. Le Guin. 9 The degree to which a society appears unified around a laudable
ideal diminishes in proportion to both the number and the depth of perspectives permitted
to question that ideal.
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News, then, is designed to be an inspiring, unabashedly optimistic "vision" of the
future more than a realist description of it. And though Morris's development of intricate
historical scenarios such as the revolution suggests that he set out to depict a utopia not
out of touch with the complexities of human nature and society, he did not set out to
depict an ambiguous utopia. News asks us to want the world it enacts--or one founded on
much the same values--unambivalently. Yet the rhetorical steps Morris must take to
present his utopia as an unambiguously "good" society make it a problematic one. It is
too good, too simple.
The Effacement of Dialogic Critiques of Nowhere's Discourse of Nature
Much of this oversimplification resides in Morris's view of Nature. I have argued
that Morris's identification of Nature as the standard for beauty breaks down at the point
where the intervention of human art becomes necessary for beauty to be optimized. On
an intuitive level, however, most of us can imagine scenarios in which this intervention
obviously would increase the "beauty" of "nature." If nature is loosely defined as that
which is not humanity or a human invention, it is difficult to get around the fact that, to
most of us, a great deal of it seems ugly. Even if some of us can locate the beauty in a
slug or a tick, it is difficult to find beauty in disease, putrefaction, excrement, starvation.
Yet these are all common elements of nature. Morris, however, is reluctant to engage
with such aspects. Just as his Nowherians are a consistent, unified, well-adjusted people
with little troubling variation, so, too, is the land of Nowhere a single, beneficent pastoral
space.
To be sure, like the people of Nowhere, the Nature of Nowhere is not completely
without variety or degrees of "beauty." One of the book's most overt acknowledgements
of unpleasantness in Nature is in its treatment of the seasons. Significantly, this treatment
occurs in a rare, genuinely dialogic moment in the text. Dick has expressed regret at the
passing of the gay summer and the coming of "the dark days" when "spring is almost too
far off to look forward to" (224). "It is, then," he says, "in the autumn, when one almost
believes in death" (224). This line is intriguing. While Dick is manifestly aware that
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death exists, his "almost" rhetorically denies it. This denial encapsulates a paradox in
Dick's thinking. He knows that Nature contains hardships such as death, yet he cannot
bring himself to accept the implications of this knowledge. Guest uncovers this
inconsistency when he challenges Dick's seeming preference for the seasons of life and
growth:
"At any rate," I said, "if you do look upon the course of the year as
a beautiful and interesting drama, which is what I think you do, you
should be as much pleased and interested with the winter and its trouble
and pain as with this wonderful summer luxury."
"And am I not?" said Dick, rather warmly; "only I can't look upon
it as if I were sitting in a theatre seeing the play going on before me E. . . .1
I mean that I am part of it all, and feel the pain as well as the pleasure in
my own person." (225)
Dick is attempting to express that while he loves every season for its own unique wonder,
he is simultaneously aware that some seasons contain more of "pain," of death and
darkness, than others. Living as a part of Nature, Dick feels this pain, like the pleasure of
Nature, as his own. The perfect idyll is a fantasy. Just as human lives are troubled by
sorrows such as Dick and Clara's divorce, so is Nature subject to its own pains. This is
News in its realist mode. And with the messiness of real life, Dick contradicts himself.
When Guest suggests that he "should be as much pleased and interested" with the winter
as the summer, Dick retorts, via rhetorical question, that he is. But plainly he is not. He
is pleased and interested to some degree in all seasons, but he has already avowed that he
is not "just as much" pleased with the winter; he prefers spring and summer. Perhaps
Dick's question is not as rhetorical as it appears; perhaps he truly is unsure of his attitude
toward the seasons. Guest's catching him in an inconsistency seems to unnerve him,
causing him to reply with a "rather warm" defensiveness. The passage is a prime
example of dialogism as a means of exposing the inner tensions that reside in an
ideology. Here specifically, the text illustrates the ambiguity of using Nature as a
standard for beauty when Nature itself is too varied to comprise one standard. To what
extent, for example, should winter be a standard for beauty if summer is more pleasing?
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Morris, however, retreats from these tensions. Guest does not pursue the issue.
Rather, in his own narration, he contents himself with praising Dick's passionate love for
Nature. Dick's defensiveness is incorporated into an unrelated movement in the text: the
slippage of Guest out of Nowhere. Throughout the chapter, the Nowherians become less
enchanted and involved with Guest, who is shortly to become invisible to them. This
disenchantment is implicitly attributed to Guest's disruptive influence as a non-utopian
presence. Dick, for instance, remarks that he feels as if Guest "had thrown a kind of evil
charm over me" (225). This disruption, however, is not attributed to Guest as an
ideologically questioning voice, for Guest is questioning the utopia less than he did in the
beginning. Rather, it is Guest's symbolic presence as the man of the past that does not fit
in Nowhere. Metaphorically, he must return home to the Victorian world because that is
where he can do the most good. Thus, the paradox surrounding Dick's love for Nature
that Guest inadvertently exposes is speedily covered over_ The dominant message
remains the simplistic correlation of Nature with pleasure, beauty, and happiness, an
oversimplification that obscures the contradiction inherent in considering Nature a
standard for beauty while improving that beauty through the (different) standard of
human art.
Humanity and Nature in the Garden
This confusion over the final priority of Nature or art emerges in News in a
discursive ambiguity over the concepts of the "garden" and the "wild," an ambiguity
reflected in traditional British concepts of the relation between human agency and
nature's agency. In traditional British usage, the uncultivated (wild) and the cultivated
(humanly managed) resist dichotomization, a tendency that has both positive and
negative implications, as I discuss presently. This resistance is the result of slippage
between two different paradigms for dichotomizing humanity and nature. One is the
opposition between "the country and the city," to borrow the title of Raymond Williams's
text on British pastoralism. Williams argues forcefully that this dichotomy is
fundamental to the divisions that underlie much of British culture: "The division and
opposition of city and country, industry and agriculture, in their modem forms," he states,
"are the critical culmination of the division and the specialization of labour which, though
it did not begin with capitalism, was developed under it to an extraordinary degree"
(304). Williams sees this division of city and country as inextricably connected to a host
of epistemological divisions, including mental and manual work, administration and
operation (304) and social classes (305). A city person, for example, is more likely to be
stereotyped as an "urbane" administrator, a country person as a rustic laborer on the land.
This opposition exists alongside a different human/nature dichotomy: the
opposition between cultivated and uncultivated land. In Man and the Natural World,
Keith Thomas orients his study of British attitudes toward nature around this distinction,
arguing that the years between roughly 1500 and 1800 saw a shift toward greater
appreciation for uncultivated land, which had traditionally been viewed as a "waste" in
need of productive human use. As uncultivated spaces dwindled, however, this attitude
began to give way to one which sought to preserve the uncultivated. Thomas ascribes
this new appreciation for the wild to several tendencies:
That concern [for preserving uncultivated land] had many ingredients: an
aesthetic reaction against the regularity and uniformity of English
agriculture; a dislike for the artificialities of the gardening movement; a
feeling that wilderness, by its very contrast with cultivation, was necessary
to give meaning and definition to the human enterprise; a preoccupation
with the freedom of open spaces as a symbol of human freedom CA
wilderness rich with liberty,' thought Wordsworth); and an element of
alienation or lack of sympathy for the dominant trends of the age
[. . . .] (267-68)
In this conception, the uncultivated is essential for human health and even human
identity.
Both these distinctions oppose humanity to nature. Nature is strongly present in
the country, humanity in the city. Nature reigns over the uncultivated; cultivation is the
triumph of humanity over nature. These two distinctions are not mutually exclusive: a
farm can differ from a city and differ from a wilderness at the same time. Taken
together, however, the two oppositions are subject to slippage. Williams restates his
city/country distinction as one between "industry and agriculture" (304). But the division
69
between cultivated and uncultivated flips agriculture from the side of "nature" to the side
of the "human." The "country," then, occupies a hazy zone that includes both cultivated
and uncultivated spaces, and the opposition of both these types of space to the "city"
tends to deconstruct the cultivated/uncultivated dichotomy. The key element in both
these dichotomies is the intensity of human intervention in nature, but there is no clear
point at which this intervention becomes negligible. When does a garden become a
wilderness? In a land that has been populated by agricultural people for many centuries,
there can be no definitive answer. In Britain, many a "waste" was once a farm and shows
traces of that history. Many a "garden" was once a wild forest later maintained by
pruners and game keepers. As I argue in chapter 1, this absence of a clear distinction has
positive ramifications insofar as it assumes that human activity may affect any natural
space, thus circumventing the myth of a pristine, untouchable nature and arguing in favor
of a global sense of responsibility for the environment.
Yet, if the city/country dichotomy partially-and productively--effaces the
cultivated/uncultivated dichotomy, the latter, nonetheless, is vital to British land and
species preservation movements. In Britain as elsewhere, the expansion of human land
use took a toll on non-human species. Thomas notes, for instance, that by 1800,
numerous bird species were diminishing, including eagles, goshawks, marsh harriers, hen
harriers, cranes, ospreys, ravens, buzzards, and bustards (275). Indeed, as a result of
intensified hunting and agriculture, the bustard was extinct in Britain by 1832 ("Russian"
9). Conversely, efforts to preserve uncultivated land aimed at the conservation of
species. In 1888, for instance, local councils began to develop by-laws to protect wild
plants (Thomas 273). If an advantage of a discursive non-disjunction between cultivated
and uncultivated spaces is a sense of global responsibility for the impact of humanity on
nature, a disadvantage is the tendency to disregard uncultivated spaces, leaving
insufficient habitat for many non-human species to persist.
Both the positive and negative potential of this discursive ambiguity is present in
News in the mobilization of the "garden" concept. The "garden" is an apt utopian image
for Morris: comprising both the human and the non-human, it epitomizes his ideal of a
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human society in harmony with Nature. Indeed, so complete is this harmony in
Nowhere, that the "garden" encompasses not only conventionally "gardened" spaces but
also the wilderness and the city. Hammond tells Guest that "England was once a country
of clearings [made by humans] amongst the woods and wastes, with a few towns
interspersed [. . 	 It then became a country of huge and foul workshops [. . . 1 It is now
a garden, where nothing is wasted and nothing is spoilt" (105). While the wild "woods
and wastes" are clearly preferable to the "foul workshops" of the industrial age, the
garden country is preferable to both. Hammond's avowal that "nothing is wasted" in the
garden contrasts with the "wastes," or treeless wilderness areas, a few sentences before.
"Waste" is an old word for "wilderness" (OED) and need not necessarily denote a failure
to utilize resources. Nonetheless, the proximity of the two usages in the text highlights
the slippage between them. The suggestion that undeveloped nature is, indeed, a "waste"
of potential human resources cannot be avoided. Hammond, then, characterizes the
transformation of all England into a "garden" comprised of a humanly useful nature as
one of the truly utopian accomplishments of Nowhere.
Hammond's grandson, Dick, however, voices a slightly different view. Leading
Guest through the "wild" (64) regrown woods of Kensington, he remarks, "This part we
are just coming to is called Kensington Gardens, though why 'gardens' I don't know"
(64). Dick's usage of the term "garden" is more restricted than Hammond's. While
Hammond would include Kensington as part of the garden of England, Dick excepts it
For Dick, what Guest describes as "a beautiful wood [. . .] where even the oaks and sweet
chestnuts were of good growth [. . .]" (64) is more a "wild" space than a "garden"
designed by human ingenuity. Compared to Hammond, Dick appears not to place so
high a value on the idea of domesticating Nature to human use.
Hammond's and Dick's respective uses of the term "garden" highlight the
slippage between "cultivated" and "uncultivated." It is not clear where one stops and the
other begins. The ambiguity of the garden concept could have been a site of productive
dialogic communication. We might imagine, for instance, that Dick is meant to have
different view of the "garden" from his grandfather. Perhaps Hammond, being by age
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more nearly tied to Guest's world of conquest and exploitation, is more concerned with
getting Nature properly domesticated, while Dick, more fully the child of utopia, does not
perceive the same need to define Nature in terms of human control of it. The text,
however, does not support this reading: it does not contrast Hammond's view with
Dick's, either through overt dialogue or clear juxtaposition.
The text does, however, offer a more direct comparison of the two concepts, a
confrontation which, once again, occurs in a moment with strong dialogic overtones.
Guest, having spotted a seeming contradiction in Hammond's avowal that Nowhere is a
garden yet contains wild spaces, challenges this contradiction: "One thing, it seems to
me, does not go with your word of 'garden' for the country. You have spoken of wastes
and forests [. .1 Why do you keep such things in a garden? and isn't it very wasteful to
do so?" (106). Here, Guest has, at least partially, observed a crucial conundrum. His
explicit question is why wilderness should be permitted in a garden. But the more
fundamental point is that wild spaces do "not go with your word of 'garden.'" The
cultivated/uncultivated dichotomy requires them to remain incommensurate categories: a
garden is cultivated; a wild space is not. Guest, however, apparently resolves the first
point to his own satisfaction by the time he gets to asking his questions since he does not
ask for any clarification of the two concepts. Here, the dialogism of the interchange
breaks down. Guest's challenge indicates a genuinely distinct perspective from
Hammond's, but the challenge is quickly submerged into a dialectic designed to illustrate
why Hammond's view is correct.
Unsurprisingly, Hammond has his answer ready: "`My friend,' he said, 'we like
these pieces of wild nature, and can afford them, so we have them [. .1" (106).
Nowhere keeps wild spaces as a pleasant corner of the broader garden civilization.
Hammond's articulation of the Nowherian ideal places human and non-human, cultivated
and wild, into harmonious coexistence within this overarching "garden." Moreover, for
Hammond, not only the "wild" but the "city," too, is encompassed by the "garden."
Williams argues that Morris's utopian London "is an imagined old London, before
industrialism and metropolitan expansion, and a projected new London, in the
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contemporary sense of the garden city" (273). To an extent, Morris, collapses the
distinction between country and city by giving the city characteristics of the garden, for
example, by transforming Kensington Gardens back into a genuine garden (or
wilderness). What is left in Nowhere's representation of the city/country dichotomy is
the "country," which makes no categorical distinction between the uncultivated and the
humanly managed. While the "wild" remains somewhat different from the "garden," the
two are not ontologically separate: a single space can be both wild and gardened.
I have argued that this non-disjunction has both positive and negative
implications. A positive ramification of this attitude in Nowhere is the society's
emphasis on "harmony." In a country that is, in essence, all one garden, the human and
the non-human coexist in a single space conducive to the health and happiness of all. A
more unsettling implication of this non-disjunction, however, is the devaluation of the
non-human. Hammond's reasons for Nowhere's preservation of wild spaces are purely
anthropocentric: humans like and can afford them. By implication, if Nowhere could not
afford wild spaces--or even if it could but did not "like" them--there would no moral
imperative to preserve them. The whole country would, indeed, resemble an'obviously
cultivated "garden." In this instance, human needs, and even wants, take precedence over
any intrinsic right of non-human Nature to persist without human management. The
anthropocentrism of this position is directly linked to Hammond's understanding of the
terms "wild" and "garden." The garden is the overarching context, the utopian space, the
irreducible setting that encompasses all other settings. The wild is a relatively
uncultivated space that exists within the garden: a part of it, subordinated to it. Though
Morris's utopia aspires to a non-dualist "harmony" of all life, it retains the
anthropocentric dualism of Morris's Britain. A "non-dualist anthropocentrism,"
however; is an oxymoron that enables the erasure of the non-human from consideration:
humanity remains central, while that which humanity is traditionally defined against is
effaced. This seems a curious accusation to make against Morris's otherwise strongly
nature-oriented and nature-loving Nowhere. And, indeed, Nowhere's impulse toward
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harmony between human and non-human undoubtedly outweighs its impulse toward
anthropocentrism. Yet the impulse toward anthropocentrism remains all the more worthy
of exposure precisely because it is veiled behind the more overt discourse of harmony.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that News from Nowhere, like many of Morris's writings,
provides both a useful critique of our current capitalist society and an inspiring "vision"
of an ecologically sustainable alternative to it. As a utopian vision, the book provides
general principles for utopian reform without applying them with a realist rigor. This
romantic generality is a strength of the text insofar as it keeps open a free play of
possibilities for specific applications, yet it is weakness in that it largely refuses a
dialogic interrogation of problematic elements in Morris's discourse. Therefore, while
we can learn much from Morris's alternative society, we must be wary of accepting his
ideology as an adequate underpinning for incorporating the values of sustainability,
pleasure, beauty, and the love of nature into our own way of life. Morris's ideology has
its inconsistencies. At some moments, Nature appears as an irreducible value humans
must live by; at others, humanity is the final determiner of how Nature should be used.
Morris's final inability to articulate a coherent paradigm for power relations between the
human and non-human, thus, leaves open the possibility of an anthropocentric
appropriation of his discourse in the service of the very models of exploitation he sought
to overturn. Specifically, Morris's insistence on a self-evident human aesthetic sense as a
standard for addressing the non-human could enable ecologically unwise decisions. For
though "natural beauty" may, indeed, often be allied with ecosystemic health, there is no
guarantee that this will be the case. Different people define beauty differently: for some,
a metropolitan skyline is lovelier than a forest. And even if a stable aesthetic standard
could be a established, it would not necessarily accord with ecosystemic needs: the
"ugly" vulture is a vital scavenger. A praxis that bases ecological policy on what is
pleasing to the human senses, thus, fails to investigate both human diversity and
ecological complexity.
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We cannot expect any ideology to be free of ambiguity and internal tension. We
can, however, interrogate ideological tensions through the dialogue of diverse voices. In
narrative, this dialogic strategy is closely allied to realism because it provides a means of
representing explicitly the muddiness inherent in the "real" human discourse of multiple
subjectivities. Morris is clearly aware that any society will comprise a variety of
personalities and viewpoints. Partially following the conventions of realism, he makes
some effort to create characters who have genuine individuality and, thus, opens up
possibilities for dialogic communication. In moments such as Guest and Dick's debate
over the seasons or Guest and Ilanunond's chat about the "wild," the text's investment in
realistic characters generates an incipient dialogism that poses vital questions about the
attitudes of Nowhere. These questions, however, are shunted aside. The dominant
literary form in News remains the utopian romance, an inspirational adventure in which
multiple subjectivities are pushed into the service of a single ideological prescription.
Moms presents his inspiring vision in all its June glory at the expense of developing a
more realistic--but perhaps less emotionally satisfying--argument for concrete social
reform. If News itself, however, is not a strongly dialogic text, it nonetheless participates
in an intertextual dialogism with authorial voices distinct from Morris's own. One such
voice is that of Morris's friend and admirer, George Bernard Shaw, whose radically
different approach to utopia I will examine next.
NOTES
/ Since Morris never defines his concept of Nature, I cannot precisely define it; in general,
however, this concept is comprised of a female-gendered, typically positive force more or less distinct from
humanity and most commonly embodied in the pastoral landscape.
2 Like many present-day environmentalists, Morris advocated the use of science where it could
genuinely benefit humanity but was wary of its appropriation for industrial capitalist purposes. He wrote,
for instance:
I fear she [Science] is so much in the pay of the counting-house and the drill-sergeant,
that she is too busy, and for the present will do nothing [to help society]. Yet there are
matters which I should have thought easy for her; say for example teaching Manchester
how to consume its own smoke, or Leeds how to get rid of its superfluous black dye
without turning it into the river, which would be as worth her attention as the production
of the heaviest black silks, or the biggest of useless guns. (qtd. in O'Sullivan 171).
3 A great deal of insightful criticism has addressed Morris's contributions to ecological awareness
and environmentalism. For example, Eric L. Fitch's "How Green Was My Utopia?" compares the utopian
ecological discourses of Morris, Wells, Ernest Callenbach. Paddy 0' Sullivan's "The Ending of the
Journey" offers an overview of News from Nowhere's contribution to environmental ideology. Kingsley
Widmer's "Primatopianism: Some Pastoral Utopianizing" chapter in Counterings contextualizes News
from Nowhere as part of the tradition of the pastoral Marxist utopia.
4 Communist states have clearly been implicated in environmental destruction Yet in "Marxism
and Ecocriticism," Lance Newman argues that the Soviet Union, in fact, practiced a form of state
capitalism through competition with the West (13). The same might be said of contemporary China.
5 This argument remains common in socialist circles today. Problems such as world hunger, it is
argued, are not the result of material scarcity but rather of inequitable distribution. There can be no doubt
that the vast and growing inequalities in the global distribution of wealth demand intensive interrogation.
However, following Latour's critique of purified categories, I am uncomfortable with a rhetoric that rejects
material scarcity as a factor in global poverty. Ross McCluney, Principal Research Scientist with the
Florida Solar Energy Center in Cocoa, Florida, argues, for instance, that with a global population of six
billion people, "Only [the number of] people in the U.S. and Europe [will have resources to live] at [our]
current level of affluence. Everyone else [must live] at the current prosperity level of Mexico." While I do
not have the expertise to evaluate McCluney's numbers, it is undeniable is that a continuously growing
population will reach the material limit of its resources sooner or later. To ignore this aspect of the
problem is as counterproductive as ignoring issues of distribution.
6 The Socialist League was founded by Morris and his compatriots after conflicts with the Social
Democratic Federation's leader, H. M. Hyndman, convinced them to break away from the SDF. Guest's




7 Sussman offers a sophisticated reading of News in the context of Victorian science fiction. He
categorizes the text as "soft science fiction," where "hard" SF attempts to extrapolate realistic future
scenarios based on present circumstances, while "soft" SF describes alternative societies nearer to fantasy
than hard fact (121). Though the terms "hard" and "soft science fiction" are notoriously slippery,
Sussman's distinction between "extrapolative" and "alternative" is useful in highlighting the two
fundamental rhetorical options available to social argumentation within science fiction.
Sussman links "extrapolative" fiction to the Victorian realist tradition, noting that both are typified
by a metonymic style, that is, a style in which certain objects are symbolic of social structures to which
they are closely related (123). In the Victorian realist novel, for example, "the damp room filled with
cooking odors [. . .] represents the HI banality of bourgeois life" (Sussman 123). "Alternative" science
fiction, in contrast, is marked by a metaphoric style, describing unknown objects by comparison with
known ones (Sussman 123). In Moths, in particular, Sussman observes a metaphorical technique in which
two known objects are used to identify a third which itself remains undeseribed: the dress of the people of
Nowhere is something between "classical" and "fourteenth-century" styles, but how exactly the garments
resemble these styles is left to the reader's imagination (123).
8 Like Sussman, Simon Denith considers this discontinuity with the present to be one of the
strengths of Morris's utopia. In his essay, "Imagination and Inversion in Nineteenth-Century Utopian
Writing," Denith contends that one of the pitfalls of utopian writing is the tendency not to develop a new
future so much as to invert elements of present society. For instance, Denith argues that Edward Bulwer-
Lytton' s The Coming Race enacts the author's fear of democracy by depicting a society in which
democracy is unnecessary (141-42): the text can be said to have "inverted" the institution of democracy. In
News, however, Moths "escapes from being trapped in the inverted categories of the present because [he]
can mobilize the weight of pre-capitalist forms" (Denith 157). He draws his material not only from his
present-day concerns, such as industrial capitalism, but also from the past: the medieval guild, for example.
By searching for the future in the past as well as the present, Moths is able, to some extent, to transcend the
ideological closures imposed by his present culture. This process is linked to dialogism insofar as it sets
two periods into "conversation." In rooting himself in two different Englands from two different historical
periods, Morris is able to cross the boundaries of both. This amalgamation of different historical epochs
creates a challengingly different type of alternative society.
9 The subtitle of Le Guin's The Dispossessed is "An Ambiguous Utopia." This novel's enactment
of an "ambiguous utopia" is discussed at length in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3
MA	 hit DOESN'T MAI 11R
NON-ANTIIROPOCENTRIC NON-ECOLOGY IN GEORGE BERNARD SHAW'S
BACK TO METHUSELAH
I brought life into the whirlpool of force, and compelled my enemy,
Matter, to obey a living soul. But in enslaving Life's enemy I made Life's
master; for that is the end of all slavery; and now I shall see the slave set
free and the enemy reconciled, the whirlpool become all life and no
matter.
Lilith, George Bernard Shaw's As Far as Thought Can Reach
introduction
Why George Bernard Shaw? The other authors I focus on are reasonably
straightforward choices: Morris's proto-green politics are exciting interest today; Wells is
notable for his work with both utopia and ecology; more recent science fiction is a
mainstay of utopian extrapolation in our contemporary world. But Shaw, today, is
considered neither an influential utopian nor any sort of ecologist The theory of Creative
Evolution to which he was so dedicated has been thoroughly discredited within the
scientific establishment In the post-Nazi world, his quasi-Nietzschean preoccupation
with the advent of the "superman" appears at best obsolete and at worst proto-fascist
Yet while such factors suggest that Shaw is irrelevant to the discourses that will shape
twenty-first-century ecological praxis, he is, in fact, surprisingly useful to an
investigation of those discourses. If Morris offers a model for a non-progressionist,




In his cycle of five plays, Back to Methuselah: A Metabiological Pentateuch
(1921), Shaw constructs "legends" of the utopian promise of Creative Evolution, which,
in Shaw's conception, locates the ultimate agency for the Neo-Lamarckian transmission
of acquired characteristics in a transcendent Life Force that drives all life and
reproduction. Following Samuel Butler, Shaw held that transmissible characteristics
included memories that could eventually be made instinctive. Any skill from bicycling to
speaking English could theoretically become as instinctive a knowledge as digestion. in
Back to Methuselah, Shaw argues that, with conscientious human application, the action
of Life Force could eventually lead to the victory of the soul over its enslavement to
matter, the result godlike beings of pure thought. While this project is "utopian" in that it
promotes what Shaw perceived as a vastly improved future for humanity, his view of
utopia bears some qualification. In his 1887 lecture, "Utopias," Shaw asserts that "it may
be taken as a rule that when a man builds himself a fanciful best of all possible worlds in
which to fly from the miseries of the real one, he invariably does what all amateur
architects do--makes it quite unfit for himself to live in" ("Utopias" 66). In this passage,
Shaw's invocation of Voltaire's satirical "best of all possible worlds" to describe a space
in which to "fly from the miseries of the real one" suggests that, to Shaw, utopia is
merely an escapist fantasy, an idealized society where flawed human beings could never
fit in. This view is reflected in Back to Methuselah. Shaw's cycle of plays presents no
pure "utopia," no ideal land. Instead, Shaw shows a succession of societies progressing
in a positive direction. He does not imagine a perfect goal to this process, only the
continuance of the process itself. This betterment of human society does not rely on
technological progress, although, like Morris, Shaw does not condemn specific
technological advancements that appear genuinely useful. Instead, Shaw's concept of
social progress requires humans to evolve: the humans of the future will be fit for a better
society precisely because they will have evolved into a better species. When I speak of
"utopia" in Back to Methuselah, then, I do not mean any single, "ideal" society but the
societies Shaw presents as reflections of the biological advancement of the human
species.
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Shaw's dualistic utopian aspirations for humanity's "metabiological"
advancement in Back to Methuselah are echoed in more recent and arguably more
influential narratives, such as Gene Roddenberry's Star Trek and J. Michael
Straczynski's Babylon 5, the latter of which I discuss at length in chapter 6. Yet because
Shaw wrote Back to Methuselah before the New Synthesis of Darwinian evolution with
Mendelian genetics had effectively quashed Creative Evolution as a "scientific"
movement, his plays articulate a philosophical and pseudo-scientific theory underlying
evolutionary and ecological assumptions that often remain unexamined in later utopian
science fiction texts. By engaging in detail with Creative Evolutionary theory, Shaw's
text makes explicit certain ideological assumptions that these texts often efface. One
such assumption of particular concern for ecological praxis is the relative unimportance
of ecological relationality. If evolution is driven by Life Force rather than selective
pressures in the environment, then energetic and material relations within the
environment are not a primary concern in the development of species. Indeed, Shaw's
emphasis on transcending matter suggests that ecological relations should ultimately
become irrelevant. The tendency of Shaw's Creative Evolution to dismiss ecological
relations could readily be used to support discourses that would subordinate ecological
issues to more purely "human" social and philosophical concerns. Moreover, this
unexamined dismissal is exacerbated by a largely dialectic rhetorical structure, in which
the didactic communication of the message of Creative Evolution undercuts the
narrative's dialogic elements, thus substantially refusing multivocal critique. Yet if
Shaw's discourse runs the risk of supporting an anthropocentric ideology that would
efface the non-human world, it, ironically, also decanters humanity, emphasizing that
humanity itself may be an evolutionary dead end destined to be superseded. If Shaw's
text, then, supports a certain disdain for the non-human, it just as strongly refuses
humanist adulation, aiming thereby to counter the hubris that might prove detrimental to
the future of humanity.
Cognitive Estrangement in Shaw's Legends of Creative Evolution
Back to Methuselah challenges humanity to promote itself as the best vehicle for
Life Force by developing a proactive faith in Creative Evolution. Indeed, in his preface,
Shaw contends that a much-improved civilization cannot be achieved without widespread
devotion to a religious faith that will support this end. Citing "[t]he success of the Hang
the Kaiser cry at the last General Election" as evidence, Shaw prophesies that "common
irreligion will destroy civilization unless it is countered by common religion" (1xxxiv).1
This common religion, he contends, must be Creative Evolution. Further, be argues that
like any religion, Creative Evolution can be most powerfully disseminated through the
use of "legends" that capture the imagination. Thus, with typical Shavian modesty, Shaw
offers Back to Methuselah "as a contribution to the modem Bible" (xix), a "pentateuch,"
as he subtitles it. He emphasizes, however, that his legends must not be read as facts but
as metaphors: "The reading of stories and delighting in them made Don Quixote a
gentleman," he explains; "the believing them literally made him a madman who slew
lambs instead of feeding them" axxxvii).
This mythic character of Back to Methuselah is most evident in its first play, In
the Beginning, a creative-evolutionary reworking of the Fall of Man. In Shaw's version
of the Fall, however, the Serpent is not Satan but a female who learned the secrets of
generation from the first mother, Lilith, who split herself in two to create Adam and Eve.
In this play, Shaw recapitulates the connection between evolution and gender that he put
forward in Man and Superman (1903). While he characterizes the masculine "superman"
as the goal of Life Force, he places the prime agency for achieving this goal in the hands
Woman, the mother.2 Shaw's Serpent, a mother herself, exemplifies this female agency,
initiating a Fall that presages a rise: an entry into the dynamic, progressive currents of
Life Force. The serpent educates Eve in the art of reproducing mankind: a process that
will spare Adam and Eve from the burden of immortality while allowing life itself to
progress indefinitely. Guided chiefly by the Will of Eve, Life Force begins slowly and
imperfectly to evolve humanity. Chief among the emerging humans is Cain, the warrior,
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who believes in glory through Neo-Darwinian struggle. As flawed a specimen as he is,
his type will persist even beyond the cataclysm of World War I, which form the
background for the second play.
Set in 1920 A.D., The Gospel of the Brothers Barnabas, focuses on the utopian
plans of brothers Franklyn and Conrad, who contend that the fundamental problem with
humanity is that people do not live long enough. Their companions, Burge and Lubin--
caricatures of former Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Herbert Henry Asquith--
are stereotypically inane politicians, yet they are inane only because they are still children
psychologically. As a biologist and Creative Evolutionist, Conrad is convinced that
humanity can combat this species immaturity by willing itself not to grow old. The
brothers have adopted the slogan, "Back to Methuselah," to inspire people to live as long
as the famous biblical longliver. Of course, Burge and Lubin do not believe the brothers
and launch no great political movement to get "Back to Methuselah."
Life Force, however, is no slave to politics, as the next play, The Thing Happens,
illustrates. Here, in the Britain of 2170 A.D., President Burge-Lubin and Accountant
General Barnabas carry on politics-as-usual. Yet unbeknownst to them, longlivers have
begun cropping up in the population. Specifically, two minor characters from the
previous play, the young clergyman Halsam (now an archbishop) and the Bamabases'
parlor maid (now Mrs. Lutestring), without any conscious effort, have simply continued
living. Their innate will to survive, perhaps augmented by memories of that long-ago
discussion in the Bamabases' parlor, has enabled them to achieve a mature adulthood.
Once they learn of each other's existence, they determine to marry and have children in
order to further the progress of the human species. Meanwhile, Burge-Lubin and
Barnabas contemplate with trepidation the implications of a burgeoning longliver
population for a shortliver society.
These implications are explored in depth in the fourth play, Tragedy of an Elderly
Gentleman. By the year 3000 A.D., the world is split into populations of shortlivers and
longlivers. The longlivers comprise two political parties, Conservatives and Colonizers.
While the Conservatives are in favor of sequestering their society from that of the
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shortlivers, the Colonizers advocate the extermination of shortlivers for the sake of
furthering civilization. On holiday to see the longliver Oracle, the Elderly Gentleman, a
proud shortliver descendant of the renowned "Bolge" and "Bluebin," makes so
unfavorable an impression on his longliver guide, Zoo, that he inadvertently converts her
from Conservative to Colonizer. Eventually, having lost faith in his own society, the
Elderly Gentleman begs not to be sent back to live with the shortlivers. His request is
granted: he is killed.
The final play, As Far as Thought Can Reach, picks up the progress of the
longliver lineage in the year 31,920 A.D. Now hatched from eggs, humans move through
all the recognizable stages of psychological development in their first four years of life.
Beyond this point, practically immortal Ancients continue their search for understanding
of the universe. These Ancients conclude that to perpetuate progress, they must evolve
beyond the body altogether, becoming pure energy with unmediated access to the
universe. The play ends with the return of the mythic figures of the first play, who
meditate on the current state of humanity While the Serpent, Cain, and Eve are satisfied
with human progress and Adam disdains progress in general, Lilith, the embodiment of
Life Force, holds that humanity has not yet progressed enough. To her, it seems they still
have far to go, farther even than her own thought can reach.
As an argument for a program of utopian social development, Back to Methuselah
is easy to criticize. One potentially serious criticism is that it undercuts practical efforts
for utopian reform by assuming that the only hope for humanity's salvation is, in essence,
to become a different species. Kingsley Widmer contends that a narrative that alters the
human species cannot be a legitimate utopian argument: "Fundamentally change the
premises [on which human society is based] by changing the beings--not just the
conditions, not just the emphasis--and the arguments (and utopias are arguments) tend to
the meaningless" (26). Here, Widmer is referring specifically to Wells's Men Like Gods,
which I discuss in the next chapter, but his statement might be more aptly aimed at Back
to Methuselah, which argues more explicitly that the human race must be fundamentally
altered. Widmer holds that reliance on an improved humanity to solve social problems
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avoids engagement with the problems themselves: "By definition, 'perfected' beings--or
`angels,' if one prefers a more ancient image—do not correspond to our language or other
experimental tests. What we have, then, is speculation so arbitrarily pure as to be
essentially false to the human. When anything goes, it does not go from here" (26). A
solution to a human problem that requires the elimination of what we understand to be
humans, Widmer argues, is not much of a solution If, for example, humans have an
unfortunate habit of initiating wars, the goal of utopian argumentation should be to
develop social structures that would make war obsolete, not facilely to propose that if
humans were less warlike, there would be less war.
Back to Methuselah is a prime example of this "form of pathological escape from
the human" to which Widmer objects (26). There is a notable lack of practical utopian
planning in Shaw's cycle of plays. While he does make alterations to social institutions,
suggesting, for example, that eugenics must be implemented and class distinctions and
sexual prudery eliminated, most of his argumentation exists in the more fanciful realm of
imagining a greater, healthier, wiser, more longlived human being who will naturally
manage things better than we do, no matter how he or she specifically goes about doing
so. The vagueness of Shaw's plan allows him to advocate values that appear
problematic if concretely applied. One such value is the goal of transcending the
physical world. The Ancients characterize this project as a type of liberation that will
enable them to "range through the stars" (Back 292). Rejecting the phenomenological
position that perception is always enabled and mediated by a physical sensory apparatus,
Shaw supposes that the spiritual self will experience the universe more immediately and
fully than the physical self, which is limited by the input of its senses. He does not,
however, produce an argument to substantiate this contention. Still less does he describe
what this perception might be like or why it should be considered valuable, beyond the
vague assurance that it will escape physical limitation. In this respect, Shaw's text fails
to meet Widmer's definition of a valid utopian argument.
Yet while this failure does reveal limitations in Shaw's vision, it also indicates
that Shaw is performing a type of utopianizing different from that which Widmer
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addresses. Widmer presupposes that a utopian narrative will be constructed in a "realist"
mode: he expects the people and institutions described to fit plausibly within our
understanding of human nature. Shaw's dominant mode, however, is satire, not realism.
His aim is to produce scripture, an edifying myth, not a "realistic" program for social
reform. In a 1921 letter to St. John Ervine, Shaw himself articulates his inability to
develop a "realistic" longliver utopia:
In Methuselah I could not shew the life of the long livers, because, being a
short liver, I could not conceive it To make the play possible at all I had
to fall back on an exhibition of the shortlivers [sic] and children [of the
Ancients] in contrast with such scraps of the long life as I could deduce by
carrying a little further the difference that exists at present between the
child and the adult [. .] (Bernard Shaw 532)
Here, Shaw expresses concisely both his narrative problem and his tactic for addressing
it Just as a prehistoric primate could not explain human civilization, Shaw could not
attempt any sort of literal depiction of a future whose inhabitants would be more evolved
than he himself Thus, much as Morris's "vision" in News from Nowhere offers a
possible future without prescribing a rigorous program to achieve it, Shaw's "legends"
reinforce a general evolutionary paradigm without requiring concrete description of
practices Shaw could not imagine. Instead, Shaw uses three techniques to suggest the
future. First, as his letter explains, he constructs human evolution via analogy: Shaw
cannot conceive of the distinction between longliver and shortliver, but he can conceive
of the distinction between adult and child. Thus, he extrapolates on those known
differences to convey an impression of the differences that must remain unknown.3
Second, as I have already noted, he stresses the metaphoricity of his narrative: we must
evolve, he argues; that does not necessarily mean that we must literally evolve into a
form that is hatched from eggs. Indeed, Peter Gahan contends that even Shaw's basic
argument for life extension should be read metaphorically as a call for the extension of
our imaginative powers (220).4 Finally, Shaw illustrates the superiority of the more
highly evolved by contrasting it with the inferiority of the less evolved. In each play,
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therefore, the less evolved become the objects of satirical derision. These techniques do
not produce a proposal for a specific type of utopian future, but they do produce a
genuine argument.
A more useful paradigm than Widmer's for examining Shaw's argumentation is
Darko Suvin's concept of "cognitive estrangement" Suvin has famously defined science
fiction as "a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and
interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an
imaginative framework alternative to the author's empirical environment" (7). In this
formulation, science fiction is "estranging" in that it depicts alternatives to social and
environmental conditions that the reader might ordinarily be expected to accept as
necessary and natural: it might, for instance, portray a society that exists without gender
or one that has achieved functional immortality. Science fiction is "cognitive" in that it
posits and enacts a rational universe: its explanations for the events it presents are
scientific and socio-historical rather than magical or mystical. Science fiction, of course,
is not synonymous with utopia and dystopia; nonetheless, cognitive estrangement can be
a powerful tool in the literary construction of a utopian or dystopian argument. The
estranging effect encourages readers to explore alternatives to the social structures they
might otherwise take for granted. The cognitive effect suggests that such alternatives
might be plausibly produced through the application of the same institutions of science
and reason that the post-Enlightenment world relies on to shape society.
While Back to Methuselah can aptly be described as a work of cognitive
estrangement, it is more estranging than cognitive. The central "cognitive" aspect of
Shaw's cycle of plays, its claim to plausible application, is the "science" of Creative
Evolution. Today, of course, there is no doubt within the scientific community that
Creative Evolution is an incorrect hypothesis. Even within the context of the science of
1920, Shaw's grasp of evolutionary theory is tenuous. He can produce no evidence that
acquired characteristics are transmitted from parent to offspring. Like Lamarck, he
contends that the vast amounts of time often necessary to create a noticeable evolutionary
change may make the inheritance of acquired characteristics impossible to observe from
generation to generation. This argument, however, only indicates that Lamarckian
evolution had not, as of 1920, been disproved, not that it is a correct hypothesis.
If Shaw's Creative Evolution is less than scientifically rigorous, his understanding
of Neo-Darwinism is also lacking. Crucially, he fails to account for the broad acceptance
within Neo-Darwinism that consciousness can be selected for, remarking that "there is no
place in Darwinism for free will, or any other sort of will [. .1" (lix). Shaw's complaint
relates to legitimate concerns that Neo-Darwinism was overly deterministic,
insufficiently concerned with the complexity and variety of human minds, and too eager
to dismiss the possibility of transcendent spirit. Nonetheless, a cursory examination of
the work of Neo-Darwinian Wells, whom Shaw knew and read, should illustrate that
Neo-Darwinism need in no way deny free will or any other plainly existing human
quality. Wells's Time Traveller, for instance, is an explicit product of natural selection
and also a strong willed and thoughtful scientist.
If Shaw's science is weak, however, his text offers compensatory strengths. Shaw
remarks in his preface that "the validity of a story is not the same as the occurrence of a
fact" (xm). Here, he is referring to the interpretation of metaphors, not to his evolutionary
theory, which he did hold to be factually correct. Nonetheless, this statement offers a key
for approaching Back to Methuselah, a set of legends Shaw identifies as
"metabiological," reaching beyond purely verifiable scientific facts toward a transcendent
philosophy of biology. Though Shaw's evolutionary theory is wrong, it still serves the
useful function of estrangement, challenging his audience to reassess its attitudes toward
humanity and humanity's future. If Shaw's evolutionary beliefs provide an estranging




In fact, Shaw's chief rhetorical mode, satire, is inherently an estranging rhetoric.
By exposing accepted practices to ridicule, it encourages us to question our acceptance.
In classical terms, Shaw's satire is Menippean, a style M. H. Abrams describes as typified
by "a series of extended dialogues and debates [. . .] in which a group of loquacious
eccentrics, pedants, literary people, and representatives of various professions and points
of view serve to make ludicrous the attitudes and viewpoints they typify by the arguments
they urge in their support" (277). It is something of a critical commonplace to dismiss
Shaw's characters as "mere mouthpieces for ideas," as the New American Library's
Reader's Companion to World Literature puts it (671). Admittedly, this reading of
Shaw's drama is oversimplified. Though his characters typically do represent certain
perspectives, they do not necessarily lack psychological depth. indeed, Richard F.
Dietrich credits Shaw with the development of "an entire system of psychological
analysis," based on the categories of Realist, Idealist, and Philistine, which Shaw
delineated in The Quintessence of Ibsenism (1890) (Dietrich 149). Though Dietrich's
argument is convincing, it is significant that he does not include Back to Methuselah in
his discussion. Because the plays in this cycle are short, each character has little time on
stage and, thus, small opportunity for subtle development. Thus, in this instance, many
characters are, indeed, little more than ciphers for certain viewpoints, which Shaw wittily
exposes as ridiculous. Such satire is a useful means of raising challenging questions, but
it is not well-suited to providing answers. Satire is designed to distort and mock; this
makes it an apt tool for describing a dystopia. It is difficult, however, to present a social
system as highly positive while simultaneously mocking and distorting it. In Back to 
Methuselah, Shaw addresses this difficulty by using satire to expose problems with
human civilization while reserving more "reasonable" argumentation for prescribing
solutions to these problems.
This strategy is evident in The Gospel of the Brothers Barnabas, in which Burge
and Lubin exemplify the decrepitude of British politics. Burge styles himself as a
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Liberal, a social reformer. Yet he does little but utter platitudes in an attempt to disguise
his ideological inconsistencies. In discussing his stint as Prime Minister during the war,
he illustrates his hypocrisy in conversation with Franklyn:
FRANKLYN. [. .] I know who you are. And the earth-shaking part of
it to me is that though you were placed in that enormously responsible
position [of steering the British state through the war], neither I nor
anyone else knows what your beliefs are, or even whether you have
either beliefs or principles. What we did know was that your
Government was formed largely of men who regarded you as a robber
of henroosts, and whom you regarded as enemies of the people.
BURGE. (adroitly, as he thinks) I agree with you. I agree with you
completely. I dont believe in coalition governments.5
FRANKLYN. Precisely. Yet you formed two.
BURGE. Why? Because we were at war. That is what you fellows never
would realize. The Hun was at the gate. Our country, our lives, the
honor of our wives and mothers and daughters, the tender flesh of our
innocent babes were at stake. Was that a time to argue about
principles? (56; brackets with emphasis Shaw's)
Burge amply illustrates why, as Franklyn attests, no one knows what his beliefs are.
Burge explains that during the war he formed two coalition governments--despite the fact
that, in principle, he objects to them--because war is a time when principles must be
suspended. They must be suspended in order to keep the Germans from doing
unspecified but presumably untoward things to the usual assortment of sacred trusts one
is expected to hold dear: life, nation, the purity of woman, the welfare of babies. But to
value these trusts--as more than mere platitudes--is a matter of principle. In essence,
Burge claims to have suspended his principles in the name of certain principles. What he
demonstrates is that he has no clear principles to suspend. He will do or say whatever
appears politically expedient
If Burge plays the reformer, Lubin is convinced that nothing substantive can
change. Only names, he asserts, from time to time, can be altered: "If it will be easier to
carry on the business of the country on the understanding that the present state of things
is to be called Socialism, I have no objection in the world to call it Socialism. There is
the precedent of the Emperor Constantine, who saved the society of his own day by
agreeing to call his Imperialism Christianity" (72). On one level, Lubin is perceptive:
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there is no dearth of philosophies whose names have been coopted exactly as he
describes. Nonetheless, the text holds Lubin's position up to ridicule. His way is
defeatist at best, actively oppressive at worst. Following the precedent of Constantine, he
would crush reform movements by appropriating their positive connotations to describe
the same old institutions that perpetuate human misery.
Burge and Lubin together represent contrasting types of political incapacity.
Burge twists like a weather vane in the winds of public opinion; Lubin sticks like a limpet
to his immutable laws of human society. If the one embodies constant change without
direction, the other embodies the refusal to acknowledge the possibility of change. This
contrast is underscored by Burge's and Lubin's criticisms of each other. Lubin tells
Burge, "You represent [. . .] mere energy without intellect and without knowledge. Your
mind is not a trained mind [. . .]" (81). Burge is extremely active but intellectually
incapable of directing his action meaningfully. Burge, for his part, accuses Lubin of
having "no foresight and no hindsight [. . .] no vision and no memory [. . .] no
continuity" (80), Lubin exists outside of history, standing by one system of values,
which he deems to be unalterable. Through the dialogue of Burge, Lubin, and the
Brothers Barnabas, Shaw holds the politics of his day up to scorn.
He makes it clear, however, that Burge and Lubin are not particularly inept
individuals, nor are politicians as a class especially inept. After Franklyn has accused
both Burge and Lubin of inadequate leadership, Conrad hastens to explain, "We're not
blaming you: you hadnt lived long enough. No more had we. Cant you see that [living to
be] three-score-and-ten, though it may be long enough for a very crude sort of village
life, isnt long enough for a complicated civilization like ours?" (82). The human race, as
a whole, simply does not live long enough to amass the experience necessary to manage a
modern civilization. Thus, Burge and Lubin, though laughable, are no worse than the rest
of us. As John Barnes contends, "The audience must be unhappy with the [satirical]
characters but it must not blame the characters for their unsatisfactory qualities" (158).
Shaw softens his satire by sparing those he ridicules from personal blame. But by the
same token, he extends the blame to all of humanity for its incapacity.
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Shaw's satire of figures such as Burge and Lubin is estranging in that it invites us
to regard leaders of the human race, and by extension the whole human race, as
biologically inadequate. Particularly within a utopian text, this move is unusual. As
Widmer's delineation of proper utopian argument illustrates, a utopia of any plausibility
is generally predicated on the assumption that the human species as it is could achieve a
highly favorable society, an assumption Shaw did not share. Shaw's text estranges us by
requiring us to examine the unsettling possibility that nothing short of a species-wide
biological change can improve humanity's lot.
But though everyone in Back to Methuselah is inadequate in the sense that no
one--not even the Ancients--has fulfilled the evolutionary potential of Life Force, not
everyone is exposed to satirical critique. The view of Conrad and Franklyn Bamabas, for
instance, is depicted as sensible. They hold to a single program for improving society
without internal contradiction. Moreover, Shaw presents their views as grounded in
sound evolutionary science: Conrad is a biologist, and when Franklyn's daughter, Savvy,
remarks that "Darwin is all rot" (70), no one challenges her. Thus, The Gospel of the
Brothers Barnabas adopts a rhetorical structure in which Menippean satire, enacting the
ridiculousness of the satirical speakers, is combined with a more shaightforward
elucidation of the principles of Creative Evolution, which, the text argues, socially
progressive people ought to espouse.
This structure is repeated throughout all the plays. In In the Beginning, the
satirical element is comparatively muted. While the text endorses the Serpent as the
voice of Life Force, the human characters who only imperfectly understand her are often
more innocent than ridiculous: Adam and Eve's initial unfamiliarity with death, for
instance, does not seem worthy of derision_ The final three plays, however, closely
recapitulate the structure of the second. In The Thing Happens, Burge-Lubin and
Barnabas are held up to satirical scorn, while the Archbishop and Mrs. Lutestring make
the case for a sensible dedication to Life Force. In Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman, the
shortlivers are ridiculed, while the longlivers are presented as voices of reason. In As Far
as Thought Can Reach, the "children" become the objects of satire and the Ancients the
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voices of wisdom_ Shaw negotiates the difficulty of using satire as a tool for utopian
argumentation by largely exempting his own utopian program of evolutionary progress
from satirical treatment.
In keeping with the Menippean model's conversational rhetoric, this endorsement
of a utopian philosophy via derision of "inferior" philosophies is constructed almost
totally out of discussion. It is discussion that separates the fools from the comparatively
wise and, ultimately, reveals the desirability of one school of thought over another. For
Shaw, talking was often more central than "action" to achieving dramatic resolution.
Christopher Inns notes that in The Quintessence of Ibsenism, Shaw identifies an
emphasis on discussion over Aristotelian "action" as the revolutionary element in Henrik
Ibsen' s drama (Imes 162). Inns contends that Shaw adopted this centralization of
discussion as a defining feature of his own drama. Indeed, Innes asserts, "The only
distinct theatrical form Shaw originated was what he labeled the `Disquisitory Play,'" a
play based on extended discourse about a topic (163). But if Shaw's text is a fabric
woven of interacting voices, his technique is more dialectic than dialogic. Instead of
placing mutually challenging voices into a Bokhtinian polyphony, Shaw develops a
rhetoric in which the ridiculous are schooled by those wiser than they. Such
conversations serve the dual function of criticizing the objects of the satire while
advocating a more utopian future through Life Force.
Dialogic Tensions in Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman
Though the satire may be trenchant, the utopia is hard to embrace, not least
because the characters who represent it are difficult to sympathize with. Crucially, these
characters lack much of the common range of human feeling, refusing friendship, sexual
love, and, to a large extent, even compassion. Shaw constructs this emotionally stripped
psychology deliberately as a model for the more highly evolved human being, as he
explains in a 1923 letter to Robert Thomson: "My intellectual interests, in science, in
history, in philosophy, in design and evolution, have been so much more lasting and
dignified than the more primitive and fleshy interests that I can conceive of no better
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paradise [to present in Back to Methuselah) than one in which they have developed into
passions and become ecstatic" (Bernard Shaw 813). Here, Shaw most likely draws on the
etymology of "ecstatic" to indicate standing outside of a physical body. ln giving a
disembodied intellectual passion precedence above interpersonal human caring, Shaw
substantially rejects at least one value we typically consider indispensable to human
society: empathy, the ability to vicariously feel another's feelings. A society without this
basic interpersonal tie may seem "utopian" in much the same way as Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World: the people inhabiting it may be pleased with it, but few of us would
advocate it as a model for our future. Indeed, Huxley himself apparently noted the
parallel: in Brave New. World (1932), the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning cites
Shaw as "one of the very few whose works have been permitted to come down to us"
(24). "Shaw" is also one of a select group of surnames retained for members of the Brave
New World (154). Though Shaw's utopians are presented as positive evolutionary steps,
they often seem less superhuman than inhuman.
The text itself, however, actively confronts this "inhumanity" in its "supermen."
The plays' dramatic structure contains more nuance than a mere lecture to the ridiculous
by the wise. The basic argument of Back to Methuselah is that humanity must evolve to
survive. More particularly, Shaw suggests that . Life Force will drive evolution in a
direction that will ultimately sever the ties of the spiritual to the material, granting the
spirit liberation from its enslavement to matter. He does not, however, present this
liberation as coming without cost. David J. Gordon sums up the narrative tension of
Back to Methuselah: "Here, as always, Shaw sided with spirit [over body], but there is
enough resistance to this ultimate version of the sublime, enough irony, to make effective
drama" (164). The text is not so fervent in its adulation of the future that it lacks a sense
of pathos for the vanishing past. The less evolved world, the world humanity must
supersede, is our world. Though much of it is deplorable, much also commands our
affection. To illustrate this point, Gordon highlights Shaw's ironic use of a work of
dramatic art to advocate the Ancients' abandonment of art: "From the Ancients point of
view [. . .] art may indeed be surpassable. But that is only to emphasize, obliquely, its
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fundamental human importance" (165). Though a time may come when humanity has
evolved beyond the need for art, the very writing of Shaw's plays reminds us that that
time is not yet. As an audience reading or watching Back to Methuselah, we are even
encouraged to identify with the artists the Ancients dismiss as mere children. Thus, the
message is not simplistic. Because we are not yet evolved enough to understand the
Ancients' wisdom, we must accept the superiority of their judgment. At the same time,
our very identification with the superseded values of the children prompts us to lament
their supersession.
The plays' pathos is most evident in the aptly named Tragedy of an Elderly
Gentleman, in which the kind and decent title character, a shortliver, must confront the
"tragic flaw" of his own evolutionary inadequacy. This sense of tragic loss is heightened
by the dubious callousness and cold calculation of certain longliver practices. In some
ways, the outmoded Elderly Gentleman appears more moral than the society that has
surpassed him. At the same time, the text presents longliver society as an indisputable
improvement over shortliver society. In this play, Shaw depicts a human population
consisting of individuals who live to be around three hundred. A group of shortlivers has
come to longliving Britain to consult the Oracle, who, they believe, can guide them
through the petty political shenanigans they face back home in Baghdad, now capital of
the shortliver British empire. Shaw mocks the naivete of the shortlivers' faith by
emphasizing the superficiality of the spectacle that the longlivers put on for the
shortlivers' benefit. The Oracle projects her image onto a screen to create the kind of
grand impression the shortlivers expect. She herself feels no need to do this. In fact, she
is so impressive in person that the shortlivers are in danger of dying if they look closely
at her. The shortlivers, however, demand childish spectacle. Like children, they focus on
material trappings, battles over social prestige, and superstitions. Longlivers, in contrast,
have no need of such rubbish; they live straightforwardly, securely, productively, and
recognize tomfoolery when they see it.
The longlivers' pragmatism has led them to revise many familiar social practices.
They have, for example, effectively abolished marriage, prudery, intense anger, religious
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superstition, sexism, blushing, and heavily metaphorical language. They have also
implemented eugenics. Zoo, a fifty-six-year-old young woman, remarks to the Elderly
Gentleman, "I specialize in babies. My first was such a success that they made me go
on" (Back 172). Reproduction is managed by longliver society--Zoo's "they"--rather
than individual parents. Zoo does not characterize her society's "making her go on" as
coercive. As a sensible member of a longliver society, she does not see any conflict
between her personal choices and the social good. She explains, "Like all young things I
rebelled against [longliver society]; and in their hunger for new lights and new ideas they
listened to me and encouraged me to rebel. But my ways did not work; and theirs did;
and they were able to tell me why. They have no power over me except that power [. .]"
(186). Far from being coercive, then, Zoo's society has simply found a social system so
workable that practically any exercise in logical argumentation will have to conclude that
the longlivers have the right idea.
Yet even if we accept that the government of longliver society is based purely on
reason, not oppression, it is difficult to wholeheartedly embrace certain longliver
attitudes. When the Elderly Gentleman asks Zoo what her people would do with their
undesirables if they could not exile them to shortliver countries, Zoo answers flatly, "Kill
them. Our tertiaries [in their third century of life] are not at all squeamish about killing"
(197). The longlivers' pragmatism dictates that the needs of their civilization outweigh
such trivial concerns as an individual's life. In fact, the longlivers' contemplation of a
program of shortliver genocide indicates their conviction that the progress of longliver
civilization may outweigh the lives of all shortlivers.
Yet for all their unsentimental pragmatism, the longlivers are reluctant to accept
responsibility for the deaths they precipitate. There is a hint of equivocation in Zoo's
description of how a degenerate longliver often "refuses to live" (196). She explains that
"[h]e simply dies. He wants to" (196), but one wonders if his death is as voluntary as
Zoo suggests, particularly in light of the Elderly Gentleman's demise. When he begs the
Oracle to allow him to stay in Britain, she warns, "My friend: if you stay with us you will
die of discouragement," the ailment that claims most shortlivers in the longliver countries
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(230). Yet when the Elderly Gentleman does, in fact, die, it is as a direct result of the
Oracle taking his hands and "[looking] steadily into his face" (231). Has he died of his
own discouragement, or has the Oracle actively killed him? After his death, she reflects,
"Poor shortlived thing! What else could I do for you?" (231). By her own account, she
has taken active agency in "doing" something "for him." According to the longliver
mind set, however, the distinction between actively killing someone and incidentally
inspiring a kind of suicide is functionally non-existent. The weak-willed kill themselves
with their own weak wills. And because this belief is perfectly in keeping with the
mandate of Life Force, the longlivers admit to neither regret nor remorse over the deaths
of such individuals. To lament over the deaths of inferiors would be counterproductive
sentimentalism.
But if the longlivers reject such sentimental concerns as regard for inferiors' lives,
the text itself does not. An argument in which Zoo threatens to kill the Elderly
Gentleman illustrates both the longliver mind set and the shortlivers' understandable
objections to it. In presenting this irreducible moral conflict, the text moves out of
dialectic and into dialogic discourse. At the same time, the text so tightly circumscribes
this dialogism that Shaw's creative-evolutionary message is never seriously called into
question. Gordon contends that in the conflicts in Back to Methuselah, "the author's
sympathy seems directed less toward the victim than the judge" (168): Zoo's contention
that the Elderly Gentleman deserves death is presented as more "correct" than his
resistance to her pronouncement. But if the text ultimately sides with Zoo, it does not
dismiss the Elderly Gentleman, who states his own innocence in persuasive terms.
Indeed, in many respects, the Elderly Gentleman is presented as the more mature and
reasonable of the two.
The argument between the Elderly Gentleman and Zoo comes to a head when he
insults her by calling her "a primary flapper playing at being an oracle," indicating that
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because she is still in her first century of life, she is merely a self-important adolescent
(190). When she responds by calling him "silly," he shoots back, "Hold your tongue!"
(190). The interchange continues:
ZOO. Something very disagreeable is happening to me. I feel hot all
over. I have a horrible impulse to injure you. What have you done to
me?
THE ELDERLY GENTLEMAN. (triumphant) Aha! I have made you
blush. Now you know what blushing means. Blushing with shame!
ZOO. Whatever you are doing, it is something so utterly evil that if you
do not stop I will kill you.
THE ELDERLY GENTLEMAN. (apprehending his danger) Doubtless
you think it safe to threaten an old man--
ZOO. (fiercely) Old! You are a child: an evil child. We kill evil children
here. We do it even against our own wills by instinct. Take care.
THE ELDERLY GENTLEMAN. (rising with crestfallen courtesy) I did
not mean to hurt your feelings. I-- (swallowing the apology with an
effort) I beg your pardon. (He takes off his hat, and bows). 1. .1 I
can say no more than that I am sorry.
ZOO. You have reason to be. That hideous sensation you gave is
subsiding; but you have had a very narrow escape. Do not attempt to
kill me again; for at the first sign in your voice or face I shall strike
you dead.
THE ELDERLY GENTLEMAN. I attempt to kill you! What a
monstrous accusation!
E. ...]
ZOO. I know you are a murderer. It is not merely that you threw words at
me as if they were stones, meaning to hurt me. It was the instinct to
kill that you roused in me. (Back 191-92; emphasis Shaw's)
By our standards, the party more at fault in this interchange is Zoo. Unable to
comprehend that Zoo is more than a mere "flapper," the Elderly Gentleman belittles and
insults her. She, however, responds with a serious threat to murder him for the "evil" of
making her angry. Far from taking responsibility for her own impulses, she refers to her
emotional reaction as something he has "done to me." She extends this argument to her
threat to kill him. According to Zoo, the Elderly Gentleman should be sony for what he
has done. In fact, she asserts, he has tried to kill her by throwing "words at me as if they
were stones." He has roused her instinct to kill; clearly, if she kills him it will be his own
fault. The fact that she threatens his life while his part in the dispute is merely name-
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calling--not so different from her many avowals of his inferiority--does not enter into her
reasoning. The fact that he apologizes while she does nothing to appease any hurt
feelings of his, likewise, has no significance for her. Moreover, while the Elderly
Gentleman behaves more or less as we would expect a normal adult to behave, the
"mature" longliver, Zoo, behaves like a petulant child who overreacts to an insult, while
refusing to take responsibility for her own role in the fight. She applies a double
standard, judging the Elderly Gentleman more harshly than herself Admittedly, Zoo is
unused to feeling angry and insulted. If she has never been insulted before, we might
expect her reaction to be strong. But though this contextualization makes her response
more comprehensible, it does not make it obviously superior to the Elderly Gentleman's.
If anything it looks "inferior," a failure of the basic ability to empathize with another.
It is this fight that convinces Zoo to change from a Conservative to a Colonizer,
who "[does] not think there should be any shortlived people at all" (192). One
shortliver's insult has convinced her that his race must be exterminated. The Elderly
Gentleman articulates the seeming excess of Zoo's position:
THE FT  DERLY GENTLEMAN. Am Ito infer that you deny my right to
live because I allowed myself--perhaps injudiciously--to give you a
slight scolding?
ZOO. Is it worth living for so short a time? Are you any good to
yourself?
THE ELDERLY GENTLEMAN. (stupent) Well, upon my soul!
ZOO. It is a very little soul. You only encourage the sin of pride in us,
and keep us looking down at you instead of up to something higher
than ourselves. (192-93)
In calling the Elderly Gentleman's soul "very little," Zoo hurls an insult as biting as
anything he has said to her. Yet she does not recognize any impropriety in the
observation: after all, her insults are plainly the truth while his are merely designed to
hurt. The Elderly Gentleman, howeyer, no longer has the luxury of feeling incensed. He
understands Zoo quite correctly when he infers that his scolding has prompted her to seek
his death (as well as the deaths of all his people). Faced with this disproportionate
retaliation, be can only exclaim in stupefaction. Zoo, meanwhile, attempts to justify her
cause by suggesting that anyone who lives so short a time does not get enough out of life
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for life to matter. The important thing is saving the advanced civilization that really
matters from the "evil" feelings of anger and the "sin of pride" that the existence of the
shortlivers imposes upon it.
But if Zoo dismisses the Elderly Gentleman as a trivial being with a "little soul,"
Shaw's characterization of him does not. On the contrary, he is the protagonist of the
play, a basically decent, tolerably thoughtful individual whose demise, though inevitable,
nonetheless, inspires sympathy. Indeed, his death itself results from his integrity.
Unwilling to return home where he would be expected to participate in the political
mendacity of his son, the Envoy, he begs to be allowed to remain in the longliver world,
even though he must risk death to do so. He tells the Oracle, "It is the meaning of life,
not of death, that makes this banishment [from longliver society] so terrible to me" (230).
The Elderly Gentleman would rather die than return to a world where life is defined by
unalterable cycles of petty corruption. As a shortliver, however, he cannot fully escape
from these cycles simply by remaining among the longlivers. Because he cannot
overcome his own shortliver corruption, he must die. Alfred Turco, Jr_ accurately sums
up the Elderly Gentleman's situation: "By definition, there can be no tragedy of life, but
there is tragedy in life whenever we become cut off from participation in the vital process
1. . .1" (286). The Elderly Gentleman's tragedy is that--as good a man as he is--he is an
evolutionary dead end. Yet as tragic as that is for him, and for us shortliving readers,
ultimately, the text must side with Zoo.
For as rude, callous, and even childish as Zoo may sometimes appear, she is
correct in her assessment of shortliver shortcomings. When the Envoy, for example,
wants to know how poison gas is made because, despite wanting peace, he recognizes the
need for an arms race, Zoo explains the folly of his position:
You can make the [poison] gases for yourselves when your chemists
figure out how. Then you will do as you did before: poison each other
until there are no chemists left, and no civilization. You will then begin
all over again as half-starved ignorant savages, and fight with boomerangs
and poisoned arrows until you work up to the poison gases and high
explosives once more, with the same result. That is, unless we have sense
enough to make an end of this ridiculous game by destroying you.
(210-11)
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While Zoo is, indeed, proposing genocide, and while we may find her apparent comfort
with this course of action troubling, the course itself is consistently advocated by the text.
Zoo contends that because shortliver civilization is evolutionarily unable to address its
basic flaws, it will perpetuate war and strife as long as it exists. The text legitimizes this
argument most emphatically through the character of "Napoleon," a shortliver war hero
caught in the same cycle of glory, destruction, and death as his namesake. Napoleon is a
microcosm of shortliver civilization. He foresees his own demise in much the same
terms as Zoo foresees the demise of the shortlivers en masse. He explains to the Oracle,
"Victory I can guarantee: I am invincible. But the cost of victory is the demoralization,
the depopulation, the ruin of the victors no less than the vanquished" (206). Just as
poison gas may give a military advantage but will lead to the destruction of civilization,
so does Napoleon's victory presage ruin. When Napoleon asks the Oracle how he can
continue to fight and win glory when ruin is inevitable, the Oracle answers that the
solution is "No die before the tide of glory turns" (207). Her message is, thus, the same
as Zoo's: the only escape from the cycle of violence and destruction the shortlivers
perpetuate is their abrupt death.
The longliver understanding of aggression as a cycle of destruction casts Zoo's
contention that the Elderly Gentleman has tried to kill her by angering her in a more
positive light. Though her claim is absurd on many levels, on one level, it makes sense:
anger leads to fighting, which leads to war, which leads to death. Thus, by arousing
anger in Zoo, the Elderly Gentleman is, indeed, promoting an ultimately self-destructive
response in her. Now, literally, Zoo's life is never in danger. Her response, however, is
more instinctive than rational. It is based on the "horrible" feelings he inspires, not the
specific facts of their interaction. Thus, while in this case, Zoo's reaction is unwarranted,
she reacts according to a longliver instinct that is highly conducive to the survival of her
civilization: if being angry feels instinctively "evil" and even life-threatening, people will
staunchly avoid anger, even by killing what makes them angry. And a culture that
instinctively avoids anger and aggression will have a natural impetus to avoid the
destruction associated with war.
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While Zoo as an individual is not particularly sympathetic, she, nonetheless,
exemplifies what Shaw presents as a superior race. Although she is young for a
longliver, and abrasive, her culture and race impel her toward constructive attitudes and
behavior. Her name invokes images of wild creatures existing in an orderly, civilized
space. Like a "zoo," Zoo is able to contain the "wild" shortlivers: she need only contact
the authorities to have any wayward shortliver paralyzed until further notice. But she is
also a creature of a "zoo" herself, a child of a well-structured civilization that has learned
instinctively to reject "savage" impulses in order to keep its aims and actions productive.
Connotatively, Zoo's name is antithetical to that of the plays' other "flapper," Franklyn
Barnabas's daughter, "Savvy," which stands for "Savage" (65). While Savvy presents
herself as a liberated woman of the future, smoking, playing tennis, and making
authoritative declamations about Darwin, she is not among the twentieth-century
characters to achieve long life. She may appear to have "savvy" and a progressive mind,
but at heart, she is a shortliver, a "savage," whose native urges toward wild and
destructive behavior will doom her particular species. In some ways, Zoo may
superficially behave like Savvy, challenging her "elders" with unabashed
pronouncements about the nature of life. But fundamentally, she is a more advanced
specimen of a more civilized human race.
If Zoo is callously correct, the Elderly Gentleman is sympathetically ignorant.
The text dismisses neither of them and, to an extent, allows their respective viewpoints to
construct thought-provoking arguments in which both perspectives contribute valid ideas.
Thus, the interactions of Zoo and the Elderly Gentleman approach a genuinely dialogic
rhetoric. Yet the play refuses to grant free rein to this dialogic tendency. Multivocal
critiques of the longliver worldview are preempted by a plot that demonstrates that
view's correctness. No character can reasonably argue, for example, that evolution by
natural selection makes more sense as a scientific theory than Creative Evolution: the plot
illustrates Creative Evolution as a fact. Likewise, no one can plausibly argue that the
human race can progress socially toward utopia without biologically evolving: the
recurrence of "Napoleons" across the millennia shows that this is untrue. While we may
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sympathize with the plight of the Elderly Gentleman, we must accept that, within the
universe presented in the play, Zoo is correct and her behavior more or less justified.
Even the Elderly Gentleman--the play's most admirable shortliver—finally sides with the
longlivers, desiring to remain in their world and forsake his own. The Elderly
Gentleman's fate is tragic in the microcosm of his life and, by extension, for the rest of us
doomed shortlivers. But, in Shaw's presentation, it is not a tragedy that questions the
legitimacy of longliver conquest. The longlivers represent Life, and the progress of Life,
ultimately, defines moral propriety.
Shaw's Rejection of Ecological Relationality
Though the furtherance of Life in humanity is essential if humanity as a species is
to persist, the Elderly Gentleman's tragedy illustrates that this very furtherance demands
the sacrifice, and often the suffering, of the less evolved. 6 This mindset carries important
ecological implications. The Colonizers' assumption not only of the shortlivers'
expendability but, indeed of the necessity of exterminating them, indicates a profoundly
non-ecological ideology. The Colonizers organize the living world into superior versus
inferior entities and groups: the longlivers are superior to the shortlivers. The goal of
Life, as they see it, is to maximize the advancement of the superior strains, to look "up to
something higher than ourselves," as Zoo puts it, in order to climb higher (193). In
pursuit of this goal, inferior strains must be eliminated, since their existence inhibits the
progress of superior individuals by contaminating them with outmoded drives: the "sin of
pride" or the instinct to kill that the Elderly Gentleman prompts in Zoo (193). What this
worldview omits is a sense of the interdependence of life forms. 'The idea that the
"superior" might materially rely on the "inferior" to survive does not occur.
Nor is there any reason it should. Though Shaw did not deny that natural
selection happens, he considered the driving force of evolution to be Life Force. And for
Shaw, Life Force is a matter of spirit, of Will, not a question of material relations.?
Indeed, a sufficiently strong Will should be able to overcome any type of physical
limitation. In the preface to Back to Methuselah, Shaw offers a typical example of this
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perspective: "Perhaps nobody is at heart fool enough to believe that life is at the mercy of
temperature" (MO, a view which radically denies the dependence of human life on its
environment. 8 Throughout Back to Methuselah, he depicts Will overcoming age, death,
disease, and the need for sleep, as well as such petty limitations as having a set number of
limbs or heads. According to Shaw's Creative Evolution, if I run out of food, I need only
will myself not to need food, and if my will is sufficiently strong, I will be in no danger
of starvation. Of course, the present will of the human race is typically not strong enough
to overcome such bodily demands. Therefore, our current weakness necessitates some
material support from an environment. Yet if one accepts Shaw's view of evolution, it
follows that, ultimately, ecological dependence should be unnecessary to the continuance
of Life.
Such an ideology is unconcerned with ecology, as Shaw's near total lack of
engagement with any overtly ecological question attests. Not surprisingly, in Back to 
Methuselah, when Shaw develops a hypothetical evolutionary scenario, he focuses on
issues that concern only human society: humans could evolve to instinctively ride
bicycles or paint masterpieces or live three hundred years, to hatch from eggs or be born
knowing how to speak. Changes in human relations with other life forms or forces of
nature are background at best. Only in In the Beginning and As Far as Thought Can
Reach does Shaw create landscapes that explicitly include non-hnman life forms.. The
landscapes in In the Beginning are predetermined by the source myths Shaw uses: the
Garden of Eden and the land Adam must subsequently till are necessary "primitive"
settings for this prehistoric story. At the other end of the text's chronology, As Far as
Thought Can Reach is set in an idyllic "sunlit glade at the southern foot of a thickly
wooded hill" (Back 235). Yet this setting, likewise, is hardly an ecologically imagined
space. Instead, it recalls the tradition of the Arcadian utopia, as do the Greek names of
the children: Acis, Ecrasia, Strephon, and so on. Indeed, Shaw describes the design of
the children's architecture as resembling "Grecian of the fourth century B.C." (235),
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placing the infants' Arcadia in opposition to the higher, intellectual utopia of the
Ancients. The woodland, then, exists to show that the idyll is inadequate, not to suggest
that undeveloped "nature" may be conducive to human survival.
This relegation of nature to background is indicative of Shaw's dismissal of the
material world in general. In the Shavian universe ecological needs are trivial. A society
predicated on Shavian Creative Evolution, therefore, can only sustain an interest in
ecological relations on the basis of moral care for the non-human. If trees are not
important to our survival, then we have no pressing reason to save them--unless we care
for them and the creatures that rely on them. Since a regard for the physical environment
in Shaw's Creative Evolution cannot be rooted in pragmatism, it must be rooted in
empathy, in a sense of fellow feeling for other entities. 9 Yet empathy is a characteristic
Shaw's people of the future expressly lack, both in their disdain for "inferior" humans
and in their disdain for the "inferiority" of physical life in general. Zoo's dismissal of the
Elderly Gentleman is echoed by the Ancients' dismissal of physicality itself The
civilization of 31,920 A.D. is oriented around a progressive separation of the human spirit
from physical preoccupations. Newly hatched "infants," bearing the appearance of
adolescents, are subject to much the same physical drives as most of us: they sleep, sing,
dance, fall in love, enjoy pretty clothes, and so on. By the time these "children" are about
two years old, they have progressed to an interest in higher arts and sciences. By age
four, they are bored with all physical occupations and begin their lives as wandering,
solitary Ancients, who persist, ageless, until some accident kills them. As Ancients, they
focus on more purely mental interests, such as higher mathematics, as well as more
advanced and, thus, indescribable pursuits. They quickly lose most secondary sex
characteristics; at least, the women are repeatedly identified as flat chested. Eventually,
they forget how to communicate in a medium as limiting as words. Older Ancients even
learn how to manipulate their bodies to give themselves extra limbs. Since physicality,
however, is a limitation to be overcome, these bodily manipulations are nothing more
than a precursor to the next evolutionary stage that will liberate humanity from the body
altogether.
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As the Ancients explain this process to the younger generation,
THE SHE-ANCIENT. None of us now believe that all this machinery of
flesh and blood is necessary. It dies.
THE HE-ANCIENT. It imprisons us on this petty planet and forbids us to
range through the stars.
[..	 .]
THE SHE-ANCIENT. The body was the slave of the vortex [of Life]; but
the slave has become the master; and we must free ourselves from that
tyranny. It is this stuff (indicating her body), this flesh and blood and
bone and all the rest of it, that is intolerable. Even prehistoric man
dreamed of what he called an astral body, and asked who would
deliver him from the body of this death. (292-93)
The complaint registered here by the Ancients is twofold. First, they do not want to be
bound to the Earth--or, by extension, to a material frame of reference--but to explore the
broader reaches of the universe. Second, they do not want to die. The body, a tyrant,
constrains them to both these fates. The She-Ancient's appeal to the dualistic impulses of
"prehistoric man" posits that the dichotomy between spirit and matter is a basic, self-
evident truth. Moreover, her contention that the body used to be the slave of spiritual
Life recapitulates the "Back to Methuselah" motif: Life used to be freer, longer, more
willful. Somehow, it "fell," as Shaw recounts in his reworking of the Garden of Eden.
As the symbolic Adam and Eve began their agrarian lives and started their human family,
humanity lost much of its instinctive understanding of how to will a better life and
became enslaved to the limitations of the body. Thus, the Ancients' dream of abandoning
the body is both a vision of a progressive climb to iinimagined heights of experience and
the recapturing of a lost birthright. It is both a forward movement and a return, a linear
progression and a "setting things to rights." This perspective, thus, rejects the notion that
the interaction of the spiritual and the physical could ever fundamentally be desirable.
As in Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman, this philosophy is unapologetic in its
dismissal of any life or matter that is "inferior" to the spiritual Life of these "supermen."
The whole Earth is no more than a "petty planet," the body mere "machinery," not a
living organism at all. Moreover, the text emphasizes that physicality per se is, by
definition, not alive. When the youth, Acis, opines that mountains possess names,
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individuality, strength, majesty, and beauty, the He-Ancient replies, "Mere metaphor, my
poor boy: the mountains are corpses," the dead remains of the more life-like volcanic
activity beneath the Earth (287). The He-Ancient explains that once he realized that the
mountains are dead, he ceased to walk among them. The proper study of life is Life.
The play does, however, voice a potential criticism of this rejection of the
physical via the figure of Adam. Near the end of the play, Adam opines, "We were well
enough in the garden. And now the fools have killed all the animals; and they are
dissatisfied because they cannot be bothered with their bodies! Foolishness, I call it"
(298). Adam's charge appears grave. This "superior" human race has apparently
willfully exterminated all other animal species. Yet all humans have achieved at the cost
of this mass destruction is further unhappiness: now that they have conquered the
physical world, they are discontent with having physicality at all. Adam's objection
opens a potential space for the dialogic investigation of the desirability of this vision of
utopia. Yet the use of the figure of Adam in the first play makes it clear that his
objections are not to be taken seriously. Adam, while not a bad person, is a bit dim,
rather lacking in imagination. It is Eve, not Adam, who determines to seize the power of
Life Force to create new life. Later, Eve criticizes both Adam and Cain for their
inadequacies, saying to Adam, "I hardly know which of you satisfies me least, you with
dirty digging [i.e. farming], or he with his dirty killing. I cannot think it was for either of
these cheap ways of life that Lilith set you free" (33). Adam, the tiller, is the figure most
closely bound in a relationship with the Earth. But by limiting himself to his agrarian
lifestyle, he shows a lack of progressive vision. Or as Eve accuses, "If you were not a
fool you would find something better for both of us to live by than this spinning and
digging" (38). But Adam does not. It, therefore, follows that his latter-day
condemnation of humanity's "progress" is intended to represent reactionary
traditionalism more than reasonable critique.
In the final play, it is Lilith, the figure who speaks after Adam, whose perspective
carries more weight. As the first mother, Lilith is the voice of Life Force. It is, therefore,
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uniquely her place to judge the extent to which her children have succeeded in fulfilling
the potential of Life. Lilith recapitulates the progress of humanity thus far:
They have accepted the burden of eternal life. They have taken away the
agony from birth; and their life does not fail them even in the hour of their
destruction. Their breasts are without milk; their bowels are gone: the
very shapes of them are only ornaments for their children to admire and
caress without understanding. Is it enough [. . .] ? (208)
Lilith's question--"Is it enough?"--indicates that all the changes achieved thus far are, in
themselves, positive, though they may be insufficient. 10 It is good to wish never to die_
It is good to eliminate pain from childbirth, as well as milk on which to feed one's
children. The implication, here, may be that the removal of any close bodily bond
between mother and child is a positive change, one which further attenuates humanity's
visceral ties to other humans and, by extension, to physicality in general. It is good not to
age, so that death strikes not as an internal failure of life but merely through unavoidable
accidents. It is good not to digest food; there is no sign that these humans eat or drink. It
is good, finally, to relegate the body to the status of mere ornamentation for the
enjoyment of children. Lilith, thus, makes a powerful summation of the values involved
in dichotomizing Life and Matter. In this system, the pursuit of life necessitates the
breaking of all ties to matter, perhaps even destroying Matter. Lilith herself dreams of a
universe that will become "all life and no matter" (300). Indeed, the only justification the
text suggests for humanity's extermination of other animals is a general sense that Life is
slowly severing itself from unnecessary material complications. Lilith asks, "Is it
enough?" only because the ties to matter have not yet been totally severed. To the extent
that humans are still physical beings, they have not yet fulfilled their duty to Life Force.
This ideology is disturbing from an ecological perspective because it supports a
radical denial of the values most central to maintaining a healthy biosphere: an awareness
of and respect for the interconnectedness of life forms and a focus on the physical base of
economy, including the sustainable use of resources and minimization of damage to
ecosystems. None of these concerns matter in Shaw's conception. Everything that the
biosphere comprises is at best insignificant to human evolution, at worst an obstacle to be
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eliminated. Thus, Shaw's Creative Evolution might plausibly be characterized not only
as non-ecological but as anti-ecological, purposefully minimizing biological diversity in
the name of progressing beyond a material frame of reference.
Shaw's Critique of Humanism
Yet, as disdainful of ecology as this philosophy is, it cannot comfortably be
characterized as anthropocentric. Shaw privileges humanity insofar as he considers it to
be the most highly evolved species on Earth and, therefore, the species most likely to
fulfill the dictates of Life Force. But he refuses the humanist convention of granting
humanity special privilege purely on the grounds of its being "human." Life Force exists
to realize the potential of Life. If humanity accomplishes that, so be it. If humanity does
not, some other species will. In the speech that closes the text, Lilith asks, "Shall I bring
forth something that will sweep [humanity] away and make an end of them as they have
swept away the beasts of the garden, and make an end of the crawling things and the
flying things and of all them that refuse to live for ever?" (298-99). Her question
suggests that just as it is perfectly legitimate for humans to exterminate other life forms in
their quest for a more advanced, spiritual existence, so too is it acceptable for her--for
Life--to stamp out humanity if some other species proves more promising. Lilith is
hopeful enough about the progress of humanity that she determines to be patient with the
species. Nonetheless, she observes that "mightier creatures than [humans} have killed
hope and faith, and perished from the earth; and I may not spare them for ever" (300)..
This is Lilith's appraisal of "these infants that call themselves ancients" (300). How
contemptible, by these standards, is our "present day" humanity, depicted in The Gospel
of the Brothers Barnabas!
In one respect at least, satire is the ideal rhetorical mode for conveying Lilith's
message: satire mocks people and civilizations. It knocks us off our proverbial pedestal.
This diminution of humanity is one of the central themes of Back to Methuselah. In .the
bickering of Adam and Eve and Cain, in the politics-as-usual of Burge and Lubin and
their technologically-more-advanced-but-philosophically-identical descendant Burge-
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Lubin, in the petty insults of the Elderly Gentleman, in Zoo's anger at those insults, in the
Ancients' continuing imprisonment within the flesh, one message is clear: humanity is
not good enough. Indeed, 30,000 years of projected, progressive evolution may well still
find it lacking. Shaw states this point explicitly in his preface: "The power that produced
Man when the monkey was not up to the mark, can produce a higher creature than Man if
Man does not come up to the mark. What [this] means is that if Man is to be saved, Man
must save himself' (xvii). Shaw's comparison between human and monkey evolution
suggests that because Man has superseded the monkey, the monkey is no more than a
remnant of a failed experiment with no real justification to persist. If this is a harsh
pronouncement on the monkey, however, it is an equally harsh admonition for Man:
become a better being or be destroyed.
This advice to the human race may be productive in at least two respects. For one
thing, Shaw demands that we take personal responsibility for our own survival. Each
individual can will him- or herself to become a better individual. Indeed, one of the
allures of Shaw's Neo-LAtnarckian view of evolution is the agency it grants each
individual in the evolutionary process. Turco contends that "Shaw's deeply held belief in
the self as the source of values was to receive its most direct and suggestive expression in
the final sections of the Methuselah cycle [. . .]" (126). He goes on to cite as an example
the He-Ancient's avowal to Acis that "you can create nothing but yourself' (Back 285).
To those given to complaining about the state of civilization, Shaw asserts that "the
pitiless reply is still that God helps those who help themselves" (xvii), surely as sound
advice today as it was in 1920. A second potential benefit of Shaw's reasoning for a
productive ecological discourse is his emphasis on humanity as a species. An ideology
that tends to frame social questions in terms of the good of the species can, for instance,
serve as a useful corrective to such phenomena as First World overconsumption,
particularly when this discourse foregrounds the species without denying the importance
of the individual seff. Creative Evolution is a process in which individual Will and Life
Force interact to enable individuals to make themselves into forms more in accord with
the goals of Life Force. If enough individuals are successful in this endeavor, humanity
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as a species will persist and progress. Thus, Shaw advises everyone to take responsibility
for improving human life and to do so not only for his or her own sake but for the sake of
all humanity and, indeed, of Life itself. Such a sense of personal responsibility both to
self and to a larger context of Life might support a responsibility for maintaining the
biosphere in a material sense.
But while Shaw may encourage a productive sense of species responsibility, he
posits a dubious system for reform, one based on a faulty--and ecologically ignorant--
theory of evolution. Shaw's narrative is not simplistic: his dramatic investment in the
plight of those, like the Elderly Gentleman, who are evolutionarily superseded
demonstrates that the evolutionary progress he advocates is not without negative
consequences. Yet his dialectic insistence on presenting Creative Evolution as "correct"
fails to engage with Neo-Darwinian objections that a more dialogic structure could have
brought against it. In failing to address the ecological implications of his system, Shaw
presents a utopian future that is not only unbelievable but troubling in its dismissal of the
physical world.
Ultimately, it is Shaw's satirical undercuttingof his own culture rather than his
utopian imaginings that conveys the greatest rhetorical force in Back to Methuselah.
While his case for Creative Evolution as a science is not compelling, his criticism of Neo-
Darwinism as a discourse can be trenchant. Shaw may be overstepping the bounds of
reasonable argument when he accounts for World War I by asserting that "Neo-
Darwinism in politics had produced a European catastrophe of a magnitude so appalling,
and a scope so unpredictable, that as I write these lines in 1920, it is still far from certain
whether our civilization will survive it" (Back x). Nonetheless, Tom Shippey argues
persuasively that "the negative prop of Shaw's argument [blaming Neo-Darwinism for
the war] carries weight where the positive one [Creative Evolution] does not" (207).
Neo-Darwinism may not have caused World War I, but there is, at least, a commonality
between a scientific theory preoccupied with the struggle for survival and a political will
determined to win an ill-advised war. Such connections highlight the functioning of Neo-
Darwinism as a discourse. Even though Shaw does not effectively challenge Neo-
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Darwinism as a scientific theory, his contention that it supports troubling sociological
trends is worth considering. Thus, as a social critic, Shaw raises provocative questions
about the desirability of numerous beliefs and practices.
Conclusion
If Back to Methuselah's weakness is its implausible and ecologically irresponsible
argument for utopian reform, its strength is its culturally estranging rhetoric. To the
extent that Shaw uses satire and reasoned argument to challenge the beliefs of his own
(and our) culture, he demands independence of thought in his audience. He supports the
questioning of ideas in general, even—perhaps unintentionally--of his own Creative
Evolution. He assaults the complacency of a humanism that assumes humanity to be the
pinnacle of creation or evolution. He confronts his audience with the idea that humanity
may be headed for extinction, with no one to blame but itself. Though Back to 
Methuselah militates against a productive ecological praxis by denying the importance of
ecological relationality to Life, the text's challenge to the notion of humanity's
unassailable supremacy remains vital in an age in which nations still contribute to climate
change, pollution, and nuclear proliferation with a tacit assumption that such practices
cannot ultimately harm "us."
While Shaw combined admonitions against human complacency with aspirations
for a utopian future, his long-time friend and Neo-Darwinian adversary, H. G. Wells, was
more likely to reserve such admonitions for his dystopias. His utopias display a more
unambivalent positivity, an assurance that humanity will ultimately triumph. But if Wells
comes nearer than Shaw to a frank adulation of humanity, he places such adulation within
a context that is assiduously ecological and scientifically astute. He may question
humanity less than Shaw, but he values the non-human more. In "The Testament of H.
G. Wells," Shaw describes the differences he perceived between his work and Wells's,
concluding that "Whese differences between us are very fortunate; for our sermons
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complement instead of repeating one another; you must read us both to become a
complete Wellshavian" (qtd. in Smith 216). Taking this advice to heart, I devote the next
chapter to an investigation of the ecological utopia of Wells.
NOTES
1 Throughout the preface of Back to Methuselah, there is an undercurrent of desperation, a sense
that civilization is in imminent danger of collapse. This desperation is principally motived by the calamity
of World War I, which Shaw describes as "a European catastrophe of a magnitude so appalling, and a
scope so unpredictable, that as I write these lines in 1920, it is still far from certain whether our civilization
will survive it" (Back x). This sense of imminent threat lends a particular urgency to Shaw's project: if
European society does not begin to reform itself now, his text suggests, it might soon be faced with
cataclysmic consequences, as indeed it was in World War II. Today, a similar sense of desperation speaks
to a pressing need for systemic social reform to confront the ramifications of exponential population
growth, global climate change, and the nuclear age.
2 This female reproductive agency is a central theme of Man and Superman, in which word
"Superman" operates as a pun meaning simultaneously "Superior Man" and "Woman." In the play, the
reproductive drive of Woman (represented principally by Ann) proves "superior" to the better judgment of
Man (represented primarily by Jack Tanner), who longs to remain romantically =entangled but ultimately
cannot resist the Life-Force-driven seduction of Woman. Over many generations, the end result of
Woman's sexual conquest of Man will presumably be that other type of Superman, the more highly
evolved human being. In Back to Methuselah, this essentialization of gender difference is more muted,
strongly recapitulated only in the initial play.
3 John Barnes argues that Shaw uses an analogic technique to establish a readily comprehensible
line of reasoning as a basic pattern for defending lines of reasoning that are harder to understand (158-59).
Thus, In the Beginning presents the Serpent (a "superior" figure) explaining the concepts of birth and
death, basic concepts for us, to Eve (an "inferior" figure). This structure is recapitulated throughout the
plays: the Barnabases explain the need for longevity to Burge and Lubin, and so on.
4 This reading is supported in The Thing Happens by an analogy the Archbishop draws between
longlivers like himself and H. G. Wells's Giants in The Food of the Gods: "You will still find, among the
tales of that twentieth-century classic, Wells, a story of a race of men who grew twice as big as their
fellows [....j The big people had to fight the little people for their lives [. . I Wells's teaching, on that
and other matters, was not lost on me" (131). Like one of Wells's Giants, the Archbishop understands that
the "little" people will try to kill him once they realize that he is a longliver whose superiority challenges
their reign. In The Food of the Gods, Wells uses the metaphor of physical bigness to signify moral
"Greatness." There is no biological reason for Wells's Giants to be superior to their small forbearers.
Their brains are the same, their thoughts and feelings; they are simply bigger. Similarly, Back to
Methuselah is designed to suggest the biological superiority that Creative Evolution might confer without
attempting to depict this evolutionary future literally.
5 My quotations from Shaw's writings reflect his unconventional punctuation, including the
omission of apostrophes from contractions.
6 It is not only shortliving humans who pay the price for Life's progress. In As Far as Thought
Can Reach, the He-Ancient states explicitly that dogs are extinct (Back 237). Now, Shaw had no great
quarrel with dogs. In Everybody's Political What's What (1944), he expresses indignation that "science"
endorses the cruel vivisection of such animals (211). But though Shaw had no wish to see dogs suffer, he
nonetheless presents the possibility that evolutionary advancement will leave no place for them.
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7 In this sense, Shaw's version of Creative Evolution differs from Bergson's. While Bergson
conceived of his elan vital as a drive operating through the material world, in such processes as
photosynthesis, for example, Shaw envisioned his Life Force more as an energy that can potentially
completely reject the substrate of matter. In this denial of the final importance of matter, Shaw's Creative
Evolution is more dismissive of ecological relationality than Bergson's.
8 So firmly did Shaw hold to this view that it led him to suggest to his friend, Wells, that Wells's
wife, who in 1927 was dying of cancer, need simply will herself to be healthy again: "If Jane is curing
herself--if she has given up making the wrong sort of tissue and is replacing it with the right sort—then you
have nothing to do but encourage her [. . 	 (qtd. in Smith 130). Wells was so angered by this bit of advice
that in a 1945 memoir of Shaw, he still recalled it with obvious distaste:
[Shaw] was impelled to write that [the cancer] was stuff and nonsense on the part of my
wife and imply that she would be much to blame if she died. There was no such thing as
cancer, and so forth, and so on.
This foolish bit of ruthlessness came to hand, and with it came a letter from
Charlotte Shaw, his wife. I was not to mind what he had said, wrote Charlotte. I must
not let it hurt either him or myself. (qtd. in Smith 221)
Charlotte Shaw, indeed, had leapt into the breach, explaining that "[Shaw] must sometimes let himself go
in this aggravating way--& he means it all so more than well! He is very fond of you and Jane" (qtd. in
Smith 133). The well-meaning naivete with which Shaw went about offending his grieving Neo-Darwinian
friend serves as ample illustration of the conviction with which he believed in a Creative Evolution that
defied both the science and common sense of his own time. His faith, presented in Back to Methuselah,
that Life could ultimately transcend physical limitation was quite literal and sincere.
9 Not every version of Creative Evolution implies a Shavian attitude toward the material
ecological world. In Chapter 1, I cite Bergson's Creative Evolution as a discourse that places greater
emphasis on ecological relations than Shaw's, both "pragmatically" highlighting the importance of ecology
for human evolution and "empathetically" suggesting a positive regard for nature. In a typical example of
his rhetoric in Creative Evolution, Bergson asserts, "The organized world as a whole becomes the soil on
which was to grow either man himself or a being who morally must resemble him. The animals, however
distant they may be from our species, however hostile to it, have none the less been useful traveling
companions [. . .]" (266-67). Ills theory of evolution, here, is very like Shaw's: both consider humanity as-
-up till now—Life Force's greatest achievement in expanding consciousness. Yet Bergson's language
contrasts notably with Shaw's: While Shaw seldom makes reference to the ecological world save in
passing or to speak of transcending it, Bergson emphasizes the world as a whole as the "soil" essential to
bringing about our development through Life Force, invoking a profoundly material and relational
metaphor for our growth as a species. He calls other animals our "useful companions" on a journey toward
the realization of Life Force's potential, suggesting an amicable as well as productive relationship. On the
whole, Bergson's concern with non-human life renders his evolutionary discourse more amenable than
Shaw's to ecological application.
10 George Slusser reads Lilith' s speech as a sign that Shaw considers the Ancients' evolution to
have proceeded in the wrong direction: "[Lilith] sees generations now frozen like statues. She alone
realizes that, if the vital force is to flow again, she must, by an act of creative will, labor and bear once
more" (136). On a literal level, this is a misrepresentation of the text. Lilith does not say that she must
labor once more. Instead, she rhetorically asks whether she must and determines to hold the question in
abeyance: "I will have patience with [the Ancients] still [. . .]" (Back 300). On a thematic level, Slusser has
misunderstood Shaw's objective. As Shaw's letter to Robert Thomson, which I have quoted, evidences, he
was not holding the Ancients' progress up to ridicule but rather presenting it—albeit metaphorically—as a
positive step in the progress of Life Force.
CHAP 1ER 4
NO PLACE FOR GNATS
THE ANTHROPOCENTRICALLY ECOCENTRIC UTOPIA OF H. G. WELLS'S
MEN LIKE GODS 
The air was free from gnats, the earth from weeds and fungi; everywhere
were fruits and sweet and delightful flowers; brilliant butterflies flew
hither and thither.
H. G. Wells's The Time Machine (49)
"Odd that there are no swallows," said Mr. Mush suddenly in Mr.
Barnstaple's ear. "I wonder why there are no swallows."
Mr. Barnstaple's attention went to the empty sky. "No gnats or
flies perhaps," he suggested.
H. G. Wells's Men Like Gods (43)
Introduction
In many respects, H. G. Wells dystopian. novella, The Time Machine (1895), and
his utopian novel, Men Like Gods (1923), function as complements. The Time Machine
presents a failed garden utopia, Men Like Gods a garden utopia that is succeeding. In the
later utopia, Wells attempts to provide solutions to the problems delineated in the earlier
dystopia. In addition to addressing problems, however, Men Like Gods also expands and
explains practices that, in Wells's view, the utopians of The Time Machine handled well,
particularly ecological management. Both books endorse the subjugation of nature by
presenting scenarios in which it has been (The Time Machine) or can be (Men Like
Gods) successfully accomplished. But while The Time Machine spares merely a few
lines to assert that this subjugation has succeeded, Men Like Gods examines a detailed
program for undertaking the endeavor.
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In both books, rhetorical structure shapes ecological discourse. The Time
Machine's sparse engagement with ecology is enabled by a substantially univocal
rhetoric that offers few opportunities for ecological questions to be probed. Conversely,
in Men Like Gods, Utopia's profound ecological consciousness is explicated and
reinforced by a dialectic rhetorical structure in which various objections to the Utopian
view are put forward so that they can be refuted. By using oppositional voices not to
challenge but to bolster the text's dominant discourse, however, this structure excludes
voices whose challenges to Utopia might prove unanswerable. Eliding the more serious
objections to Utopia, the text produces the illusion that science itself justifies Utopian
ideology. The lack of discursive challenge to Utopian ideology, in turn, allows the text to
characterize a radically anthropocentric project of ecological domination as
unquestionably "correct." But if the text's dialectic rhetoric effaces certain objections, it,
nonetheless, engages with others. Thus, this dialectic operates as an incipient dialogism,
opening up discursive spaces for the examination of some potential problems with the
Utopian system, even as it refuses to acknowledge others. The productivity of this
multivocality is particularly evident when juxtaposed with the more limited, largely
univocal discourse of The Time Machine.
In this chapter, therefore, I compare the ecological discourses of The Time
Machine and Men Like Gods, arguing that the multivocality in Men Like Gods supports a
far more detailed exploration of ecological relationality. Despite the relative complexity
of its ecological discourse, however, the later text's rejection of dialogism ultimately
allows its dubious anthropocentrism to pass uninterrogated. As a text that is at once
highly ecologically aware and devoutly anthropocentric, Men Like Gods exposes the
limitations of the pragmatic ecocentrism I describe in chapter 1, enacting what I term an
"anthropocentric ecocentrism," which centralizes issues of ecosystemic health but does
so solely to benefit the human species. In Men Like Gods, a rejection of dialogic critique
permits the retention of internal inconsistencies in this Utopian ideology. These
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inconsistencies, in turn, illustrate how anthropocentrism reinforces a potentially
dangerous disregard for ecological complexity even within a scientific framework that is
ecologically well informed.
Wells's Anthropocentric Ecocentrism
In the early twentieth century, Wells was a significant force for the dissemination
of ecological thinking. In particular, Peder Anker observes, "Wells's popular books and
lectures help explain why the acceptance of ecological reasoning in general and human
ecology in particular gained momentum in the 1930s" (197). Wells's own thinking about
nature and human society was profoundly relational. Indeed, the concept of "human
ecology" contends that all human social activity participates in the larger context of
ecological relationships, thus hybridizing the purified discourses of "Nature" and
"Society" that Bruno Latour describes. A radical position in Wells's own time, even
today, this notion that economy is ecology is globally marginalized, despite a growing
understanding that human economy cannot persist without ecological sustainability. As
an advocate of human ecology, Wells was an inveterate and influential "ecocentrist": to
invoke my own working definition of the term, he was primarily concerned with how
activities affect systems.
But if Wells articulated a hybrid discourse that collapses distinctions between
human society and ecological relationality, he simultaneously retained a purified
discourse of humanity as categorically distinct from everything non-human. Indeed,
Wells was an extreme anthropocentrist, his moral system oriented almost entirely around
the interests of humanity. To improve human society, he considered most any other life
form potentially expendable, even if its extermination would accomplish nothing more
than making humans a little more comfortable. In my epigraphs for this chapter, for
example, I submit Wells's reiteration of the idea that a utopia -will extirpate gnats. The
main problem with gnats is that they swarm annoyingly around one's face. The fact that
Wells evidently considered this annoyance sufficient justification for the extermination of
these insects--and that he apparently persisted in this view from at least 1895 to 1923--
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illustrates the extent to which he was attached to a value system that places human
advantage above any intrinsic value in other life forms. In two areas only does Wells
grant non-humans moral consideration. First, he is inclined to grant "human rights" to
any hypothetical species more "advanced" than humans, hence his moral ambivalence
toward the seemingly monstrous Martians in The War of the Worlds. Second, he does
not condone the senseless suffering of any animal. Wells is consistent in this view,
whether he is condemning the brutality of a Moreau or holding forth on the need to
remove suffering for "any creature" in Men Like Gods. Apart from these provisos,
Wells's anthropocentrism is total.
This marriage of radical ecocentrism and radical anthropocentrism makes Wells
an ideal test case for the pragmatic definition of ecocentrism that I put forward in
chapter 1. In that chapter, I argue for a suspension of definitions of ecocentrism that
require adherence to a particular set of values, such as deep ecology's belief in nature's
intrinsic rights. Instead, I propose an ecocentrism defined solely by systems-oriented
thinking, even where the goal of such thinking is the preservation of the biosphere for
humanity. Wells offers a case study of the uses and limits of this pragmatic definition.
To an extent, Wells's anthropocentric ecocentrism is, indeed, conducive to maintaining a
healthy biosphere. Wells did not need to care about the rights of anything non-human in
order to advocate many positions that would be consistent with Green politics today: he
supported sustainable living, population control, and a regard for the complexities
involved in altering ecological relationships. His concept of utopia typically embraces
what I call "sustainable change." Describing his utopian philosophy, Wells reflects in
Mind at the End of Its Tether (1945): "[T]t was natural for him [Wells] to assume that
[. . I new things would appear, but that they would appear consistently, preserving the
natural sequence of life. So that in the present vast confusion of our world, there was
always the assumption of an ultimate restoration of rationality, an adaptation and
resumption" (5). Change is constant, but change itself naturally occurs in consistent
patterns that enable life to adapt and persist, Change naturally is—and should remain--
sustainable.
118
Yet while Wells's ecocentrism in many ways supports a sustainable ecological
praxis, this concern with sustainability is undermined by his anthropocentrism. In
assuming that humanity has a self-evident right to manipulate the non-human world for
its own ends while granting little sense of intrinsic worth to the non-human, Wells
endorses the massive alteration of the biosphere for the enhancement of human life.
However, the same anthropocentrism that characterizes this project as desirable supports
a dangerous underestimation of the practical difficulties involved in it. Anthropocentrism
tends to dismiss the non-human as simple: too simple to be of much intrinsic interest and
simple enough to be manipulated with relative ease. Men Like Gods dramatically
illustrates this tendency toward oversimplification. Though the book is deeply concerned
with ecological complexity, its anthropocentric bent, nonetheless, sabotages its
engagement with the implications of this complexity. If ecological oversimplification is
evident in Men Like Gods, however, it is more extreme in The Time Machine.
Univocality and the Effacement of Ecology in The Time Machine 
By examining ecological discourse in The Time Machine, I intend to highlight the
relative ecological sophistication of Men Like Gods, while tracing how problematic
ideological assumptions in the earlier text remain an impediment to ecological
understanding in the later text. One of Wells's most famous dystopias, The Time
Machine recounts a Time Traveller's journey into the year 802,701 A.D. When the Time
Traveller first arrives in this balmy world populated by carefree, jolly little people, he
believes he has encountered a pastoral, communist utopia, a play on the Morrisian idyll.
He soon discovers, however, that his initial impression is mistaken. Far from being a
product of communism, this future society is the product of capitalist exploitation. Over
millennia, a sharp class division between aristocrats and workers has separated humanity
into the childlike Eloi and the monstrous Morlocks. Having lived under circumstances of
ease and abundance for thousands of years, the Eloi have lost the physical and intellectual
strengths that the struggle for survival selects for; indeed, natural selection has promoted
indolence, for "[u]nder the new conditions of perfect comfort and security, that restless
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energy, that with us is strength, would become weakness [. . .] [F]or the strong would be
fretted by an energy for which there was no outlet" (50). For the Eloi, energy is
maladaptive, a disturbance to the indolent majority. Thus, energetic individuals would
likely be ostracized, a process that would create sexual and social selection against
energetic traits. The Morlocks are also a product of natural selection, their eyes suited to
the dark underground they inhabit, their cannibalistic tastes shaped by the availability of
the Eloi as a food source. Although they retain more intelligence than the Eloi, the
Morlocks, too, have mentally degenerated, their intellect reduced to a rudimentary
mechanical talent and a predatory cunning. Because humanity has lost the intelligence to
plan for the future of the planet, the ultimate outcome of this scenario can only be the
death of all life on Earth. Millions of years in the future, the Time Traveller visits a
frigid, twilight Earth populated only by "a round thing, the size of a football [. .]
hopping fitfully about" in the shallows of the sea (93). Eventually, the death of the sun
will render Earth uninhabitable, and with no human race to expand life into space,
terrestrial life will end.
The Time Machine illustrates a worst-case scenario arising from two central
social problems: bourgeois exploitation of the working class and a complacent disregard
for the need to plan for humanity's evolutionary future. In broad terms, the lessons
implicit in this dystopia are clear: if we are to guard ourselves against the degeneration of
our species, humanity must eliminate the sharp division of the human race into exploited
and exploiters; furthermore, it must not leave human evolution to the mercy of natural
selection.
But while, as a cautionary tale, The Time Machine is a dystopia, it is set against
the backdrop of a utopian habitat. The human race has devolved, but the paradisal land
humanity once created remains remarkably paradisal in 802,701 A.D., presenting the
appearance of "a tangled waste of beautiful bushes and flowers, a long-neglected and yet
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weedless garden" (44). Conjecturing about the conditions that led to the seeming garden
paradise of the Eloi, the Time Traveller posits a successful program of biological
management:
In the end, wisely and carefully, we shall readjust the balance of animal
and vegetable life to suit our needs.
This adjustment, I say, must have been done, and done well; done
indeed for all Time, in the space of Time across which my machine had
leaped. (49)
The Time Traveller characterizes the development of the "garden" as the utopian triumph
of the subjugation of nature, a triumph that, he asserts, has been accomplished "for all
Time." Indeed, the stability of this garden is remarkable. Given the current evolutionary
state of the Eloi and Morlocks, we must assume that this garden has been "neglected" for
many thousands of years, yet the forces of natural selection have apparently not devolved
any of humanity's carefully bred plant species into "weeds." As far as the Time Traveller
can tell, no new diseases have appeared to replace those once stamped out (49). Aside
from appearing rather overgrown, the garden has retained its agreeably managed state
without actual management. It is as if the evolutionary forces that have transmuted the
Eloi and Morlocks into their present forms have ceased to operate on the rest of Earth's
ecology. In the time of the Eloi and Morlocks, most species on Earth appear to have
come close to achieving what we know today as Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium,
hypothetical conditions under which evolution within a population will not occur
(Price 316).
But though this garden appears almost to have attained a self-sustaining
ecological stasis point, it is not ultimately unchanging. The final section of the book
shows the whole landscape degenerating into a cold, lifeless wasteland as the sun slowly
bums out, an image that contradicts the Time Traveller's assertion that "this adjustment
[. .] must have been done f. 	 for all Time." The Time Traveller's final vision of a
frigid, almost lifeless Earth, is proof that the conquest of nature has not been permanent.
This inconsistency might, at first, appear insignificant. The Time Traveller's meaning,
after all, is plain: the ancestors of the Eloi and Morlocks did devise a garden utopia that
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required minimal management for thousands of years. This is a monumental
achievement, even though the inevitable demise of the Earth dictates that it cannot be
everlasting. The Time Traveller's pronouncement that the change has been made "for all
Time" can be read as merely a bit of hyperbole designed to praise these ecological
engineers.
But, in fact, this moment of exaggerated praise is symptomatic of The Time
Machine's underestimation of the difficulties involved in the subjugation of nature.
Within the book's narrative frame, the Time Traveller's pronouncement is peculiar. His
discussion of his adventures in the future takes place after his return. His most recent
experience of the future, in fact, has been not the paradisal "garden" of the Eloi but the
bleak, dying world whose existence he, nonetheless, seemingly forgets in his discussion
of nature's "wise and careful" subjugation. This forgetting indicates an optimism that is
out of keeping with the primary narrator's description of the Time Traveller's general
view of the future: "[The Time Traveller], I know--for the question had been discussed
among us long before the Time Machine was made--thought but cheerlessly of the
Advancement of Mankind, and saw in the growing pile of civilization only a foolish
heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in the end" (Time 98).
Yet the Time Traveller's pessimism vanishes when he speaks of controlling animal and
vegetable life.
Wells probably did not intend this slip into optimism to be thematically
significant. He gives no indication that he was aware of any inconsistency between the
Time Traveller's praise for the subjugation of nature and his observations of the dying
Earth, nor does any character comment on the Time Traveller's unusual optimism on the
topic of ecological management. These apparently inadvertent inconsistencies, therefore,
suggest a lack of deep engagement with ecological questions on both the Time
Traveller's part and Wells's. The conquest of nature is not at issue. On the contrary, the
text assumes that it is desirable and practicable. Indeed, not only does the Time Traveller
state that this readjustment of life has been done "for all Time" (though manifestly it has
not); he also tells us that it has been.done "wisely and carefully." It is curious to see the
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same society that allowed an unjust capitalist division of labor to degenerate their race
into infantile fools and cannibalistic monsters described as "wise and careful." While
marshaling the forces of evolution to advance humanity was a feat beyond these people,
total mastery of the rest of biological life was evidently smoothly achieved. This contrast
implies that humanity is complex, the rest of nature comparatively simple.
Implausible as this scenario is, its occurrence in Wells's 1895 novella is not
surprising. Wells's assumption of the relative simplicity of nature reflects the prevailing
view of his Victorian society. The Victorians commonly assumed that the natural world
could be readily understood and prudently managed by humanity. 1 In chapter 2, I
discuss how the imminence of the conquest of nature is put forward even by so respectful
a disciple of "Nature" as William Morris in his 1884 lecture, "Useful Work versus
Useless Toil" This faith in humanity's ability to control nature is supported by a belief
that the human mind is more complex than nature's systems: complex enough to manage
them better than "Nature" does. This complexity is often figured as an indication of
human superiority not only in degree but in kind. Charles Darwin's co-contributor to the
theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace, for example, contends in
Darwinism (1889) that humans "possess intellectual and moral faculties which could not
have been ]. . .] developed [by natural selection], but must have had another origin; and
for this origin we can only find an adequate cause in the unseen universe of spirit" (478).
The human spirit is the only phenomenon Wallace describes as defying materialist
explanation. Wells's mentor, T. H. Huxley, echoes this belief in Evolution and Ethics
(1893-94). Like Wallace (and unlike Darwin), Huxley contends that human behavior
cannot be explained in purely evolutionary terms. For Huxley, humanity is driven by an
"ethical process" deriving from God that counters the "cosmic process" of the survival of
the fittest: natural selection makes humans (and other animals) competitive and
aggressive, but a divinely bestowed spirit makes (only) humans capable of altruistic
behavior as well.
In his prolegomena to Evolution and Ethics (1894), Huxley implicitly invokes this
ontological division between humans and other life forms to justify the transformation of
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the Earth into a managed garden, "where every plant and every lower animal should be
adapted to human wants, and would perish if human supervision and protection were
withdrawn" (20). What Huxley goes on to characterize as the potential "serpent" in this
"Eden" is not desire to subjugate the environment but the Malthusian tendency of humans
to reproduce excessively and the temptation to manage this problem eugenically (20-21).
According to Huxley, humanity is too complex for eugenics to be practicable:
I doubt whether even the keenest judge of character, if he had before him a
hundred boys and girls under fourteen, could pick out, with the least
chance of success, those who should be kept, as certain to be serviceable
members of the polity, and those who should be chloroformed, as equally
sure to be stupid, idle or vicious. The "points" of a good or of a bad
citizen are really far harder to discern than those of a puppy or a short- '
horn calf [. . .1 (23)
The implication, again, is that while the rest of nature is simple enough to be readily
understood and manipulated, humanity is not. This dichotomy is facilitated by Huxley's
lack of ecological contextualizing. He compares the selective breeding of humans to the
selective breeding of dogs and cattle: a species compared to other species. He does not
relate the management of human evolution to the management of an entire system: a
species compared to a forest, for example. Though Huxley was well aware that natural
selection is a product of selective forces at work in the environment, he does not describe
the relationality among these forces as central to the functioning of a managed nature. In
fact, his contention that "Eden" would be a place in which plants and animals would die
without continual human intervention suggests that he considered the adaptation of each
organism to human needs more important than the maintenance of functional webs of
relations. Huxley's lack of ecological awareness is a product of his time: it would be
demanding a great deal to ask him to write extensively about ecosystems some forty
years before the word was coined.
Likewise, Wells's relative deemphasis on ecology in The Time Machine is
understandable. In the 1890s, ecology was in the first stages of becoming an established
science. Yet though Wells's ecological discourse in The Time Machine is in its infancy,
he already shows signs of moving beyond Huxley in his capacity for relational thinking_
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Despite being strongly influenced by Huxley, Wells rejected his mentor's ontological
division between humans and other life forms. For Wells, the division between "cosmic"
and "ethical" processes did not exist: as with other species, all human drives, including
the will to develop ethical systems, were produced solely by natural selection. 2 Thus,
there is no divine spiritual essence preventing the degeneration of humanity into Eloi and
Morlocks: degeneration will progress as far as selective pressures drive it. One effect of
this non-disjunction between humans and the rest of nature is Wells's willingness to
endorse eugenics. If the natural world, in general, can be managed, then humanity can be
as well; indeed, it must be if evolutionary degeneration is to be prevented. On the
question of eugenics, most of us living in the post-Holocaust world would side with
Huxley more than Wells. In refusing a strict separation between humanity and other
species, however, Wells productively adopts a more ecologically oriented world view
than Huxley. For Wells, everything the human species is can be explained in terms of
relational tensions between humanity and its environment. Insofar as it discusses human
evolution, therefore, The Time Machine is exceptionally ecological: every aspect of the
development of the Eloi and Morlocks is explained relationally: as a matter of the
availability of food, of the clemency of the climate, of the influence of the Eloi and
Morlocks on each other, and so on. All these environmental factors combine to produce
the two strains of humanity the Time Traveller encounters.
Even the slight attention the Time Traveller pays to the development of the Eloi's
garden habitat suggests an assumption of ecological relationality. When the Time
Traveller asserts that humanity will "readjust the balance of animal and vegetable life"
(Time 49, my emphasis), he invokes the homoestasis principle that would later typify
Arthur Tansley's ecosystem concept. Moreover, the Time Traveller shows an explicit
awareness that the actions of all the participants within a habitat affect that habitat. He
observes, for example, that due to the elimination of numerous decomposers, such as
fungi, from the environment, "the processes of putrefaction and decay had been
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profoundly affected f. . .1" (49). The elimination of many forms of fungi is an endeavor
of ecological consequence, one of the factors in the "readjustment" of relations among
life forms.
But just how such readjustments have been made is not explained. After his
initial mention of the alteration of processes of decay, for instance, the Time Traveller
never alludes to it again. While he invokes an underlying principle of ecology to explain
the Eloi's garden, the text fails to apply the rigor of his analysis of the ecological
relations that generated the Eloi and Morlocks to the ecological relations that would
constitute the rest of the environment_ Wells's garden paradise is not Huxley's "Eden":
far from needing continual human maintenance, the world of the Eloi has maintained its
own ecological stability for thousands of years. Yet like Huxley, the Time Traveller
(and, by implication, Wells) still assumes that the conquest of nature will be
comparatively "simple." Indeed, the very depiction of this "garden" as almost
insusceptible to evolutionary change suggests an assumption that ecological stability is
easy to maintain.
This dismissal of a complex non-human world is enabled by a predominantly
univocal rhetoric that relies almost solely on the Time Traveller to explicate the Earth's
future. This univocality is certainly not total. The Time Machine is, in fact, narrated by
two people: the Time Traveller and the primary narrator, who is one of the guests present
at the Time Traveller's recounting of his adventures. The primary narrator frames the
first person narrative the Time Traveller delivers. And while the primary narrator is
seldom present as a voice himself; his slight commentary, nonetheless, distinguishes him
from the Time Traveller. The former is an optimist, the latter a pessimist. Though the
Time Traveller thinks "but cheerlessly of the Advancement of Mankind," the primary
narrator avers that "to me the future is still black and blank [. . .1" (98); in other words,
the future is not preordained, the decline into dystopia not inevitable. The tension
between these two voices complicates the Time Traveller's narrative. Is the bleak future
that the Time Traveller has seen indelible, or is it a call for utopian thinkers to stave off
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such a fate? The multivocality of this structure, however, is limited. The primary
narrator offers no critique of the Time Traveller's tale beyond his slightly more hopeful
interpretation of it.
There are other voices in The Time Machine, but the text openly advertises that
they are not to be considered full human subjects. Almost all of them are indicated by
allegorical labels rather than names: the Editor, the Psychologist, the Medical Man, They
are examples of types, not individuals. Their main function is to represent a complacent
Victorian bourgeoisie that foolishly refuses to accept the legitimacy of the Time
Traveller's warnings. When the Time Traveller asks what his audience thinks of his
story, not as a true account but as a speculation, the only response he gets is the Editor
remarking, "What a pity it is you're not a writer of stories!" (95). The joke is obvious:
this is a written story and a fine one at that! Within the narrative itself, however, this
refusal even to engage with the Time Traveller's tale as a vehicle for social critique
expresses the gathering's naive feeling that the Time Traveller has been spinning them a
jolly yarn with no possible relevance to human society. The remaining characters, of
course, are explicitly not human subjects: the Eloi and the Morlocks are given no
dialogue. Although the Time Traveller learns the Eloi's simplistic language, even the
single named Eloi character, the Time Traveller's companion, Weena, apparently says
nothing worth recording. The Time Traveller never learns the language of the Morlocks.
The different perspectives present in The Time Machine can be categorized thus:
the Time Traveller, who is the protagonist and central point of view of the story; the
primary narrator, who is rather more optimistic but basically agrees with the Time
Traveller's views (even if he doubts the literal veracity of his story); the rest of the Time
Traveller's audience, who represent the average narrow-minded, middle-class Victorian;
the Eloi, who are like foolish five-year-old children, and the Morlocks, who are not
linguistically accessible. Given this array of characters, it is almost inevitable that no
voice should arise to legitimately question the Time Traveller's suppositions about the
future. To his credit, the Time Traveller manages a great deal of questioning on his own,
working through several hypotheses about the development of humanity before hitting
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upon what he considers the right answer. Yet since his--and Wells' s--focus is on human
evolution rather than broader ecological relationships, the Time Traveller does not apply
the same skepticism to his analysis of the creation of the garden-environment. And
because Wells does not adopt a rhetoric that encourages others to question the Time
Traveller, the structure of the text does not demand extensive investigation of the Tune
Traveller's view of the conquest of nature. Thus, when the Time Traveller proclaims that
the readjustment of the balance of life has been accomplished "for all time," there is no
one to point out to him that his own narrative contradicts this.
Dialectic Support for the Conquest of Nature in Men Like Gods
Ideologically, The Time Machine and Men Like Gods are almost identical: the
former enacts the horrors of rejecting a certain model of human advancement, the latter
the rewards of embracing that model. In this ideology, progress is the guiding principle.
In his better known work, A Modern Utopia (1905), Wells contrasts his utopian vision
with Thomas More's Utopia: "[The Modern Utopia must be not static but kinetic, must
shape not as a permanent state but as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages"
(Ch. 1, Sec. 1). In the Wellsian utopia, this "ascent" involves bettering human life and
deepening human knowledge by instituting a welfare state that cares for everyone's basic
needs while encouraging each person to foster his or her individual talents for the good of
society. Such a utopia places a premium on scientific education, which Wells perceived
as the cornerstone of a rational world state. The "ascent" must also include evolutionary
advancement, and because the elimination of conditions of natural struggle will undercut
the progressive agency of natural selection, a Wellsian utopia advocates some sort of
eugenics. 3 John Partington argues that as a kinetic utopia, A Modem Utopia revises The
Time Machine by providing a hopeful, progressionist alternative to the earlier text's
failed static utopia. 4 I contend that Men Like Gods similarly functions as a response to
The Time Machine but does so with a greater emphasis on the intricacies of ecological
management. 5
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In Men Like Gods, Wells presents a Utopia that has avoided the fate of the Eloi
and Morlocks by refusing to exploit a laboring class and adopting a mild form of negative
eugenics to ensure that the human race continues to advance instead of degenerating.
This Utopia exists in a parallel dimension to the 1920s England of the novel's
protagonist, utopian thinker Mr. Barnstaple. When Mr. Barnstaple, along with a few
Earthling companions, stumbles into this other dimension, he begins a journey of
discovery akin to that of the Time Traveller. For while Utopia does not exist in the future
of Earth, it is a society that represents a more advanced stage of human civilization. In its
past, Utopia has suffered from and surmounted many of the afflictions of terrestrial
society, including wars, economic exploitation, and overpopulation. Mr. Barnstaple
embraces Utopian wisdom, while his fellow Earthlings are inclined to reject it. Thus,
when the Earthlings are quarantined to prevent the spread of an epidemic caused by Earth
microbes to which the Utopians have no natural immunity,6 the Earthlings--minus Mr.
Barnstaple--foolishly declare war on the Utopians. Before they can do much damage,
however, the Utopians send them to another dimension, retaining only Mr. Barnstaple,
whom they eventually return to England, where he resumes his life, refreshed and
optimistic.
Men Like Gods is concerned with developing a Utopia that a rational thinker like
Mr. Barnstaple will consider workable. To make a case that this Utopia is plausible, the
text must describe Utopian practices in detail. It is never more detailed than in its
discussion of the subjugation of nature. Indeed, in his 1986 paper, "FL G. Wells and
Ecology," W. M. S. Russell singles out Men Like Gods as a text ahead of its time in its
"far-sighted" principles for ecological management (150), which generate a "planned and
landscaped environment of utopia which would [. . .] bear study by conservationists
today" (148). 7 Though Wells's support for ecological control in Men Like Gods remains
as enthusiastic as it was in The Time Machine, the later text demonstrates an enhanced
awareness of the difficulties inherent in this task. Much of this heightened awareness is
due to advances in the science of ecology and to an intensification of Wells's own
concern with ecological questions between the 1890s and 1920s. Throughout the 1920s
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and '30s, Wells became increasingly invested in the concept of "human ecology," or
social economics (Anker 113). 8 In the influential popular science text, The Science of
Life (1930), which Wells coauthored with his son, G. P. Wells, and Julian Huxley
(grandson of Thomas Henry), ecology is described as "an extension of economics to the
whole world of life" (961). "Human ecology" encapsulates the idea that all human
activities—as well as non-human activities--have ecological implications. Industry,
family structure, forms of government, educational institutions, balance of trade: all these
things are part of Earth's ecology and have an ecological impact.
In Men Like Gods, this awareness of the interconnectedness of human and non-
human agencies is mobilized to explain the conquest of nature sketchily outlined in The
Time Machine. Though the Utopians are sensitive to the intricacy of ecological relations,
they, nonetheless, wholeheartedly endorse human domination of nature. The basic
Utopian assumption is that a biosphere, while extraordinarily complex, is not so complex
that human science is incapable of comprehending and controlling it. The Utopians
pursue the subjugation of nature by rigorously studying the ways in which life forms
interact. Species that are harmful or unpleasant to humans may be exterminated but only
if their loss will not occasion disproportionately negative ecological consequences. Thus,
each unwanted species is "put upon [its] trial" (72) to determine if it can justify its
existence in terms of human needs:
Of each [species] it was asked: What good is it? What harm does it do?
How can it be extirpated? What else may go with it if it goes? Is it worth
while wiping it out of existence? Or can it be mitigated and retained?
And even when the verdict was death final and complete, Utopia set about
the business of extermination with great caution. A reserve would be kept
and was in many cases still being kept, in some secure isolation, of every
species condemned. (72)
The Utopians' ideology is unambivalently anthropocentric: principally concerned with
the utility of organisms for human society, expressing little sense of intrinsic value in the
non-human world. Their hesitation to exterminate species is primarily utilitarian.
Species exist within webs of ecological relation; other species "may go with [a species] if
it goes." To destroy a species is always to run the risk of upsetting these relations in
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unexpected ways potentially deleterious to humanity. Therefore, it is in humanity's
interest to limit such unforeseen disruptions by limiting species extinction. The "reserve"
of an exterminated species is kept not out of a sense of the species's right to exist but as a
precautionary measure should unexpected ecological instabilities require its
reintroduction. Thus, the Utopians' anthropocentric praxis is informed by an extensive
understanding of ecology.
The emphasis on ecology in Men Like Gods is doubtless more a result of Wells's
growing interest in ecological questions than a product of a particular rhetorical
paradigm. Nonetheless, the development of the Utopians' painstaking program of
ecological management is enhanced by a multivocal rhetoric. While the univocal
structure of The Time Machine militates against the examination of issues, including
ecology, that are not a focus of concern to the Time Traveller, the relative multivocality
of Men Like Gods opens up spaces for the examination of ecological questions through
argument among different viewpoints. This multivocal structure is essentially dialectic,
using oppositional viewpoints to support a certain position by providing a space for
counter-arguments to be presented and refuted.
If Bakhtinian dialogism celebrates the power of heteroglossia to unravel dominant
discourses, Men Like Gods is not dialogic. Its multivocality is designed to fortify the
dominant Utopian discourse, not problematize it. Yet, as I argue in chapter 1, dialectical
and dialogic processes are not categorically distinct but rather exist at different points
along a continuum of multivocal rhetorics. In dialectic discourse, oppositional voices are
intended to endorse the dominance of a certain view; in dialogic discourse, the emphasis
shifts to challenging dominance. In both cases, however, the rhetorical structures
acknowledge the value of conflicting perspectives to attaining a deeper understanding of
an issue. Thus, the dialectic structure of Men Like Gods constitutes an incipient
dialogism. Like a dialogic rhetoric, this structure recognizes the necessity of allowing
diverse voices to be heard.
The rhetorical structure of Men Like Gods differs from a fully dialogic rhetoric,
however, in its adherence to a paradigm in which all viewpoints can be resolved into a
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single, "correct" answer. Heteroglossia describes a type of discursive milieu in which
different "languages" are always, to some extent, incompatible. Some beliefs, some
needs, some types of understanding will always be in conflict with others. Thus,
dialogism posits that irreducible discursive difference is a precondition at least of modern
society, if not all human society. The rhetoric of Men Like Gods does not accept this
assumption. Instead, the text adopts a discursive structure that is an inevitable
consequence of Wells's scientific positivism. If science can uncover definitive answers
not only to physical but even to social questions, then a single language must be able to
express those answers definitively. Now, scientific discovery itself thrives on dialogic
challenge: the more rigorously a hypothesis or experimental procedure is questioned, the
more reliable the conclusions will be. Thus, tested in the crucibles both of
methodological rigor and dialogic investigation, experiments or even theories may be
reported in a relatively "objective" language and determined to be provisionally correct.
But the further removed from a concrete application of the scientific method a report
becomes, the more likely it will reflect ideological vicissitudes. And when science is
called upon to prescribe ethics, as Wells's scientific positivism demands, the scientific
method, designed to determine how things occur, not whether they should, cannot be
applied at all. By positing one "correct" language, however, Wells's positivism rejects
the ideological dimension of ethical discourse. Dialogism and scientific positivism are,
thus, incommensurate ideas. As a scientific-positivist text, Men Like Gods must either
present different perspectives as reconcilable (reducible to one perspective) or as correct
versus incorrect.
Presenting science as a reliable standard of correctness, Men Like Gods voices an
array of perspectives through several named characters--both Earthlings and Utopians--
who are more or less distinct from each other, if not deeply developed. The story is
recounted from the third person point of view of utopian dreamer Mr. Barnstaple. Like
William Morris's William Guest, Mr. Barnstaple is the outsider to Utopia who is,
nonetheless, already mostly converted to Utopian wisdom before the fact. Though Mr.
Barnstaple has numerous questions for the Utopians, he is almost always willing to
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accept their answers at face value. Consistently presented as the most insightful of the
Earthlings, he functions as "yes-man" to the Utopians. Of their program of ecological
domination, for example, he thinks that "it seemed to him the most natural and necessary
phase in human history" (74); this response is typical of his attitude toward Utopia. The
remainder of the Earthlings represent either caricatures of prominent British political
figures (Mr. Catskill is Winston Churchill, for instance) or caricatures of types (the two
chauffeurs are stereotypical cockneys). Some of these characters are merely
contemptible: the prudish clergyman Amerton is despised not only by the Utopians but
by his fellow Earthlings. Yet others, despite the element of parody in their presentation,
are far from complete imbeciles. Wells's example of average womanhood, Lady Stella,
has flashes of a mild insight; she, at least, is able to admit what Wells presents as
unvarnished truth: "We are inferior creatures [to the Utopians]" (117). The Utopians are
presented as wiser than the Earthlings yet are also less clearly differentiated. This lack of
differentiation is almost certainly not an intended theme: Wells's concept of utopia is
designed to foster a strong strain of individuality. Nonetheless, with the exception of the
"backward" (183) Utopian woman, Lychnis, who is unhealthily preoccupied with death
and sorrow, the perspectives of the adult Utopians are more or less interchangeable.
Even with this rather "flat" array of characters, however, the conflict between Utopian
perspectives and Earthling perspectives requires the Utopians to defend the wisdom of
their system. And if this defense is not always rigorous, it nevertheless demands a more
sophisticated explication of the subjugation of nature than The Time Machine.
A crucial objection to the Utopians' system of ecological management is put
forward by the sentimental aesthete aptly named Freddy Mush. Mr. Mush is concerned
that the Utopians have upset what he calls the "Balance of Nature," though "[w]hat this
Balance of Nature of his was, and how it worked on Earth, neither the Utopians nor Mr.
Barnstaple were able to understand very clearly" (72). Nor is Mr. Mush able to explain
it: "Under cross-examination Mr. Mush grew pink and restive and his eyeglass flashed
defensively. 'I hold by the swallows,' he repeated. 'If you can't see my point about that
I don't know what else I can say'" (72). By "holding by the swallows," Mr Mush means
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that he interprets the absence of swallows in Utopia as a sign that these birds have been
driven to extinction; their extinction, in turn, must be a sign of an upheaval in the Balance
of Nature. Mr. Mush is an idiot, a dandy with a defensive eyeglass and an amusing
name, who blushes and sputters as he finds himself unable to answer the most basic of
legitimate questions. But Mr. Mush's objection is valid. It is, in fact, so significant that
the text goes to great lengths to answer it.
This objection is addressed in a third person narration vaguely ascribed to the
Utopians, an indication of how little Wells distinguishes between different Utopians'
views. This narration maintains that swallows are not extinct in Utopia. They are,
however, restricted to the few localities where their insect prey has not been eliminated.
In developing the "swallow objection," Wells addresses one of the central complaints that
could be made against his Utopian project of ecological control: that it will adversely
impact "desirable" species. The text concedes that this is not an easy problem; in fact,
"Wile question of what else would go if a certain species went was one of the most subtle
that Utopia had to face. Certain insects, for example, were destructive and offensive
grubs in the opening stage of their lives [.	 and then became either beautiful in
themselves or necessary to the fertilisation of some useful or exquisite flowers" (73).
Even without considering a species's ecological roles, anthropocentric arguments may be
adduced both for and against its persistence: humans may find the caterpillar "offensive"
but the butterfly beautiful. The fact that a species does exist within webs of ecological
relation makes the question of whether it should persist even more complex. If certain
insects are eliminated, the swallows that feed on them will be eliminated too. The
question, then, is whether the loss of the pleasant swallows and other insectivorous birds
is a fair price to pay for the extermination of insect pests. In Utopia, the answer has been
a cautious "yes." While "sufficient [insect] species had remained to make some districts
habitable for these delightful birds" (73), in the main the birds have been considered
expendable. Mr. Mush is right to this extent: the swallows have mostly been lost, and
this loss is, in and of itself, a sad thing, a sign that the conquest of nature cannot be
accomplished without sacrifice.
134
Mr. Mush is wrong, however, in his supposition that the absence of swallows
must be a sign of a reckless imbalancing of Nature. Yet this accusation, too, has merit.
The idea that nature exists in some sort of balance is far from absurd to Wells. I have
already noted that the Time Traveller, an early portrait of Wells's educated scientific
man, refers to readjusting "the balance of animal and vegetable life" as a laudable goal
(Time 49). What makes Mr. Mush's avowal suspect is the capital letters: it is the
"Balance of Nature" he is concerned about, a sort of sacred, holistic essence with which
humanity must not tamper. Wells, however, was a dedicated reductionist. For Wells, it
was undeniable--indeed, it would be foolhardy to the point of suicidal to deny--that life
forms exist in more or less "balanced" ecological relations, 9 but these relations
themselves can be broken down into analyzable parts. Wells assumed that given
sufficient scientific advancement, it will be possible to determine with reasonable
certainty how each species fits into ecosystems. On the basis of such knowledge,
humanity can decide when a species can be eliminated without unjustified disruption of
the "balance of nature" in lower case letters. The possibility of error, of course, still
exists; this is why a portion of each exterminated species is retained in case
reintroduction proves ecologically necessary.
Though Freddy Mush himself is not to be taken seriously, his objections to
Utopia, nonetheless, create a discursive space in which such serious questions can be
addressed. At the same time, this dismissal of Mr. Mush as a legitimate point of view
thwarts dialogic engagement with the issues he raises. Thus, while the "swallow
objection" provides an opportunity to explore in some detail the complexities of Utopia's
subjugation of nature, Mr. Mush's inability to make such objections forcefully enables
the Utopians to make precarious claims about the efficacy of Utopian ecological planning
without having to defend them. For instance, the Utopians--via Wells's third person
narration--mention that "Where had been much befriending and taming of big animals;
the larger carnivora, combed and cleaned, reduced to a milk dietary, emasculated in spirit
and altogether becattled, were pets and ornaments in Utopia" (Men 73). The text offers
no explanation for how a large carnivore, evolved to be a fierce predator, can readily be
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"becattled" into a complacent pet, nor for how an organism evolved to eat meat can
subsist on a diet of milk. Given Wells's Darwinian training, the most likely answer
would be selective breeding, but this answer is not given, nor are any possible objections
to it addressed. More troubling from an ecological perspective is the passing remark, "It
had been infinitely easier to get rid of such big annoyances as the hyena and the wolf than
to abolish these smaller pests [various insects}" (73). Wells is undoubtedly correct that
the elimination of large predator species is easier than the elimination of tiny, populous,
quick-breeding insects. This claim is disturbing, however, in its assumption that wolves
and hyenas are merely "annoyances," relatively easy "to get rid of." In chapter I, I
discuss the ecological havoc wreaked on American ecosystems as a result of the
extermination of predators such as the wolf. In his discussion of the Utopians' strategy
for "putting a species upon its trial," Wells addresses the possibility that the
extermination of one species will lead to the extermination of its ecological partners:
swallows cannot exist without insects. He does not, however, address the inverse
possibility that certain populations may explode in the absence of a particular species:
without wolves, what checks deer populations? Since the entire Utopian scheme for
ecological domination is based on caution, one could hope that the Utopians' system
would afford them the opportunity to negotiate such questions without ecological
catastrophe. Nonetheless, the absence of rigorous interrogation of such an expansive
program of extinctions, even by so ecologically astute a thinker as Wells himself, does
not bode well for the realistic application of any such program, assuming such a goal
were considered desirable.
By presenting Mr. Mush as too foolish to raise serious objections, the text refuses
complex engagement with questions about the "balance of nature," reducing them to his
simplistic ranting. Yet it does not so summarily dismiss other Earthling critics. Less
ridiculous, though still satirical, is Rupert Catskill. It is given to Mr. Catskill,
appropriately his country's Secretary of State for War, to defend the Social Darwinist
position that struggle and privation are necessary for the continued development of
humanity. A true politician, Mr. Catskill begins by praising the Utopians for their
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accomplishments. Having established his appreciation for the "almost magic beauty" of
Utopia (76), he goes on to develop much the same critique that the Time Traveller makes
of the society that gave rise to the Eloi and Morlocks. He asserts to the Utopian,
Serpentine, that "all the energy and beauty of life are begotten by struggle and
competition and conflict; we were moulded and wrought in hardship, and so, sir, were
you" (79). Mr. Catskill goes on to ask rhetorically, "Are you preventing degeneration [in
the absence of a struggle for survival]?" (79). This is an argument Wells must respect: it
is, after all, precisely the scenario he delineated with such precision in The Time 
Machine. The question of what is to prevent Utopian degeneration is one the Utopians
themselves have grappled with seriously. What makes Mr. Catskill look foolish is his
assumption that they have not grappled with it: "He assumed there had been losses with
every gain [. . .]" (77; my emphasis), rather than asking the Utopians if this had been the
case. Thus Mr. Catskill's error is a failure of genuine inquiry, an assumption that he
knows the "right" answer and is addressing his case to the Utopians not to be challenged
but only for the rhetorical effect of showing himself to be right.
Although Mr. Catskill intends his questioning of Utopian wisdom to be rhetorical,
the Utopians have answers ready. Degeneration in the absence of struggle is a real
possibility. The Utopians guard against it by instituting eugenics and maintaining a
competitive society: 'The indolent and inferior do not procreate here," Urthred explains
(81), echoing an earlier section in which the Utopians explain to Mr. Barnstaple that "[i]f
the individual is indolent there is no great loss, there is plenty for all in Utopia, but then it
will find no lovers, nor will it ever bear children, because no one in Utopia loves those
who have neither energy nor distinction" (64). Utopian society is progressive, its citizens
trained to strive for ever greater scientific and social achievement. This cultural emphasis
makes the indolent and unintelligent unattractive mates and, thus, guards against the
degeneration of the Utopians into creatures like the Eloi. Mr. Catskill's legitimate
question about the role of struggle in Utopia provides an opportunity for the Utopians to
explain how they have decoupled evolutionary progress from Malthusian privation.
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Yet, as with the complaint of Mr. Mush, the text undercuts the dialogic potential
of Mr. Catskill's objection. Instead of developing this exchange of ideas as genuine
"dialogue," a conversation in which the ideas of different speakers build on one another,
the text presents Mr. Catskill's objection and the Utopian rebuttal in two blocks of text
After several pages of almost uninterrupted oratorical flourish from Mr. Catskill, he
concludes with, "I have said my say" (80). Apparently he has, for his speech is followed
by several pages of uninterrupted answering oratory from Urthred. In fact, when Urthred
offers to engage him in a contest of strength to demonstrate Utopian biological
superiority, Mr. Catskill responds only with this invitation: "You go on talking" (84). In
fact, no. one offers any counter-challenge to Urthred's rebuttal. This presentation of
Urthred's exposition in a single, unanswered block once again enables the text to put
forward as definitive a praxis that, in fact, is problematic. Utopian eugenics is based on
the idea that social undesirables will not produce children because no one will mate with
them. Our own--and indeed nineteenth-century--experience with population growth,
however, suggests that in the absence of draconian sterilization measures, social
undesirables often produce children. Urthred does not explain why this is not the case in
Utopia. And since Mr. Catskill has already "said his say," there is no one to ask him.
This refusal of dialogic critique promotes disturbing trends in Western ecological
disourse by allowing the text to wholeheartedly endorse a radically anthropocentric view
of nature. The text's only hint of a challenge to this view comes once again from Freddy
Mush. However, it comes less from Mr. Mush's own words than Urthred's interpretation
of them: "This man with the lens before his eye [Mr. Mush] struggles to believe that there
is a wise old Mother Nature behind the appearance of things, keeping a Balance" (82). It
is clear that Urthred is mocking Mr. Mush's adherence to the concept of a holistic
"Balance" that may be linked to a semi-sacred Mother Nature. Urthred asserts that Mr.
Mush "struggles to believe" this, thereby trivializing his position by suggesting that, on
some level, he already knows that he is wrong. Urthred goes on to reject Mr. Mush's and
Mr. Catskill's arguments, asserting that nature "is not awful [ie_ awesome], she is
horrible," a source of misery to be tamed to better use (82). The text offers some
138
refutation: "Thew! Worse than "Nature red in tooth and claw,"' murmured Mr. Mush"
(82). However, this "murmured" invocation of Alfred, Lord Tennyson, a literary
reference Urthred cannot possibly be familiar with, is clearly a personal aside and not an
attempt at dialogue. Urthred interprets it accordingly, continuing his diatribe as if he had
never been interrupted.
Finally, Urthred summarizes the Utopian ecological attitude:
Half the species of life in [sic] our planet also, half and more than half of
all the things alive, were ugly or obnoxious, inane, miserable, wretched,
with elaborate diseases, helplessly ill adjusted to Nature's continually
fluctuating conditions, when we first took this old Hag, our Mother, in
hand. We have, after centuries of struggle, suppressed her nastier fancies,
and washed her and combed her and taught her to respect and heed the last
child of her wantonings–Man. With Man came Logos, the Word and the
Will into our universe, to watch it and fear it, to learn it and cease to fear
it, to know it and comprehend it and master it. So that we of Utopia are no
longer the beaten and starved children of Nature, but her free and
adolescent sons. We have taken over the Old Lady's Estate. Every day
we learn a little better how to master the planet. Every day our thoughts
go out more surely to our inheritance, the stars. And the deeps beyond and
beneath the stars_ (82-83)
This passage raises numerous questions about the desirability of Utopian ecological
ideology, none of which are explicitly posed within the text. Urthred's exposition
provides, among other things, an excellent illustration of the dissonance inherent in the
Western identification of Nature with Woman. Female Nature is simultaneously "our
Mother," a figure typically regarded with respect, and the wild, "wanton" woman, an
inferior in need of constant domination. Thus, our Mother is a dirty "old Hag" in need of
a good washing, a mere "Old Lady," whose estate has been rightfully taken over by
"Man," her "sons" (human females are effaced). Far from needing to respect their
mother, Nature's sons much teach her to "respect and heed" them. Even within Wells's
Utopia, this discourse of nature is internally inconsistent. Urthred's contempt for
untamed Nature implies that Nature is no more than a "nasty" mass of "ill-adjusted"
energies to be "taken in hand." Yet this view is contradicted just a few pages earlier by
Urthred's discussion of the Utopian system for eliminating species. The caution
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Utopians adopt in this process, their intense awareness of the intricacy of ecological
relations, suggests a clear understanding that Nature (prior to human management) is, in
fact, a highly complex system of approximate balances that should be tampered with only
using extreme care. Hardly a trivial "Old Lady," nature itself must be taken seriously,
and the very caution of the Utopians' program of ecological management does so. Yet
the discourse of conquest Urthred engages in would seem to undercut this respect.
Here, then, is a rupture in Wells's ecological program: it is difficult to believe that
a people who can speak so derisively of nature could, in fact, manage it with sufficient
care to avoid ecological disaster. The text itself obliquely supports this objection. Later
in the novel, remarking on the Utopians' low opinion of Mr. Barnstaple, the Utopian
Sungold asserts that "contempt is the cause of all injustice" (211). Sungold' s statement
occurs in a different context from Urthred's exposition, and there is no evidence that
Wells intended the one to critique the other. Yet Urthred's characterization of nature is
clearly contemptuous. Can such an attitude, then, underlie a just eco-management
policy? Perhaps so. But since no character questions Urthred's assertions, the issue of
whether or not such a policy could be achieved is not addressed, with the result that
Wells's program appears suspect.
Another rupture in Utopian ideology exists around the mandate that the Utopians
give themselves for this conquest. The Utopians grant themselves the moral right to
subjugate nature essentially because they alone have the mental capacity to do so. 1 ° It is
with Man that "Logos, the Word and the Will [came] into our universe" (82-83). Here
the biblical formulation that "the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (King
James Bible, John 1.1) has been replaced by an identification of the Word with Man and,
hence, of Man with God. The sense that humanity represents the pinnacle of knowledge
is further evidenced by Urthred's assertion that humanity came into the universe "to learn
it": as soon as the universe (or nature) becomes something containing secrets to unlock,
the old Hag becomes a depersonalized "it," an object to learn, not a wisdom to learn
from. 11 While nature as a source of wanton energy can be personified as a woman to
dominate, nature as a source of knowledge cannot be personified because that "person"
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would suggest an individual more knowledgeable than Man. And to maintain his
mandate to dominate Nature, Man must be the most knowledgeable force present. But if
humanity's right to dominate nature is based on knowledge, humanity's ignorance would
call this right into question.
And Men Like Gods is adamant that the Utopians are only just beginning to
comprehend the universe. The aged and venerable Sungold states the point emphatically:
"We have gone on for three thousand years now [pursuing Utopia', and a hundred million
good brains have been put like grapes into the wine-press of science. And we know to-
day--how little we know. There is never an observation made but a hundred observations
are missed in the making of it" (214-15). Through this portrait of the Utopians'
limitations, Wells conveys his sense of Utopia as always in progress: "We have hardly
begun!" Sungold avers (215). Similarly, Urthred calls Man Nature's "adolescent sons."
To Mr. Barnstaple, the Utopians may appear to be "men like gods," but Urthred
understands that as a society they are not yet even fully grown as "men." 12
Here lies another problem with Utopia. The Utopians, Sungold explains, are "like
little children who have been brought to the shores of a limitless ocean" (Men 215),
where the ocean can stand for the complexity of the universe. Yet this is the same
universe that Man exists to "know, comprehend, and master" (83). These two ideas
might be reconcilable if the Utopians viewed Man as, indeed, a child learning about the
universe so that when he is grown, he will know how to manipulate it. But the Utopians
are not waiting for Man to be "grown." They are already pronouncing life and death
sentences on every species on their planet: the little child has taken upon himself the right
to determine the fate of the ocean, an image which does not inspire confidence in the
ability of the Utopians to manage their biosphere.
Furthermore, the notion that the Utopians are pursuing this management with
caution is undercut by Urthred's description of the project: ""The gnawing vigour of the
rat,' he mused, 'the craving pursuit of the wolf, the mechanical persistence of the wasp
and fly and disease germ, have gone out of our world. That is true. And we have lost
nothing worth having. Pain, filth, indignity for ourselves--or any creatures; they have
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gone or they go'" (80-81). Taken literally, this passage borders on nonsensical. The
literal removal of pain from the world would presumably eliminate all predation, since
being eaten typically hurts, and thereby eliminate all carnivorous, non-scavenging links
in food chains. The extermination of "filth" would logically require the elimination of
excretory processes, requiring a radical redesign of the entire animal kingdom. The
concepts of removing "gnawing vigour," "craving pursuit," "mechanical persistence,"
and "indignity" from the world are so abstract and difficult to define that, as terms in a
scientifically precise program of management, they are essentially meaningless. One
could argue, for instance, that eliminating "mechanical persistence" might require
eliminating such mechanically persistent processes as human immune reactions or
digestion.
Since no character questions Urthred's ideas, the text is not compelled to clarify
his meaning. It is left to readers to interpolate the ideology behind his discourse. Yet
while various interpretations are possible, each interpretation retains troubling ideological
elements. Taken literally, Urthred almost seems to be advocating the elimination of life
as we know it. But it is likely that Urthred is not speaking literally. In this passage, he is
answering Mr. Catskill's objection that competition has died in Utopian society. On the
contrary, Urthred asserts, only its "gnawing, craving, mechanical" forms have died.
Thus, some of Urthred's tropes may be aimed specifically at describing human social and
eugenic constructions, not all animal species. Yet it is clear that his description is not
solely oriented around humanity He specifically states that these miseries are being
eliminated "for any creatures." And ecologically, such a program is so impracticable as
to be ludicrous. Perhaps Urthred is taking poetic license. Perhaps he does not literally
mean that Utopia should eliminate all pain but merely that it should substantially lessen
it But if Urthred is being hyperbolic, his very use of hyperbole suggests an extremist
bent in Utopian ecological praxis. Since practice is shaped by the rhetoric deployed to
support it, hyperbolic rhetoric does not foster moderate practice. Indeed, in keeping with
Urthred's statements, Utopian ecological management is extraordinarily intensive. In his
discursus on that Hag, Mother Nature, Urthred asserts that "half and more than half of all
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the things alive, were ugly or obnoxious, inane, miserable, wretched [. .1" (82), all
reasons, according to Utopian ethics, to eliminate or alter them as long as the ecological
consequences are deemed acceptable. Utopia grants itself the sanction to alter or
extinguish more than half of all life, for reasons as subjective--and, I might suggest,
trivial--as being "inane." One could argue that such a program is inane. But, in the text,
no one does.
The Incompatibility of Dialogism and Scientific Positivism
Ironically, Men Like Gods might have produced more productive--and less
narrowly anthropocentric--arguments if it had challenged Utopian convictions more
rigorously. Earlier in this chapter, I compare the rhetoric of Urthred to that of Sungold in
order to illustrate inconsistencies in the Utopian vision of ecological management. While
Urthred emphasizes humanity's ability to comprehend and, thus, to subjugate nature,
Sungold emphasizes the extent of humanity's ignorance. While Urthred derides nature as
an "old Hag," Sungold stresses the moral dangers of holding anything in contempt. Such
differences could have been developed dialogically, investigating the tensions in Utopian
ideology by contrasting the views of a progressively optimistic and contemptuous
Urthred with a more cautious and respectful Sungold. Wells, however, does not place
these voices in dialogue. Urthred and Sungold do not appear in the same scene, nor does
Mr. Barnstaple contrast their perspectives in his own mind. Despite the differences in
their rhetoric, both are presented as aware of humanity's limited knowledge and, at the
same time, enthusiastic about humanity's continued conquest of the universe. They are
presented, in fact, as two representatives of a single ideology. The inherent
contradictions in supporting a conquest justified by the science of the ignorant or in
arguing against contempt while showing contempt for nature are, thus, left to Wells's
readers to make sense of--if they can. Conversely, some of the most impressive pieces of
Utopian argumentation occur in response to potentially valid objections. By
acknowledging Mr. Mush's observation that the swallows have largely been sacrificed,
the Utopians demonstrate that they are aware of at least some of the negative
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consequences of their ecological praxis; they, thereby, present themselves as reasonable
and informed. The juxtaposition of genuinely different voices, such as Mr. Mush's and
the Utopians', enables a comparatively detailed engagement with complex ecological
questions. It is in the silencing of diverse viewpoints that Men Like Gods most notably
fails to articulate a convincing argument for its anthropocentric ecological praxis.
Yet while the text's refusal to question the desirability of the Utopians'
philosophy weakens Wells's Utopia by leaving potential problems unaddressed, the text's
aim of presenting an unambivalently laudable Utopia renders engagement with serious
objections almost impossible. The socio-ecological structure of a world government of
the type presented in Men Like Gods must be so complex that no single novel could
begin to answer all the questions that could be raised about its various practices. But if
questions cannot be answered, there are only two ways to deal with them: they can be
asked and left unanswered, or they can be left irnasked. It is not surprising that Wells
took the second option. If he had posed major questions without clearly answering them,
he would have undercut his characterization of Utopia as a society in which science
dictates a clear course of action for the betterment of the human race. Utopian clarity of
purpose would become muddied by a cacophony of conflicting voices. Leaving
questions unasked, in contrast, may suggest that all relevant questions have already been
answered. The effacement of oppositional voices creates an illusion of ideological
coherence. But it is only an illusion.
Yet this fantasy of complete coherence is essential to Wells's philosophy of
scientific positivism. As a scientific positivist, Wells held that science could lead to an
approximation of the "truth" about our world and that this approximate truth would
illuminate a general course of right action that any properly scientifically minded person
would agree to. W. Warren Wager sums up the implications of such a view: "Science,
[Wells] believed, rendered not only politics obsolete, but also diversity of opinion, creed,
and culture" (43). As Wells himself remarked late in his career, "Only one body of
philosophy and only one religion [. . .] can exist in a unified world state" (qtd. in Wager
49), the type of utopia he had advocated, at least, since his 1901 Anticipations. Today,
however, it is widely accepted--as it was by many in Wells's time--that science does not
imply a complete ethical system. Science may not be practicable without an ethical
regard for adhering to the scientific method and an investment in seeking "objective
truth." Beyond these concerns, however, science itself posits no values. It may tell us
that no racial difference is reflected in the human brain, but it does not tell us that all
races should, therefore, be treated equally. It may tell us that, contrary to Descartes's
assertions, animals can feel, but that fact alone does not condemn the meaningless and
torturous vivisection practiced by Wells's Doctor Moreau. Wells's belief that science
will designate ethics, however, leads him to conflate his own culturally constructed
ideology with incontrovertible scientific "truth." For Wells, an understanding of
evolution naturally suggests an ethical system wherein Earth must be biologically
managed by humanity to ensure the continuance of life and the advancement of Man. He
does not typically address the idea that a properly educated person with a grasp of
evolution might not find this course morally acceptable. He does not question whether a
single species, however mentally advanced, has the right to claim absolute power of life
and death over other species; he does not question whether this species has a right to
redesign an entire biosphere--or by extension the whole universe. In Men Like Gods, no
one--educated or absurd--reflects this contrary view. Even Mr. Mush's appeals to the
Balance of Nature relate more to the feasibility of the Utopian conquest than its moral
desirability.
A rejection of dialogic communication facilitates Wells's conflation of science
and ethics. If no educated scientist emerges to challenge Utopian ecological ethics, there
is no obvious space for observing that this ethics is not endorsed by the scientific method.
Conversely, the more that diverse voices were to talk about Utopian ethics--even without
the aim of deconstructing it--the more that ethics would be problematized; such
problematizing is a virtually inevitable side-effect of open discourse about complex ideas.
To maintain the illusion of an ethics dictated by sound science, Men Like Gods must,
145
therefore, strictly limit its multivocality. The necessity of such limitation is evident in the
text's usage of the concept of telepathy, the chief means of face-to-face Utopian
communication.
Kingsley Widmer criticizes Wells's telepathy as an inappropriately fantastic
device for a utopian novel: "[In Men Like Gods] there is now a world of 'demigods,'
beings bred into not only higher intellect but direct psychic communication [. .] This, I
argue, should be viewed less as eutopian projection than scientistic fantasy" (26).
Widmer's contention that Wells's use of telepathy is more fantasy than rational
extrapolation is valid. Wells himself attempts no scientific explanation of the
phenomenon. The Utopian Urthred states only that "in some manner which we still do
not understand perfectly, people began to get the idea before it was clothed in words and
uttered in sounds" (Men 50). This improbable occurrence, however, like the inter-
dimensional travel that brings the Earthlings to Utopia, is most likely intended more as a
useful plot point than a utopian argument. If it is nothing else, telepathy provides means
for these two societies to communicate that is less ethnocentric than assuming that
Utopians speak English.
But while Wells probably introduced telepathy as little more than a convenience
to enable inter-dimensional communication, the phenomenon of telepathy, nonetheless,
highlights the dialogic ambiguity inherent in verbal communication. In Wells's
telepathic scheme, a signified concept is automatically translated into the appropriate
signifier in the language of the "listener." If the "listener" does not comprehend this
concept in the same way as the "speaker," however, the translation must be approximate.
Thus, when Serpentine explains his profession, each of the Earthlings interprets his
meaning differently:
[Serpentine] called himself something that Mr. Barnstaple could not catch.
First it sounded like "atomic mechanician," and then oddly enough it
sounded like "molecular chemist." And then Mr. Barnstaple heard Mr.
Burleigh say to Mr. Mush, "He said, `physiochemist,' didn't he?"
"I thought he just called himself a materialist," said Mr. Mush.
"I thought he said he weighed things," said Lady Stella. (42)
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Each of these translations reflects the knowledge and attitudes of the listener. Mr.
Burleigh, a comparatively intelligent and educated man, hears a properly scientific
approximation of Serpentine's "words." Mr. Barnstaple, likewise intelligent and
educated but also unusually inquisitive and open-minded, hears at least two rather
sophisticated translations. Mr. Mush, a literary man who disdains science, can get no
further than a sense that Serpentine is involved with something that rejects the finer
spiritual qualities of life. Lady Stella, the tale's representative of "invincible
ordinariness" (22), hears the only translation her inadequate, woman's education leaves
available, a vague sense of the empirical process involved in Serpentine's work.13
Fantastic though the notion of telepathy is, it serves as an apt metaphor for the very real
complexities of human communication. Words, like Wells's telepathic communications,
are unstable, as Bakhtin observes: "The word, directed toward its object, enters a
dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and
accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships 1. . .1" ("Discourse" 276).
Telepathy, then, could readily serve as a vehicle for the intensive exploration of the
"dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment" of verbal slippage in which we all
communicate.
Wells, however, does not exploit this potential. After his initial detailing of the
vagaries of telepathic communication, conversation proceeds more or less as if everyone
were speaking a commonly comprehensible English. Wells's failure to return to the
discursive possibilities of the narrative frame of telepathy suggests that he did intend
telepathy as little more than a plot gimmick to explain how Earthlings and Utopians can
communicate. I do not contend that Wells must have consciously--or even
unconsciously--shied away from exploiting the dialogic possibility of telepathy because
he sensed that do to so would undermine his utopian project. My point, rather, is that if
this potential had been exploited, the Utopian ideology voiced most forcefully by Urthred
could not have been presented as fully coherent and sufficient. Telepathy exposes the
imprecision of verbal communication. If verbal communication is imprecise, however,
then knowledge shared and expanded through it cannot be transparent. Yet the illusion of
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a transparent language is essential to the validation of Utopian ideology. Imagine
Urthred's discourses on ecological management being interpreted by each of his
Earthling listeners with a slightly different shade of meaning. What constitutes an
"inane" life form? Just what connotations is "Old Lady" supposed to carry? How
exactly is nature like an "estate"? If a species is put on "trial," does that imply that it has
been accused of crime? Urthred's every sentence could be intensely debated in an effort
to pin down his meaning. And with every nuance that would be uncovered, the self-
evidence of his position would be called into question, if only because it would become
plain that his words can be read in several ways. But Wells's Utopia is predicated on
scientific positivism, and scientific positivism can only function in a world in which
knowledge is, for all intents and purposes, reliable and transparent. Wells's concept of
telepathy problematizes knowledge; therefore, telepathy cannot be examined too closely.
The discussions it would naturally occasion cannot occur.
An open, dialogic engagement with the complexity of human discourses would
risk undermining Wells's scientific positivism. Yet Wells's failure to grapple with this
discursive complexity in Men Like Gods, likewise, weakens the text's argumentation.
Indeed, Wells's contention that a utopia must and can operate under a single,
unambivalent, scientifically reasoned set of values is at odds with what many critics have
characterized as strengths in his writing. Examining numerous critical studies of the
ambivalence latent in the Wellsian utopia, Carol S. Franko concludes, "These studies
suggest that Wells's ambivalence toward utopia was productive," exposing complicated
tensions between utopian and dystopian impulses (12). Darko Suvin argues that a
"fundamental ambiguity [. . .] constitutes both the richness and the weakness of Wells"
(216). While this ambiguity robs Wells's specific social arguments of some of their
force, Suvin argues that it endows his narratives with a different kind of power, a power
to enthrall and stimulate minds that "makes thus an aesthetic form of hesitations;
intimations, and glimpses of an ambiguously disquieting strangeness" (Suvin 217).
Wells's son, Anthony West, has argued that Wells was predominantly a stoical realist
who wrote with optimism against his better judgment (Hammond 78). In
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Men Like Gods, however, Wells's pessimistic and ambivalent modes largely disappear
into an optimistic oversimplification, as if any narrative more complex would collapse his
utopian vision.
Men Like Gods superficially circumvents the challenge that telepathy presents to
Utopia by downplaying the complications caused by telepathy. The underlying problem,
however, remains. The Utopians' ideology is dubious. Their program for pervasive
ecological management, though clearly scientifically informed, opens up disturbing
possibilities for both ecologically and morally devastating practices. These possibilities
are effaced by a narrative strategy that refuses an intensive dialogic interrogation of
Utopia, opting instead for an objection-answer format, in which the Utopian answer to
each Earthling objection is presented as definitive. The resulting text was more than
adequate to please Julian Huxley, who praised the Utopians' pursuit of "the
understanding of Nature for its own sake, and its control for the sake of humanity,"
adding that "[b]y control Mr. Wells means not only utilitarian control, but that which, as
in a garden, is to please and delight, and that highest of all control, artistic and scientific
creation" (qtd. in Anker 111-12). Huxley understood and applauded Wells's message.
Of course, he already agreed with Wells, his future co-author of The Science of Life.
Unfortunately, Wells's narrative strategy generates a vision of utopia so replete with
unacknowledged ethical and logical gaps that the unconverted will find little reason to
embrace it. This may be one reason why, as Wells himself commented, Men Like Gods
"got a dull press" (qtd. in Russell 147). It certainly lies behind Widmer's contention that
the novel is nothing more than "scientistic fantasy" (26).
Conclusion
In comparison to the substantial univocality of The Time Machine, Men Like 
Gods enacts a multivocal discourse that supports a relatively complex exploration of
Utopian ecological praxis. Nonetheless, the absence of significant dialogic engagement
with perspectives that would legitimately question Utopian ideology in Men Like Gods 
enables the text to present a problematic anthropocentric discourse as scientifically
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"correct." Wells's endorsement, via the Utopians and Mr. Barnstaple, of a program of
ecological management that could radically alter most of life on Earth raises questions
not only about the morality of such a scheme but even about its feasibility from the
anthropocentric perspective of maintaining a healthy environment for humanity If, as
Wells stresses, humanity is vastly ignorant about nature, then the idea that humanity can
be trusted to redesign the biosphere without making any catastrophic mistakes is dubious
at best.
At the same time, the text's refusal to allow discourses that would problematize
its extreme anthropocentrism makes Wells's Utopian ideology an apt illustration of both
the possibilities and the limitations of an anthropocentric ecocentrism. According to the
definition I put forward in chapter 1, the ideology presented in Men Like Gods is
"pragmatically ecocentric" (i. e. ec,osystemically-oriented) in its basic assumption of the
necessity of ecosystems to all aspects of human civilization. But while such an ideology
could, to an extent, reinforce a productive ecological caution and concern for
sustainability, its emphasis on the goal of total human management could readily be used
to advocate radical, progressive change at the expense of sustainability. Thus, the gaps in
Wells's discourse suggest that a purely pragmatic ecocentrism may be a place to start but
not to end the search for a healthy ecological praxis. In contrast, later, more dialogic
science fiction encourages various perspectives to challenge purified discourses, such as
Wells's radical anthropocentrism, thereby creating a more nuanced hybrid complexity.
In chapter 5,1 examine two examples of such hybrid discourse in more recent science
fiction.
NOTES
1 Victorian society, of course, comprised a variety of views of nature. Some schools of thought
questioned the conquest of nature more than others. Even the unambivalent belief that nature could and
should be subjugated was justified in numerous ways. For an extensive discussion of this variety, see
Donald Worster's Nature's Economy, chapter 9, "The Ascent of Man."
2 In their essay, "The Socio-biological and Human-ecological Notions in The Time Machine,"
Katalin Csala-Giti and Janos I. Toth argue that Wells's sociobiological ideas, like contemporary
sociobiology, can provide a means for integrating social and biological factors in efforts to confront current
socio-ecological problems.
3 Just what sort of eugenics society should practice was a difficult question for Wells. While he
cautiously advocates the humane execution of undesirables in Anticipations (1901) (168) and state coercion
to prevent them from reproducing in A Modem Utopia (Ch. 5, Sec. 1), two decades later, in Men Like
Gods he hopes that an enlightened choice of mates will be sufficient to ensure the ascent of the species.
4 According to Partington, The Time Machine's depiction of this degeneration of the human race
into Eloi and Morlocks is intended to subvert the ideal of a static utopia in which an ideal state can be
maintained forever by showing that a "paradisal" elimination of struggle will only stifle the productive
processes of evolution and lead to a degenerate human race (60). In this reading, the problem with the
"utopia" of The Time Machine is that it is static rather than progressive: its goal was the attainment of a
state of "perfection" rather than continual betterment. A "modem utopia," in contrast, will avoid
degeneration by adopting a kinetic model that advocates continual progress. Since A Modem Utopia and
Men Like Gods present very similar utopian visions, it is valid to read both books as responses to The Time
Machine.
5 In chapter 9 of H. G. Wells and the Modem Novel, J. R. Hammond argues that Men Like Gods 
was intended as a parody of foolhardy utopian dreaming. He points out that the novel includes parodic
elements, such as caricatures of prominent British political figures. Furthermore, the end of the novel
shows that Mr. Barnstaple, the utopian dreamer, cannot stay in Utopia but must return to the mundane
world of Earth. This return, Hammond contends, represents the necessary triumph of pragmatism.
Hammond's reading, however, is not strongly supported by the text. He is correct that several of Wells's
Earthlings are caricatures, but this is a parody of English society, not Utopia. Mr. Barnstaple's return from
Utopia is not a rejection of it but simply an acknowledgement that, as an inferior Earthling, he does not yet
belong there. Indeed, Mr. Barnstaple returns to Earth prepared to help bring Utopia about on Earth: "I shall
take up my earthly life at the point where I laid it down, but--on Earth—I shall be a Utopian" (212). He
remarks later to his wife, "I don't want a safe job now. I can do better. There's other work for me" (230);
presumably this "other work" will involve living as a Utopian on Earth in order to bring Earth closer to a
Utopian state. Finally, the fact that Men Like Gods embodies many of the utopian values that Wells
consistently advocates in other works suggests that he intended these values to present positive principles
for a better society.
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6 The idea that the Utopians have exterminated disease microbes and, thus, lost their natural
immunity to them is the same that Wells used in The War of the Worlds to explain the demise of the
invading Martians, who have no immunity to terrestrial diseases. The difference is that Utopian science is
sufficiently advanced to find a cure for the epidemic before it devastates their society. The text does not
explain how Utopian science accomplishes this feat, though Utopia's emphasis on scientific education does
lend plausibility to the idea that the task would not be beyond their capability. At the same time, it is
tempting to stand with Earthing character Rupert Catskill and proclaim the epidemic a sign of the potential
folly of a program for ecological management whose elimination of interspecies interactions makes for an
immunologically weaker human race.
7 Russell is inclined to praise Wells's scheme for ecological management. He argues that in Men
Like Gods, "Wells realized that man must now take active responsibility for ordering and improving life on
earth" (149), suggesting that Wells was correct in this "realization." I approach Wells's program for total
ecological control with greater hesitation. Nonetheless, in the current age of global, human-made
environmental problems, Russell's contention that humanity must take responsibility for ordering life on
Earth may, to some extent, be irrefutable. Even if we strive to minimize human management, some global
management (of carbon dioxide emissions, for example) is necessary, if only to attempt to counteract
already existing problems, such as global warming.
8 Though Wells used the term "human ecology" chiefly from the 1930s on, he was already
interested in human ecological concepts as early as the 1920s. Late in his career, he observed that his 1920
Outline of History was intended to be an "Outline of Human Ecology," developing an evolutionary
explanation of historical events (Anker 200).
9 A lack of consideration for such interconnectedness is responsible for the demise of the Martians
in The War of the Worlds: the Martians do not account for the agency of microbes as participants in Earth's
biosphere and, therefore, are not prepared for the microbial attack that exterminates them.
10 The idea that superior intelligence grants the moral authority to exercise complete control over
the less intelligent was common in Wells's time and, indeed, still has currency today. A particularly
powerful endorsement of this view appears in Olaf Stapledon's 1936 novel, Odd John, which Leonard
Isaacs calls "one of the most influential treatments of the 'superman' theme in science fiction" (25). John,
the leader of the "superman" species, talks complacently about his early ambition of ruling the entire
human species, an ambition he abandoned only because "Ulf I were to take over Hom. Sap. I should freeze
up inside, and grow quite incapable of doing what is my real job" (Stapledon 69-70). Though his chief
human companion, whom he mockingly calls "Edo," calls him an "arrogant young cub" (Stapledon 68),
neither Fido nor any other character evinces any concrete objection to John's sense of entitlement.
Stapledon once acknowledged Wells's influence on his work by stating, "A man does not record his debt to
the air he breathes" (qtd. in Isaacs 25).
11 Urthred's shift from a personified to a depersonalized nature is one example of a dissonance
Louise Westling observes between the post-Enlightenment metaphor of nature as a mechanism and the
earlier metaphor of a female Nature: "The idea of Nature as feminine clashes with the mechanistic
metaphor and takes us back to the fact that new ways of figuring land and nature did not wholly displace
older patterns of thinking about the physical world" (33). This superimposition of conflicting metaphors
highlights an ambivalence in Urthred's (or Wells's) attitude toward nature.
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12 This image of the limitations of human knowledge echoes Wells's belief that knowledge must,
by its nature, be limited. In his 1903 lecture, "Scepticism of the Instrument," Wells asserts his belief in the
impossibility of exact knowledge. Human knowledge is based on classification, Wells argues, yet
classification necessarily places objects that are not identical under a single generic heading; it describes
continuous change in terms of discrete gradations. It is, thus, always approximate. He compares human
knowledge to a newspaper picture comprised of tiny black and white rectangles:
At a little distance you really seem to have a faithful reproduction of the original picture,
but when you peer closer you find not the unique form and masses of the original, but a
multitude of little rectangles, uniform in shape and size [. . . .] I submit the world of
reasoned inquiry has a very similar relation to the world I call objectively real. For the
rough purposes of every day the network picture will do, but the finer you purpose the
less it will serve, and for an ideally fine purpose, for an absolute and general knowledge
that will be as true for a man at a distance of a telescope as for a man with a microscope,
it will not serve at all. (Wells, "Scepticism")
As a scientific positivist, Wells held that science could yield definitive answers to how human society
should function. Yet Wells's avowal of the impossibility of exact scientific knowledge seems to belie his
scientific positivism. For how can a social system based on appeals to scientifically tested data produce
indisputable judgments if the data are always, to some extent, erroneous? The most obvious answer is that
"[for the rough purposes of every day the network picture will do." Even though scientific knowledge is
approximate, it is reliable enough to prescribe a course for human society. Certainly, errors may occur, but
this is why, for example, the Utopians retain a reserve of exterminated species for possible reintroduction.
This answer, however, depends on an assumption that the margin of error in scientific knowledge will
generally be small enough to do little damage. Contingency planning will be sufficient to avoid
catastrophe. But it is not clear that scientific error will be slight in a world where, as Sungold observes, a
hundred observations will be missed for each observation made. Wells own understanding of the necessary
limits to human knowledge, therefore, seems to argue against the wisdom of the Utopian program of total
ecological management.
13 Wells has justly been criticized for gender bias. But his misogynistic tendencies
notwithstanding, he was a staunch advocate of improved education for both men and women. In Men Like
Gods, to take just one example, the researchers into inter-dimensional travel, Arden (a man) and Greenlake




Near the end of his life, H. G. Wells came to question much of the view of human
civilization he had advocated throughout his career. He expounded on his changing
attitudes in Mind at the End of Its Tether (1945), a collection of reflections written in the
third-person. Early in the text, he sums up the utopian ideology that underlies so much of
his fiction in a passage I have already referred to in chapter 4 of this study:
[lit was natural for him to assume that there was a limit set to change, that
new things would appear, but that they would appear consistently,
preserving the natural sequence of life. So that in the present vast
confusion of our world, there was always the assumption of an ultimate
restoration of rationality, an adaptation and resumption. It was merely a
question, the fascinating question, of what form the new rational phase
would assume, what Over-man, Erewhon or what not, would break
through the transitory clouds and turmoil. (5)
This passage offers a concise articulation of the philosophy behind the "kinetic utopia"
described in A Modem Utopia and more intricately enacted in Men Like Gods. This
utopia is "a long ascent of stages" (Modem Ch. 1, Sec. 1): out of every era of chaos, a
higher order emerges, a step toward a Superman, a more utopian society. The "limit set
to change" here is not absolute but relational: humanity can (and should) progress
indefinitely, but it will always progress within a kind of coherent pattern: things will
change together so that a workable socio-ecological system is maintained. Chaos is the
exception: a "transitory" upset within a greater, more rational order.
But now, nearing his eightieth birthday, having lived to see two world wars, Wells
found his positivist's faith in a rational universe under assault: "The more he scrutinized
the realities around us, the more difficult it became to sketch out any Pattern of Things to
Come" (Mind 6). The writer who for decades had predicted the course of his society's
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future, often with an eerie accuracy, could make no more sense out of it. He became
increasingly concerned that humanity might, indeed, be on the path to extinction,
incapable of restoring rationality to the chaos of modem civilization. He commented that
"in this strange new phase of existence into which our universe is passing, it becomes
evident that events no longer recur. They go on and on to an impenetrable mystery [.
(Mind 15; emphasis Wells's). The great pattern of ascending stages appeared to have
been replaced by a linear movement devoid of recurrence: in this new world, there was
no assurance that chaos would eventually be reordered. Wells's "universe" may refer
either to a physical space or to the "universe" of human perception, or to both. But in
both senses of the word, his statement resonates with the times.
When he wrote these reflections, Wells was old, his mind perhaps not at its
sharpest; in his lifetime, he might simply have seen too many changes to be able to
accommodate them all. Yet he was not alone in his pessimistic confusion. Wells wrote
these reflections at the dawn of the postmodern age. And his description of a loss of
order and rationality, his sense that our world has slipped out of recognizable patterns of
history, his characterization of events as an "impenetrable mystery" all have a distinctly
postmodern ring. Particularly in Euro-American culture after World War II, faith in the
explicability and predictability of the world was eroding. By the late 1950s and early
1960s, exponential population growth and pollution were creating unprecedented global
fears for the health of the biosphere. Cold War in the nuclear age was threatening the
very continuation of life on Earth as we know it. Alongside such apocalyptic fears,
changes in the fabric of daily social existence further unsettled dominant ideologies.
Civil rights movements challenged traditional categories of race, class, gender, and,
eventually, sexual orientation. Increasing multiculturalism problematized national and
ethnic identifications. This questioning of identity categories resulted both in an
estranging loss of stable identity and a liberating reaction against the power structures
associated with those categories.
In such a world, the comparatively clean and orderly utopias of William Morris,
George Bernard Shaw, and Wells appear not only fanciful but undesirable, falling prey to
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what Jameson calls "the implacable postmodern critique of high modernism itself as
repressive, totalizing, phallocentric, authoritarian [. . 1" ("Utopianism" 383). Though
none of these three writers is properly a "high modernist," all are implicated, to some
extent, in repressive, totalizing, and patriarchal ideological affiliations no longer
acceptable in the postmodern world. In the second half the twentieth century, "utopia"
itself became suspiciously dystopian, and dystopia appeared imminent. In the 1946
foreword to his quintessentially dystopian "Utopia," Brave New World, for example,
Aldous Huxley revised the book's estimate that the world would sink into totalitarianism
within a few hundred years, remarking that "it seems quite possible that the horror may
be upon us within a single century" (xvii). A true utopia--in the pre-Brave New World
positive sense of the word--did not appear similarly realizable. The Cold War and early
post-Cold War years marked the hegemonic rise of what Jameson terms "anti-
Utopianism," the belief that utopias are, by definition, totalitarian and, thus, that any non-
totalitarian utopia is impossible. This assumption of utopian impossibility informs the
work of many late-twentieth-century speculative fiction writers. In keeping with this
spirit of the age, for instance, Octavia E. Butler comments, "I find utopias ridiculous.
We're not going to have a perfect society until we get a few perfect humans, and that
seems unlikely" (qtd. in Miller 339).
Yet Butler is often regarded as a utopian writer; indeed, I frame her as such in the
following chapter. Her discourse is utopian in that it offers hope that humanity can create
a better society. For even a disbeliever in utopias can "utopianize" as long as utopias
need not consist solely of the kind of idealized social "advancements" depicted by
Morris, Shaw, and Wells. If in the post-atomic, post-humanist, postmodern age, the
dream of a substantially untroubled society loses its claim to plausibility, social reform
remains, as ever, a conceivable goal. The utopias of the postmodern age, however, are
more likely to explore reform open-endedly than to prescribe specific reforms. Soren
Baggesen describes such texts as expressions of "dialogic pessimism." Using Ursula K.
Le Guin's The Word for World is Forest (1972) as a case in point, Baggesen argues that
by dialogically juxtaposing conflicting points of view, Le Guin opens up a space for a
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productive discussion of social "evils" and, thus, for the possibility of mitigating them.
He concludes, "[I]t might seem a meagre consolation to suggest that we can deliberate
about evil, but never finally abolish it. Yet I would point out that the nadir of historical
aspiration is still 'utopian': that such deliberation holds out a 'utopian' hope--slim though
it be--for Blochian MOglichkeitsraum [a space of possibilities]" (41). These
contemporary utopias remain utopian in their willingness to seek social improvement in
the free play of possibility. In Bruno Latour's terminology, they are hybrids: partial,
particular, provisional mixes of improvement and degradation. They cannot pierce the
"impenetrable mystery" of the universe any more than the aged Wells could. But in the
hybrid utopias, this impenetrability is no cause for despair.
These might be considered the utopias of minds less tethered to a faith in rational
change and rational order. If Wells's trope of a "mind at the end of its tether" invokes a
sense of desperation, it also implies a hope of breaking free. For the utopianizers who
came after Wells, the very acceptance of the contemporary world's confusion provides a
kind of freedom, a widening of scope. The dichotomies of utopia and dystopia,
progressionism and non-progressionism, superior and inferior no longer hold much sway.
Positive and negative trends can coexist free of the rhetorical necessity of arguing that
one or the other must prevail. And if, in these new utopias, there is a concomitant retreat
from idealized heights of utopian dreaming, it is a retreat accompanied by a concrete
realism that lends force to their arguments.
This movement from absolute to hybrid utopia could be traced year-by-year
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. The relevance of utopian
fiction for ecological praxis could be explored through the evolutionary and ecological
discourses of Olaf Stapledon, Robert Heinlein, Frank Herbert, John Brunner, Kim
Stanley Robinson, and a multitude of others. Since I do not have the space for such a
comprehensive study, however, I explore instead a few texts that show particularly strong
ideological affiliations with the earlier texts I discuss. In chapter 5,1 focus on two case
studies of hybrid utopian novels: Octavia E. Butler's Earthseed books (1993, 1998) and
Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed (1974), before turning, in chapter 6, to examine
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the science fiction television series Babylon 5 (1993-1998) and Lexx (1996-2002), both
of which show hybrid utopianfdystopian influence within the relatively purified discourse
of TV space opera. In these final chapters, my focus on recent texts enables direct
engagement with our current ideological formations. Although it is less recent, I include
The Dispossessed not only because it provocatively revises Morris's Nowhere but also
because it continues to speak to our current socio-ecological situations. Indeed, in
chapter 5, I argue that Le Guin's text can be read as a response to Butler's, even though it
is some two decades older. If The Dispossessed correlates with News from Nowhere, the
Earthseed books correlate with Men Like Gods, refiguring the Wellsian progressive
utopia for a more provisional age. Similarly, Babylon 5, which evidences a
contemporary Creative Evolutionist strain in popular science fiction, may be usefully
compared to Back to Methuselah. Babylon 5's evolutionary discourse, in turn, can be
problematized by the dystopian, non-progressionist series, Lexx, which, in many ways,
articulates a cautionary ecocentric ideology antithetical to Babylon 5's anthropocentric
utopianism. All these texts ably illustrate the transformations of the older discourses of
Morris, Shaw, and Wells as, having passed through the crucible of postmodern




TWO CASES OF ECO-UTOPIAN ARGUMENTATION IN
THE HYBRID SCIENCE FICTION NOVEL
Adulthood is both sweet and sad.
It terrifies.
It empowers.
We are men and women now.
We are Earthseed.
And the Destiny of Earthseed
Is to take root among the stars.
Octavia E. Butler, Parable of the Talents 394
Her concern with landscapes and living creatures was passionate. This
concern, feebly called, "love of nature," seemed to Shevek to be
something much broader than love. There are souls, he thought, whose
umbilicus has never been cut. They never got weaned from the universe.
They do not understand death as an enemy; they look forward to rotting
and turning into humus.
Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed 185
Introduction
In this chapter, I present two case studies of the use of hybridity to strengthen
utopian argumentation by provisionalizing it. Following Bruno Latour, I use the term
"hybridity" to refer to a perspective that collapses the borders between concepts typically
placed in binary oppositions, such as nature and culture, male and female, human and
animal, utopia and dystopia. Binary oppositions generally assume the dominance of one
term over the other. Latour's discussion of nature and society in We Have Never Been
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Modern offers a concise illustration of this hierarchizing. According to Latour, Western
civilization's unwritten "Modern Constitution" sometimes frames nature as transcendent
and society as a force subject to nature's laws. Conversely, it may frame society as
transcendent and nature as subject to society. But in neither case does it let nature and
society stand simultaneously as equal terms. Hybridity, in contrast, deconstructs such
oppositions to open a discursive space for a non-hierarchical synthesis of categories.
As categories, "sustainability" and "change" are seldom presented the type of
ontologically purified dyad Latour observes in "nature" and "society." There is no
cultural drive, for instance, to present one term as transcendent and the other as
immanent. Yet just as the Modern Constitution enforces hierarchical relations upon
"nature" and "society," so do traditional utopian and dystopian narratives tend to strongly
privilege either "sustainability" or "change." Thus, William Morris's Nowhere stresses
sustainability with minimal change, while the evolutionary utopias of George Bernard
Shaw and H. G. Wells stress progressive change to such an extent that they devalue
issues of ecological sustainability. Discourse in hybrid science fiction novels, in contrast,
commingles the values of sustainability and change so that each becomes deeply
dependent on the other. Instead of significantly privileging one concept over the other,
these hybrid novels more fully attend both to the need to support sustainable socio-
ecological practices and the need to accept the inevitability of change while actively
pursuing positive changes.
In this chapter, I address how a hybrid discourse collapses the categories of
"sustainability" and "change" in Octavia E. Butler's Earthseed series (1993, 1998) and
Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed (1974). Both Butler's and Le Guin's texts
exemplify what I term "sustainable change," an ideology which stresses that
sustainability requires change, just as change must be sustainable if it is not to lead to
wide-scale destruction. With neither term prioritized over the other, the two operate as a
single process. In their adherence to this paradigm of sustainable change, the Earthseed
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books and The Dispossessed each offer models for ecological praxis that can
accommodate change both in human society and in the non-human world, while
continuing to foreground the need for relative ecological stability.
As a hybrid philosophy, sustainable change is aptly expressed through a hybrid
rhetoric, and the most apt rhetoric of hybridity is dialogism. A dialogic juxtaposition of
voices troubles dominant discourses by demonstrating that non-hierarchical multivocality
is essential to developing a more complicated, and thus realistic, understanding of human
society. Because hybridity, like dialogism, is partial and non-hierarchical, dialogism is a
natural rhetorical structure for a hybrid text. Yet the extent to which hybrid texts adopt
dialogic strategies varies. Though both the Earthseed books and The Dispossessed enact
an ecological praxis based on sustainable change, I contend that the more prominently
dialogic rhetoric of The Dispossessed offers a more ecocentric and, thus, more
sustainable model, while gaps in the dialogism of the Earthseed books permits the
retention of a concernfiil anthropocentrism. I further contend that the hybrid utopian
arguments of both texts are partially undercut by a tendency to endorse a single,
insufficiently questioned discourse.
Both texts inscribe a dominant discourse by centralizing a voice that is
marginalized within the cultural context of the text. I examine this process of
centralization using Bakhtin's concept of "centripetal" and "centrifugal" languages.
Bakhtin invokes the image of forces pulling toward a center to describe how a dominant
or "centripetal" language "makes its real presence felt as a force for overcoming [. .1
heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual
understanding and crystalizing into a real, although still relative, unity--the unity of the
reigning conversational (everyday) and literary language, 'correct language'"
("Discourse" 270). Centripetal language reinforces the dominant ideology, defending the
assumption that a single way of speaking and understanding can be "correct" and
sufficient for ordering society. But the privileged status of a centripetal language is
always being dismantled by discourses pulling at it from the fringes: "Alongside the
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centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work;
alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of
decentralization and disunitication go forward" (Bakhtin, "Discourse" 272).
Both Butler's protagonist, Olamina, and Le Guin's protagonist, Shevek, develop
discourses that are centrifugal to their societies' centripetal languages, re-visioning within
their own cultural contexts the dominant ideologies of their cultures. Yet within both
texts, the protagonists' voices are centralized, the "dominant" discourses, conversely,
given comparatively little opportunity to defend themselves. In this centralization of
their protagonists' voices, these texts risk reproducing the repression inherent in
supporting a single discourse over all others: the protagonists' voices become centripetal
within the narratives, pushing other voices to the periphery. As a result, the otherwise
culturally marginal discourses that dominate within these texts are not questioned as
rigorously as they might be, leaving some of their dubious assumptions unchallenged.
Their tendency to reinscnbe a hierarchy of discourses notwithstanding, both the
Earthseed books and The Dispossessed explore sophisticated philosophies that offer
productive models for an ecological praxis based on sustainable change. By employing a
hybrid discourse that refuses to erase the difficulties suggested by the scenarios they
construct, these texts guard themselves against many of the accusations of "simplistic
utopianizing" that may be leveled against Morris, Shaw, and Wells. Of course, no
argument can be definitive in a context that accepts the final provisionality of our
knowledge, It is to be expected, therefore, that Butler's and Le Guin's novels display
their own gaps in reasoning. I contend, however, that a less hierarchical application of
dialogic techniques might have enabled these texts to expose and, thus, address more of
these gaps:
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An Even More Modern Utopia
Anthropocentric Univocality and Sustainable Change in Octavia E. Butler's
Earthseed Books
I was tempted to title this section "A Postmodern Utopia." "Postmodern" is, after
all, an apt description of Octavia Butler's science fiction. Indeed, as I discuss in the
"Interlude" preceding this chapter, a postmodern cultural influence is pervasive in late-
twentieth and early twenty-first century science fiction, supporting discourses that
problematize ideologies and embrace hybrid complexity. Butler's postmodernism is
typified by a hybrid discourse that challenges the process of identity categorization
foundational to much of Western ideology. 1 Much productive critical work has been
done on her deconstruction of traditional categories of gender, race, and species. 2 In this
chapter, however, I examine Butler's texts along a different axis: instead of stressing her
texts' postmodernity, I stress their ideological affiliation with the earlier tradition of H. G.
Wells's "modem utopia," a type of progressionist society that stresses the ascent of
humanity. In particular, I investigate the ecological discourse that derives from this
mingling of hybrid provisionality and humanist progressionism in Butler's Earthseed
books: Parable of the Sower (hereafter Sower) and Parable of the Talents (hereafter
Talents). Butler's hybridity supports a paradigm based on sustainable change, an
ideology that stresses the need to accept and shape change in such a way that enough
ecological stability is retained to avoid catastrophic imbalances. She characterizes this
ethic of change as a "partnership" among life forms, ecosystems, and whole biospheres
that resists rigid hierarchy and classification.
At the same time, the Earthseed books undercut this hybrid model of
"partnership" by reinscribing an anthropocentrism that gives the human agenda priority
over other life forms' needs. 3 This reinscription is enabled by the series's relative
univocality. Indeed, despite their hybrid mixing of discourses of utopia and dystopia, the
Earthseed books deemphasize dialogic conversation among multiple perspectives, a
departure from Butler's typically more multivocal rhetoric. In "Biopolitics of
Postmodern Bodies," for example, Donna Haraway identifies Butler's Clay's Ark (1984)
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and Xenogenesis series (1987-89) as examples of cyborg feminism, a discourse typified
by the subversion of "myriad organic wholes" so that "[t]he transcendent authorization of
interpretation is lost [. .]" (Haraway "Cyborg" 152-53). Haraway contends that by
embracing the necessary partiality of all perspectives, Butler's earlier novels argue
productively against the acceptance of any one perspective as "correct" In the Earthseed
books, however, this "transcendent authorization of interpretation," while certainly
challenged, is not entirely "lost." Rather, Butler privileges the "voice of wisdom"
embodied in her protagonist, Olamina, who, in turn, represents "humanity" as a uniquely
privileged species. The centripetal dominance of Olamina's voice allows her
anthropocentric hierarchizing to pass unremarked.
This anthropocentrism links the Earthseed books to the older Wellsian science
fiction tradition. Both Butler and Wells develop scenarios that promote humanity's
colonization of other planets. Both are aware of the difficulty involved in the
transformation of ecological relationships that this colonization would require. Both
frame this colonization effort specifically in terms of the survival of the human species,
with comparatively little reference to other life forms. Although Butler's more
provisional discourse surpasses Wells's in embracing the values of partnership and
compromise, both scenarios are implicated in an anthropocentric ideology of ecological
domination enabled by the texts' endorsement of a single centripetal discourse.
Now, all voices need not be equally weighted in order for productive critique to
occur. Since the Earthseed books recount the rise of the Earthseed religion, it makes
sense that Earthseed's values form the most prominent discourse. This emphasis reflects
the Olamina's determination to implement Earthseed despite massive resistance from the
dominant culture. Earthseed is born out of dystopian social crisis in America in the
2020s. Sower depicts a society in the grips of an apocalypse, or "Pox," in which, as Jim
Miller observes in "Post-apocalyptic Hoping;" unbridled capitalism has resulted not only
in poverty but in environmental disasters, including drought and water shortage (353).
By the 2030s, the setting for most of Talents, the worst of the Pox is over. Yet a
frightened America all too willingly embraces the promise of renewal offered by the
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fascist Church of Christian America, whose worst manifestation, the Crusaders, rounds
up groups of "heathens" for "reeducation," which includes forced labor, the separation of
families, rape, torture, and murder. Earthseed responds to these crises by enacting
proactive, realistic social change. This change, at least in the short-term, cannot be
radical: Earthseed initially lacks the power to substantially challenge more dominant
social trends. But Earthseed's early actions are not less relevant for being limited to
promoting survival, community, and hope among a few individuals. As Lisbeth Grant-
Britton contends, "In these novels [. .] these deeply-embedded new goals [of Earthseed]
often manifest themselves as no more than the presence rather hall absence of
alternatives. But for many exploited people, change is often a matter of starting with
almost nothing and making incremental advancements" (281-82). For the impoverished
inhabitants of this twenty-first century dystopia, the important point is not that change be
systemic or ideal but that it be possible and shapable.
Founded by a young African-American woman, Lauren Oya Olamina,
Earthseed's fundamental tenant is "God is change." Change is the only constant: a force
that must be both accepted and used. The idea that "God is change" impels Olamina to
adapt to--and thus alter--the worsening conditions of her society. Instead of abandoning
hope or merely waiting for things to get better, she is always planning and acting to
improve her living conditions. At the end of Sower, Olamina founds the prosperous
community of Acorn, a town she intends to use as a base for promulgating Earthseed. In
Talents Acorn is destroyed by the Crusaders, but the Earthseed movement itself,
nonetheless, spreads and gains power. The end of the book finds an aged Olamina
contemplating the imminent departure of Earth's first starship, a major step on the path to
the "Destiny" of colonizing other worlds.
Because she is the hero of this series, Olamina's voice is emphasized. Sower is
composed entirely of Olamina's writings, her journals and her scriptural text, "Earthseed:
The Book of the Living." Thus, in this first novel, all dialogue is mediated by Olamina's
voice. The reader hears Olamina's thoughts but has only her conversations with others to
indicate their perspectives. Talents, in contrast, is the product of four voices. Olamina's
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writings, which remain the bulk of the text, are joined by a few excerpts from the writings
of her husband, Bankole, and her brother, Marc. The primary narrator of the book,
however, is Olamina's daughter, Asha Vere, who has compiled the texts of her relatives
and stitched them together with her own commentary near the beginning of each chapter.
The Earthseed books, then, employ two main dialogic strategies. One is conversation
recorded within the writings of a particular narrator. The other is the use of multiple
narrative voices. Both of these strategies contribute multivocality to Butler's narrative.
Olamina's Earthseed begins, then, as a centrifugal language in Butler's twenty-
first century dystopia, offering an alternative to that society's dominant discourses.
Against the received view of her childhood community, Robledo, that hiding behind their
walls will keep them safe until things get better, Earthseed builds positive changes by
confronting a worsening world. Against the dominant discourse of Christian America's
religious bigotry, Earthseed embraces diversity. Against a frightened America's dream
of returning to a golden past, Earthseed offers the hope of an unpredetermined future.
Throughout Olamina's life, Earthseed gradually gains prestige, ending as a language that
is, if not "dominant," at least widely influential.
But while Olamina's language is centrifugal within the context of her own
society, it is the centripetal language of the Earthseed books, representing the ideology
endorsed by much--though not all--of the text. Although ()lamina is presented as the
proverbial "voice crying in the wilderness" of apocalyptic America, her voice dominates
the series. Undoubtedly, the centralization of Olamina's discourse serves a valid
function. In recounting the story of her life and her religion's rise to prominence, the
narrative offers a powerful vision of personal agency and the vulnerability even of
dominant languages to "Change." What is problematic is the silencing of critiques of
Earthseed that this centralization effects.
To be sure, many aspects of Olamina's discourse are persistently challenged
Throughout most of the narrative, her marginalized status leaves her open to criticism
from more dominant discourses. Olamina's father argues that her preparations for
disaster in Robledo will only promote anger and panic among her neighbors. Her
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childhood friend, Harry, accuses her of brutality for her cold willingness to hurt or kill
people in order to survive. Her brother, Marc, criticizes Earthseed as a whole, arguing
that God is changeless and that Christian America--in its less violent manifestations--is
the best option for strengthening the nation. Finally, her dream of humanity's Destiny of
"taking root among the stars" is derided by many as a fanciful excuse to squander
valuable resources on space exploration.
Indeed, it is in this dream of interstellar colonization that Olamina's discourse is
presented as most centrifugal: most marginalized by her society's centripetal discourse.
Even many who embrace the basic tenants of Earthseed consider the Destiny an
unrealistic fantasy. Yet, ironically, it is precisely this vision of colonization that the text
itself challenges least. While the practicality of Olamina's space-faring ambitions is
productively critiqued, her assumption that humanity has the right to colonize an alien
biosphere receives no critique at all. Olamina's ethics of space colonization defines a
unitary language simply because, on this point, none of the voices centrifugal to her
discourse disagree with her.
A Comparison of Wells's and Butler 's Colonial Discourses
Like Wells's Utopians, ()lamina assumes that humanity has a right to expand
indefinitely into alien ecosystems and to alter those systems with the principal aim of
ensuring human survival, an assumption as unchallenged in the Earthseed books as it is in
Men Like Gods. The irony of this commonality can hardly be overstated. Unlike
Wells's Utopians, Olamina does not extol domination; she does not make a virtue of
human "superiority"; indeed, she emphasizes the values of partnership and
accommodation. Nonetheless, perhaps without intending to, she also voices an
anthropocentric ideology that could readily be deployed in ways that trivialize ecological
relationality. 4 In stating that the expansionist ideology of the Earthseed is akin to that of
the Wellsian utopia, however, I do not mean that the two are identical. On the contrary,
these ideologies differ in several respects, which can be directly traced to the pivot point
of hybridity. As a hybrid thinker, Olamina treats hierarchical binary oppositions as
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largely artificial. Such artificial categories provide little justification for conquest.
Indeed, Earthseed has a strongly non-dualistic strain that promotes a concord among all
life forms:
Nature







Or drifting down. (Talents 383)
In this verse, Olamina adopts a rhetoric that stresses the commonalities of all life:
everything is nature. This commonality refuses hierarchy. In her avowal that nature is
"you / Me / Us / Them," the pronouns are connected by coordination rather than
subordination: rhetorically each group she lists exists on the same level. Wells, who
rejected T. H. Huxley's ontological division between humans and other animals, might
agree that "Nature / Is all that exists," but he would be less inclined to express this
sameness in the egalitarian terms ()lamina adopts. For Wells, nature is decidedly
hierarchical, the most "highly evolved" species legitimately claiming dominion over all
others.
Earthseed, in contrast, offers "partnership" as the guiding principle for interacting
with others, whether those others are human companions or alien biospheres. As
Olamina explains to one of her companions, Len, "Earthseed is about preparing to fulfill
the Destiny. It's about learning to live in partnership with one another in small
communities, and at the same time, working out a sustainable partnership with our
environment" (Talents 358-59). In creating an analogy between partnership with humans
in a community and partnership with the environment, Olamina represents the
environment as similar to a human ally, an agency deserving moral consideration, not
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merely a tool to use. This attitude, ()lamina suggests, is essential to the appropriate
fulfillment of the Destiny. Earthseed scripture makes this point as well:
Any entity, any process that
cannot or should not be resisted or
avoided must somehow be
partnered. Partner one another.
Partner diverse communities. Partner
life. Partner any world that is your
home. Partner God. Only in
partnership can we thrive, grow,
Change. Only in partnership can we
live. (Talents 135)
"Partnership" suggests a relation in which both partners have agency and use it
cooperatively for mutual benefit. To "partner" something is to take responsibility for
acting with it and upon it while allowing it to act with and upon you. The idea of
partnership is naturally linked to the central creed of Earthseed: that we must accept
Change, but shape it too. Partnership is a relation of mutual respect. For Wells, change
should ideally be guided solely by humanity, which should shape nature and humanity
itself to its desired ends. In contrast, Olamina's concept of "partnership" suggests a need
to conform to external conditions as well as to shape them. Her very survival during the
Pox is predicated both on reshaping the disintegrating society she was born into and on
learning to shape herself to survive within it. The community of Acorn is built as much
upon practical adaptations to a harsh reality--such as staying well-armed and expelling
untrustworthy members--as it is upon utopian hopes of refiguring human civilization.
This model of partnership accepts the impossibility of survival through total
domination. To survive, one must recognize and accommodate the power of other
agencies. If Wells's concept of a kinetic utopia evokes a linear technocratic and
scientific progressionism, Olamina's "Change" evokes "rolling with the punches" as
much as a progressive program. "All that you touch I You Change," she writes; "All that
you Change / Changes you" (Sower 3): the agency is mutual. And because no single
force has absolute control, no single agenda can proceed without interruption: "I know
things will go wrong now and then," Olamina concedes (Talents 393). Change is chaotic,
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unpredictable; new Poxes will arise. But as long as humanity takes the initiative in
shaping change, it can weather these times of crisis and emerge stronger. In pursuing
proactive optimism in the midst of dystopia, Earthseed embodies what Patricia Melzer
calls Butler's "dialectical" understanding of utopia as "always in relation to the dystopian
term, or its possibility" (33). Because the world is inherently unstable, absolute utopia is
impossible, yet the very instability of the world always leaves open the possibility for
positive change.
Clearly, ()lamina views change as less controllable than Wells does. Yet finally,
both embrace a progressive model of shaping change. Wells sees utopia as an "ascent of
stages" (Modern Ch. I, Sec. 1); similarly, ()lamina teaches not just to adapt but to
"[a]dapt and grow" (Talents 22). This growth, both spiritual and physical, is essential to
avoiding extinction on Earth: "[Earthseed] will offer us a kind of species life insurance,"
she writes (Talents 393). This "insurance" derives from spreading humanity to different
planets so that a disaster on one planet cannot destroy it. Likewise, in The War of the
Worlds, Wells's narrator looks to space for species preservation:
[W]hen the slow cooling of the sun makes this earth uninhabitable, as at
last it must do, it may be that the thread of life that has begun here will
have streamed out and caught our sister planet [Venus] within its toils.
Dim and wonderful is the vision I have conjured up in my mind of
life spreading slowly from this little seed-bed of the solar system
throughout the inanimate vastness of sidereal space. (253)
As if echoing Wells's "seed-bed" metaphor, ()lamina teaches that "the Destiny of
Earthseed is to take root among the stars" (Sower 68). One of her central creeds,
repeated in several of her Earthseed verses, this avowal of self-designed Destiny recalls
Wells's Utopian, Urthred, who asserts in Men Like Gods, "Every day our thoughts go out
more surely to our inheritance, the stars" (83). Thus, the concept of "Destiny," like
"inheritance," frames humanity as a privileged species for whom interstellar expansion is
an unproblematic inevitability.
()lamina and Wells figure interstellar colonization as part of a natural progression,
like growing up and leaving home. Indeed, both invoke the metaphor of a grown child
leaving its mother to frame this colonization as a sign of the human species's achieving
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adulthood. When Wells's Urthred speaks of reaching out to the stars, he does so in the
context of proclaiming humanity to be "no longer the beaten and starved children of
Nature, but her free and adolescent sons" (Men 83). Using a somewhat different rhetoric
to a similar purpose, Olamina, too, writes of weaning humanity from Mother Earth:
Earthseed is adulthood.
It's trying our wings,
Leaving our mother,
Becoming men and women.
We've been children,




But Earthseed is adulthood. (Talents 394)
Certainly, ()lamina frames the relationship between humanity and the biosphere more
positively than Urthred. She characterizes nature/Earth as a loving mother, not a cruel
one. For her, humanity comprises both men and women, not merely "sons." In
Olamina's language, too, the "blame" for humanity's problems is shifted from Nature,
"beating and starving her sons," to Earth's children, "fighting for the full breasts." On
the whole, Olamina's tone is less hostile to the world humanity has evolved in. And
being less hostile to nature, her teachings are likely to be more amenable to the
development of a harmonious, sustainable ecological praxis than Wells's more conquest-
oriented philosophy.
Despite these significant differences, however, Olamina's and Wells's common
metaphor of grown children leaving Mother Earth supports a similar disregard for
ecological relationality. Both Olamina and Wells use the fundamental progressionist
metaphor of "leaving behind" that I discuss in chapter 1. Being tied to the Earth is
associated with childhood. The natural progression for the human species is to leave the
Earth, to leave Mother. A problem with this image, in both Wells's and Olamina's
writings, is that, superficially, it suggests that it is our natural "destiny" to exist outside of
a biosphere. It is natural to leave behind the system that gives us the 	 water, food,
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light, gravity, and so on that we need to survive. Now, neither ()lamina nor Wells
suggests that living without a planet to support us should be an immediate aim. Both
understand that humans require a web of ecological relations to survive. The purpose of
leaving Earth is to gain greater agency in our own survival. On other planets, we will not
be protected by our "Mother" but, like adults, will protect ourselves: we will construct
our own relations to the environment more methodically than we have on Earth. Indeed,
we must be able to do this if we are to survive in an alien biosphere. An "adult"
humanity can shape its environment for itself The dubious assumption, here, is that a
non-Earth biosphere could readily be found (or made) to accommodate us. According to
this view, the Earth is ultimately unnecessary.
In this dichotomization of humanity and the Earth, humanity becomes the force
with significant agency. Both ()lamina and Wells emphasize that humanity is the only
species (on Earth at least) with the power to rationally choose its destiny. In The Science 
of Life, Wells (with Julian Huxley and G. P. Wells) argues that with humanity, evolution
"has at least the possibility of becoming purposeful, because man is the first product of
Evolution who has the capacity for long-range purpose, the first to be capable of
controlling evolutionary destiny" (642). Similarly, Olamina explains, "The human
species is a kind of animal, of course. But we can do something no other animal species
has ever had the option to do. We can choose: We can go on building and destroying
[. . . Or we can make something more of ourselves. We can grow up" (Talents 358). It
is, indeed, probable that humanity is the only species on Earth capable of consciously
planning for its future as a species. Yet in stressing humanity's ability to do what "no
other species has ever had the option to do," Olamina, like Wells, does more than simply
state a fact She emphasizes humanity's responsibility to seize and use this power. She
also supports a dichotomy between humans and all other life forms. For both ()lamina
and Wells, the focus remains squarely on the human species as a unit. ()lamina repeats
this emphasis at several points: "[The Destiny] offers us a kind of species adulthood and
species immortality" (Talents 156); "We need to become the adult species that the
Destiny can help us become!" Talents 179); "[Earthseed] will offer us a kind of species
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life insurance" (Talents 393; all emphasis mine). For both Wells and Olamina, humanity
is chiefly what matters. Other species, forces, and webs of relation are relevant but
mainly as ancillary factors that must be taken into account as humanity shapes a destiny
for itself. When Olamina speaks of humanity as "Earth's seed," the embodiment of the
potential of the entire Earth, she risks replacing her principle of "partnership" among
forces with an anthropocentrism that figures humanity as the only term of interest.
Unquestionably, the singleness of this human focus is more absolute for Wells
than Olamina. As I argue in chapter 4, Wells's radical anthropocentrism almost
completely rejects intrinsic rights for other species, the notable exception being his
condemnation of the senseless suffering of any creature. Olamina's anthropocentrism is
more moderate. Like Wells, she does not condone the suffering of animals. Unlike
Wells, she seems to accept a species's intrinsic right to exist, at least as long as its
existence does not immediately imperil humanity. When small, slug-and-slime-mold-like
life forms are discovered on Mars, for instance, she comments,
I suppose that if the Martian "slime molds" can be used for something—
mining, perhaps, or chemistry--then they'll be protected, cultivated, bred
to be even more useful. But if they prove to be of no particular use, they'll
be left to survive or not as best they can with whatever impediments the
company sees fit to put in their paths. If they're unlucky enough to be bad
for business in some way--say they develop a taste , for some of the
company's building materials—they'll be lucky to survive at all. I doubt
that Terrestrial environmental laws will protect them. Those laws don't
even really protect plant and animal species here on Earth. (Talents 85)
It is clear that Olamina is not endorsing these commercial values. She implicitly aligns
herself with the Martians by characterizing these practices as "impediments the company
sees fit to put in [the Martians'] paths" and not, for example, as "efficient production
standards." But while ()lamina rejects a purely utilitarian attitude toward other life
forms, she gives only a vague indication of what ethical guidelines should govern
interspecies or interplanetary relations.
As an abstract principle, Olamina's concept of "partnership" is conducive to a
judicious, non-destructive ecological praxis. Indeed, part of its power lies in its
vagueness. Like the United States Constitution, Earthseed is designed to be general
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enough to adapt itself to changing times. At the same time, this vagueness provides little
practical guidance for the interstellar encounters already about to begin within Olamina's
lifetime. Olamina counsels humanity to partner "any entity, any process that / cannot or
should not be resisted or / avoided" (Talents 135). But she provides no means for
determining what it is appropriate to resist or avoid. There is, of course, no simple
answer to this question, and it is a strength in Olamina's teachings and Butler's books
that no simplistic solution is put forward as definitive. What is of concern is not the
absence of an answer to this question but rather the absence of any significant attempt to
pose it.
The Destiny as a Centripetal Discourse
Despite her call to "partner any world that is your / home" (Talents 135), Olamina
focuses so singly on the Destiny as the preservation of humanity that she devotes almost
no attention to what this Destiny could mean for the planets on which it is to be carried
out. She aims her dreams of colonization at worlds that already bear life: "I suspect that a
living world might be easier for us to adapt to [. . .]" (Sower 74). Butler, likewise,
espouses this view. In an interview about the Earthseed series, she explains, "The more
our new world can do for us the more likely we are to be able to survive on it. For
instance, a world that offers breathable air, potable water--or water that can easily be
made potable--and arable land is much more desirable than a dead world like the moon or
Mars" ("Conversation" 415). 5 But even on a living planet, it seems unlikely--or at least
it should not be counted upon—that humanity will find another biosphere whose air is
made of just the right composition of gases for us to breathe comfortably or whose soil
contains appropriate nutrients to allow our crops to flourish. Faced with a non-Earth
environment, how should humanity go about colonizing it? Olamina speaks of "adapting
to" a new world rather than adapting that world to humanity. This willingness to shape
oneself to fit one's environment is implicit in the Earthseed doctrine of embracing
Change.6 It is, therefore, likely that Olamina's disciples would attempt to transform
themselves to breathe alien air before attempting to transform the alien atmosphere. (The
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latter would, perhaps, be a more Wellsian endeavor.) Thus, Olamina's followers would
probably spare the alien biosphere from the catastrophic destruction that would almost
surely follow the recomposition of its own atmosphere.
Yet humans could not colonize a planet in significant numbers without having a
profound effect on its biosphere. The very addition of biomass to a finite space would
alter ecological relations within that system. Nor would this merely be human biomass.
The starship that departs at the end of Talents includes animal embryos and plant seeds
(406). Butler's mention of "arable land" indicates that colonists would raise Earth crops.
But each hectare devoted to human farming and housing is a hectare taken away from the
native environment, shifting existing ecological relations. Moreover, assuming that the
alien environment does not kill terrestrial life forms, the introduction into the alien
biosphere not just of humans, animals, and plants, but inevitably of microscopic
organisms would run the risk of repeating disasters associated with introducing species
between continents on Earth, disasters ranging from the ecological havoc wreaked by
rabbits and mice in Australia, to the dangers posed by African "killer bees" in America,
to the spread of diseases such as smallpox and syphilis. To develop a colonization
scenario that would begin to address these difficulties would be the work of another
novel, and indeed, Butler has spoken of plans to continue the Earthseed series into the
colonization phase ("Conversation" 415). What is missing from Sower and Talents
however--and it is a significant omission--is a concrete attempt to gesture toward these
difficulties.
In fact, as real, fully imagined objects, the potential colony planets are almost
completely absent from the text's discussion of the Destiny. Instead, Olamina repeatedly
identifies interstellar colonization with "heaven." Describing the effort required to
achieve the Destiny, she writes, "There's always a lot to do before you get to go to
heaven" (Sower 75). Later, she tells one of her companions, Travis, that "my heaven
really exists, and you don't have to die to reach it" (Sower 199). Olamina's use of the
"heaven" trope is not disingenuous. She recognizes that people need a goal to galvanize
them, a hope of some future "heavenly" enough to be worth generations of struggle. At
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the same time, her equation of alien planets with "heaven" devalues considerations of the
very "real-world" difficulties, both practical and ethical, that colonization will entail.
Olamina also tends to equate any colonized planet with Earth. In her scripture, she
writes, "Earthseed is all that spreads / Earthlife to new earths" (Sower 68). Once again,
this rhetorical move obscures the alien planet itself: planets to be colonized are "heaven"
or "earth," but almost never extrasolar worlds in their own right. This metaphorical
effacement of other planets reflects Olamina's more literal lack of engagement with these
worlds. She devotes almost none of her writings to conjectures about alien planets.
While she supports the colonization of living planets, her only commentary on
extraterrestrial life forms is her discussion of the Martian slugs. At the end of Talents,
when she writes of the first colonization expedition, she does not even mention the planet
to be colonized. Instead, the thrust of her commentary is the importance of an adult
humanity's leaving (Mother) Earth.
Miller obliquely addresses this lack of engagement with colonized planets in his
characterization of the Destiny as a utopian drive: "To think of this other world [i.e. the
world to be colonized] is to think of a better world, the good place which is, as yet, no
place" (355). Invoking they etymology of "utopia," Miller describes the Destiny as a
proactive, optimistic impulse, "a way to begin to think the future" (355). Certainly, the
Destiny can be a positive tool for encouraging human enterprise. It might even
ultimately be the wisest course of action for preserving terrestrial life. But Miller's
"utopia" also recalls a more negative sense of the word: utopia as idle fancy effacing the
complexities of reality. Olamina's colonizable worlds are indeed "no place" in her
rhetoric: blank slates for humanity to write upon. But a planet, of course, is not "no
place." And to characterize it as an empty space to be shaped as a new heaven or earth is
to deny its concrete existence in way that might be deleterious both for human colonists
and indigenous life.
This effacement of an alien planet's material identity represents a gap in
Olamina's discourse. The question of the "rights" of extraterrestrial life forms or
ecosystems is apparently not a question she devotes much thought to. In discussing the
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multiplicity of perspectives explored in the Earthseed series, Peter Stillman contends that
while most of the narrative is told from Olamina's point of view, "her self-conscious self-
reflections give the reader resources to question her decisions" (30). In Bakhtinian terms,
when Olamina questions herself, she provides a centrifugal language to read against her
own centripetal language. But on the ethics of extraterrestrial rights, she does not
question herself. It is left, then, to other voices to open this question. Yet no voice does
SO.
Curiously, in the Earthseed books, this silence is limited to the ethics of
interstellar colonization. Other aspects of Earthseed--and Olamina--are presented as
open to criticism. Olamina's husband, Bankole, is skeptical of the feasibility of her
ambitions. A self-described "doubter" (Talents 45), he writes that Olamina "dreams and
writes and believes, and perhaps the world will let her live for a while, tolerating her as a
harmless eccentric. I hope that it will. I fear that it may not" (46-47). Bankole's fears
are justified. In the course of the narrative, Olamina makes one grave, practical mistake:
she does not break up the community of Acorn in time to prevent the Crusaders from
capturing almost all of her followers. In her consolidation of Earthseed in this single
community, she unwittingly recapitulates the "gated-community" fallacy that destroyed
her childhood home. The text explicitly presents this decision as a failure of Olamina's
judgment. Indeed, she pointedly rejects suggestions, including Bankole's, to branch out
into other communities. Her daughter Asha later accuses her of shortsightedness: "She
sacrificed us for an idea. And if she didn't know what she was doing, she should have
known [. 1" (Talents 138).
Asha is Olamina's most cogent critic, the strongest centrifugal force pulling at the
loose threads of Earthseed. In fact, in the first section written in Asha's voice, she calls
Olamina's life work "misguided" (Talents 2). In particular, Asha rejects the Destiny,
arguing that it diverts attention and resources from problems on Earth: "So much needed
to be done here on earth--so many diseases, so much hunger, so much poverty, such
suffering, and here was a rich organintion spending vast sums of money, time, and effort
on nonsense. Just nonsense!" (Talents 380). Asha's is the most sophisticated criticism
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mounted against the Destiny. For there is, indeed, no easy balance to be struck between
preparing for the future and helping the present. Nor is her criticism that the Destiny is a
fanciful waste of resources definitively answered. This is a strength of the text. While a
single answer to such a complex question of resource distribution would seem simplistic,
the dialogic juxtaposition of views invites readers to openly explore the criticism. 8 Such
an open exploration of the potential problems and solutions involved in a certain course
of action is one of the core functions of the hybrid science fiction novel. In mounting this
critique, Asha's voice ably serves the function of a centrifugal discourse, challenging
assumptions of the centripetal discourse that might otherwise pass unexamined.
Yet Asha's critique is focused solely on the question of the desirability of the
Destiny for humanity. She cites "diseases," "hunger," "poverty," and "suffering," all
typically characterized as human social problems, as issues that should take precedence
over space exploration. If anything, the ethical questions involved in human-
extraterrestrial interactions are even less present in her mind than they are in Olamina's.
At least, Olamina provides the concept of partnership as a principle for how to address
such concerns. But no centrifugal voice exists to push this vague principle toward
concrete ethical application. Asha is concerned solely with helping humans on Earth.
Bankole, like most of Olamina's detractors, finds the Destiny only unrealistic, not
ethically problematic. Marc objects to Earthseed in general, but he, too, dismisses the
Destiny merely for being fanciful. Thus, on this crucial question of the ethics of
colonization, even the type of dialectic questioning that Wells's puts forward in Men Like 
Gods is absent. On this issue, the centripetal discourse is literally the only discourse in
the text.
This lack of engagement with the practical ethical problems surrounding
interstellar colonization could easily enable social and ecological domination on the part
of the colonists. The possibility is made explicit when the interstellar age is about to
begin, an aged Olanaina laments that the first starship has been named the Christopher
Columbus: "I object to the name. This ship is not about a shortcut to riches and empire.
It's not about snatching up slaves and gold and presenting them to some European
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monarch" (Talents 406). Olamina's point is valid. Since these interstellar expeditions
will not to return to Earth, they cannot use the "New World" as a mere source of raw
materials to benefit the "Old World." The "New World" will be "home" and, therefore,
will demand a certain loyalty and investment. Nonetheless, the fact that this name has
been chosen, despite its obvious connections to imperialism, exploitation, and genocide,
is an early warning sign that Earthseed itself is "changing" into something potentially
more conquest-oriented than Olamina intended. Butler, of course, is aware of the irony
and, thus, opens up a space of implicit critique of Earthseed's imperialist potential. The
notion that Earthseed itself may become distorted, may be made, as Bankole predicts,
"more complicated, more open to interpretation, more mystical, and more comforting"
(Sower 234), is part of the irreducible complexity embodied in the concept of Change.
Yet even in its original form, Earthseed emphasizes the need for the human species to
grow and preserve itself deemphasizing the role of other life forms and the ethics of
colonizing other biospheres. In this respect, the religion begins with a gap in its ethics.
As the colonization progresses, this gap may be filled by a practical, harmonious system
for colonization as "partnership." Just as easily, it may be filled by the manifest
"Destiny" of Earthseed to "change" alien worlds into "heavenly new earths" at the
expense of the indigenous life.
Partnership in Acorn
Earthseed is implicated in an anthropocentric discourse that might privilege
humanity at the expense of the non-human. Moreover, in deemphasizing the non-human,
Earthseed runs the risk of devaluing ecological relations among non-humans that sustain
humanity's environment. At the same time, it is clear that this anthropocentric strain is
not the dominant theme in Earthseed ideology. Unlike Wells's Utopians, Earthseed
rejects conquest more than it enables it. It embraces partnership. Its concept of Change
requires human adaptation just as much as it endorses manipulation of the environment.
Earthseed sees change as integral to sustainability, adaptation as the path to survival.
Much of this ideology promotes a sound ecological praxis.
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Indeed, Olamina's community of Acorn exemplifies such praxis. Acorn embraces
a constant state of Change. As a base for the development of Earthseed, it is a growing
community. This growth is intentional, not incidental, the result of Acorn's reaching out
to help and teach more people. It is a growth that rejects overconsumption; indeed,
Acorn routinely produces a surplus of food, which the residents sell to surrounding
communities. They use their profits to purchase tools and equipment they could not
readily produce in Acorn, thus accommodating the growth of the community without an
overextension of resources. Acorn accomplishes this successful relationship with its
socio-ecological environment through conscientious "partnership" with its environment
in all details of its existence. Crops are planted at the correct time of year; pests are
removed by hand if necessary; wells are dug in the appropriate location. A premium is
placed on acquiring the hands-on knowledge needed to sustain this community. In
Acorn, every object and aspect of life is important. Every act should be a thoughtful,
informed decision geared toward developing a community that can survive times of crisis
and shape Change to build a better future. Acorn is, thus, a powerful model for a healthy
ecological praxis sustained according the values of Earthseed.
What is disturbing in Butler's depiction of the Destiny, then, is less Olamina's
ideology than the text's univocality. Indeed, even the presence of anthropocentric trends
in Earthseed need not, in itself, be a problem. Anthropocentric discourse is part of our
world and, thus, deserves to be heard. It also deserves to be questioned. But in the
Earthseed books, the anthmpocentrism with which the Destiny is framed is insufficiently
questioned. While the principle of "partnership" offers an alternative to anthropocentric
and hierarchical models for ecological interaction, this principle is weakened by the text's
tendency to efface the agency and identity of that non-human "partners" involved in the
Destiny. The idea of colonizing alien worlds is not necessarily ethically unsound, but it
is ethically complex. In the Earthseed books, however, every voice treats the ethics of
interstellar colonization as unproblematic. Thus, the potential problems with this
anthropocentric vision of human expansion pass unremarked through the sieve of a
centripetal language.
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Death Is Not an Enemy
Socio-ecological Critique in Ursula K Le Guin's The Dispossessed
One potential alternative to Olamina's ultimately progressionist project of striving
toward species adulthood is articulated in Le Guin's The Dispossessed. If the Earthseed
books partake of the Wellsian utopian tradition, The Dispossessed is more nearly allied to
the non-progressionist tradition of Morris's Nowhere. Indeed, Le Gum has stated that the
anarchism she depicts in the society of Anarres was inspired, in part, by Peter Kropotkin
(Moore 32), who, in turn, once described Morris's News from Nowhere as "perhaps the
most thoroughly and deeply Anarchistic conception of future society that has ever been
written" (qtd. in McMaster 73). 9 Like Morris, Le Guin privileges healthy, balanced
living over progress as a utopian value. Yet unlike Morris, she does not present a clear
argument for a particular type of utopia. Thus, while Morris advocates decentralized
communism, Le Guin does not similarly endorse anarcho-syndicalism or any other
socioeconomic system.
Le Guin subtitles her novel "an ambiguous utopia," suggesting that, in contrast to
Nowhere, her utopia is designed as much to explore as to inspire. It is less a rallying cry
for social change than an investigation of possibilities for change both positive and
negative. In keeping with her avowal of ambiguity, Le Guin's Anarres is more
complicated and problematic than Morris's Nowhere. Ironically, it this open
acknowledgement of the problematic character of Anarres that enables a more realistic
argument for the possibility of a utopian revolution against capitalism, bureaucracy, and
the exploitation of nature. If Morris presents all "reasonable" people in News from
Nowhere as endorsing his utopia, Le Guin offers more critical and more diverse
perspectives. This mobilization of numerous, sometimes conflicting ideologies to
represent social interactions with "realistic," multivocal complexity is a particular
rhetorical strength of The Dispossessed. At the same time, this depiction of social
diversity is partially undercut by the text's centralization of the single voice of its
protagonist, Shevek, in such a way that other voices, though always present, are pushed
to the periphery. While Shevek's anarchistic voice generates a productive intertextual
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critique of discourses, such as the Wellsian/Shavian view, that advocate progress and
control as central values, the marginalization of voices other than Shevek's, nonetheless,
limits this critique by allowing the text to evade full engagement with the very viewpoints
it is implicitly critiquing, thereby sacrificing certain opportunities to appeal to readers
who might espouse those viewpoints.
The Ambiguous Utopia of Anarres
The Dispossessed contrasts the two societies of capitalist Urras and its anarchistic
moon, Anarres, principally through the experiences of the brilliant Anarresti physicist,
Shevek, who visits Urras, against his own people's wishes, in order to advance his study
of temporal physics. On Urras, Shevek develops a Theory of Simultaneity that will
eventually lead to the creation of the ansible, a tool for instantaneous communication
across any distance. By liberating interplanetary communication from delays sometimes
of many years, the ansible will open up the possibility of a genuine interstellar
community based on the free exchange of knowledge. The ansible is, thus, emblematic
of the dream of Odo, the founder of Anarres civilization, who delineated an anarchistic
social theory based on freedom of action and expression and the rejection of private
ownership.
The society Odo advocated has much in common with Morris's Nowhere. In both
societies, there are no prisons, no formal punishments for crimes, yet theft does not occur
because, as Shevek puts it, "[n]obody owns anything to rob" (Dispossessed 149). In both
societies, murder does occur but is a rarity since most of the social conditions that
promote such violence do not exist. Both societies encourage people to pursue whatever
type of work appeals to them, yet people voluntarily take on the more unsavory jobs
through a sense of communal responsibility enhanced by an appreciation for an
occasional change of pace. Shevek explains that "if you work at a mechanical loom
mostly, every tenth day it's pleasant to go outside and lay a pipe [. .]" (150). In News
from Nowhere, Hammond makes a similar point "JA111 work is now pleasurable; either
because of the hope of gain in honour and wealth with which the work is done, which
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causes pleasurable excitement, even when the actual work is not pleasant; or else because
it has grown into a pleasurable habit [. .] and lastly f. . .] because there is a conscious
sensuous pleasure in the work itself [. . .]" (122-23). Hammond's explanation, though
rhetorically more absolute than Shevek's, is similar in concrete application. While
Shevek makes no claim that "all" work is pleasurable, both societies place a premium on
the pleasure to be derived from work.
Yet Anarres and Nowhere differ in important respects as well. The two societies
diverge strongly in their view of aesthetics. Certainly, both discourage non-functional
ornamentation: Morris, for instance, writes disparagingly of the gaudiness of nineteenth-
century women's fashions. Shevek refers to the useless trinkets in Urrasti gift shops as
"acres of excrement" (132). Yet for Morris, aesthetics should be one of the guiding
principles of society. It is a sense of beauty as much as anything else that encourages his
Nowherians to reject the polluting factories of the industrial age and return to a largely
pastoral lifestyle. In Nowhere, work is art: every created object should be both useful
and aesthetically pleasing. Followers of Odo, on the other hand, are wary of art in
general. Odo's teaching that the non-functional is "excrement," a waste product of the
social organism, is sometimes interpreted so rigidly on Anarres that any aesthetic
decoration may be suspect. Shevek's friend Bedap, for instance, humorously objects to
Shevek's orange blanket: "It's definitely an excremental color,' Bedap said. 'As a
functions analyst I must point out that there is no need for orange. Orange serves no vital
function in the social organism [. . .]'" (162). While Bedap's playful complaint is not a
genuine moral objection to Shevek's blanket, the fact that he makes such an observation
at all reflects the uneasiness with which the Anarresti approach the idea of valuing beauty
for its own sake.
This difference between the Anarresti and Nowherian attitudes toward beauty
reflects a fundamental difference between the two societies' approaches to nature and
ecology. As I discuss in chapter 2, Morris generally equates Nature with beauty: Nature
is one of the central standards by which the creation and preservation of beauty is to be
judged. This view of Nature enables Morris's depiction of an unproblematic utopia: most
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of the time, Nowhere is both beautiful and functional. No choice need be made between
one or the other: the Nowherians can have it all. While this attitude promotes a profound
affection for the non-human world, it effaces what might be termed "ugly nature": if
Nature is synonymous with beauty, is a hookworm unnatural? As a central motivation
for utopia, the preservation of an aesthetically pleasing lifestyle offers no reason to
protect such aesthetically unpleasant species, thereby opening up a space for careless
ecological management. A fetid pool may be aesthetically unpleasing yet an important
participant in the health of a local ecosystem. In News from Nowhere, Morris's emphasis
on beauty as a reason for preserving Nature underwrites a corresponding deemphasis on
the gritty and often unlovely reality of ecological necessities.
The Anarresti's deemphasis on the aesthetic in general reflects different
motivations for living in harmony with the environment. In contrast to the fertile
countryside of Nowhere's pastoral England, Anarres is a world of ecological scarcity, a
place where, as Kingsley Widmer remarks, "Full pastoral alternatives are hardly viable"
(50). On Anarres, ecological relations must be carefully taken into account simply
because the sustainability of life in such an environment is always precarious:
Man fitted himself with care and risk into this narrow ecology. If he
fished, but not too greedily, if he cultivated, using mainly organic wastes
for fertilizer, he could fit in. But he could not fit anybody else in. There
was no grass for herbivores. There were no herbivores for carnivores.
There were no insects to fecundate flowering plants; the imported fruit
trees were all hand-fertilized. No animals were introduced from Urras to
imperil the delicate balance of life. Only the Settlers came, and so well
scrubbed internally and externally that they brought a minimum of their
personal fauna and flora with them. Not even the flea had made it to
Anarres. (186)
On Anarres, nature is primarily conceived in terms of ecological necessity rather than
aesthetic pleasure. In her emphasis on the intricacy and tenuousness of ecological
relations, Le Guin is more akin to Wells than Morris. Indeed, far from retreating into the
pastoral prettiness of Nowhere, The Dispossessed confronts the difficulties of
interplanetary colonization much more directly even than Butler's reasonably
ecologically conscientious Earthseed books_ In the passage I have quoted, Le Guin offers
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at least general answers to a major question Butler never takes up: how could humans fit
into an alien biosphere? They could fit, Le Guin suggests, by severely limiting the
number of introduced species, both macroscopic and microscopic, by rejecting "greed" in
their harvesting of existing life forms (this must logically include human population
control), and by showing, in general, an understanding of the scope and limitation of
webs of relation they are entwining themselves into: flowering plants cannot reproduce
without pollinators, and so on. It is also significant that in Le Guiri's speculative
universe, numerous planets, including Earth, Urras, and presumably Anarres, have been
seeded with life originating on the planet, Hain. Thus, the biosphere of Anarres is not
evolutionarily "alien" to Urrasti life forms. Ecologically, therefore, the Urrasti
colonization of Anarres is more like the European colonization of Australia than the
human colonization of a hypothetical alien biosphere. This common evolutionary lineage
lends plausibility to the assumption that Anarres's atmosphere is breathable, its food
edible.
This ecological scarcity is part of the ambiguity of Le Guin's utopia. By many
people's standards, Anarres is not a beautiful place. Despite his intense loyalty to
Anarres, even Shevek is favorably impressed with the comparative verdure of the country
of A-lo on Urras. Anarres is not an easy place to live: Shevek sees first hand the effects
of a famine brought about by drought. At one point, he even finds himself stranded on a
train where "[a] raid on the truck gardens [to get food] was seriously proposed, and
bitterly debated, and might have been carried out, if the train had not hooted at last for
departure" (256). Even in a society that practices a utopian socialist distribution of
resources "to each according to his need," real scarcity results in real hunger, which in
turn, threatens the social fabric of Odonian "brotherhood." Anarres, then, is far from
Morris's idyllic vision of the English summer.10
As Robert Philmus observes, however, an ecologically stressed world is
conducive both to "mutual aggression" and to "mutual aid" (128). Privation fosters not
only conflict but also social equality and cohesion. Scarcity on Anarres requires a
modification of Odo's teaching that each community should be largely self-sufficient.
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On Anarres, a single community is unlikely to have access to all the natural resources
required for self-sufficiency. Thus, ironically, ecological scarcity demands an even
greater cooperative "brotherhood" than Odo suggested: "The special resources and
products of each region were interchanged continually with those of others, in an intricate
process of balance: that balance of diversity which is the characteristic of life, of natural
and social ecology" (Dispossessed 96). This ecologically imposed need for social
coordination, however, is not entirely positive; indeed, it further contributes to the
ambiguity of the utopia by generating both positive and negative ramifications. For if
scarcity promotes cooperation, regard for diversity, and a deep awareness of the need for
"balance," it also demands a certain level of centralization, for "as they say in the
analogic mode, you can't have a nervous system without at least a ganglion, and
preferably a brain" (96). This administrative center, located in the city of Abbenay,
walks a thin line between coordination and control. Indeed, in Shevek's time, it is clearly
becoming a force for social oppression.
On Anarres, no one is legally required to do anything, but this does not mean that
certain actions are not coerced. Because life on ecologically scarce Anarres demands
centralized coordination, work postings are managed through an overarching syndicate,
Divlab. Though anyone is free to refuse a posting, such refusal carries social
consequences. A person who resists working where he or she has been assigned may be
labeled a "nuchnib," an uncooperative member of society likely to incur mockery or even
physical violence from his or her more cooperative fellows (150). Of course, most of the
time, an individual will be pleased with his or her posting because Divlab takes into
account personal interests, training, and career aspirations. If someone's field of study,
however, does not accord with what is perceived as functional for the social organism,
then there may be no postings that support that study. To pursue certain types of work,
therefore, one has no choice but to become a nuchnib. Such a person's work may be
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dismissed, ridiculed, or even boycotted. When Shevek takes a liking to the music of the
composer Salas, for instance, he is shocked to learn that Salas has never been given a
posting related to music. Discussing the matter with Salas, Shevek protests,
"But there must be postings for composers."
"Where?"
"In the Music Syndicate, I suppose."
"But the Music syndics don't like my compositions. And nobody
much else does, yet. I can't be a syndicate all by myself, can I?" (174)
Without public support to for his composition, Salas is free to compose but unlikely to be
able to gather enough musicians and resources to make his music readily heard. In effect,
his compositions are suppressed. More frightening is the case of Shevek's childhood
friend„ Tirin. After writing a comic play interpreted by some as anti-Odonian, Tirin is not
only ridiculed--an expression of anarchistic free speech--but also posted to a series of
hard physical jobs in remote outposts where he has small opportunity to pursue his
theatrical ambitions. Eventually, this suppression of his freedom of expression drives
him insane.
Shevek as Dialogically Constructed Protagonist
Most crucially, of course, The Dispossessed is the story of Shevek, who must
ultimately risk exile on Urras in order to freely pursue his work. Throughout most of his
career as an Anarresti physicist, Shevek runs up against "walls," a central symbol in the
novel. His interest in Simultaneity Theory is not considered functional for society. His
need to correspond with Urrasti physicists in order to find colleagues in his unusual field
marks him as a subversive, a "propertarian" of ideas who secretly admires Urrasti society
and "egoizes" over his own, anti-social work. As a result of these perceptions, Shevek is
routed to posts that prevent him from fully practicing his physics, refused permission to
export his major work on Simultaneity Theory to Urras, and finally--along with his friend
Bedap--accused of "total irresponsibility toward society's welfare" because the two of
them have sent unsanctioned communications to Urras (355). Shevek's family, too, is
made to pay for his unpopularity: his partner and daughter are harassed for being
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associated with him. In spite of all these pressures to abandon his work, Shevek decides
to travel to Urras to pursue his physics, even though he may not be allowed to return to
Anarres.
As one might expect of an Anarresti, Shevek disapproves of much of Urras
society. Unlike Anarres, Urras is rife with social and economic inequality. In spite of the
planet's ecological abundance, the poor suffer for want of basic resources and services,
while the rich pay exorbitant prices for useless baubles. On Urras, nations spy on each
other, wars rage, different social classes disdain one another, and women are derided as
fatuous inferiors. In short, the planet is an amalgamation of many common social
criticisms of our own Western civilization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet
if Urras is a dystopia, it is an "ambiguous dystopia." Perversely, Urras offers certain
freedoms that anarchic Anarres lacks. Its artistic expression is less constrained; indeed,
Shevek is entranced by Urrasti music. More crucial for Shevek, international competition
on Urras drives a vigorous scientific establishment, which, far from rejecting Shevek's
work, is eager to exploit its promise for socioeconomic superiority. Shevek reflects on
the irony that while practicing physics on Anarres, "[hie had had no equals. Here, in the
realm of inequality, he met them at last" (72).
For Shevek, however, neither Anarres nor Urras provides a satisfactory outlet for
his physics. If Anarres wishes to suppress his work altogether, Urras wishes merely to
capitalize on it as a tool for propertarian power politics. Having defied Anarres to come
to Urras, Shevek finally defies his Urrasti hosts as well. After briefly joining with A-Io's
Odonian revolutionaries, he seeks asylum at the Terran Embassy, where he shares with
the entire interplanetary community the equations that will lead to the construction of the
ansible. In the true spirit of Odo, Shevek thinks freely, acts freely, and shares freely
information that, by providing for instantaneous interstellar communication, will serve
the eminently Odonian purpose of destroying walls between people and planets.
Although by the end of the book, neither Urrasti nor Anarresti society has substantially
changed, there is no doubt that by freely sharing his work, Shevek has taken a step
toward preserving the spirit of true Odonian anarchism.
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In this regard, The Dispossessed is not particularly ambiguous. Though Le Guin
does not depict Shevek as a character without bias or perceptual limitations, she makes it
clear that his course of action is a valid interpretation of Odonian principles, a course
preferable to those of both Anarres and Urras. Philmus makes this point explicitly: "It is
the burden of  The Dispossessed to redeem [the] promise [of Odo's utopia] and to do so in
and through the person of Shevek" (129). In other books set in the same speculative
universe, Le Guin consistently presents the ansible as a boon to the peaceful, non-
imperialistic social union of the interplanetary Ekumen. The fact that this positive
presentation is already in place in The Left Hand of Darkness (1969), published several
years prior to The Dispossessed, further suggests that The Dispossessed as a text is
designed to endorse Shevek's actions. And, indeed, it is easy to view his actions as
laudable. As Philmus observes, "Shevek must earn--and be shown to earn" his status as
social redeemer "through certain painful realizations about his Anarresti past and his
present life on Urras" (130). Shevek clearly does this: his actions, motivations, and
revelations carry much of the nuance and plausibility of a real person's journey through
difficult experiences.
Shevek's complexity as a character is constructed by the text's dialogic rhetorical
structure. Mike M. Cadden has developed an extensive analysis of the centrality of
dialogism to Le Guin's work, which is typified by the combining of numerous discourses,
not all of which can be comfortably reconciled with each other. Cadden observes, for
example, that Le Guin's Earthsea books include influences as diverse as Taoism, Jungian
psychology, feminism, anthropology, and Sartre's existentialism, to name a few: "We
would have trouble coming up with a single synthesis of these many systems, to be sure,"
he remarks (516). Cadden contends that this conglomeration of discourses is
fundamental to Le Guin's conception of character. Her fictional characters, like living
human beings, are shaped by their dialogic encounters with others.11
Shevek is a dialogically constructed character. From his childhood to his sojourn
on Urras, his horizons are continually broadened by exposure to the voices and
experiences of others. As a young man, for instance, Shevek disapproves of "intellectual
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nuchnibi" who refuse their assigned work posts to pursue eccentric interests (173). Yet
exposure to his activist friend Bedap and to Bedap's "intellectual nuchnibi" friends
gradually encourages Shevek to join their ranks and, eventually, to challenge the
mounting oppression of Anarres society. When Shevek wonders how Divlab can justify
refusing Salas a posting in his own field of music, it is Bedap who replies, "They can
justify it because music isn't useful Canal digging is important, you know; music's mere
decoration [. . .1 We've gone right back to barbarism. If it's new, run away from it; if
you can't eat it, throw it away" (175-76). By the time he departs for Urras, Shevek has
largely come to share Bedap's opinion: it is, after all, Anarres's fear of the newness of
Shevek's physics that drives him toward Urras in the first place.
Similarly, Shevek's appreciation for Urras's biological diversity is informed by
his partner, Takver's, career as a biologist. Long before Shevek has set foot on Urras,
Takver tells him, "On the Old World there are eighteen phyla of land animal; there are
classes, like the insects, that have so many species they've never been able to count them
.1 Think of it: everywhere you looked animals, other creatures, sharing the earth and
air with you. You'd feel so much more a part" (186). Later, on Urras, when Shevek is
shown a child's pet otter, he immediately calls it "ammar": "brother," as the Anarresti
call one another (152). Although Shevek is not consciously thinking of Takver, the text
directly links his response to her influence: "It was as if the beauty and strangeness of the
beasts and plants of Urras had been charged with a message for him by Takver, who
would never see them [. . .1" (152). Shevek's love of nature is forged out of Takver's
love for it.
The Urrasti, too, shape Shevek's understanding of his universe. After a lifetime
of fearing the Urmsti as a corrupt and corrupting civilization, Shevek discovers that they
often behave just like Anarresti. At dinner with the family of the physicist Oiie, Shevek
is surprised to hear Oiie speak to his wife with genuine respect and companionability.
Oiie's attitude immediately complicates Shevek's assumption that Urrasti men merely
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regard women as contemptible inferiors. Shevek is similarly startled to see Ofie's wife
chastise her child in much the same way that he or Takver might chastise their own
daughter:
"Ini! Be quiet!"
Sadik! Don't egoize! The tone was precisely the same. (147)
Just as the Urrasti are more like the Anarresti than Shevek has guessed, however,
they are also different in ways he only begins to comprehend once he is on Urras. It is
chiefly through conversation with Chifoilisk, a spy for the socialist country of Thu, that
Shevek begins to understand the political volatility of his position on Urras. Chifoilisk
explains that Thu and A-lo, two superpowers in a state of cold war, are both scrambling
for possession of the potential power of Shevek's research. He warns Shevek to be
careful of the loti physicist, Pae:
"[Pae is] dangerous to you because he is a loyal, ambitious agent of the
Ioti government. lie reports on you, and on me, regularly, to the
Department of National Security--the secret police. I don't underestimate
you, God knows, but don't you see, your habit of approaching everybody
as a person, an individual, won't do here, it won't work. You have got to
understand the powers behind the individuals." (137)
While his dinner with Oiie shows Shevek that the Urrasti are, in some ways, more like
"normal" individuals than he initially imagined, Chifoilisk shows him that they are also
representatives of various mutually hostile factions for which Anarres has no counterpart.
Being himself an individual, not merely the agent of a certain social group, Shevek does
not blindly follow Chifoilisk's counsel. In fact, it is largely his insistence on regarding
people as individuals that leads him to join with the Odonians on Urras. Yet, he learns
from Chifoilisk all the same. After their conversation, Shevek is careful to consider the
political contexts of his interactions with the Urrasti: he does, indeed, do his best "to
understand the powers behind the individuals."
In his mounting distrust for such powerful Urrasti political agents, Shevek reaches
out instead to a different kind of Urrasti, his servant Efor. The heteroglossia of Urrasti
civilization is dramatically enacted in Efor's use of multiple dialects to negotiate different
social situations. When he is functioning as the servant of "Dr. Shevek," he speaks the
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centripetal language of his Ioti masters. But when Shevek convinces him that he regards
Elm' as his equal, Efor begins to communicate more freely in his native, centrifugal
dialect, illustrating the privation of the Urrasti working class by discussing his inability to
obtain medical care for his children. When Efor remarks that his "kid" died in a public
hospital, Shevek prompts,
"It was your child that died in the hospital?"
"Yes, sir, my daughter, Laia."12
"What did she die oft"
"Valve in her heart. They say. She don't grow much. Two years
old when she died."
"You have other children?"
"Not living. Three born. Hard on the old sow. But now she say,
`Oh, well, don't have to be heartbreaking over 'em, just as well after all!"
Is there anything else I can do for you, sir?" The sudden switch to upper-
class syntax jolted Shevek; he said impatiently, "Yes! Go on talking."
(283-84)
Despite his Odonian upbringing, Shevek initially allows himself to see Efor as little more
than a "servant," coming and going, washing and tidying. Once they begin to converse,
however, Shevek is confronted with Efor's individuality, his identity as a member of the
Urrasti underclass, his identity as a father--as Shevek is. Through this contact with Efor,
Shevek is able to shift his attention away from the upper-class physicists and toward the
working class Odonians struggling for revolutionary reform. His final choice to flee his
university colleagues and align himself with the revolutionaries is constructed out of
knowledge and values he has absorbed from his doctrinaire Anarresti upbringing, his
relationship with his family, his nuchnibi friends, the writings of Odo, and his various
interactions with both upper- and lower-class Urrasti. His course of action, while it is
emphatically individual, is, thus, the product of a lifetime of dialogue.
Yet because Shevek is an individual, his relationship with the voices he
encounters must be mediated by his personal ideology. He does not simply absorb what
others say to him; he evaluates it, choosing, for example, to reject Chifoilisk's advice to
cease seeing people as individuals but to embrace Takver's love of nature. Seeing the
narrative primarily through Shevek's eyes, the reader is encouraged to identify with
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Shevek's particular world view. In the previous section, I argue that Butler's Olamina
develops a language that is centrifugal to the culture she inhabits but centripetal within
the Earthseed books. Shevek's language functions similarly. On both Anarres and Urras,
he is an outsider, whether a nuchnib, a rebel, a foreigner, or a "man from the Moon" (78).
Shevek's Contentment with Hybrid Provisionality
Yet within Le Guin's text, his perspective dominates. Shevek's woridview prizes
Oda's emphasis on freedom, individuality, and sharing. It stresses equality and
interdependence, appreciates commitment but is fascinated by the inevitability of change.
Since this is a hybrid text, it is not surprising that its dominant discourse--defined by
Shevek's point of view--is provisional, contentedly uncertain, more process- than goal-
oriented. Ile is neither a Wellsiata/Shavian "progressionist" nor a Morrisian "non-
progressionist" Instead, while his life's work embodies scientific, technological, and
social progress, his worldview also embraces limits to the efficacy of the progressionist
paradigm. For instance, he views time as existing in linear and cyclic forms, both of
which are essential. As he explains to his Urrasti colleagues:
Only within each of the great cycles, where we live, only there is there
linear time, evolution, change. So then time has two aspects. There is the
arrow, the running river, without which there is no change, no progress, or
direction, or creation. And there is the circle or the cycle, without which
there is chaos, meaningless succession of instants, a world without clocks
or seasons or promises. (223)
Though linear progressions and cycles are both inevitable and vital, it is the cycle that
Shevek emphasizes most strongly, metaphorically locating progress within the broader
context of cyclic time_ Just as Shevek suggests a limit to the power of progress, he
embraces the idea that knowledge itself not only must be but should be perpetually
incomplete. As he struggles to develop a General Temporal Theory, he has a revelation:
"But was not a theory of which all the elements were provably true a simple tautology?
In the region of the unprovable, or even the disprovable, lay the only chance for breaking
out of the circle and going ahead" (280). According to this view, progress does not
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suggest any kind of ascent toward increasingly perfect, godlike knowledge. On the
contrary, progress itself is predicated on a continual welcoming of uncertainty and the
possibility of error.
A running theme in Shevek's philosophy, and one which reflects Le Guin's Taoist
influence, is the surrender of the fantasy of total or near-total control over one's life or
environment. The inevitability of cycles, the continuousness of change, the uncertainty
of knowledge all point to the impossibility of any ultimate, stable mastery of the universe.
By constructing the text around a discourse that proposes contentment with uncertainty
and limitation, Le Guin places her book in an intertextual dialogue with other discourses
more prominent in contemporary Western Civilization.13
This conversation has ecological implications. In ecological terms, Shevek's
view is in harmony with my second epigraph for this chapter, which shows Shevek
reflecting on Takver's attachment to "nature":
Her concern with landscapes and living creatures was passionate. This
concern, feebly called, "love of nature," seemed to Shevek to be
something much broader than love. There are souls, he thought, whose
umbilicus has never been cut. They never got weaned from the universe.
They do not understand death as an enemy; they look forward to rotting
and turning into humus. (185)
Though this passionate feeling is not Shevek's own, it embodies an attitude he clearly
respects. This foregrounding of death and rotting differs from Morris's more edenic
portrayal of nature, just as Shevek's stress on the uncertainty of life differs from Morris's
simpler vision of a stable, non-progressionist utopia that will persist indefinitely. More
pointedly, however, this perspective challenges the progressionist discourse exemplified
by Wells, Shaw, and, to an extent, Octavia Butler. In the previous section, I discuss the
similarity between Wells's and Butler's invocation of the trope of leaving behind the
mother (Earth) and attaining species adulthood (in space). Olamina writes that
"Earthseed is adulthood. / It's trying our wings, / Leaving our mother, / Becoming men
and women" (Talents 394). Shevek's depiction of Takver's relationship with Anarres
takes aim at the legitimacy of this metaphor. Takver is one of those "unweaned" souls
"whose umbilicus has never been cut." In Butler's terms, she ought to be a child
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"fighting for the full breasts" (Talents 394). But Takver is not a child. On the contrary,
she is a partner and mother, a good one, a professional biologist and full participant in
Anarresti civilization, who throughout the book maturely makes difficult decisions
regarding the health and welfare 'of- her children, her partnership with Shevek, her own
career, and even her own safety. She does not, Le Guin suggests, need to "wean herself'
from attachment to her world in order to be a functioning, "adult" member of the human
species.
To Wells's Utopian, Urthred, Takver's inability to detach herself (physically and
emotionally) from dependence on the whims of her environment would doubtless qualify
her as one of the "beaten and starved children of Nature" (Men 83). To an extent, this
description fits: like all Anarresti, Takver does go hungry during the famine, which
prematurely ages her and robs her of two teeth. Yet Takver does not consider herself
oppressed or enslaved by her ecologically harsh world. Even if that world were to
prematurely kill her, she "[does] not understand death as an enemy; [she looks] forward
to rotting and turning into humus." The power of nature to end human life--a power
Wells's Utopians are deeply concerned with mitigating--is simply not a power that
Takver begrudges. Let nature end her life, she will love it passionately as long as she
lives. The contention of Shaw's Lilith that "Life" must destroy the "enemy Matter" as
part of its attainment of eternity would be incomprehensible to humus-loving Takver. To
Shaw, of course, this itself would be evidence of her imminent evolutionary supersession,
Perhaps Shaw would be right. But to Shevek and Takver, that is not the point. Life is
always uncertain. It would be ridiculous to waste time worrying about whether or not
oneself or one's culture or one's species might be superseded by something else. Where
death is not an enemy, ceasing to be is not ultimately an ill. "I don't give a hoot for
eternity," says Takver bluntly in the midst of a philosophical tack with Shevek (190).
Shevek agrees: "It's nothing to do with eternity [. . All you have to do to see life
whole is to see it as mortal. I'll die, you'll die; how could we love each other otherwise?
The sun's going to bum out, what else keeps it shining?" (190). In The Time Machine,
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Wells presents the dying sun as the ultimate bleak image of humanity's failure. In
Shevek's imagery, however, such death itself is no more or less than a prerequisite for the
joys of living.
The Centripetal Representation of Shevek's Discourse
The hybrid discourse that Le Guin develops in The Dispossessed admirably
challenges both the discourse of progress and "leaving behind" as well as the less
prominent, but still powerful, discourse of "return" to a stable, pastoral idyll. These
challenges, however, remain mostly intertextual. Within Le Guin's text itself, the voices
that stand in opposition to Shevek's philosophy are many but are given only slight
development. Shevek is the only significant point-of-view character. While other points
of view occasionally intrude, they do so for no more than a few lines at a time and often
function primarily to validate Shevek. For example, his early physics teacher, Mitis,
"watched him [study a physics equation] with compassion and admiration" (57); already
she recognizes Shevek as a rising star in an unforgiving field. Years later, Shevek's
friend, Bedap, watches him comforting his daughter, Sadik. Seeing the closeness of the
father and daughter, Bedap reflects that he himself meddles "in other people's lives
because I don't have one. I never took the time. And the time's going to run out on me
all at once, and I will never have had. . that" (370). Bedap's feelings are understandable
and sensitively portrayed, but in the larger context of the narative, they serve, once
again, to highlight the achievements of Shevek, who manages to be a social reformer,
physics genius, and good family man all at once. Still later in Shevek's career, the
"compassion and admiration" of Mitis is echoed at a higher pitch by the Terran
ambassador, Keng, who "was shaken by [Shevek], and looked at him with compassion
and a certain awe" (346).
In contrast, those who are unimpressed with Shevek's attitudes and actions are
generally not shown as point-of-view characters, even for a line or two. Since their
objections are typically expressed in conversation with Shevek—as in Chifloilisk's
avowal of Shevek's political naivete--it is left to Shevek to interpret their state of mind.
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In Shevek's conversation with Chifoilisk, for example, the text states that "[Chifoilisk's]
expression as he stared down into the fire was bitter [. .1" (136). But is Chifoilisk's
"expression" a true indicator of his feeling? And if he is bitter, what precisely in his own
life is prompting the bitterness? While this description certainly adds a human dimension
to the character, the mediation of Chifoilisk's mood and words through Shevek's
perception prevents the reader from understanding Chifoilisk's perspective as it might
appear in Chifoilisk's own Thuvian mind.
Even the views of major sympathetic characters, such as Takver, are typically
mediated through Shevek's perspective. In the paragraphs in which I discuss Takver's
attitude toward nature, it is almost entirely Shevek's interpretation of Takver's attitude
that I am reporting. Takver's own voice, again, is mainly heard in conversation, the
thoughts underlying her words finally inaccessible. I suspect that this persistent focus on
Shevek's perspective to the near-exclusion of others underlies Widmer's contention that
the characters and relationships in The Dispossessed read flat. 14 Widmer describes
Shevek and Takver's egalitarian partnership as "somewhat thin, inadequately explored,
and sentimental" (45). Widmer locates this "thinness" in characterization in "the
conventions of fantastically changed conditions, ornate apparatus, synthetic
nomenclature," which "depersonalize and thus weaken a subtle sense of human
relationship" (45). There is some fairness to this contention. As a writer of alternate
societies myself, I have found my ability to express subtle nuances in characters limited
by a "synthetic" language that cannot plausibly make use of the richness of our own
contemporary vernacular. At the same time, I argue that the "thinness" Widmer
perceives derives more from Le Guin's choice to remain in Shevek's point of view than
from her choice to locate Shevek on a far-flung, "fantastic" world.
Le Guin's earlier novel, The Left Hand of Darkness, may serve as a useful
illustration of this point. As a narrative about the androgynous culture of the planet
Gethen, The Left Hand of Darkness depicts a society that is, if anything, more "fantastic"
than Anarres and Urras. Yet Sarah LeFanu describes Le Guin's development of the
book's principal relationship, between the Terran Genly Ai and the Gethenian Estraven,
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as an accomplishment of "immense subtlety." Far from reading the relationship as
"thin," LeFanu calls its culmination in Estraven's death "heart-breaking." Though their
relationship "almost founders on misapprehensions and mistakes" that arise from Genly
and Estraven's cultural dissimilarity (LeFanu), the two, nonetheless, become more whole
through their contact with each other, forming what Gary Willis describes as "two halves
of one soul that is unifying itself' (38). Significantly, this novel is constructed out of
both Genly's and Estraven's narrations. Thus, two contrasting and sometimes conflicting
perspectives are continually placed in a dialogic relation that does not privilege one view
over the other. Since both Genly and Esh-aven are shown in all their interior complexity,
their interactions reflect that complexity. In The Dispossessed, in contrast, Shevek
continually interacts with characters who appear "flat" next to him simply because their
inner complexity cannot be fully revealed through his viewpoint.
The comparatively superficial examination of human relations enabled by this
narrative structure reflects a concomitant superficiality in its intratextual socio-ecological
discourse. Toward the end of the book, for instance, when Shevek states that he
considers Urras to be "Hell," Keng counters that from her perspective: "[l]t is the world
that comes as close as any could to Paradise" (347). She goes on to explain, "I know it's
full of evils, full of human injustice, greed, folly, waste. But it is also full of beauty,
vitality, achievement [. . .] It is alive, tremendously alive--alive, despite all its evils,
with hope" (347). This is a provocative challenge to Shevek's view. Keng acknowledges
all the ills Shevek has perceived in Urras but considers them slight next to the planet's
beauty and vitality. This is almost a direct inversion of Shevek's view: he, too, has
perceived beauty and vitality on Urras but considers such things slight next to the planet's
evils. By introducing Keng's alternative viewpoint, the text indicates that Shevek's view
cannot be considered the single "correct" one. Yet this new interpretation of Urras
cannot effectively interrogate Shevek's centripetal discourse. Keng's perspective is only
introduced in the last pages of the book, unaccompanied by substantial development of
her inner thought processes or personal experience of Urras. We have never seen Keng
marvel at the vitality in the streets of A-lo. We have never seen her admire the artistry
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that Shevek decries as mere excremental decoration. After numerous chapters devoted to
the details of Shevek's experience on Urras and his Ananesti interpretation of that
experience, Keng's alternative view, like Chifoilisk's, is too slight to enable the reader
seriously to experience Urras from any perspective other than Shevek's.
While The Dispossessed offers a powerful intertextual critique of views such as
the colonial expansionist strain in the teachings of Butler's Olamina, this critique is
limited by the text's lack of fully developed counter-discourses. If Butler provides no
character like Shevek to intelligently question Olamina's expansionist ambitions, Le
Guin provides no character like Olamina to challenge the wisdom of Shevek's less
progressively proactive philosophy. As Keng seems to hint, a case could be made that
Urras does embody more hopeful vitality than Anarres, that for all its obvious ills, Urras
may be the model more worth emulating. Urras is artistically and scientifically freer than
Anarres. It might also ultimately prove to be the stabler of the two societies. While
Urras, for all its social injustice, has endured as a civilization for millennia, the
Settlement of Anarres occurred only 170 years before Shevek's journey to Urras. In less
than two centuries, Anarres society has declined from Odonian idealism to a state of
significant bureaucratization and oppression. Perhaps Odo's vision of society is not, in
fact, practicable in the long term. One of the discourses that might most fervently
support Urras as a healthier society than Anarres is the "anti-Utopianism" that Fredric
Jameson identifies as dominant in our culture. This is the school of thought that equates
"Utopia," particularly in its communist or anarchic modes, with naive fantasy and/or
tendencies toward Soviet-style social repression. Writing in 1994, Jameson asserts, "It
would seem that the times are propitious for anti-Utopianism; and [. the critique and
diagnosis of the evils of the Utopian impulse has become a boom industry"
("Utopianism" 382). The cultural sway held by this "anti-Utopian" discourse illustrates
the need to address its concerns both fairly and rigorously in any utopian argument.
But the narrative structure of The Dispossessed does not seriously investigate the
possibility that Urras may be the preferable society. And because the novel gives short
shrift to perspectives that differ from Shevek's, readers who would be inclined to endorse
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those perspectives may sense unacknowledged gaps in the philosophy that Shevek
espouses--a failure, for example, to comprehend Keng's perception of Urrasti virtues.
Such gaps are unavoidable. In an "ambiguous utopia," we must expect that no system of
thought will be presented without questionable elements, not even Shevek's personal
challenge to both Anarres and Urns. In its centralization of the text around Shevek's
perspective, however, The Dispossessed, nonetheless, sacrifices some of the provocative
socio-ecological exploration it might have achieved with more dialogic attention to
diverse voices. While the book adds a powerful voice to discourses of ecological
sustainability based on participation with--rather than control of--the environment, the
text's relative lack of engagement with conflicting views may render this philosophy
unconvincing to more anti-utopian readers.
Conclusion
In the foregoing critiques of Butler's and Le Guin's ambiguously
utopian/dystopian experiments, I may sound as if I want to have my cake and eat it too: I
praise these hybrid texts for embracing uncertainty and provisionality, then criticize them
for not developing stronger arguments through a fuller dialogic exploration of multiple
perspectives. So am I advocating open-ended exploration or convincing argumentation?
To speak with a calculated degree of "uncertainty," there is no straightforward answer to
this question. By definition, the more convincingly a case is put, the less provisional it
appears. Yet in arguments relating to phenomena as complex as our biosphere and the
action of human civilization within it, conclusions must be provisional: there are simply
too many details and too many unknowns for them to be otherwise. Thus, perversely, the
arguments that embrace greater uncertainty, up to a point, turn out to be more convincing
arguments: Morris's utopia looks less plausible than Le Guin's precisely because his
narrative enacts it in terms that are more definitive and, therefore, more simplistic. Of
course, an excess of "uncertainty" ultimately generates no type of argumentation at all,
merely unfocused confusion. Where the balance lies between a productive provisionality
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in argumentation and a descent into a chaos of "provisional" viewpoints I cannot say.
Each hybrid text will balance itself slightly differently, and there is, of course, no ideal
formula.
In this chapter, I suggest that both Butler and Le Guin diminish the potential force
of their arguments by employing a rhetorical technique in which a voice that is
centrifugal within the narrative's dominant cultures becomes centripetal within the
discourse of the text. By centralizing these "marginalized" voices, the Earthseed books
and The Dispossessed risk recapitulating the marginalizing of discourses they overtly
resist, deemphasizing dialogic engagement with perspectives that might challenge their
respective protagonists' views. I do not mean, by this contention, to devalue the power of
these narratives as effective challenges of our dominant Western ideologies. On the
contrary, in these novels, both authors contribute provocative complications to our socio-
ecological discourses. Both have made powerful use of multivocality, hybridity, and
provisionality to produce sophisticated critiques of the social injustice and environmental
exploitation inherent in current globalized capitalist economics.
The nuance with which such texts approach contemporary social and ecological
problems is all the more evident in contrast to the greatly simplified appeal often
embodied in the contemporary television space opera. In the next chapter, I examine the
legacy of Neo-Lamarckian utopian progressionism in J. Michael Straczynski's science
fiction television series Babylon 5. As an intertextual counter to this discourse, I offer
the ecological egalitarianism of Paul Donovan and Wolfram Tichy's dystopian space
opera, Lexx.
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1 Since I have used Latour as a basis for defining hybridity, I must note that Latour considers
postmodernism hostile to a productive hybridity. Postmodernism, according to Latour, does indeed reject
the purification of categories but does so in a way that "rejects all empirical work as illusory and
deceptively scientistic," retaining only "(dlisconnected instants and groundless denunciations" (46). Latour
objects to postmodernism's nihilistic bent, its tendency to refuse physical reality and significant meaning.
Butler's postmodernism, however, eschews this nihilistic vein. Her work uses partiality and uncertainty to
confront socio-ecological problems proactively, not to support an enervated denial of meaning.
2 Critical texts that have productively explored Butler's challenge to traditional categories of race,
gender, and species include Donna's Haraway's "Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies," which describes
cyborg feminism in Butler's Clay's Ark and Xenogenesis series; Lisbeth Grant-Britton's "Octavia Butler's
Parable of the Sower: One Alternative to a Futureless Future," which traces Butler's refiguration of the role
of the black woman as hero; Catherine S. Ramirez's "Cyborg Feminism: The Science Fiction of Octavia E.
Butler and Gloria Anzaldna," which identifies Butler's black female heroes as exemplars of Haraway's
cyborg feminism; and Jim Miller's "Post-apocalyptic Hoping: Octavia Butler's Dystopian/Utopian Vision,"
which argues against Hoda M Zaki's characterization of Butler as a dystopian biological essentialist.
3 On one level, a text that partially supports anthropocentrism while partially challenging it could
be considered hybrid in its very mingling of those two discourses. The Earthseed books make this move:
the daughter of a Baptist minister, Olamina is heavily influenced by the anthropocentric Christian
patriarchy into which she was born, and she often incorporates elements of this anthropocentrism and
patriarchy into the community of Acorn in a critical, self-reflexive way. While consistently treating
women as equal to men, for example, she nonetheless make no serious challenge to her culture's
privileging of heterosexual unions and traditional marriage. Within this broader hybridity, however, the
paucity of significant challenges to the anthropocentrism of the Destiny empowers that discourse at the
expense of less anthropocentric perspectives, including Olamina's principle of "partnership."
4 I frame these two discourses as Olamina's and Wells's respectively, even though this requires
me to compare the views of a fictional character to those of a real person, because these two figures are the
best representatives of their respective discourses. Since Wells produced a large body of didactic work in
support of certain utopian aims, it is useful to range over multiple Wells texts to illustrate values that
transcend any single text. Butler is a more provisional writer. Though her narrative stance is favorably
inclined toward Earthseed, it remains problematic to equate her view with Olamina's. therefore, use
()lamina as a representative of Earthseed and Wells as a representative of the Wellsian evolutionary-
progressive utopia.
5 Butler goes on to identify life on a dead world with living biodomes. The possibility she does
not address is what science fiction commonly calls "terraforming," that is, creating an Earth-like biosphere
on a "dead" world. Such a task would be so immense that it might well prove functionally impossible, and
Butler may be correct that the easier option would be the modification of life within an already existing
biosphere. Terrafonning, however, has one notable advantage over Butler's concept of colonizing
preexisting biospheres: it would circumvent the moral and ethical problems involved in inserting terrestrial
life into an alien biosphere in a way that would almost certainly substantially alter both the terrestrial life
forms and the alien ecosystems, likely resulting in the extinction of certain species.
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6 'This exploration of human adaptability and the fluidity of human identity is a characteristic of
Butler's work that has often been remarked upon. Her Xenogenesis books, for instance, investigate the
possibility of humanity becoming hybridized with an alien species. Butler describes her short story,
"Bloodchild," explicitly as an attempt to explore the accommodations humans would have to make when
living on an alien planet (Afterward to "Bloodchild" 32).
7 Such potential difficulties with extrasolar colonization are explored in depth in John Brunner's
Bedlam Planet (1968). Brunner's human colonists find themselves caught in a mounting crisis when an
indigenous species of bacteria takes up residence in their guts and begins absorbing nutrients the humans
need to survive.
8 What Asha misses, however, in her critique of the Destiny is the point ()lamina keeps returning
to: humanity must eventually expand beyond Earth if it is going to survive as a species. In the Wellsian
long term, this point is undeniable: life on Earth will be destroyed when the dying sun engulfs it. Even in
the shorter term, it seems likely that a species prone to aggression, with the nuclear capability to destroy
most macroscopic life on its planet, will end up annihilating itself sooner or later if it only resides on that
planet. From this perspective, the Destiny is not at all fanciful. As difficult as it may be to achieve--and
both ()lamina and Butler concede this difficulty--it may, in fact, be the best long-term hope for the survival
of terrestrial life.
9 In his study of anarchism in News from Nowhere, Rowland McMaster takes issue with
Kropotkin's assertion. Morris, McMaster argues, was more pessimistic than Kropotkin about the ability of
human society to persist without the external enforcement of rules governing behavior. If Nowhere appears
to present a completely efficacious anarchism, that is only because Morris wrote his book in the mode of
romance, "a mode characterized by idealization [. . I" (McMaster 73). As I argue in chapter 2, News from 
Nowhere is a "vision," not necessarily meant to be a realistic depiction of that future.
10 The depiction of Anarres as ecologically scarce is part of a phenomenon in utopian fiction that
Fredric Jameson terms "world reduction," which he describes as "an operation of radical abstraction and
simplification" of the environment of a speculative society ("World-Reduction" 372). This simplification
enables the strong expression of certain social arguments that might become muted in a more intricate
setting. A society's response to absolute scarcity, for example, can be most forcefully depicted in a society
where absolute scarcity can be readily distinguished from the scarcity that results from problems in
production or distribution. In The Dispossessed, Jameson argues, "the principle of world-reduction has
become an instrument in the conscious elaboration of a utopia" (372). Ecological scarcity on Anarres is
more than just part of a setting: it is an integral aspect of the functioning of Anarresti society.
11 Le Guin herself has often commented on her drive to create characters who speak to her as if
they were real people in all their complexity. In "The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction," she says succinctly,
"That's why I like novels: instead of heroes, they have people in them" (169).
12 Here, Le Guin gives us a hint of Efor's Odonian affiliations: "Lain" was Odo's first name
(Dispossessed 84).
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13 Le Guin develops a similar argument against the fantasy of control in The Lathe of Heaven
(1971). In this novel, she invokes a Wellsian rhetoric to characterize her antagonist, Haber's, goal of
controlling the world to make it a better place. Like Wells, Haber advocates a "World State" whose
responsibility it is to care for all people (142). Like Wells, Haber envisions a world where "men will be
like gods!", a world that can only be brought about by "trained, scientific hands" (145). Ironically, it is a
different aspect of Weilsian rhetoric that Le Guin explicitly cites in The Lathe of Heaven. In an epigraph
from A Modern Utopia, she quotes Wells's assertion, "Nothing endures, nothing is precise and certain
(except in the mind of a pedant), perfection is the mere repudiation of that ineluctable marginal inexactitude
which is the mysterious inmost quality of Being" (44). Thus, within The Lathe of Heaven, Le Guin could
be said to deconstruct the Weilsian utopian vision, quoting Wells himself to question the possibility of a
utopia founded on "godlike" scientific control of the world.
14 Flatness of characterization is notorious in utopian fiction and, to a lesser extent, dystopian
fiction. I attribute this tendency to at least two traits of these genres: first, characters in an alternative
society often represent that society more than complex individuals, and second, these genres often
minimize dialogic discourse among complex individuals in order to present an unambiguous utopian or
dystopian message. The substantial dialogism of Le Guin's purposefully ambiguous utopia is crucial to the
development of Shevek himself as complex character. At the same time, the limitations the text places on
this dialogic engagement contributes to the flatness of Le Guin's secondary characters.
CHAPTER 6
POSITIVE CHANGE AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY
INTERTEXTUAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN BABYLON 5 AND LEXX
This [galaxy] is yours now, and you have an obligation to do as we have
done, to teach the races that will follow you, and when your time comes,
as ours has, to step aside and allow them to grow into their own destiny.
Lorien, "Into the Fire," J. Michael Straczynski's Babylon 5
KAI. Her food gathering strategy is to imitate other life forms so these
targeted life forms will not act defensively before being consumed.
Lyekka consumed Boosh and Bando.
STAN. You mean she ate them?
KAI. Yes.
STAN. Oh, that's just great. Well, are you going to save Moss?
KAI. I have no motivation to save Moss from Lyekka. Or Lyekka from
Moss.
"Lyekka," Paul Donovan and Wolfram Tichy's Lexx
Introduction
In this chapter, I delve into television space opera. Like hybrid science fiction
novels, TV science fiction inherits the late-twentieth century's postmodern distrust for
monolithic answers to social questions. Instead of requiring an all-encompassing
"correct" discourse, these TV shows typically present a diversity of socio-cultural views
as desirable: in Star Trek, humans can learn from Vulcans and vice versa. Despite this
regard for multivocality, however, TV science fiction typically enacts discourses more
purified than those of hybrid science fiction novels. Like the alternative-society
narratives of William Morris, George Bernard Shaw, and H. G. Wells, such shows are
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either strongly utopian or strongly dystopian, progressionist or non-progressionist.
Rarely do they embrace the "ambiguity" of a socio-cultural exploration like The
Dispossessed. In utopian series, in particular, appreciation for discursive diversity,
though genuine, is often subordinated to an endorsement of a hegemonic utopian
discourse: ideological loyalty to Star Trek's United Federation of Planets, for example.
By adhering to a purified discourse of utopian faith, utopian TV shows serve as a bastion
against the contemporary "anti-Utopian" impulse described by Fredric Jameson, retaining
a sense of hope that a unified, highly positive future society is attainable. These texts,
thus, offer a productive counter to the postmodern jadedness of much contemporary
literature. At the same time, the purification of utopian discourse is enabled by a
rhetorical retreat from dialogic interrogation, a move that effaces provocative challenges
to the utopia. In contrast, dystopian TV shows are amenable to a broader variety of
views, though they, likewise, may silence voices that intelligently champion the dystopia.
If both utopian and dystopian TV series restrict intratextual dialogic critiques, however,
they can be used to mount insightful intertextual critiques.
In this chapter, I juxtapose J. Michael Straczynski's utopian, progressionist series,
Babylon 5 (1993-98), with Paul Donovan and Wolfram Tichy's dystopian, non-
progressionist series, Lexx (1996-2002). I contend that these shows function as
complements. Babylon 5 presents an inspiring scenario of proactive change as a means
to a utopian future yet adheres to a strongly hierarchical anthropocentrism that fails to
consider the importance of ecology to human society. Conversely, Lexx foregrounds the
necessity of sustainable ecological relations yet submerges the productivity of this
ecocentric discourse in a rhetoric of futility. Put in conversation, however, the discourses
of these shows enhance each other by posing necessary questions and alternatives,
thereby becoming more useful proponents of change and sustainability, respectively,
among the cultural influences on our ecological praxis.
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The Ideological Influence of Television Space Opera
In chapter 5, I contend that hybrid science fiction novels offer a depth of dialogic
exploration that is absent from more purified texts. It may seem anticlimactic, therefore,
to end this study with a type of text that I have already identified as less sophisticated
than others I discuss. But the importance of the television space opera for ecological
praxis lies less in its discursive complexity than in its popularity. Every year, science
fiction TV shows enter millions of homes. After ending its run as a syndicated series,
Babylon 5 garnered 10.7 million viewers in the United States for its 1998 debut on TNT
("B5"). Though less popular in the United States, Lexx has aired in more than one
hundred countries (Lohr). As popular entertainment, such shows are significant
participants in reflecting, disseminating, and questioning the ideologies that produce and
consume space opera. Because they are set in a fictive reality, these shows are well
placed to challenge traditional assumptions about our own perceptions of reality. Yet, as
Kathy Ferguson observes in her analysis Star Trek: Deep Space Nine (1993-99), "science
fiction, particularly in the form of a popular prime time TV series, also stays in business
and cultivates corporate sponsorship by confirming some of the cherished expectations
held by readers/viewers" (181). To retain a mass audience, these shows must appeal to
the dominant ideology, the ideology that is--by definition--most representative of that
audience. Thus, the prime time TV space opera is both a radical and a conservative
ideological force, a space where redefined realities mix abundantly with cliches. Given
the ideological influence of TV space opera, therefore, its critical dismissal would leave a
significant gap in the study of ecological discourse in speculative fiction.
But while critical engagement with space opera is necessary, the term, "space
opera," itself is notoriously troublesome. A much-maligned subgenre of science fiction,
"space opera" conjures images of space dogfights, hyperspace vortexes, and green-
skinned alien seductresses. Beyond such superficial impressions, however, the subgenre
has proven difficult to define. Patricia Monk describes space opera as "an attitudinal
bias" that "sees the extraterrestrial universe [. . .] as both knowable and manageable"
(300). Responding to Monk, Gary Westfahl offers an alternative definition of space
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opera as a form that exists to provide light entertainment with "no scientific value and no
literary value" ("Beyond" 177). Responding to both Monk and Westfahl, Joe Sanders
argues that space opera is characterized by an assurance that human beings can positively
confront "immensity," typically symbolized by the vastness of space. It is not my
intention here to definitively define "space opera" but to embrace it as an apt, if loose,
description for the narratives I discuss in this chapter. Both Babylon 5 and Lexx
represent the universe as if it were substantially known or knowable. Both are designed
to provide light entertainment and do not balk at introducing one-dimensional supporting
characters, improbable plots, and questionable science to do so. Both readily confront
immensity, addressing vast scales of time and expanses of space while presenting
characters who mold galaxy-shaking events. Since these shows meet many criteria of
various definitions of "space opera," the term provides as a convenient means for
distinguishing these "popular" texts from the "literary" science fiction I describe in
chapter 5.
As widely disseminated texts that both reflect and subvert of dominant
ideologies, these TV shows are productive sites for exploring contemporary Western
social issues. The original Star Trek (1966-69), for instance, is renowned for the
integrationist message embodied in its "proto-multicultural crew" (Malcolm 30).
Babylon 5's exploration of the rise of a secret police within the democratic society of
Earth anticipates concerns over some anti-terrorism policies of the Bush Administration.
Likewise, space operas explore the meaning of being "human." In two separate episodes,
the British dystopian series Blake's 7 (1978-81) investigates the "humanity" of human-
like animals genetically engineered as slave labor ("The Web" 1.5, "Animals" 4.5). In
Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, the symbiotic relationship that defines the Trill species
creates a space in which to explore gender identity (Ferguson). More crucial to this
chapter is space opera's interest in future human evolution: Star Trek offers both the
Metrons ("Arena" 1.18) and the Organians ("Errand of Mercy" 1.26) as utopian models
for humanity's future. Conversely, Blake's 7 predicts humanity's evolutionary
degeneration ("Terminal" 3.13). The central plot of Earth: Final Conflict (1997-2002)
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pits human evolutionary potential against the evolutionary degeneration of the alien
Taelons and Jaridians. And Babylon 5, as I discuss presently, crucially reflects upon the
evolutionary progress of humanity.
Space Opera and Ecology
Yet despite all the subgenre's possibilities for ideological and (pseudo-)scientific
exploration, these shows seldom engage ecological questions. Typically set outside of
the Earth's biosphere, they often use contrivances to circumvent discussion of the
physical complexities involved in inhabiting alien biospheres or creating artificial
environments. In Star Trek, any "M-class" planet will handily sustain human life, while
by the era of Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987-94), food can be conveniently
"replicated" without recourse to agriculture. In most of these shows, "humanoid" aliens
abound, while other life forms are rarely depicted. Attacks on a planet are usually
quantified in terms of "people" killed as if a biosphere consists of "people" and nothing
else. Westfahl explores this deemphasis on physical environment as exemplified by the
use (or lack of use) of the space suit in American science fiction films, arguing that these
narratives typically reject a realist engagement with the dangers of space, as exemplified
by the need to wear a space suit in a vacuum. Citing the original Star Trek, he observes,
"For the most part [. .1, the crew of the Enterprise experienced outer space only by
watching it on television [i.e. their view screen]" ("The True Frontier" 60). Life in space
becomes life within a set of rooms on a spaceship technologically buffered not only, as
Westfahl contends, from the realities of space but also from the realities of existence
within an ecological web of energetic interdependencies.
This lack of engagement with ecological issues is particularly striking in Babylon
5 because the series is so centrally concerned with evolution. It can be argued that most
television space operas seldom discuss ecology because they focus on other issues: the
original Star Trek, for example, is concerned principally with race, gender, and the Cold
War. Significant engagement with ecology could be seen as a digression from these
topics. But no such claim can be made about Babylon 5. The show pivots around its
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evolutionary discourse, and since current biological science recognizes evolution as an
ecologically driven process, the near absence of ecology in this discourse cannot be
dismissed as an issue of thematic focus. Rather, Babylon 5's lack of engagement with
ecology effectively reinscribes an environmentally destructive humanist ideology that
privileges humanity as ultimately superior to and divisible from the rest of the physical
world.
Ideology, however, must not be conflated with a text's overt "message."
Babylon 5 does not endorse ecological destruction; indeed, it frequently cites harm to the
environment and destruction of resources as pernicious consequences of violent conflict.
But the ideological assumptions enacted by the narrative enable ecological damage by
failing to appreciate the importance of ecological relations. It is not contempt for the
environment but rather carelessness of it that renders Babylon 5's ideology suspect as a
model for ecological praxis.
In a radical departure from the usual parameters of the TV space opera, Lexx
inverts Babylon 5's ecological disregard. Lexx is not overtly "about" ecology; it seldom
preaches environmental responsibility in the way that Star Trek preaches multicultural
integration. Yet, on the level of tacit ideological assumption, ecology is foundational to
the universe presented in Lexx. Questions of energetic relations, food production, waste
disposal, and predator-prey balances are basic to the series, sometimes as major plot
lines, sometimes as background realities, but almost always as vital considerations. In
this way, the ideology of Lexx is ecocentric: the show does not need to preach ecological
awareness; it enacts such awareness episode by episode.
This difference in approach to ecology is part of a broader contrast between the
strategies Babylon 5 and Lexx employ to portray alternative civilizations. Babylon 5 is
fundamentally humanist and utopian. Though much of the series is concerned with war,
injustice, and corruption, these socials ills take place within a broader historical vision
that promises human progress toward a higher civilization and state of being. The
closing words of the finale of its fourth season express the show's ultimate position:
"faith manages" ("Deconstruction" 4.22). Dedicated, optimistic struggle will reap its
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rewards in the end. Lexx, in contrast, is unremittingly dystopian. The dominant
cosmology of the Lexx universe depicts time as cycle--not unlike an organism's life
cycle--that passes eternally through the same sequence of events. The events of the series
take place in a time of universal degeneration as irrevocable as time itself. Though
destruction may be temporarily mitigated through the actions of courageous people,
sooner or later, it will claim the universe.
In many ways, Babylon 5 and Lexx function as antitheses, each presenting a
philosophy that is absent or severely underrepresented in the other. Thus, when analyzed
together, the two shows can be placed in a productive intertextual dialogue. The
evolutionary progressionism of Babylon 5 provides an inspiring--but ecologically
simplistic--model for progressive change, whereas the dystopian cycles of life, death, and
time omnipresent in Lexx generate an ecologically nuanced--but dismally deterministic--
discourse of sustainability. As mutual critiques, these two series build a conversation that
foregrounds the need for a proactive faith that action can achieve desirable change, as
well as a cautionary awareness that maintaining ecological sustainability is both difficult
and vital. Intertextually, these shows open a dialogic space for the exploration of
sustainable change. Accordingly, in this chapter, I begin by examining the
anthropocentric evolutionary utopianism of Babylon 5 before turning to the ecocentric
dystopian alternative of Lexx.
"Get the Hell out of Our Galaxy! "
Utopian-Progressionist Evolution in Babylon 5
At the risk of being unoriginal, I have chosen the same title quotation as Thomas
Marcinko in his comparison of the genre of the American western to Babylon 5. Original
or not, the quotation is too apt to omit in seven words, it sums up why Babylon 5 is
ecologically problematic. In the scene this line is excerpted from, the show's protagonist,
Captain John Sheridan (Bruce Boxleitner), and his ally and later wife, Deleon (Mira
Furlan), have just deployed philosophy rather than military might to win the Shadow
War, defeating the ancient races called the Shadows and Vorlons. They have
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demonstrated that they no longer need the guidance of these "First Ones." Because the
younger races have achieved their own species adulthood, the galaxy is now "theirs."
The ideology underlying Sheridan's claim to "ownership" of the galaxy shares the
common progressionist assumption that species of great evolutionary advancement have
the right and responsibility to manipulate their environment as they deem appropriate,
with the implication that such manipulation is not ecologically problematic. Like Shaw's
Creative Evolution, Babylon 5's evolutionary discourse decouples evolution from
ecological relationality, stressing, instead, inherent evolutionary potential and strength of
will as prime forces driving advancement. But while Shaw warns that Life Force may
exterminate our inadequate species, Babylon 5 presents humanity as a species destined
for evolutionary greatness. To emphasize the superiority of humanity, the show employs
a rhetoric in which the discourse that extols humanity is figured as "right," all others as
"wrong." Though the series's lionization of personal agency supports a proactive faith in
the possibility of positive change, its combination of ecological deemphasis,
anthropocentrism, and a rejection of dialogic critique supports an ideology that largely
disregards ecology, thus enabling a careless ecological praxis, prone to underestimating
both the complexity of ecological relations and their importance to human life. While the
series's discourse, therefore, laudably promotes hope for utopian change, it risks
endorsing ecologically irresponsible changes.
Set between the years 2258 and 2262, Babylon 5 is an epic Of war and political
intrigue, culminating in the establishment of an Interstellar Alliance among space-faring
species that marks the dawn of a new age in the social and evolutionary development of
these "younger races" toward a utopian future. The narrative is centered both physically
and thematically on the space station, Babylon 5, a hub of intercultural exchange
designed and operated by Humans 1 (In this chapter, I use Straczynski's capitalized
"Human" to designate the species as discussed on Babylon 5 and "human" to designate
our species in the "real world.") Throughout the last four of its five seasons, the series
focuses on the heroic figure of John Sheridan, a noble war veteran and tactical genius
who becomes Captain of Babylon 5 and later President of the newly formed Alliance.
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In this epic, Straczynski uses the series's sociopolitical events to illustrate his
vision of evolution. The Babylon 5 universe presents evolution as a process occurring
among different generations of species. One generation, called the "First Ones," is
comprised of a set of species millions of years more highly evolved than Humans. As if
in fulfillment of the dream of Shaw's Ancients, the First Ones are depicted as having
transcended the usual limits of physicality and, presumably, any need for bodily
participation in ecosystems. 2 Indeed, one species of First Ones, the Vorlons, explicitly
exists in a form of pure energy, using "encounter suits" as physical shells to facilitate
interactions with more materially bound species. Similarly, the generation called the
"younger races" has evolved at roughly the same time in roughly parallel ways to each
other. 3 These younger races include all the "humanoid" species on the show: Humans,
Minbari, Nams, and Centauri being the most prominent examples. 4 Still younger than
the younger races are the ones who will come after them. While not characters in the
drama, these youngest races are explicitly present in the show's evolutionary schema
Standing behind all these species is the figure of the "First One," Lorien (pronounced
"Lor-i-EN") (Wayne Alexander), who identifies himself as the first being in the universe
to attain "sentience."5 A quintessential sage, Lorien articulates the vision of evolution
endorsed by the narrative, most concisely in the passage I quote for my first epigraph, in
which he explains the ethics of evolutionary progression to the younger races: "This
[galaxy] is yours now, and you have an obligation to do as we [elder races] have done, to
teach the races that will follow you, and when your time comes, as ours has, to step aside
and allow them to grow into their own destiny" ("Into the Fire" 4.6). Like Shaw, Wells,
and Octavia Butler, Straczynski orients his evolutionary paradigm around the metaphor
of reaching adulthood. It is the moral responsibility of the elder races to be "shepherds
for the younger races," as Delenn puts it, until the younger races are sufficiently mature
to govern themselves ("Into"). It then becomes the duty of the elder races to depart the
galaxy, leaving it to the government of their juniors, who, in time, will become the elders
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shepherding those still younger. Like Butler's Earthseed religion, this vision of
responsible evolutionary advancement empowers humanity to take active steps toward
constructing a brighter future.
But while this scenario promotes a positive sense of human agency, it does so by
reinscribing humanity as a privileged evolutionary "leader." Like Shavian and Wellsian
evolutionary ideology, Babylon 5's discourse is concerned with categorizing species
according to how "highly" they are evolved and how much evolutionary potential they
possess. All assume that "advanced" species have the right to manage their environment.
But whereas Wells and Shaw place almost no moral limits on this right, Straczynski does:
elder races must not excessively interfere with the development of the younger. Yet this
moral consideration extends only to those younger races undergoing the same type of
evolutionary progression as their elders. It would not, for instance, extend to sharks or
grasses. In short, "the galaxy" should be ruled by the races, including Humans, that can
best advance in it.
The ideology that underlies this discourse can be elucidated by Straczynski's
online Babylon 5 commentary. It is, of course, potentially problematic to use authorial
intent to explicate a text: Straczynski's stated view on evolution, for example, is not
necessarily equivalent to the view enacted in Babylon 5. But in this case, the series
closely reflects its creator's philosophy. Few television writers have claimed the kind of
creative authority that Straczynski has maintained over Babylon 5. Indeed, by writing
every episode of Babylon 5's third season, Straczynski became the first to write an entire
season of an American TV program (Wexelbla.t 212). 6 He is also unusual among
television writers in his online accessibility to his fans, whose questions he has routinely
answered via Usenet posts. In analyzing Straczynski's online presence, Alan Wexelblat
notes, "Recovering authorial intent is the most prevalent activity in the Babylon 5 online
community" (212). Since Straczynski has been forthcoming in voicing his intent, and
since his intent has become a significant part of viewer reception of Babylon 5, it seems
reasonable to incorporate it into this analysis.
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Since Babylon S itself addresses the future of Human evolution and not its past,
Straczynski's online posts prove particularly useful in relating the evolutionary discourse
of Babylon 5 to a broader discourse of "real world" human evolution. Babylon 5 seldom
comments on species outside of Straczynski's continuum of evolutionary progress;
however, this does not indicate that Straczynski himself lacks ecological awareness.
Educated in a scientific tradition that has discredited Neo-Lamarckian evolution,
Straczynski, like Wells (and unlike Shaw), conceives of evolution as a process driven by
environmental pressures. When questioned online about the plausibility of numerous
"humanoid" species evolving independently, for example, Straczynski replied with an
appeal to parallel evolution based on ecological relationality:
From an evolutionary standpoint, you want your sensors at the highest part
of your body, to look for prey or predator; you want your mouth that high
as well, to eat leaves if need be. To run from predators or after prey you
need good legs, at least two; four can be hard to get through narrow areas,
and tends [sic] to deprive one of two limbs that could otherwise be used
for tools and the evolution of the opposable thumb required for
technology. [The humanoid body] seems a very sensible arrangement
across the board for an advanced species. (Straczynski, "Parallel")
Whether or not Straczynski's explanation of humanoid evolution would be convincing to
an evolutionary biologist, conceptually his scenario is ecological: concerned with how a
species interacts with its ecological partners, including its predators and prey. Yet while
Straczynski's discussions of evolution show an awareness of the importance of
environmental pressures, they generally do not engage with natural selection per se. 7 In
the passage above, either natural selection or the acquirement of characteristics could
account for the evolutionary path he outlines. Traits like high sensory organs and long
legs could be selected for because they confer a survival value: they help an individual to
flee predators and catch prey. They could also be acquired by Lamarckian use, since
searching and running would be habitual activities necessary to survival. Because
Straczynski's discourse tends not to address evolutionary mechanisms, it could be used to
endorse either natural selection or the Lamarckian acquirement of characteristics, both
mechanisms ultimately driven by environmental pressures.
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In the evolutionary discourse of Babylon 5 itself, however, the amenability of
Straczynski's broader discourse to a belief in the acquirement of characteristics enables
the introduction of a Neo-Lamarcldan bent that deemphasizes environmental pressures.
At least among more advanced species, evolution appears to be driven not only by the
environment but also by some sort of inner impetus to progress. Indeed, the fact that this
impetus functions within numerous species to produce analogous advancements suggests
an agency much like Shaw's Life Force, which derives less from individual will than a
universal Will. This sense of a universal, spiritual connection among all life forms is
articulated in the religion of the Minbari, a species the series generally identifies with
spiritual wisdom. As the Minbari ambassador, Delerm, explains, "We believe that the
universe itself is conscious in a way that we can never truly understand. It is engaged in
a search for meaning, so it breaks itself apart, investing its own consciousness in every
form of life. We are the universe trying to understand itself' ("Passing through
Gethsemane" 3.5). This sense, reminiscent of Hegel and Bergson, that the consciousness
of living beings manifests a drive to attain a higher universal consciousness reinforces the
importance of evolutionary progress, defined mainly as mental or spiritual progress. The
universe itself, thus, drives evolution by demanding advancement toward higher
consciousness. By the same token, the universe promotes utopia, pushing species toward
a deeper understanding of themselves and their surroundings that will ultimately lead
toward a more just and fulfilling way of life.
The Unitary Language of Evolution in Babylon 5 
Much of the series enacts this utopian, evolutionary progress. In the epoch during
which Babylon 5 takes place, most of the First Ones have already departed the galaxy. A
few races, however, have stayed behind, most notably two old opponents, the Vorlons
and the Shadows. Early in the series, the Vorlons are presented as mystical voices of
cryptic wisdom, the Shadows as near-invincible destroyers bent on merciless
annihilation. As the series proceeds, these characterizations are problematized_ We
discover that both the Vorlons and the Shadows regard themselves as guides for the
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younger races and take this duty seriously. Their ideologies, however, are diametrically
opposed. The Vorlons favor advancement through "order and obedience," casting
themselves as the watchful parents overseeing the progress of their children's interstellar
civilization ("Into"). The Shadows' philosophy, in contrast, is reminiscent of a Shavian
satire on Neo-Darwinism: the Shadows believe in advancement through "chaos and
evolution" ("Into"). Indeed, their adherence to the mechanism of the survival of the
fittest is so extreme that they view it as their duty to launch an interstellar war every
thousand years to weed out the weak races and leave the strong ones stronger. For
millennia, the Vorlons and Shadows have kept an uneasy truce. While the Shadows leave
the Vorlons free to indoctrinate the younger races, the Vorlons agree not to interfere in
the Shadows' periodic mayhem. By the present crucial moment in evolutionary history,
however, their truce has frayed. Unable to tolerate the Shadows' warfare, the Vorlons
ultimately enter the Shadow War themselves, prepared to kill off the younger races rather
than let Shadow "chaos" determine their future.
Thus, the younger races find themselves caught between two immensely superior
fighting forces, both bent on the younger races' near total destruction--all for their own
evolutionary good. In "Into the Fire" (4.6), however, Sheridan and Delenn, rhetorically
supported by Lorien, convince the First Ones that this destruction does not help the
younger races. This discursive confrontation occurs in a state of being that Lorien
describes as "elsewhere." In this "elsewhere," Sheridan debates with the Vorlons, while,
in a separate "space," Delenn debates with the Shadows. Delenn observes that the
Vorlons and Shadows have both "lost [their] way." What was once a genuine wish to
guide the younger races is now mere ideological one-upmanship. But the reification of
their respective philosophies is not the Vorlons' and Shadows' only error. Their more
fundamental error has been to remain in the galaxy after most of the other First Ones
have left. They are attempting to "parent" already grown species that have, in fact,
philosophically transcended their parents.
Within the evolutionary scenario of Babylon 5, this philosophical degeneration of
the elder races is a peculiar move: the Shadows and Vorlons are, after all, millions of
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years more "advanced" than the younger races, yet Sheridan and Delenn handily out-
argue them. Reason, the narrative suggests, and not military might, earns the younger
races their victory. But Sheridan and Delenn's victory is no great philosophical triumph,
for neither the Shadows nor the Vorlons voice any substantive philosophy for Sheridan
and Delenn to address. The Shadows' attempts to justify their guided Social Darwinism
are woefully inadequate. They argue merely that war will select for the strongest, a
contention that simplistically equates advancement with the ability to "win" in violent
struggles. The Shadows do not address the possibility that the winners may simply be the
best fighters, not the best people. One could argue, however, from a Shadow perspective,
that victory in this type of war requires all the characteristics one would want in an
"advanced" species, including not only a strong survival drive and the ability to master
advanced technology, but also strategic intelligence, an ability to cooperate, and a
sophisticated social structure. But though the Shadows' position could be developed in
such provocative ways, the narrative does not do this. Instead, it reduces the Shadows to
the peremptory assertion that "Where is only chaos and evolution," followed by a claim
of absolute authority over the younger races: "You will fight because we tell you to
fight." Delenn, unsurprisingly, does not find this argument compelling. With even less
attempt at philosophical discussion, the Vorlons state only that their goal is "to destroy
the darkness" (i.e. the chaotic power of the Shadows). Echoing the rhetoric of the
Shadows, they assert, "There is only order and obedience," and command Sheridan, as a
representative of the younger races, to "do as you are told." Like Delenn, Sheridan is not
swayed.
The structure of the respective.Vorlon and Shadow debates is closely parallel,
with rapid intercutting between the two scenes emphasizing the philosophical kinship
between the Shadows and Vorlons. Though each race perceives the other as its
ideological antithesis, in fact, both have become dogmatic tyrants, incapable of
reasonably defending their views. Likewise, this intercutting illustrates Sheridan's and
Delenn's similar understandings of these First Ones. No sooner does Delenn tell the
Shadows, "This is about you being right," than the scene shifts to Sheridan proclaiming
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to the Vorlons, "You're trying to force us to decide which of you is right," indicating the
parallel insights of our two heroes. Sheridan--the protagonist--then becomes the first to
voice the crucial revelation of the Shadow War: "But what if the right choice is not to
choose at all?" Cut to Delenn: "What if we reject the idea that we must decide which of
you is right?" Thus, both Sheridan and Delenn independently and simultaneously
determine that both the Shadows and Vorlons are wrong and must be rejected. The
separateness of their reasoning processes underscores the narrative's endorsement of their
insight: if two good minds independently reach the same conclusion, that conclusion is
probably correct. It is at this point that the Shadows and Vorlons simultaneously
abandon all pretext of persuasion and each demand unflagging allegiance. Sheridan and
Delenn are so plainly in the right that the First Ones can contest them only by resorting to
infantile threats. The discursive feebleness of the Vorlons and Shadows is further
stressed by the Shadows' horror at the realization that Lorien has allowed the younger
races to witness this debate: "You've let them see. You've let them know," they accuse
Delenn, apparently considering her complicit with Lorien. The First Ones have defended
themselves so lamely that the public's very access to the debate seals their defeat.
In fact, the positions of the Shadows and Vorlons are so indefensible that
Sheridan and Delenn need no great wisdom to defeat them. It is hardly a revolutionary
insight that there may be some compromise between order and chaos or that authorities
that demand total obedience without justification do not deserve it. But the narrative is so
concerned with presenting Sheridan and Delenn as unassailably "right" that it depicts
their "highly evolved" adversaries as mental infants. By enabling our heroes to win a
philosophical victory without ever engaging in anything more than the most superficial
discussion, this move displays the series's resistance to genuine dialogic discourse.
Instead of fostering productive debate, the narrative finalizes its endorsement of
Sheridan and Delenn's position by stamping it with the approval of Lorien. When
Sheridan contends, "We've learned how to stand on our own," Lorien echoes, "This
[galaxy] belongs to the younger races now. They have learned bow to stand on their
own." This rhetorical use of Lorien validates our heroes' thinking by appealing to
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timeless authority: the First One, perhaps the oldest and wisest intelligence in the
universe, sides so unreservedly with Sheridan and Delenn that he reiterates not only
Sheridan's ideas but his exact wording. The correctness of Sheridan and Delenn is
presented as so obvious that there is no discursive space for interrogating such crucial
issues as the disturbingly imperialist overtones of Sheridan's claim to ownership of the
galaxy. Because this discourse is never required to address subtle questions, it never
transcends superficiality.
It might be argued that the medium of network TV demands a certain
superficiality in philosophical discourse because discursive complexity would confuse or
bore the casual viewers essential to maintaining high ratings. Indeed, this was the
explicit reason behind the radical simplification of storylines in the TV space opera
Andromeda, which replaced its original executive producer, Robert Hewitt Wolfe, in
order to pursue simpler plots. As the show's starring actor and co-executive producer,
Kevin Sorbo, explained in Cult Times Magazine, "Robert is a genius, but was developing
stories that were too complicated and too clever for the rest of us to understand [. . . .]
That simple `turn-up-tune-in' attitude was what was missing" (qtd. in Sparborth). But
while it is true that the medium of television imposes limits on discursive depth, such a
production-level explanation for the simplistic philosophizing that concludes the Shadow
War is inadequate. For while dialogism is rejected in Babylon 5's evolutionary
discourse, it is embraced in the series's major secondary plot line involving two of the
younger races, the Centauri and the Narn. Though it is clear that the Centauri's brutal
occupation of Nam home world is indefensible, within this macrocosm, both sides are
guilty of atrocities, both cultures rich with redeeming virtues. The dialogic dimension of
the conflict is most dramatically enacted in the tempestuous relationship between the
Centauri ambassador, Londo Mollari (Peter Jurasik), and the Narn ambassador, G'Kar
(Andreas Katsulas). Diametrically opposed politically and sometimes mortal enemies,
these two men, nonetheless, have much in common: both are politically astute, patriotic,
witty, courageous, and ultimately moral (although both--principally Londo—commit
many immoral acts). Their continual sparring builds the most subtle and sophisticated
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socio-cultural commentary in the series and, indeed, one of the most sophisticated in TV
space opera. The privileging of Sheridan and Delenn as the voices of wisdom, then, is
not merely a TV convention but an ideological rejection of potential dialogic challenge to
its evolutionary progressionist, message.
This refusal of dialogic critique persists as the series explores the next stage of the
younger races' evolution, an evolutionary progress presented in the finale of the fourth
season, "The Deconstruction of Falling Stars" (4.22), which examines the course of
Human evolution up to a million years past the ending of Babylon 5. Preceded by an
episode entitled "Rising Stars" (4.21), which emphasizes the triumph of Sheridan and
Delenn in founding the Interstellar Alliance, "The Deconstruction of Falling Stars"
begins with the tribulations that will plague the reputations of its founders. Far from
representing genuine interrogation of Sheridan and Delenn, however, these criticisms are
coded as ignorant and invalid, thus reinforcing the narrative's commitment to its heroes'
excellence. One hundred years after the founding of the Alliance, "experts" argue that
Sheridan and Delenn's contribution to the "Hundred Year Peace" has been grossly
exaggerated. Self-important and disdainful, these commentators vacuously proclaim our
heroes' inconsequence with such assertions as: "They didn't do; they allowed others to
do" and "They actually didn't do anything." Such absolute language, by itself makes
these claims indefensible. Even if Sheridan's historical importance were exaggerated, as
Captain of Babylon 5, he could not have "done nothing" with regard to events centered
on the station. This pedantic idiocy is finally challenged by an aged Delenn. Clad in a
white robe and bearing a staff, with the awesomeness of an Old Testament prophet, she
strikes the ignoramuses dumb, accusing, "You do not wish to know anything. You wish
only to speak. That which you know, you ignore because it is inconvenient That which
you do not know, you invent [. .1" ("Deconstruction"). Certainly, this condemnation is
deserved. Yet Delenn's words might be applied to the discourse of the series itself The
narrative's very refusal to allow these commentators to pose legitimate questions
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"ignores" any "inconvenient" implications in the discourse--such the imperialistic
overtones of claiming ownership of the galaxy--thus "inventing" the legend of a Sheridan
and Delenn who are indisputably correct.
The episode proceeds to expand upon this legend. As history unfolds, it seems
that the legacy of the Alliance will be lost. By 2762, Earth, once one of the central
planets in the Alliance, is reneging on its interstellar commitments and turning its
attention to a looming civil war that will come to be known as the Great Burn. By 3262,
the Great Burn has devastated Earth's biosphere and reduced its Human population to a
pre-industrial level of technology; on Earth, the Alliance is no more than a distant
memory. But none of these historical crises can thwart the broader evolutionary sweep of
Human progress. Near the end of the episode, we see a man in Human form awaiting the
artificially induced nova that will consume the Earth. 8 Speaking to a computer screen on
which he has been watching records of human history, he explains, "Our job is finished
[....] This is how the world ends, swallowed in fire but not in darkness [. . We
created the world we think you would have wished for us, and now we leave the cradle
for the last time" ("Deconstruction"). With these words, the man's Human shape
dissolves into a bright mass of energy, which enters into an encounter suit reminiscent of
those the Vorlons once wore in their interactions with the younger races. We, then, see
the man's ship departing through a hyperspace jump point This future-Human's speech
encapsulates the evolutionary path of Humanity. As indicated by the man's Vorlon-like
energy form, the future-Humans have fulfilled their evolutionary potential to become
"First Ones." With the nova of the sun, the Earth—the world—is ending, but it will not be
swallowed in "darkness" because the children who have left its "cradle" persist to carry
its legacy out into the broader universe. The future-Human's address to the history
played out on his computer screen highlights the evolutionary sweep of Humanity's
progress. The labor of all prior epochs has built Humanity into the superhuman species it
has become. The "you," the future-Human addresses includes Sheridan and Delenn, and
the other major figures on Babylon 5 who helped forge the Alliance, and by extension, all
the people who have contributed across history to Human progress. The episode ends
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with the printed words "faith manages," an articulation of the show's commitment to the
possibility of a utopian future despite the inevitability of catastrophes on the way to the
achievement.
The utopian message is inspiring, not least because it foregrounds the difficulty of
forging a better future: Straczynski accepts that "Great Burns" will occur; nonetheless,
Human fortitude will triumph in the end. Yet for all its productive tension between
utopian aspirations and historical crises, this glowing Human future resists dialogic
interrogation. The future-Human is alone when he apostrophizes his forebears; there is
literally no one present to question anything he says. Online, Straczynski has said of this
scene, "By this point, [the future-Humans} were in the position of the Vorlons, and now
have to take their (our) place guiding the younger races, the next wave, while not getting
in the way and remembering the lesson of the shadow/vorlon [sic] conflict" ("Sol").
Straczynski sets this scene at the optimal moment for reinforcing the evolutionary
excellence of Humanity, when Humanity is just embarking upon the task of guiding its
juniors. Those races younger than Humans are not yet evolved enough to question their
elders as Sheridan and Delenn question the Shadows and Vorlons. This is a Humanity at
center stage: the glorious leader, not the outmoded parent who must let the children fly on
their own. This is a Humanity whose words must be taken as truth because no
challenging voice exists. Whereas we meet the Shadows and Vorlons at the end of their
useful careers in this galaxy, we meet future-Humanity in its prime. Yet the Humanity
represented here is not simply in its prime; it is better than those precursors. Straczynski
announces that Humans will not make the same mistakes as the Vorlons (and, by
implication, the Shadows), the final effect being the revelation of a glorious Human
future in which all historical crises and Human folly will ultimately be transcended.
Imperialism and Anthropocentrism in Babylon 5's Evolutionary Discourse
'The unitary language that validates the wisdom of the future-Humans similarly
supports anthropocentrism throughout the series: Humans have a uniquely great destiny.
Yet it would be simplistic to read Humanity's ultimate triumph in Babylon 5 as nothing
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more than a literal extrapolation into the grand evolutionary future of humanity in the real
world. Indeed, Straczynski describes his evolutionary scenario more as a metaphor than
as extrapolation, explaining in an online post:
Very early on, John Copeland [producer of Babylon 5] asked me, "Okay,
bottom line it for me, what's the [Shadow] war about?" I said, "It's about
killing your parents." And his eyes went wide, and I explained, "No, not
literally. . . but at some point you have to step outside the control of your
parents and create your own life, your own destiny. That process is
inevitable. . . and if there are indeed older races, and they're interfering,
that puts them smack in the middle of that same process." ("ITF"; ellipses
Straczynski's)
"Killing your parents," here, can refer to the self-assertion of children seeking autonomy
from their parents. But this literal growing up is also analogous to other processes. If
there were interfering elder species like Shadows and Vorlons, for example, then the
junior species interfered with would, likewise, have to mature and attain autonomy. Even
without the literal presence of "advanced aliens," the Shadow War can represent human
advancement beyond previous physical and mental limitations. On this level, the
narrative can refer to literal evolution without advocating one particular evolutionary
scenario. In Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson articulates this possibility: "Of course,
the evolution of the organic world cannot be predetermined as a whole [. . .] But this
indetermination cannot be complete; it must leave a certain part to determination," one
aspect of this "determination" being the vital impetus to evolve (86). Straczynski's
extrapolations should not be read as a precise formula for humanity's future. Yet the
basic idea that humanity can biologically progress toward a higher intellectual and
spiritual awareness can be read literally. Between the microcosm of children leaving
home and the macrocosm of human evolution lie such analogous processes as cultural
evolution: the overturning of traditions that are no longer efficacious in a changing world,
for example. The Shadow War represents all of these movements. They are all
examples, Straczynski states, of the "same process." Not "similar," but the "same."
Straczynski's discourse, thus, does not discriminate among psychological, cultural, and
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evolutionary maturation. Each process is "inevitable," ontogenic: children grow up;
cultures progress; species evolve. In each case, there is a necessary, quasi-predetermined
advancement.
Moreover, on both cultural and biological levels, the narrative figures Humans as
a species with a unique potential for such high advancement, although this does not mean
that they alone will advance. The presence of Delenn—a Minbari—in the history outlined
in 'The Deconstruction of Falling Stars" implies that others among the "younger races"
have followed the same evolutionary path as Humans. Indeed, the evolutionary schema
of Babylon 5, which posits parallel evolution, suggests that Humans will not be the only
race of new "First Ones," and Straczynski has even stated online that "Wile Minbari
eventually make it [to First-One status]" ("Future"). But if Humans are not alone among
the new First Ones, "The Deconstruction of Falling Stars," nonetheless, focuses on the
evolution of Humans and the fate of Earth. There might be many reasons for this
narrative choice, not least of which is the marketing consideration that a human audience
is likely to be most invested in the future of its own species.
Yet this Human focus also exemplifies the anthropocentrism implicit throughout
the series. In fact, the show reflects two distinct kinds of anthropocentrism, a "literal"
variety referring to the "real world" view that considers humans of greater importance
than other life forms or systems on Earth, and a "metaphorical" anthropocentrism,
describing a narrative position that privileges Humans over other "sentient" species in the
Babylon 5 universe, such as the Minbari, Centauri, and Nam. This second category is
"metaphorical" insofar as it does not literally signify species superiority but rather
cultural superiority: it is "anthropocentrism" standing for ethnocentrism. In television
space operas, "species" difference often represents human cultural difference. 9 In the
Star Trek universe, for example, the silicon-consuming blob called the Horta stands for a
different species--a truly non-human life form; Vulcans, Klingons, and Romulans stand
for different cultures--peoples with strange, alien customs. Similarly, in the Babylon 5
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universe, the Vorlons may represent a genuinely different species or the outline of a
possible future for the human species. The "humanoid" races, however, are basically
humans with foreign languages, religions, social structures, and so on.
This, of course, raises the question: foreign to whom? The obvious answer for an
American television show is "foreign to mainstream America." There is no question that
the Human characters in Babylon 5 subscribe to contemporary Western values, esteeming
freedom, democracy, sexual and racial equality, religious tolerance, monogamy,
marriage, and nuclear families. Additionally, Marcinko argues that the show is
particularly American in its similarity to the genre of the western. Invoking Michael
Wilmington's discussion of the western hero, Marcinko characterizes Sheridan and his
predecessor, Season One's protagonist, Jeffrey Sinclair (Michael O'Hare) as "variations
of the [western's] theme of 'an outsider or principled loner face to face with outlaws or
sadists, prodded into the final showdown'" (60). Marcinko also sees a similarity between
the western's depiction of "evil" as a purely human problem and Babylon 5's final
struggle against the corruption of Earth's government. The Shadows and Vorlons having
been dealt with, we discover that "[t]he real villains are human beings" (Marcinko 60).
There is, moreover, a distinctly expansionist, American ring to Sheridan's Kirk-like
avowal that he is drawn to space because it is "a new frontier" ("And Now for a Word"
2.14). Alien races, in contrast, embody characteristics that are not typically American.
The Centauri are governed by an entrenched aristocracy; the Minbari divide their citizens
into different castes; Nam warriors carry swords and follow a strict warrior's code of
honor. All these characteristics recall human cultures: pre-Revolutionary France,
traditional Hinduism, and samurai bushido, for example. But these are traits of cultures
that America--and much of the contemporary Western world--marks as other.
But not only does the show "other" these alien cultures; it also depicts them as
inferior to Humanity (as loosely represented by American culture), at least in some
respects. The Centauri, for example, being exploitative, monarchical, patriarchal
imperialists, are depicted as culturally inferior to nearly everyone. More surprising is that
the Minbari are presented as inferior to Humans, even though they are typically regarded
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as the most advanced of the younger races. The Minbari are, indeed, an impressive
people. Technologically, they have begun to master the Vorlons' capabilities.
Historically, they are far better informed than any other younger race, having already
survived the Shadow War of one thousand years before. In hand-to-hand combat, their
warriors are almost undefeatable. Culturally, they are sophisticated in their art and
peaceful in their relations: murder within the Minbari species is practically unthinkable.
Yet the Minbari have their weaknesses, notably cultural inertia. Their rigid caste system,
for example, imposes rivalries and injustices, and the Minbari's faith in their own
wisdom often renders them deaf to reasonable arguments for change. They also tend
toward isolationism. This is the crucial point where Humans supersede them and, indeed,
supersede all the younger races.
In a Season Two interview with a Human journalist, Delenn praises Babylon 5 as
a unique meeting place for diverse races:
[N]o one else [besides Humans] would ever build a place like this.
Humans share one unique quality. They build communities. If the Narns
or the Centauri or any other race built a station like this, it would be used
only by their own people. But everywhere Humans go, they create
communities out of diverse and sometimes hostile populations. It is a
great gift and a terrible responsibility, one that cannot be abandoned.
("And Now for a Word")
There is a political agenda behind Delenn's encomium. As Earth becomes disgruntled
with the expense of Babylon 5, Delenn seizes an opportunity to stress the station's value
to its owners in terms that are calculated to flatter them. Yet while she speaks with
political savvy, she, nonetheless, voices a position that the narrative presents as truth.
Her very dedication to preserving Babylon 5 suggests that there is no other interstellar
meeting place to fill its function. Indeed, the series repeatedly emphasizes that Babylon 5
is uniquely cosmopolitan. Deleon, moreover, is a voice of wisdom throughout the series:
her sociopolitical judgments are rarely incorrect, her sense of morality intense and
sophisticated. And while Delenn herself has a personal attachment to Humans–she
undergoes a genetic transformation to become half Human and eventually marries a
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Human--her primary loyalty to the Minban lends further credibility to her praise for
Humanity: the Minbari ambassador would probably not characterize Humanity as
superseding her own people unless she found an important truth in her words.10
Yet the structure of the Babylon 5 narrative calls Delenn's statement into
question. Humans, we are told, are uniquely gifted in building communities. If
"Humans," here, evokes mainstream American culture, this statement recalls American
pluralism and multiculturalism. Yet, ironically, the narrative characterizes "Humans" as
building links between diverse cultures while it simultaneously "others" cultures that
differ notably from an American norm. Such a move is more hegemonic than
multicultural: uniting diverse peoples as long as they recognize that the unifiers' ways are
best. The "community building" ideal is undercut by a rhetoric that frames the "Human"
builders as apart from and--at least in some respects--superior to everybody else.
This hegemonic tendency is by no means unique to Babylon 5. Iver Neumann,
for instance, observes that "[i]n Star Trek, the identity of persons as well as worlds
revolves around the need to fit in with an already established social order epitomized by
the United Federation of Planets [. .]" (45). Naeem lnayatullah echoes Neumann: "My
enjoyment [of Star Trek: The Next Generation] is based on overlooking that [. . .] its
ideas serve to sustain the hegemony of an imperial culture" (60). Foucault scholar Clare
O'Farrell, under the internet pseudonym "Panopticon," goes further, suggesting that "all
of this [emphasis on human 'uniqueness' in American science fiction television] is
perhaps a thinly disguised reflection of the USA's current imperialist stance with regards
to cultures which are not American." While it seems clear that Straczynski did not intend
to endorse imperialism in Babylon 5, his discourse is, nonetheless, implicated in the
dominance-oriented ideologies that define much of American TV space opera.
In its emphasis on division and hierarchy, the "metaphorical" anthropocentrism
(ethnocentrism) of Human (American) superiority to the alien (foreign) is closely related
to the "literal" anthropocentrism of human superiority to the non-human. Both elevate a
particular group to the privileged status of possessing "a great gift and a terrible
responsibility" that implies a duty to guide the affairs of those less "gifted." While this
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sense of responsibility might serve as a basis for proactive personal, cultural, and species
agency, its implicit hierarchizing indicates an ideology fundamentally at odds with the
"heterarchical" modes of relationality that Patrick Murphy describes as essential to
combating the domination and exploitation of women, cultural "others," and the
environment (5). Certainly, Babylon 5 advocates such relational values as cooperation,
cultural diversity, and equal rights for all "sentient" beings: the great triumph of the
series, after all, is the Interstellar Alliance that unites diverse peoples. Yet the narrative
remains principally concerned with extolling good leadership. "The Deconstruction of
Falling Stars" suggests that Sheridan and Deleon are among the greatest leaders in the
evolutionary history of the younger races. In fact, in early Season Four, Sheridan literally
returns from the dead, assuming a quasi-messianic status that he retains for the rest of the
series. Just as Sheridan and Deleon are lauded as epic leaders, future-Humanity as a
whole is cast as the optimal "leader" of the less-advanced. The future-Human shown at
the end of "The Deconstruction of Falling Stars" is depicted as a wholly positive figure:
his Human appearance is stately and attractive, his energy form a pure brightness, his
words conveying respect, responsibility, and hope.
This lionization of Humanity's future implies that Humanity possesses a
particular greatness not found in other beings. Sheridan--a Human--is the founder of the
movement that will propel future-Humans to a status even more impressive than the
Vorlons'. Even the Minbari's major prophet, Valen, was originally a Human: Jeffrey
Sinclair, sent back in time to guide the Minbari. If Shaw's Creative Evolution stresses
that humanity may be superseded by another species, Straczynski's evolution suggests
that Humanity has a talent for superseding others. In the broad, evolutionary sense,
"Humanity" stands for all humans, not just one culture. And indeed, Straczynski's
commentary on human evolution echoes Babylon 5's illustrations of human superiority.
In an online post explaining the importance of risk-taking to human culture and
evolution, he writes, "What sets the human race apart from everything else is our
persistence, the stubborn, noble dignity that propelled Washington's men [. . .1 to refuse
to knuckle under, and to go on" ("JMS Genie"). Here, though Straczynski's example is
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quintessentially American, it is the entire "human race" that he "sets apart from
everything else" as categorically different from all other life forms. Moreover, he sets
humanity apart by asserting a unique area of human superiority: a "stubborn, noble
dignity" that no other type of being can match.
Another of Straczynski's online posts on human evolution exemplifies his
characterization of humanity as a uniquely privileged agency:
The best physical evidence indicates that we evolved ourselves up from
the ground, pulling ourselves up by our genetic bootstraps across a million
years of struggle, evolution and blood, surviving because we were smarter
than anything that was stronger than us. This, to me, is something to be
proud of; we did it ourselves, we weren't just created whole and complete,
all the work pre-assembled at the factory. We walked on the moon
because we earned it by growing smart, and learning--in however
inconsistent and fractured a way--to live and work together more often
than we fought with each other j. . .] ("JMS Question"; emphasis
Straczynski's)
Here, Straczynski casts evolution as a type of human self-construction: we should "be
proud" that "we evolved ourselves" by "pulling ourselves up by our genetic bootstraps."
If this is not emphatic enough, he repeats, "we did it ourselves," and stresses, "We
walked on the moon because we earned it." In this post, Straczynski is defending
evolution (against creationism) as an inspiring worldview, and this defense doubtless
underlies some of his rhetorical emphasis on the glories of evolution as human
achievement. Nonetheless, his pronouncement that evolution is something humanity
does by and for itself is as extreme an instance of the effacement of ecological
relationality as any encountered in Shaw's Creative Evolution. In Straczynski's depiction
of evolution, the idea that humanity not only acts but is also acted upon is almost
completely absent. Straczynski mentions overcoming creatures "stronger than us," but he
frames these creatures as vanquished adversaries, not evolutionary partners shaping the
human species. Straczynski's rhetoric grants the agency for evolutionary change solely
to humanity.
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The Resurgence of Non-Ecological Creative Evolution in Babylon 5
This agency is predicated on a non-disjunction between personal, cultural, and
biological evolution that is reminiscent of Shaw's. Just as Shaw believed that an
individual's activities, memories, and personal will could, through Life Force, affect
human evolution, so Straczynski constructs a scenario in which personal and cultural
advancement are causally linked to evolutionary advancement. After expelling the First
Ones from the galaxy, Sheridan remarks to Delenn that the younger races are now
responsible for all their own mistakes: "We can't blame anyone else from now on" ("Into
the Fire"). This cultural independence is figured as a step in biological evolution: the
sociopolitical expulsion of the First Ones has launched the younger races into the next
stage of their evolutionary journey toward becoming the new First Ones depicted in "The
Deconstruction of Falling Stars." Unlike Shaw's Life Force, however, Babylon 5's
evolutionary discourse posits no mechanism to connect these different types of progress.
If the science of evolution is a crucial concern in Back to Methuselah, it is not in
Babylon 5. It is not difficult, however, in the age of genetic engineering to imagine
technologies that would link cultural with biological evolution. Indeed, in creating this
link--even without direct reference to eugenic technologies--Babylon 5 embodies Bruno
Latour's hybridity, illustrating that natural and cultural formations are not ultimately
divisible. This openness to hybrids is potentially productive. But the discourse of
Babylon 5 loses much of this productivity by emphasizing "society" at the expense of
"nature." Indeed, apart from the fact that biological evolution alters organic bodies,
Babylon 5's evolutionary scenario invokes almost exclusively non-biological social
changes.
Like Shaw's Creative Evolution, Babylon 5's culturally driven evolution locates
the prime agency in the evolutionary process outside of the physical environment. For
Shaw, it is a matter of Will; for Straczynski, it is a matter of rising to the "terrible
responsibility" of being a mature, self-governing species. By describing evolution as a
matter of moral behavior rather than physical necessities, both discourses almost
completely efface the necessity of ecological relationality to the existence of human life,
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In both cases, human evolution--human existence--is ultimately contingent upon little
besides human behavior. While Shaw's discourse sometimes invokes other terrestrial
species as evolutionary potentials or dead ends, in Babylon 5's discourse, the vast
majority of organic life is absent. All life that is not destined to become "sentient," for
instance, is omitted from the cosmic genealogy of elder and younger races: this
presumably includes almost all plants, fungi, microorganisms, and the vast majority of
animals. If these life forms are not present in the discourse, then the ecological
relationships among them are, necessarily, not present either. In this respect, the
relationships outlined between the First Ones, the younger races, and the "galaxy" in the
Shadow War are reminiscent of the relationships between the British, the Americans, and
America outlined by The Declaration of Independence. The First Ones have become
tyrants. The younger races, therefore, have a right and a duty to sever ties to them and
claim the galaxy as a space of self-government. The ecology of the galaxy in Sheridan
and Delenn's discourse is no more present than a discussion of American agricultural
practices in The Declaration. In both discourses, the ecological underpinnings that allow
life to persist are assumed to be so stably and unalterably in place that they are not at
issue. Since there will always be air, water, food, there is no reason to talk about it.
Yet just as deforestation, pollution, erosion, and other environmental problems
serve as reminders of the inescapability of ecology in American society, so does the
ecological world intrude into the Babylon 5 narrative. Because Babylon 5 is fiction,
however, these ecological intrusions occur less as explicit problems than as gaps in the
text, points where ecological relationality is not plausibly addressed. "The
Deconstruction of Falling Stars" offers a minor example. One thousand years after the
time of Babylon 5, Earth has been plunged into a new dark age in which advanced
technology has been lost, the environment devastated. Wise, old Brother Alwyn (Roy
Brocksmith) remarks that during the Great Burn, "Itihey burned the earth and the air and
the cities and the sea," going on to explain that the world has scarcely recovered from this
catastrophe, even after five hundred years. The importance of the biosphere to Human
life seems plain here. Yet later in the episode, an off-hand comment from Alwyn
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highlights the superficiality of the show's engagement with ecological relationality.
Alwyn mentions that his compatriots are "assembling a working gasoline engine." In the
year 3262, more than a millennium after fossil fuels would have been exhausted on Earth,
it is difficult to imagine how these Earth-bound people could have access to gasoline.
Yet no reference is made to this difficulty. Though this engine itself is not important to
the plot of Babylon 5, the script's oversight is an apt illustration of the mindset that
underlies the series's sparse ecological discourse. Thus, the ideology of Babylon 5
expresses the distinctly American assumption of a perpetual surplus of natural resources:
build the engine, and the gasoline will be there.
A more prominent example of this deemphasis on ecology occurs in "And the
Rock Cried Out, No Hiding Place" (3.20), in which the Narn, G'Kar, returns to his home
world after it has been bombed by its Centauri colonizers. A fellow Narn describes the
effects of the bombing to G'Kar: "The wind never stops. They say it will take years for
all the particulate matter to drift down out of the sky and back into the ground. The days
and nights are colder. It never seems to feel warm anymore." Here, the narrative clearly
expresses an awareness that a major bombardment of a planet from space would have
long-lasting deleterious consequences. But these consequences are described merely in
terms of sensory perceptions: the planet feels cold and windy. As G'Kar listens to his
friend, he holds a handkerchief over his nose, suggesting that the dust is hard to breathe.
What is not addressed is the ecological catastrophe that would result from such an attack.
The dust cloud occasioned by the bombing would be akin to that associated with the
meteorite collision thought to have precipitated the extinction of the dinosaurs. But while
a disaster of this magnitude could be expected to threaten a mass extinction on Narn,
drastically altering its ecosystems and devastating its crop production, no one mentions
such repercussions.
This lack of concern for the ecological backbone that supports a civilization is
characteristic of the series in general: it devotes little time to explaining how space ships
are powered or agriculture managed or food distributed. At certain moments, these topics
are, indeed, alluded to: we find Sheridan reviewing oxygen consumption and recycling
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logs for the station, for instance ("And the Rock"). And the station's chief medical
officer, Dr. Franklin (Richard Biggs) notes that "living in a big tin can surrounded by a
vacuum" is far more precarious than living within a biosphere ("And Now"). But such
issues do not rise to prominence as areas of concern. The Shadow War, for example,
would almost certainly have destroyed agricultural resources supporting billions of
people, yet interstellar hunger is not a significant topic in the aftermath of the war.
The show's anthropocentric concern with illustrating humanity's unique greatness
militates against an ideological investment in ecological relationality. For if humanity
were presented as just one participant among innumerable interacting forces, it would not
stand out as categorically separate and superior. As Ursula K. Le Guin observes in "The
Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction," "[The Hero] needs a stage or a pedestal or a pinnacle.
You put him in a bag and he looks like rabbit, like a potato" (169). Babylon 5 constructs
its pedestal by endorsing a unitary language that presents the positions of its heroes as
beyond legitimate criticism. This resistance to dialogic communication is symptomatic
of an ideology that glorifies the leadership of select individuals or a select culture or
species while largely disregarding "lesser" life forms and the webs of ecological relation
in which they are integral participants. Such a disregard, in turn, indicates a problematic
model for ecological praxis. Just as the series itself is careless in its ecological
assumptions concerning a gasoline engine or the bombing of a planet, so would an
ecological praxis based on such an ideology tend toward carelessness in the management
of ecosystems. Ultimately, this carelessness undermines the series's otherwise
productive utopian call for personal, cultural, and species maturation through responsible,
proactive agency. If Babylon 5, however, does not substantially critique its own
rhetorical presentation of humanity's relationship to the non-human, it receives an
intertextual critique from the space opera, Lexx
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"It's Okay: Everything Dies"
Ecology as Living and Dying in Lexx
If, like many utopian texts, Babylon 5 establishes a unitary language of socio-
evolution, Lexx„ in keeping with its more dystopian theme, authorizes greater dialogism.
In chapter 1, I cite Michael J. McDowell's contention that a dialogic rhetoric is
particularly apt for discussions of ecology because both dialogism and ecology embody
relationality. It is not surprising, therefore, that as a strongly ecocentric text, Lexx tends
toward dialogic discourse. Admittedly, dialogic communication is not foregrounded in
Lexx; in fact, the series subordinates verbal communication, in general, to action and
special effects. But while verbal discussion is more prominent in Babylon 5 than Lexx,
the conversations Lexx presents are more consistently dialogic. In Lexx, there is no
moral leader, no infallible character or cause, and, therefore, no unitary language. For if
no one can be relied upon to be "correct," no reliably "correct" discourse can exist. Thus,
discourse in Lexx is always explicitly provisional, imperfect, subject to challenge. This
provisionality, in turn, enables a discursive complexity in which "good" people can be
mistaken and "villains" can make valid points. In such a rhetorical frame, no voice can
be dismissed. All exist together in a fundamental relationality that forms the core of the
series.
Ask a casual viewer of Lexx what the main theme of the series is, however, and
that person is likely to respond, "Sex," rather than, "Relationality." And with good
reason. The show is founded on a romantic triangle: Zev (Eva Habermann, spelled
"Xev" after Season Two's recast with Xenia Seeburg) is a scantily clad "love slave" with
an accelerated libido, who is in love with Kai (Michael McManus), who cannot
reciprocate because he is "dead," meaning that his body has been "de-carbonized" in a
way that renders him incapable of experiencing most human feeling. Xev is more than
willing to seek sexual solace elsewhere--almost anywhere, in fact--except with her other
traveling companion, the sexually frustrated Stanley Tweedle (Brian Downey), whom
she, like most other women, finds profoundly unattractive. Trite, certainly. But there is
more to Lexx than sexual cliche. Lexx is, indeed, about sex. It is also about death,
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specifically about "dead" Kai's quest to achieve his final, irrevocable death. Lexx is
about the crossroads between orgasmic intensity of feeling and feeling nothing at all. It
enacts the shadow of death that hangs over the struggle for life. As a dystopia, Lexx can
be dismal in its stress on degeneration and death as the inevitable end of all things. Yet
the series's crucial philosophical realization is that dying is the same as living. Deaths,
Lexx reminds us with ecosysternic awareness, make life possible. Thus, while Lexx is
not "about" ecology, ecological relationality fundamentally underlies its entire narrative
structure.
The Rejection ofHierarchy in Lexx
The creation of Canadian co-writers, Paul Donovan, Lex Gigeroff, and Jeff
Hirschfield, this Canadian-German co-production began as a series of four made-for-
television movies (collectively considered its first season) and subsequently ran as a TV
show for three years (Seasons Two through Four). The series details the adventures of
Xev, Stan, Kai, and lovelorn robot head, 790, aboard a living space ship, the Lexx, a
genetically engineered "Insect" and the single most powerful destructive force in the Two
Universes. Over the course of four thousand years of wandering (most spent in cryogenic
suspension), these vagabonds defeat the totalitarian Divine Order and, later, its surviving
representative, Mantrid (Dieter Laser), though not before Mantrid destroys the universe
called the Light Zone. Exiled to the remaining universe, the Dark Zone, the crew become
trapped in orbit around the planets Fire and Water, populated by the spirits of the dead,
before finally journeying to a contemporary Earth, the narrative's depiction of which is
rife with Canadian satire on American hegemony.
Similarly, as a show, Lexx defines itself against the "hegemony" of American TV
space opera: "We [writers of Lexx] just don't care about Star Trek these days," remarks
Donovan, commenting on Lexx's departure from the mainstream ("Lexx Appeal").
Produced by the small Canadian company, Salter Street Films, founded by Donovan and
his brother, Lexx has a creative freedom denied to Babylon 5, beholden to the corporate
interests of megaconglomerate, Warner ("Lexx Appeal"). Using this freedom to
236
systematically break established conventions of American science fiction TV, Lexx is
more "campy" than dramatic, more irreverent than moralizing. If Star Trek and Babylon
5 foreground human greatness, Lexx foregrounds human failings.11 Indeed, as Donovan
notes, human imperfection is foundational to the series: "[T]he certain knowledge that we
are a flawed species, fused with endless Monty Python and Star Trek episodes and
everything else I watched [as a teenager], resulted in Lexx. . I think" (qtd. in Gibson 36;
ellipsis original). The crew of the Lexx are morally ambiguous, often inept, and
frequently cause more harm than good, yet they are more admirable than most others they
encounter. In Lexx, any obviously "noble" character is soon killed off or exposed as evil.
Given the show's dark attitude toward humanity, it may seem curious that one of
the writers' humorous "rules" for the Lexx universe states, "There are no life forms more
intelligent than humans, unless and until such a life form does the requisite script
writing" (Lexx: Bible 24). 12 This pronouncement, enacted throughout the series, seems
to lend itself to an anthropocentric discourse: nothing can be better than humanity. This
"rule," however, is a set against the conventional space opera practice of using "advanced
aliens" to emphasize human greatness. Typically, such aliens either represent the grand
potential of human evolution (Vorlons, Shadows, Metrons, Organians) or enervated
species whose superiority to humans is illusory (Vorlons, Shadows, Taelons). Lexx's
rejection of any intellect beyond humanity's is part of its dystopian bleakness,'denying
the possibility of positive "advancement" But it is also part of the series's refusal to
hierarchize. No species is "above" humanity, but neither is humanity--itself an
unimpressive species--"above" all others. Instead, various types of beings stumble along
together in webs of conflicted, often brutal, but necessary relationality.
Lexx does not, however, resist all traces of anthropocentrism. Significantly, the
plot line most nearly replicating typical humanist assumptions of space opera is the one
that comes closest to invoking a "superior" alien species. Millennia before the series
begins, humanity warred with the Insects, beings which, if not more intelligent than
humans, were vastly more powerful. Humanity, nonetheless, defeated the Insects for the
conventional space-opera reason that, as Kai puts it, the humans showed more
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"resourcefulness" than their "methodical" adversaries ("End of the Universe" 2.20). The
Insects, whose malign influence survives for a time in the Divine Order, are motivated by
a single-minded drive to exterminate humanity. Indeed, Mantrid wishes to destroy a
universe purely to appease the hatred for humanity that he derives from his Insect aspect.
Offering no reason for this hatred, the show presents humans solely as innocent victims
of an irrational wrath. The defeat of the Insects, thus, recalls the space opera-trope of the
"superior" alien that is really "inferior" to a righteous humanity. In keeping with this
trope, it is the Loa's human crew who prevent Mantrid from destroying Dark Zone,
thereby saving an entire universe. This human triumph, however, is undercut by
Mantrid's successful destruction of the Light Zone, a devastation unwittingly enabled by
the Lexx crew, whose actions earlier in the series allowed Mantrid to absorb the Insect
essence that drives his destructive urges.
Despite such partial reinscriptions of space opera's conventional anthropocentric
hierarchizing, on balance, Lexx rejects such hierarchies. The crew of the Lexx have no
heroic leader. All three main characters are deeply flawed, psychologically marred by
the Divine Order. Stan, imprisoned, belittled, and abused for years, is craven and
insecure. Xev, raised "in a box" cut off from most human contact, is naive and
emotionally needy. Kai, enslaved for millennia to a power he "died" trying to fight, is
almost devoid of emotional affect. None of these characters fits the traditional paradigm
of the space opera protagonist, the heroic Captain Kirk or Captain Sheridan. Indeed,
Stan, the "captain of the Lexx," is the least heroic of his companions. Xev sometimes
rises to "heroic" action but is just as likely to be petty or foolish. Kai, the most
conventionally "heroic," persistently excludes himself from leadership decisions on the
grounds that he is dead. In the absence of a "hero," all three leads act as co-protagonists,
carrying roughly equal weight as participants in the drama. The narrative structure of
Lexx is based on the bumbling interactions of these fallible individuals rather than the
heroics of a noble leader. Thus, Lexx resists anthropocentrism by resisting not only the
idealization of humanity in particular, but also hierarchical paradigms in general.
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The Centrality of Ecological Relationality in Lexx
Instead the show emphasizes the web of interstellar ecological relations on which
the crew's existence depends. To the best of my knowledge, Lexx is unique in TV
science fiction in making the daily needs of organic life a major part of its narrative
content. The Lexx himself is an organic entity, who exists in a symbiotic relationship
with his crew that depends on the recycling of metabolic energy. 13 The Lexx excretes
water and what passes for food, while digesting the excrement of the humans. This
mutual caprophagy is, of course, the subject of much toilet humor, but it is also a
pragmatic means of energy conservation. Unfortunately—but realistically--the recycling
of bodily wastes provides only a fraction of the energy required for the Lexx to function.
To make up the difference, he must periodically eat other organic material. He prefers to
do this by blowing up planets and devouring any resulting organic debris, though he can
also obtain sustenance by consuming space debris or landing on planets and eating small
parts of them.
All of these practices raise moral considerations that the Lexx's crew sometimes
address. At several points in the series, for example, the crew are forced to choose
between allowing the Lexx to starve and become helpless--leaving them stranded and
defenseless in space (and starving themselves)--or letting him kill and consume a vast
quantity of organic material, often including humans. In fact, for most of Seasons Three
and Four, the Lexx remains almost incapable of movement, his only option for refueling
being to consume a large portion of an "inhabited" planet (i.e. a planet with human life),
a course his crew are reluctant to let him take. Nonetheless, during their Season Four
sojourn on Earth, they command him to bite a chunk out of the Amazon rain forest, and
at one point, Stan is prepared to let him eat Holland. Such decisions are not presented as
unimpeachable. Indeed, a persistent flaw in Stan's character is his willingness to
sacrifice the lives of many he does not know to save a few he does, a tendency for which
both Xev and Kai criticize him. The series seldom provides ideal moral solutions to the
problems its protagonists face. Instead, the crew discuss (or explicitly fail to discuss)
various options and muddle through with better or worse consequences.
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But while Lexx does not empower a unitary language in the way that Babylon 5
does, it does advocate certain overarching values. If there is a voice that articulates an
ethics for the series, it is Kai's. Kai repeatedly invokes two moral principles: one is
"nature," in the sense of "living in accord with one's nature"; the other is "balance." He
often appeals to what is "natural" to justify tolerance for life forms that would ordinarily
be considered inimical. In the fourth TV movie, "Giga Shadow" (L4), for example, Kai
allows a newly hatched Cluster Lizard to imprint on him as its "mother," even though
Cluster Lizards are aggressive, worm-like, brain-eating predators. The crew should
accept the little Lizard, Kai argues, because "[iIt's a baby, an innocent." It is not morally
culpable for its natural inclination to eat brains, though, as Zev observes, the crew may
have to kill it sooner or later for their safety. This eventuality does not arise, however.
Instead, in one of its more overtly moralizing plots, the narrative endorses Kai's choice:
the Cluster Lizard ultimately saves the lives of the entire crew--and perhaps much of the
Two Universes--by eating the brain of the Giga Shadow, a remnant of the destructive
Insect race. Kai's refusal to dismiss the Cluster Lizard as an inferior, a pest, or an enemy
enables the Lizard to fulfill a productive role in preventing the "unbalanced" devastation
of the Giga. Shadow. Kai's thought process illustrates a type of ecocentrism that accepts
the intrinsic right of all organisms to participate in ecological relationships.
Similarly, when the crew befriend Lyekka (Louise Wischermatm), a carnivorous
plant in the shape of a woman from Stan's dreams, they reconcile themselves to her
periodic consumption of human prey on the grounds that it is in her nature to eat living
flesh. In Lyekka's introductory episode ("Lyekka" 2.3), the plant woman devours a
crew of three astronauts who are guests aboard the Lexx. 14 After Kai has observed her
eat two of them, he warns Stan of her behavior. When Stan asks Kai if he is going to
protect the final astronaut, Moss (Stephen McHattie), Kai replies, "I have no motivation
to save Moss from Lyekka. Or Lyekka from Moss." Though he is prepared to defend
Stan apparently out of personal loyalty, Kai sees no moral reason to interfere in the
predator-prey relation between Lyekka and Moss. Lyekka must eat to survive, while
Moss to survive must avoid being eaten. While Stan expects Kai to protect Moss
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presumably because Moss is a human being, Kai acknowledges no inherent superiority in
the value of Moss's human life over Lyekka's plant life. Each has an equal right to try to
live according to his or her nature. Though Lyekka ultimately does eat Moss, the crew of
the Lexx find ways to coexist with her. Most of the time, she remains dormant in a
vegetative pod on the ship's bridge, awakening only when she is hungry. Having a
genuine fondness for Stan, she agrees not to eat him or Xev (she cannot digest Kai)
unless she is too hungry to stop herself. Because Lyekka displays this self-control, the
crew allow her to remain on board the Lexx. When she must feed, they do their best to
locate food for her so that she will not consume the crew.
The crew's interactions with Lyekka's species, however, are not always so
congenial. Though Lyekka herself dies protecting her companions at the end of Season
Two, the Lexx encounters her people again in Season Four, this time as an invading force
bent on eating all life on early twenty-first-century Earth. Whereas one plant person is a
dangerous predator whose appetite can, nonetheless, feasibly be sated, thousands of such
plant people become an intergalactic plague of locusts destroying all organic life on
planet after planet, leaving no possibility for that life to renew itself. As Kai explains,
"To consume other plants and animals is natural and normal, but to scour a planet of all
life [. 1 is unbalanced" ("ApocaLexx Now" 4.20). Despite the fact that there is little
love lost between the crew of the Lexx and planet Earth, the crew determine to rescue the
planet from the plant people.
They do not, however, initially assume the plants to be the "enemy." Instead,
they begin by reasoning with the new "Lyekka" who visits them as a representative of the
plants. Kai begins by reiterating his appeal to ecological balance:
KAI. Eating everything on the planet is unbalanced. What will you do
afterwards?
LYEKKA. Eat another tasty planet
[- -	 -]
KAI. And when the universe runs out of planets, Lyekka will starve to
death.
LYEKKA. This universe has lots of yummy planets. ("ApocaLexx Now")
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Lyekka's view is in keeping with traditional capitalist assumptions that resources will
always be available to accommodate growth--or that, if they will not be, their exhaustion
is so distant an event as to be functionally irrelevant. Her position, thus, explicitly
articulates the tacit assumption that underlies Brother Alvvyn's gasoline engine in
Babylon 5: in both cases, the discourse assumes a perpetual sufficiency of resources.
Kai, in contrast, appeals to the need for sustainable living. If the plants to do not
moderate their consumption of life forms to allow organic life the opportunity to
regenerate, they will be making food into a non-renewable resource, thereby destroying
the ecological base on which their own lives depend. Lyekka is, of course, correct that a
whole universe--at least as presented in Lexx--contains many planets harboring organic
life. The plants might, indeed, plausibly persist for many millennia, stripping planet after
planet of all life. Yet Kai's assessment of the plants' fate is ultimately valid. Even a
universe does not contain infinite resources.
The plants, however, do not accept the necessity of such long-term planning.
Swayed more by the crew's threats of retaliation than their case for sustainable predation,
the plants pretend to negotiate a deal: they will eat Japan and spare the rest of the Earth.
This compromise, though unfortunate for the Japanese, would save the plants from
starvation while allowing life on Earth to persist. It is only after the plants indicate that
they will not abide by this deal that the crew seriously discuss fighting them. Stan,
however, argues that Earth is not worth saving; it is, after all, a "type 13" planet
progressing rapidly toward self-annihilation. Rather than incur the plants' wrath, he
contends, the Lela should flee the area, leaving Earth to its fate. Xev counters,
conventionally, that they have a moral responsibility to protect the people on Earth. But
Stan, who has not been greeted warmly by most Earth people, is unsympathetic. Kai,
however, observes that more is at stake than Earth. In his view, "Lyekka [i.e. the plant
civilization] is a dangerous predator who will consume this entire universe unless she is
stopped" ("Lyekka vs. Japan" 4.23). Xev expands on Kai's reasoning, telling Stan, "We
can take [Lyekka] on now. We can take her on later. But we definitely have to take her
on sometime" ("Lyekka vs. Japan"). Both Xev and Kai remind Stan of the finite nature
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of the universe and its ecological resources. While the crew of the Lexx could avoid
battling Lyekka's people on Earth, they would only be postponing a confrontation over
resources that must occur sooner or later. In suggesting that they attack the plants on
Earth, Xev and Kai use the same reasoning that advocates switching to alternative energy
sources well before petroleum reserves are exhausted. If it must be done sooner or later,
why not sooner, with minimized damage? Though Stan is initially skeptical, Xev and
Kai's reasoning eventually convinces him to battle the plants. In the final episode of the
series, though they fail to save the Earth, the crew vanquish the plants at the cost of Kai's
"life.
While the plant crisis is a simple tale of the perils of overpredation, the series
investigates ecosystemic breakdown on a more complex level in its third TV movie,
"Eating Pattern" (1.3). A narrative thematically centered around patterns of eating, this
movie begins with the Lexx's need for food. The crew determine that the most
convenient and least destructive way to appease his hunger is to land on a waste disposal
planet and allow him to eat organic refuse. The crew soon discover, however, that this
planet, a remnant of a civilization destroyed by war, is reaching the critical stages of
ecosystemic collapse. During the war, the planet was seeded with a life form that had
been removed from its native habitat to be used as a biological weapon. This parasitic
queen organism creates drones that mimic human form and, by kissing a human, transmit
a satellite worm into the human's nervous system. The worm, then, invades the human's
brain, causing a ravening need to feed the satellite worm—which protrudes from the
host's neck--with a substance called "pattern," which is distilled from flesh. When the
worms consume sufficient pattern, the hosts are impelled to go to the queen's lair, where
the worms regurgitate the pattern, thus feeding the queen. But in this alien habitat, the
worms have had too few hosts to parasitize. By the time the crew of the Lexx arrive,
every human has been infected and every conventional source of food consumed so that
the humans must produce pattern by cutting off their own limbs as raw material for the
distillation process. Plainly, the population that feeds the queen (and, thus, the queen
herself) will not survive long under these circumstances.
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The queen is well aware of this. She communicates her understanding through a
drone named Wist (Doreen Jacobi), in the shape of an early human victim. Though Wist
represents a merciless predator, the brutal destruction she wreaks on the planet's human
inhabitants is an act of desperation more than free choice. Removed from her native
habitat, she has survived using the only means at her disposal. Just as the infected
humans are deranged with hunger for pattern, so Wist (and the queen she is a part of) is
on the point of starvation. The planet, which, she recalls, was once "delicious, plentiful,"
now "has no future." Nor has the queen herself. But the queen accepts that it is her time
to die: "It's okay," Wist tells Kai. "Everything dies. That's why we have daughters, so
life goes on after us." What matters is the survival not of the individual but of life itself.
Wist's sentiment is echoed by the leader Of the infected humans, Bog (Rutger Hauer),
who explains the Russian roulette-like game the humans engage in to determine who will
lose limbs and who will win pattern: "The point of the game is that there's always
another point The points become dots; the dots become a line; the line is part of a bigger
circle, the circle of life." Ultimately, the vicious game the humans play, like the
parasitism of the worms that drive them to it, is the last struggle of a failing ecosystem to
continue the "pattern" of life. This ecosystem, of course, cannot be salvaged, and, to
protect their own lives, the crew of the Lexx resist Wist and the queen's daughter (in the
form of a giant Wist), who is finally killed when the Lexx destroys the planet. But
though Wist must be destroyed for the Lexx crew's safety, she is not depicted as evil.
She is simply a predator. The moral wrong rests with the humans, many years before,
who infected the planet with a life form that its ecosystems could not support.
"Eating Pattern," thus, enacts the abjectness of life's final struggle to persist in the
absence of an adequate supporting system. Beyond this final struggle lies death. But
death, in Lexx, is not only represented as the unconscious, decomposing state of an
organism no longer living; it is also represented as a type of "life" stretched beyond its
normal limits, a consciousness and activity substantially disconnected from the
ecosystemic "circles" of life and death that perpetuate organic living. The show's prime
example of this living death is Kai.
Kai as Exemplar of Life and Death
A once-living human who has spent two thousand years as a "de-carbonized"
Divine Assassin, Kai is adamant throughout the series that he is "dead." This contention,
however, is not as incontrovertible as Kai presents it. Lexx expert and fan essayist, D. G.
Valdron, under the pseudonym, "Darrow," challenges Kai's assertion. 15 Playing on
Kai's stock phrase, "The dead do not feel" (or engage in a myriad other activities),
Darrow argues that "he's not dead. The dead do not make dry witty comments, the dead
do not do contortions to evade moral responsibility, the dead do not get up and walk
around. There is a long list of things that Kai does that the dead do not do" ("Living").
Indeed, Kai's claim to indisputable "deadness" is challenged not only by his broad range
of behaviors but also by the claims of other "dead" characters that they are alive. In
"Giga Shadow," for instance, the Insect essence of His Divine Shadow, ruler of the
Divine Order, invades the body of a reanimated human Cleric after His Shadow's own
physical form is destroyed. The Cleric, His Shadow asserts, is dead: "It is only I who am
alive." Similarly, the robot head, 790, whose only organic component is a fragment of
brain kept artificially "alive" by a substance similar to the protoblood that animates Kai,
is physically at least as "dead" as Kai is. Yet 790 enmeshes himself furiously in living
feelings, claiming to have "perfect human love" for Xev ("Norb" 2.12) and, later, for Kai.
More complex is the discourse of His Shadow's Chief Bio-Vizier, Mantrid, a
megalomaniacal being whose physical state is akin to "dead" Kai's. Both Kai and
Mantrid begin as humans and end as beings consisting of human, machine, and Insect
aspects.16 In "Norb," Kai asks, "Are you alive, Mantrid?" Mantrid answers, "I exist. Is
there any more to it?" and goes on to explain that his essence is contained in a machine.
When Kai asks if Mantrid is, therefore, a machine, Mantrid replies, "If you like. I
function_ And I know that I have purpose." Kai's questions--is Mantrid alive? is he a
machine?--indicate an investment in distinguishing life from death. For Mantrid, on the
other hand, what matters most is purposeful agency, be it defined as alive or dead. Yet
Mantrid, too, shows a need to classify his existence. After surviving an attack by Season
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Two's Lyekka, he proclaims, "I am alive" ("End of the Universe" 2.20). Kai, however,
does not accept this: later in the same episode, he remarks to Mantrid, "I know I am dead,
but you believe you are alive [. .1" (my emphasis), his contrast between "knowledge"
and mere "belief' rejecting Mantrid's claim to living status. But though Mantrid is not an
admirable character, his description of his self-conscious and purposeful state as "living"
seems as reasonable as Kai's professions of "deadness." The dialogic disagreement
between Kai and Mantrid indicates that Kai's discourse of "death" is not the only way to
interpret this state of being.
Darrow contends that Kai misunderstands his own state: "Kai is a sort of alive
that he does not understand or recognize, so he thinks it's death." ("Living"). The "dead"
Kai, Darrow argues, is essentially a fossil of the living Kai. Because this fossil lacks the
original's biochemical systems, be is physiologically incapable of feeling in a
recognizable way: "[Kai's] emotions feel distant and far away, faint, as if a person was
shouting at him from across an abyss. Without the amplified stereo system of carbon
based biochemistry, the emotions which arise naturally from cognitive function are
simply not amplified the way they would be for us" (Darrow, "Living"). For Kai, this
"distant shouting" of emotion would contrast so sharply with his memories of "living"
emotion that he might readily interpret it as no feeling, no life. Unquestionably, Kai is
telling the truth to an extent when he says he does not feel. In "Giga Shadow," when Zev
asks him how it feels to have killed his ancient adversary, His Divine Shadow, Kai
appears to genuinely grapple for an answer and find none: "I feel. . . I feel . . . I have no
feeling for it," he finally decides.
But while Darrow's analysis of Kai's physical state sheds light on why Kai
defines himself as dead, it does not fully account for his tenacity in clinging to this
definition. Indeed, much as Judith Butler speaks of "performing gender," we might say
that Kai "performs" death. And he does so with increasing scrupulousness as the series
progresses. While in Season One's "Giga Shadow," he attempts a serious analysis of his
feelings about the death of His Shadow, by Season Three, he is quick to assert to a
woman who accuses him of having feelings, "I am dead, and I do not feel anything.
Ever" ("K Town" 3.6). Over the course of the series, his affect flattens, and his dialogue
becomes more stereotyped, reiterating with increasingly frequency his catch phrase: "The
dead do not [do various things]." Although Kai's physical being bears a resemblance to
both a living and and a dead state, he systematically accentuates his deadness and
minimizes his living characteristics.
Kai's insistence on his deadness derives not only from his physically altered state
but also from his identity as a living person. We are obliquely introduced to the living
Kai through a musical reenactment of his life in the episode, "Brigadoom" (2.1.8).
Millennia before Xev and Stan's time, Kai was born into a human society called the
Brennen G. Like Shaw's Ancients, the Brunnen G long ago discovered how to halt the
aging process, with the result that, in Kai's time, only a handful of people, like Kai, are
their "natural age," born presumably to replace those Brunnen G who have died of
accidental causes. 17 But if Shaw's Ancients use functional immortality to attain ever
higher consciousness and understanding, the Brunnen G have not had similar success.
Unlike the Ancients, the Brunnen G's agelessness is a technical rather than an
evolutionary achievement. As "ordinary" human beings, the Brunnen G are not mentally
constituted for immortality. Instead, their long life provokes a fear of accidental death so
intense that most of them cower indoors, rejecting all hazardous activities. Moreover,
their brains appear overloaded with too many years of information: the elders among
them can scarcely remember who they are.
Along with a few other "newborns," Kai disdains the enervated society of his
elders, pining for the days when noble Brunnen G warriors defeated the Insects in the
Insect Wars. He attempts to revive this glorious past when his planet is threatened by the
Divine Order. When Kai alerts the Brunnen G to their danger, most are initially panic-
stricken but soon come to view their impending destruction as a welcome release from an
intolerable immortality. Only a few newborns, led by Kai, venture out to fight the Order,
knowing they will probably die. In fact, their entire civilization is obliterated. The last
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survivor, Kai is killed by his His Divine Shadow and reanimated as a mindless Divine
Assassin. After serving the Divine Order for two thousand years, Kai regains his
memories and joins forces with Stan and Xev to defeat the Order.
But though Kai regains his memories, he does not regain his organic body.
Indeed, the dead Kai contrasts starkly with his living self. While the dead Kai professes
to feel nothing, want nothing, and "not meddle in the affairs of the living" ("ApocaLexx
Now"), the living Kai is an emphatic participant in life. He likes balloons ("Lafftrak"
2.5) and fishing ("White Trash" 2.8) and is apparently so fond of making music that even
his dead self shows an interest in singing and playing the piano ("The Rock" 4.6). The
living Kai is involved in a tempestuous romance with a woman who, like most of the
Brunnen G, cannot appreciate the sense of adventure that urges him to explore beyond his
home planet. He is a leader, a spokesman for his fellow newborns, in the vanguard of the
Brunnen G's doomed assault against the Divine Order.
He defines himself and his activities against the stagnation of his ageless elders.
In the musical rendering of his life, so great is his contempt for the cowardice of his
elders that when they refuse to combat the Divine Order, he asserts, "We are the Brunnen
G; we deserve to die" ("Brigadoom"). He criticizes his people both for fearing to die and
for fearing to live. In both instances, his basic criticism is the same: the Brunnen G fear
to confront life. Whether they hide indoors to avoid catching a disease or wait passively
for the Divine Order's destruction to release them from their miserable longevity, they
refuse to participate in the actions that make life meaningful. Kai, conversely,
participates in life on many levels, accepting that these activities may lead to his death.
The basic premise that underlies his understanding of life is that living and dying are
inseparable. To be fully alive is to be willing to die in the course of experiencing life.
This basic philosophy survives unchanged in the dead Kai millennia later. In "The Key"
(3,8), the dead Kai invokes the cliched—but in this case highly significant—analogy
between orgasm and dying. Having experienced both, he states that while the sensations
are akin, dying is far more intense. Dying is, thus, the epitome of living: "The point of
death is the point of joy," Kai asserts ("The Key"), the moment of one's most passionate
participation in life, the antithesis of the Brunnen G elders' long living death.
Yet the series emphasizes that dying not only occurs at a single moment but is, in
a broader sense, a precondition of all living: all organic bodies degenerate toward death.
This degeneration ends in decomposition into basic nutrients, which are essential to the
furtherance of new life. In order for life to continue, things must die. In keeping with
Kai's analogy between life and sex, the living/dying must participate in the world around
them, not only for the experience of living but for the physical continuance of life itself.
Kai holds that the natural function of death is to provide for the living. In "Garden" (3.9),
he attempts to fulfill this role by allowing himself to be buried in a flower bed. Returning
to the earth, he explains to Xev, "is the natural way of all dead things." Actor Michael
McManus has stressed his belief in his character's dedication to this process, remarking
that if Kai had not had to disinter himself to rescue Stan and Xev, "I think he happily
would have stayed there [in the flower bed], seriously and very, very, very determinedly
trying to decompose there under the earth." Alive, Kai participated in life; dead, he is
still dedicated to doing so--in the way proper to dead things--by fertilizing the flowers.
Ironically, Kai's efforts fail: the flowers planted in the earth next to him soon shrivel and
die, apparently poisoned by his de-carbonized body.
Kai, who so often appeals to nature and balance, defines the processes of life in
terms of ecological relationality. He cannot, therefore, with moral integrity, define
himself as "alive" because he is not significantly an ecological participant. Of course, he
is not truly "dead" either: not unconscious, not decomposing. He is, in fact, involved in
one ecological relationship: to function, he requires protoblood, a by-product of Insect
metabolism. But since, by Season Two, the Insect race is extinct, protoblood is a non-
renewable resource, a remnant of an ecological link that will soon be severed, along with
Kai's conscious existence. Kai approaches this imminent oblivion with a certain relief,
as it signifies his attainment of a more truly dead state. Indeed, so much does Kai long
for a real death that in Season Four, he wagers Stan's and Xev's lives in a game of chess
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with the evil spirit Prince (Nigel Bennett) on the condition that, if Kai wins, Prince will
enable him definitively to die. Kai seeks death because he recognizes that if he is not
absolutely "dead," he is nearer dead than living. 18 Genuine death is part of life, the earth
in which life flourishes. Kai is excluded not just from living but from the entire cycle of
life. He cannot feel pain or pleasure; he cannot eat or excrete, save for processing his
protoblood. He cannot even fertilize the flowers. Like the Brunnen G elders he despised,
he has merely existed century after century, excluded from meaningful participation in
the processes that define living.
Living as Dying in Lexx
Kai's philosophy demands a moral rejection of this unlife. To him, such an
existence contributes nothing meaningful to the universe. Thus, Kai must assert
Mantrid's "deadness" as well as his own. To Kai, it is morally untenable for Mantrid to
define himself as alive while not participating in the cycles of life. Events of the series
support Kai's position; in fact, Mantrid shows more contempt for ecological relationality
than any other figure in Lexx. In Season Two, Mantrid attempts to use his self-
replicating robotic drones to transform everything in the Two Universes into Mantrid
drones. As Darrow observes, Mantrid's goal is "simply to replace all the matter in the
Universe[s] with himself [. .]" ("Mantrid"). Mantrid is the ultimate solipsist. He
literally sees no value in anything that is not Mantrid. Darrow remarks, "[Mantrid]
wanted to take everything and give nothing. At the center of his character was an empty
hunger, which in his new [post-human] existence was writ large" ("Mantrid"). What
Darrow describes as "an empty hunger" aptly fits Mantrid's compulsions. Mantrid
wishes to eat without being eaten, to live without dying. But this ambition, taken to its
extreme, reduces to nothing the consumption of everything to no end but consumption
itself. Kai notes the futility of this aim, challenging the Bio-Vizier, "And after destroying
all of humanity and converting an entire universe into Mantrid drones, then what do you
do, Mantrid?" ("End of the Universe"). Mantrid answers that he will eat the second
universe, and "[o]nce I've done that I'll rest" Mantrid's concluding his activity with
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"rest" echoes God's creation of the world in Genesis. But Darrow contends, "Mantrid
was actually on the way to becoming the antithesis of God. His goal was to be the being
who would say 'Let there be Dark' and that would be the end" ("Mantrid"). Mantrid's
aim is the final extermination of all the diversity and relationality of life. Fittingly, the
final words he utters before being extinguished himself proclaim a nihilistic triumph: "I
destroyed a universe!" ("End").
These "dead" figures are juxtaposed with Stan and Xev, both thoroughly
enmeshed in the struggles of life. The series begins with Stan and Zev each being
released from a type of prison: Stan from enforced service as a security guard for the
Divine Order, Zev from her upbringing in a box and subsequent imprisonment for
insulting her husband on their wedding day. For both characters, their new-found
freedom on the Lexx excites a jumble of sensations: fear, courage, strength, hunger,
sexual frustration, anger, friendship. Stan revels in his power as captain of the Lexx (he
alone can command the ship as long as its organic key lives in his body); he attempts (in
vain) to seduce Zev; he plots and executes revenge against the mercenaries who raped
and tortured him and sold him to the Divine Order. For her part, Zev, bolstered by the
ferocious Cluster Lizard DNA she has absorbed during her adventures, flings herself
headlong into her first experience of personal agency: enthusiastically, she fights,
explores perilous planets, taunts Stan, eats cockroaches, and falls powerfully in love with
Kai, as determined to preserve his "life" as he is to assert his "deadness."
The exuberance of Stan and Xev is inseparable from their existence as living,
organic bodies. Their lives are constantly being threatened: by the Divine Order, by
Mantrid, by starvation on board a starving Lexx, by the evil Prince, by carnivorous
plants. The very tenuousness of their lives pushes them to live with a furious energy:
when death looms in the background, every moment of living matters. Even Stan, who
is, of his companions, the most terrified of death, ultimately recognizes that the presence
of death makes life worthwhile. At the end of "Brigadoom," the theatrical reenactment of
Kai's life, the performers offer the Lexx crew a chance to travel between dimensions with
their immortal theater troupe, thus avoiding Mantrid's imminent destruction of the Light
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Zone. Stan refuses, "[clause they [the theater troupe] don't live; they're not real. They
are just like the Brennen G: not alive, not dead." Stan realizes that facing death--just as
Kai did long ago--is being alive, being "real." Fittingly, the series closes, in the midst of
death, with the living. In the final episode, Prince brings Kai back to life, thus enabling
Kai to truly die. The Lexx, too, now four thousand years old, dies of old age but not
before reproducing a baby Lexx, which carries Stan and Xev out into the universe, still
alive, still participants in the cycles of life that surround them.
Dystopian Futility in Lexx
The final episode ends with Stan and Xev in a fraternal embrace, smiling at the
continuation of life in the midst of their grief for Kai and the Lexx. The scene suggests
an appreciation for the persistence of the ecological webs that preserve life. Yet the
hopeful note of this ending is largely undercut by a sense of futility inherent in the
series's cosmology. Lexx posits a universe that moves through cycles of time, repeating
the same events exactly in each cycle. Thus, the Time Prophet (Anna Cameron), a
recurrent figure who aids Kai's Brennen G people, is able to prophesy because she
remembers the events that have occurred in previous cycles of time. The system is
completely deterministic and, thus, fatalistic. In the microcosm of individuals' lives,
people can strive to live well. But in the macrocosm of cosmic events, those educated in
the course of universe know that their actions can never accomplish anything but the
repetition of all that has passed before. The series offers no serious counter-discourse to
this cyclic model of time. Though Lexx is more dialogic than Babylon 5, voices that
might insightfully argue for a more optimistic philosophy are consistently silenced.
This backdrop of futility is heightened by the unchallenged assurance that the
cycle will always end in universal degeneration and death. In their movement through
different stages, these cycles of time may be likened to Northrop Frye's cycle of modes.
Following Aristotle's practice of categorizing protagonists' powers of action as superior
or inferior to "ours," Frye defines five main literary modes: myth, romance, high mimetic
(tragedy and epic), low mimetic (realism and most comedy), and ironic (33-34). He
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organizes these modes as a sort of degenerative process, a movement from those typified
by the most "superior" protagonists to those typified by the most "inferior." Further, he
notes that "[o]ur five modes evidently go around in a circle," irony finally approaching to
myth (42). If we superimpose Frye's modes onto Lexx, the main action of the series
settles most comfortably into a "mythic-ironic" mode. Like Frye's ironic heroes, the
Lexx crew, in many ways, are "inferior" to us (or we may hope so): Stan and Xev can be
awkward, naive, simplistic, morally questionable,. while Kai is not a fully functioning
human being at all. Yet their story often treads into myth, addressing the end of
universes and cosmic prophecies. Moreover, in keeping with Frye's model, their history
moves in a circle, accelerating toward the end that will lead to the next, mythic
beginning.
But while universal rebirth is, indeed, vaguely discernible in the "future-past" as
the Time Prophet calls it ("Super Nova" 1.2), the near future promises nothing but further
decline. The noble Brunnen G who defeated the Insects degenerate into the frightened
immortals Kai disdains, only to be exterminated altogether by the brutally oppressive
Divine Order. The destruction of the Order, in turn, presages the rise of Mantrid, who
destroys the entire universe of the Light Zone. Subsequently, in the Dark Zone, the Lexx
destroys the age-old planets of the dead, Fire and Water, leaving the spirits of the dead to
be reincarnated, often in twisted, insane forms on Earth, which is itself destroyed. Stan
and Xev survive the end of the series, but the universe that awaits them is a bleak one--
and getting bleaker.
Lexx's dystopianism is linked to its ecocentrism. The same concern for cycles of
life and death that foregrounds ecological balance, the necessity of dying to living,
underlies the cosmic cycle of life and death that defines the growth and degeneration of
the Two Universes. Yet the cyclic model of time in Lexx operates more according to a
metaphor of organism than ecosystem. Life and death are preordained, not only as
general processes, but as a developmental sequence. The randomness, the Darwinian
"chance," that generates ecosystemic variation is effaced in Lexx's philosophy. Thus, the
high regard Lexx shows for ecological relationality is partially subverted by a narrative
253
stance of hopelessness. Ecological balance, in the Lexx universe, is foregrounded as
vital. And yet, in the long run, no depth of concern for balance will be sufficient: the
universe will still age and die--and be reborn and die again.
As an ecocentric dystopian text, Lexx resonates against the utopian ecocentrism
of William Morris's News from Nowhere. Both texts presuppose a need for humans to
exist in "balance" (Le)ox's metaphor) or in "harmony" (Morris's) with a broader
environment Both privilege sustainability over "advancement" Beyond these
similarities, however, the texts diverge sharply. While News from Nowhere holds out a
vision of a blissful, utopian future, Lexx is bleak even for a dystopia. For although most
dystopian texts suggest a latent utopian content--The Time Machine, for example, depicts
evolutionary degeneration in order to promote eugenic ascent--Lexx offers no such
implicit hope. And yet for all its undercurrent of futility, this basic ugliness in the Lexx
universe adds a dimension to the series's ecological discourse that is absent from
Morris's. In chapter 2, I argue that in equating ecological health with beauty, Morris's
ideology effaces the necessity of "ugly" aspects of nature. Lexx, in contrast, often lingers
on the grotesque aspects of ecological necessity. Even more starkly than The
Dispossessed, Lexx resists natural beauty as an indicator of ecological health, while
preserving a focus on the primary need for balance within a system: beautiful or ugly,
harmless or dangerous, living or dying, participants within the system of life cannot exist
outside the system. This relational orientation encapsulates the profound ecocentrism of
Lexx.
Nonetheless, in its commitment to being, as Donovan puts it, "a little bit more
nihilistic" than the utopian space operas it defines itself against ("Lexx Appeal"), Lexx
loses some of the potential power of its philosophy as a model for ecological praxis. In
its drive to be anti-humanist, to foreground human failing where Star Trek and its ilk
foreground human strength, Lexx suggests that humans can ultimately accomplish
nothing lastingly significant And though this is almost certainly true on a cosmic scale
of billions of years, it is not a message that prompts positive human action on Earth here
and now. Like Babylon 5, Lexx articulates a discourse that is finally inadequate, a piece
of an answer to the questions that beset the contemporary world. But set in juxtaposition
with narratives like Babylon 5. this incompleteness may be seen to engage in an
intertextual dialogue that strives toward a deeper understanding of possibilities for human
action. If Lexx's anti-humanism trivializes positive human agency, it also strikes down
human hubris. Its ecocentrism is interwoven with futility, but in this very futility, it
advocates ecological caution by illustrating the difficulties of manipulating nature. It
may be argued that, as a series, Lexx is too much in love with death. But in its persistent
return to the end of life, the series offers the consolation that death is not an enemy to be
overcome. Rather, dying itself is living.
Conclusion
Like the evolutionary discourse of Babylon 5, the ecological discourse of Lexx
takes a cosmically long-term view of history. But while Babylon 5's operational
metaphor for time is a line, Lexx's is a circle. In Babylon 5, races evolve, guide younger
races to evolve, then leave the galaxy to those younger races while presumably
continuing their own evolution elsewhere in the universe: the process is one of perpetual
advancement. In Lexx, cosmic history is a closed loop. In cycle after cycle of time,
events repeat exactly as they occurred in the previous cycle. Each of these metaphors, by
itself, effaces fundamental attributes of time as it affects us. Babylon 5's progressionist
model shows repetition but not cycling: new races evolve through the same stages as their
elders, but the eider races simply pass away into the distance, into an immeasurable,
unknown evolutionary greatness. There is no return, no final death, no ecosystemic
background tying life forms together. Lexx's cyclic model, in contrast, focuses so
heavily on death and return that it allows for no change, no re-imagining, no hope for
anything better than what has gone before.
Integrated, however, these two models may be shown to produce a more nuanced
discourse. One model for integrating them exists in Le Guin's The Dispossessed, in a
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passage I have already cited in chapter 5. Here, Shevek explains his concept of time as
cyclic and linear together, identifying the cyclic as vaster:
Only within each of the great cycles, where we live, only there is there
linear time, evolution, change. So then time has two aspects. There is the
arrow, the running river, without which there is no change, no progress, or
direction, or creation. And there is the circle or the cycle, without which
there is chaos, meaningless succession of instants, a world without clocks
or seasons or promises. (223)
According to Shevek's model, time is, as Lexx contends, ultimately a cycle, a beginning
and ending and beginning of the universe. But within these cycles, time is, as Babylon 5
contends, a linear movement that allows "change, progress, direction, creation." Within
the outline of the recurrent cycle lies the hope of personal agency, the hope that Humans
may, indeed, learn from the mistakes of the Vorlons and become a better, more
beneficent species. Yet, if humans exist, as Lexx suggests, within broader cycles, as
members of systems before they are anything else, this progress need not be the result of
any special "humanness" denied to all other beings. Instead, it would be the result of
hope and effort, of Straczynski's contention that "faith manages." And yet this progress
could only result if such faith is supported by a Lexxian regard for the balance of things,
a respect for all creatures that make up the webs of life. For without such a regard, we
will remain in immediate danger of perpetuating the ecological devastation already
occurring in our contemporary world and, thus, of destroying ourselves. Speaking as
almost antithetical voices, Babylon 5 and Lexx together articulate a set of tensions and
values we must take into account in developing an ecological praxis that stresses
sustainability within inevitable change, while keeping alive the utopian hope that we
ourselves can change for the better.
NOTES
I The capital letter signifies Humanity as one sentient species among others—the Minbari, the
Centauri, and so on—in much the way that "Earth" suggests a planet among planets as opposed to the more
singular "earth and sky."
2 The idea that "advanced" aliens will be beings of pure energy is also illustrated by Star Trek's
Metrons and Organians and Earth Final Conflict's Taelons.
3 By convention, "First Ones" is capitalized and "younger races" is not, perhaps because the "First
Ones" refers to a precise set of species, while "younger races" could technically refer to any species
younger than the First Ones.
4 The Minbari, who look generally Human save for a bony casing covering much of the head, are
a peaceful and culturally "advanced" people. The Narn are reptilian-looking race known for their warrior
spirit and furious at their oppression at the hands of the imperialistic Centauri, who look essentially Human
save for unconventional hairstyles.
5 The term "sentience" in TV space opera is slippery enough to deserve its own essay. Its
etymology suggests the possession of sensory perception. However, if such a definition were applied
rigorously, "sentient" beings could include any entity that responds to sensory input, including flatworms,
plants, and even viruses. In TV space opera, the term is often synonymous with "intelligent" life or, more
commonly, "self-conscious" life. However, it is seldom applied to "animals," including such self-
conscious beings as great apes. Most frequently, the tern is used a standard for judging the extent to which
a species deserves moral consideration. In practice, it almost always refers to species whose thought
processes are equivalent to or "more advanced" than humans'. Of course, if translated back into the real
world of life on Earth, this type of "sentience" can refer to nothing but humans. Read metaphorically, then,
the term becomes a justification for excluding non-human life from significant moral consideration.
6 Straczynski himself has noted that while he is the first to write an entire season on American
TV, he is not the first do so in the history of TV science fiction. Terry Nation preceded him, writing the
entire first season of the British space opera.Blake's 7 ("Re. ATTN: JMS I Heard"). Straczynski counts
Blake's 7 among the series that influenced Babylon 5 ("JMS: Influences"). In addition to sharing a "B
Number" names, both Blake's 7 and Babylon 5 are considered pioneers of the increasingly common
extended story-arc format, more recently adopted by space operas including Lexx, Farscape (1999-2004),
and the remake of Battlestar Galactica (2003-), among others. The bond between Blake's 7 and Babylon 5
extends to their sharing the spotlight at the annual Redemption fan convention.
7 1n its vagueness about evolutionary mechanism and its equation of evolution with progress,
Straczynski's evolutionary discourse is a normative example of what Michael Ruse characterizes as
contemporary popular perceptions of evolution. Ruse states emphatically, "[Ljet there be no mistake that at
a popular level, which for most people is the beginning and the end of their acquaintance with evolution,
Progress continues to ride high. I have yet to find a museum or a display or chart or a book which is not
overtly progressionist" (526). The idea that natural selection can function either to complicate or simplify




8 In writing this scene, Straczynski was aware that our sun is not due to go nova in a million years.
The episode specifies that the emissions from the sun are "atypical," indicating that it has been tampered
with in some way ("501"). Whether this tampering is caused by the future-Humans is not clear. The future-
Human's juxtaposition of the "end of the world" with "our job [being] finished" suggests that the future-
Humans themselves may have chosen to destroy the Earth by inducing a nova, a possibility that would
suggest a near total rejection of the intrinsic rights of "lesser" life forms to persist on their native biosphere.
9 For an anthology of essays addressing representations of culture and politics in science fiction at
length, see To Seek out New Worlds: Exploring Links between Science Fiction and World Politics, edited
by Jutta Weldes.
10 The idea that humans are uniquely destined for greatness is common in TV space opera. In a
fan-oriented essay, Clare O'Farrell, under the internet pseudonym "Panopticon," has argued that American
series, in particular, tend to employ "a standard rhetoric that for all their faults and weaknesses, humans
have `special qualities' unique in the universe." She cites the original Star Trek, Star Trek: The Next
Generation, Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, Star Trek: Voyager (1995-2001), Space Above and Beyond 
(1995-96), and Babylon 5 as prominent examples. A further example, not cited by Panopticon, is Earth:
Final Conflict, a series based on a Gene Roddenberry premise in which humans hold the key to the
evolutionary future or extinction of the "more advanced" yet sterile and degenerating Taelons.
This anthropocentrism is so apparent throughout American TV space opera that it has become an
object of satire. The American-Australian series, Farscape, for example, indulges in a moment of self-
satire in an episode in which white, male, American protagonist (also the show's sole human character and
a fan of TV space opera), John Crichton, must don an amusing cape and goggles and cover his face in slime
to rescue his companions. Mentally compromised by the influence of an alien being, be slurs, "Humans are
superior!" ("Crackers Don't Matter" 2.4).
11 Lexx is not much concerned with developing a plausible back story for its universe. Humans
are pervasive throughout the Two Universes. How these humans are connected to the present-day Earth
that the crew visits in Season Four is not discussed, nor is the absence of any language bathers explained.
In fact, Lexx is the only TV space opera I know of that does not acknowledge the relativistic problem of
traveling faster than the speed of light.
121 wish to thank Frank Shannon, creator of The Lexx Museum <www.lexxmuseum.com>, for
giving me access to his copy of this widely unavailable production book.
13 The show always refers to the Lexx as male, most likely based on his masculine voice.
However, the fact that the Loot has a baby at the end of the series suggests that his crew may have
misidentified his sex. Alternatively, he may be a hermaphroditic being or belong to a species in which the
males give birth.
14 On one level, Lyekka's hunger is clearly a metaphor for sexual appetite; indeed, she brings her
victims to an orgasmic bliss as she devours them. In Lexx, voracious appetite is often depicted through
attractive female characters, with obvious sexual connotations. Xev, for example, who is part Cluster
Lizard, has a biological compulsion to eat her mates. Yet this sexual dimension exists alongside the motif
of literal eating, with an attendant ecological concern for finding food. In	 sex and food are intimately
linked as two manifestations of the appetites that define living.
15 A significant presence in Lexx fandom, Darrow was once mentioned as a possible author for an
official companion book to Lexx (Donovan, Interview with the Frey). Donovan, endorsed the potential
project, staling, "1 am very pleased because Darrow knows the show better than anyone" (Interview with
the Frey).
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16 Both Mantrid and Kai retain what Mantrid calls human "programming" ("Korb" 2.12) within
bodies that are largely inorganic machine: Mantrid a computer, Kai a de-carbonized being containing
microcomputers. Both are also physically linked to the Insect race: Mantrid fusing with part of an Insect
essence, Kai requiring protoblood—a by-product of Insect metabolism—as an energy source.
17 That the ideology of Lexx is more ecologically oriented than that of Back to Methuselah is
evidenced by the narratives' respective approaches to the population dynamics of an "immortal" society.
Several of the characters in Back to Methuselah are under four years old, suggesting that this futuristic
humanity reproduces regularly. Yet if the Ancients only occasionally die as a result of accidents, such
regular reproduction would not only be unnecessary but would quickly result in extreme overcrowding.
Unconcerned with the physical world, however, Shaw's text does not address this habitat-oriented problem.
Lexx, in contrast, specifies that newborns among the Brunnen G are very rare. Though the narrative does
not explicitly cite population pressure as a reason for this dynamic, an assumption of the need for
population stability is in keeping with the show's emphasis on ecological balance.
18 I do not mean to suggest that Kai's exclusion from ecological relationality must be his only
motive for stressing his "deadness." Other likely reasons include survivor guilt (he is famously "the last of
the Brunnen G") and a desire to deny the human feelings that would necessitate a painful grieving process




In the preceding six chapters, I explore comparatively purified discourses from
late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British utopian and dystopian fiction to
elucidate ideological patterns still evident in the more hybrid discourses of contemporary
speculative fiction. I argue that progressionist discourses tend toward anthropocentrism,
commonly advocating the value of "leaving behind" human dependence on ecosystems to
attain a transcendent human freedom. Conversely, non-progressionist discourses tend
toward ecocentrism, stressing humanity's need to exist in a relatively stable relationship
with its ecological partners. Further, evolutionary progressionist discourses can be
divided into diverse subsets, two of the most influential of which are (Neo-)Darwinian or
Neo-Lamarckian, where the former tends toward greater concern with ecological health
and ecological mastery, the latter toward a primary concern with spiritual transcendence.
The texts I have explored illustrate developments in these discursive trends that
reflect Western literature's increasing emphasis on provisionality, hybridity, and dialogic
tension over the course of the twentieth century. In the (Neo-)Darwinian tradition, the
retention of an anthropocentric progressionism exists alongside an increasingly cautious
ecological discourse. The sparse ecological explication of The Time Machine gives way
to the more detailed program of ecological conquest outlined in Men Like Gods, which,
in turn, gives way to the Earthseed books' avowal of the necessity of partnership with a
complex and indomitable nature. As (Neo-)Darwinian discourse becomes increasingly
attuned to the material complexities of ecological relationality, however, scientifically
discredited Neo-Lamarckian discourses further sever their ties to an evolutionary science
grounded in material observation. Thus, in the Neo-Lamarckian tradition, the spiritual
transcendence advocated in Back to Methuselah is recapitulated in Babylon 5 without an
apparatus of evolutionary pseudo-science to explicate the series's progressionist
assumptions. But if Babylon 5 displays a simplified discourse of evolution, it,
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nonetheless, deploys this discourse through the concept of "alliance," which, in contrast
to Shaw's endorsement of single longliver lineage, at least putatively advocates the
dialogic complexity of a multicultural community. In non-progressionist discourse, the
aesthetic ecocentrism of News from Nowhere's pastoral idyll gives way to an increasing
acceptance of the necessary and appropriate functions of hardship and death. Thus, The
Dispossessed employs a hybrid discourse in which an "ambiguous utopia" exists within
an ecological context of scarcity and privation, while Lexx develops a dystopian
discourse, which, nonetheless, locates a positive valuation in the acceptance of living and
dying as identical processes within a necessary framework of ecological sustainability.
Based on comparative analyses of these texts, I argue that a dialogic rhetoric, with
its attendant regard for the irreducible complexity of human discourse, is most conducive
to a complex exploration of possibilities for sound ecological praxis. As a rhetoric that
eschews rigid purification and categorization, dialogism tends to support an ethic of
sustainable change, which values both the necessity of socio-ecological sustainability and
the acceptability and sometimes desirability of socio-ecological change. I contend that,
among the texts I examine, The Dispossessed most fully develops a dialogic articulation
of a utopian hope for sustainable change.
Yet each text I examine contributes to the heteroglossia of our ecological
discourses. Even texts that substantially refuse engagement with peripheral voices within
the text, nonetheless, may be placed in productive intertextual dialogue. Indeed, if the
type of intratextual dialogic rhetoric that Mikhail Bakhtin identifies as characteristic of
the novel is a representation of the complexity of discourse in our lived experience, then
this intertextual dialogism is one example of the dialogic nature of "real life," the
conversation among multiple authorial "languages" that constructs the discourses that
shape our ecological praxis. Thus, the more extensively we investigate the numerous
voices that contribute to our cultural discourses of evolution, ecology, and human society,
the more fully we can draw upon these voices and their critiques of each other to develop
practices conducive to healthy interactions between humanity and the non-human world.
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